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1 of 2

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U.S. NAVY

TRANSLATION OF WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY.

For Period

beginning 18 January, 1943

ending 30 June, 1943.

PG Numbers 31827 thru 31837.

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WWNS (Ger.)
2775

WAR DIARY

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY.

CAPTAIN PETERS.

18 January - 30 June, 1943.

PG Numbers 31827 thru 31837.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20315

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
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18 January 1943.

On 18 January, 1943 Captain Peters assumed the duties of Captain U-boats Norway. His office is in Narvik aboard the "Grille".

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 625 (Benker) Square 6361 lower right hand corner.
U 622 (Queck) Square 6374 center.
U 629 (Bugs) Square 6637 top right hand corner.
U 302 (Sickel) Square 6631 left upper edge.

All AB. Boats occupied an attack area, depth of sweep of 40 miles. The total attack area stretches from Bear Island 105 miles to the south. Its position corresponds to the expected convoy route at this time of year.

In port:

U 354, 657 Narvik.
U 251, 334, 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 355, 376, 377, 405, 592, 703 Bergen.
U 209, 601 Kiel.
U 586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 255 (Reche) 0600 put out from Tromsø to Hammerfest.
1730 put in to Hammerfest, alongside "Black Watch", 5-hours' readiness.
U 354 (Herbschleb) 1200 put out from Narvik to Trondheim for repairs.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Fliieger Fuehrer North (East):

Sea reconnaissance to the north up to 74.5° N.

Fliieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Sea reconnaissance to N.W. up to 73° N.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: 0846 one submarine in AB.7322, course 180° , diving.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service: None.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

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IV. Current U-boat operations:

Under headings (a) - (c): None.

(d) Miscellaneous: Boats are stationed in the attack areas allocated to them.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. General situation:

2020.

Radio message to U 302 (Sickel) from Captain U-boats Norway:

"New attack area grid square 6647 center, depth of sweep 40 miles".

The new attack area contracts the southern end of the patrol line occupied by the boats and equalizes the distances between the individual positions.

(Signed) Peters.

19 January, 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 625, 622, 629 as on 18 January.
U 302 grid square 6647 center.

In port:

U 255 Hammerfest, U 657 Narvik, others as on 18 January.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 354 Proceeding Narvik-Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

North westwards up to 74.5° N.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

North westwards up to 74° N.

III. Reports on the enemy:

Under headings (a) - (d): None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: Reliable agent from G.I.S. station Hamburg reports by letter from Copenhagen on 1 January: Iceland: Agents learn repeatedly from U.S. soldiers that large convoys will go from the U.S.A. to Russia in January, February and March. Greatest activity in February. Some will re-group in Iceland ports. These transports are the result of recent pressure by Moscow and consist of the most modern war material.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

Under headings (a) - (d): As on 18 January.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. General situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

20 January, 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

As on 19 January.

In port:

U 255 Hammerfest, U 657 Narvik, U 251, 334, 354, 378, Trondheim, others as on 18 January.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 354 put in to Trondheim.

U 657 put out from Narvik for Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

North eastwards up to 73° N. and north westwards up to 75° N.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

North westwards up to 74° N.

III. Reports on the enemy:

Under headings (a) - (d): None.

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IV. Current U-boat operations:

Under headings (a) - (d): As on previous day.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. General situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

21 January, 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

As on 19 January.

In port:

U 255 Hammerfest, U 251, 334, 354, 378,
Trondheim, others as on 18 January.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 657 proceeding Narvik - Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):) No reconnaissance
Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:) because of weather
conditions.

III. Reports on the enemy:

Under (a) and (b): None.

(c) By radio intercept service: According
to radio traffic, 2 submarines at sea.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: G.I.S. Station
Kiel reports:

"Agent learns from English shipping (?) DEN.
in Lisbon: On 26 January a convoy
of 16 ships with machine tools and
medical supplies is to sail for Russia
from Belfast. This convoy put out
several days ago and was ordered to
return because of insufficient cover."

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IV. Current U-boat operations:

Under headings (a) - (c): Nothing special.

(d) Miscellaneous: Short signal from
2038 Benker, 1948:

"Have made passage to 65°63'N:
Passage impeded by drift-ice, but possible
for ships and boats."

2355 Benker's short signal acknowledged. He probably meant: Have passed to north grid square 63 ---; He could not have expressed it more accurately owing to the lack of suitable short signal groups. Because of the corruption of short signals often observed in Northern Waters, the boats are instructed to send tactically important reports as radio messages or as radio signals.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. General situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

22 January, 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

As on 19 January.

In port:

As on 18 January.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 657 proceeding from Narvik to Hammerfest.
Fast convoy from Tromsø.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Sea reconnaissance in area between 12° and 20° E.
up to 74° 30' N.

Ice reconnaissance: N.E. 74° 30' N. 15° E. single
ice floes. Ice limit runs from 74°10' N. 18° to
74°10' N. 21° E. and thence eastwards.

Sea reconnaissance north of Kola inlet up to 72°30' N.

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Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

FAN reconnaissance in sector Tromsø - AB6113

- 5541.

Sea reconnaissance in Northern Waters, southern sector.

III. Reports on the enemy:

Under headings (a) - (e): None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

Under headings (a) - (c): None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Radio message 0200/797:

"Benker from Captain U-boats. Presume short signal means: Have passed square 63 to the north."

1515 Short signal from Benker 1511:

"My short signal of yesterday was wrongly confirmed, it should read: Large ice fields in grid square 63. Passage impeded by drift-ice, but possible for ships and boats."

Radio message 1558/706:

From Captain U-boats:

(i) Short signal to Benker: Large ice-fields grid square 63, passage impeded, possible for ships and boats.

(ii) Prevent ice damage at all costs. Report, as soon as passage is no longer possible.

The supposition that grid square 63 was meant in Benker's short signal of 21st January 1948 hrs., is thus confirmed.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. General situation: Nothing special.

Signed) Peters.

23 January, 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

As on 19 January.

In port:

As on 18 January.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1510 U 657 put in to Hammerfest.
1930 U 657, 255 put out from Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Sea reconnaissance in area North Cape up to 74° N.
13° E. and 75° N. 20° E.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Sea reconnaissance of Tromsø via AB 6481 and 6347.
Further reconnaissance via 5255, 5321, AB.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:)
(b) By air reconnaissance:) See operation
convoy.

Under headings (c) - (e): None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

Under headings (a) - (c): See operation convoy
PQ21.

(d) Miscellaneous: 0141 following radio message
received from Bugs: (2139/720).

"Captain U-boats: 1857 dived because of vessel
in grid square 6643 through correction of
estimated position. According to screw's
noise, submarine (?) Sickel".
Sickel has been in attack area grid square
AB 6647 center since the evening of 18 January,
depth of sweep 40 miles. So it could only
be U 302, but the possibility of the sudden
appearance of enemy submarines in these attack
areas must not be disregarded. Accordingly
following radio message (0240/721) was sent
to Bugs:

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- (1) Most probably one of our boats: Sickel's attack area grid square 6647 center, depth of sweep 40 miles.
- (2) Appearance of enemy submarines is always possible.

To clarify the position completely, Sickel was requested in radio message 0245/722, to confirm by short signal that he occupied his proper attack area on 18 January, he did so at 0500.

Operation against convoy P021

1320 Telephone message received from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

"At 1230 07° E., 2373, 15 merchant ships, escorts in full screen, course 70°: speed slight. Aircraft shadowing giving D/F signals on "Bruno". Same report was received at 1356 as Most Immediate on Command Liaison Wave Luftwaffe - Navy, and corrected at 1448 to: 17 E. 2373, 13 merchant ships. 11 patrol vessels full screen, formation; square. Aircraft broke off shadowing because of darkness.

1520 Received by telephone and confirmed at 1640 by radio message:
"Most immediate. FW 200 reports at 1230 in 26 W. 3734, a battleship, a cruiser, 4 destroyers, course 30° and 60°, high speed 18 - 23 knots.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten."

Thus there was a convoy in AB 6750 at 1230 while a battle group was in position in AE 2947 north of Iceland, apparently on account of the convoy.

Decision:

With the 4 boats at sea a patrol line will be drawn up across the convoy's course as reported, so that, at a speed of 8 knots, convoy will reach the patrol line tomorrow morning at about 0800. Accordingly, radio message Most Immediate (sent on Ulli 1602, on Command Liaison Wave Luftwaffe - Navy) from Captain U-boats:

- (1) Air reconnaissance reports at 1230 convoy of 13 ships, escorts in full screen, naval grid square AB 6755, course 70°: slight speed.
- (2) Benker, Queck, Bugs, Sickel, Göllnitz form patrol line from AC 4411 to 4476 lower right hand corner.
Göllnitz, the 5th boat, at present proceeding from Tromsø to Hammerfest, receives following radio message at 1437:

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"Most immediate. Göllnitz from Captain U-boats:

Put out as quickly as possible via LoppHAVET and proceed at maximum speed to AB 66. Further orders to follow."

However, this order will not reach the boat until it has put in to Hammerfest and cannot be executed immediately because of Diesel engine trouble.

U 255 (Reche), which has been lying in readiness at Hammerfest for several days, receives the following order by teleprinter:

"Most immediate. Sail immediately at maximum speed and proceed to square AB 66. Arrange sailing escort there. Further orders to follow."

1930 U 255 (Reche), 657 (Göllnitz) put out from Hammerfest via SRI. Of these boats, Göllnitz had been ordered to take his place in the patrol line while Reche had received instructions by teleprinter to proceed to AC 44. Nothing was changed at first in these instructions, in order to await further developments.

Up to midnight no further reports were received, nor did any special incidents occur.

Weather forecast: for evening of 23 January: Wind NW 4-6, freshening to 7, squally snow showers, visibility except in snow shower 10-15 miles.

(Signed) Peters.

24 January, 1943.

0037 Radio message 2349/737 sent:

From Captain U-boats, 24 January.
Air reconnaissance 5 Ju 88 in area 26° E. to 15° E to 74° 30' N., will start at dawn.

0254. Radio message 0155/739/176 sent:

From Captain U-boats:

- (i) Benker, Bugs, Sickel, Göllnitz, Reche form group "Nordwind".
- (ii) Reche will extend the patrol-line to the south.

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(iii) 24 January 0700 form new patrol line, at speed of 10 knots, from AC 4174 left edge center to 4484.

This order was necessary because the addition of Reche created a new situation. This order moved the patrol line further north by one position so as to anticipate a more northerly course by the convoy. Point (iii) of this order was not executed, as meanwhile contact with the convoy's protecting forces had been made.

0237 Radio message 0115/738 received:

Most immediate. 2 destroyers in AC 4472. Contact lost again immediately owing to driving snow.

Sickel (U 302).

It is not clear whether this would be the convoy itself or whether the 2 destroyers belong to a forward escort or battle group. As we run the danger that, if this is in fact the convoy, it may pass the patrol line unobserved, the four boats, which are definitely in the patrol-line, are ordered to proceed eastwards with the convoy, while the two boats Göllnitz and Reche are ordered to close in at maximum speed on the south flank. Accordingly:-

0415 Radio message 0346/740/178 sent:

Most immediate from Captain U-boats:

(i) Benker, Queck, Bugs, Sickel: Proceed immediately from old patrol line into reconnaissance-line, course 70°, 10 knots.

(ii) Göllnitz, Reche: close in at maximum speed on south flank.

0517 Most immediate:

0434/741 received:

Convoy in square AC 4467.

"Sickel" (U 302).

It appears from this report that the convoy is proceeding at about 10 - 12 knots and is therefore a convoy of fast steamers. It was only just contacted by the southern flank of the patrol line. The boats lying further north are not in a very favorable position for attack, considering the relatively high speed of the convoy.

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0635 Radio message 0612/742/180 sent:

Most immediate from Captain U-boats.

- (1) Group Nordwind: attack on Most Immediate 0434 from Sickel.
- (2) Sickel to remain as shadower "Fritz", until other boats close in, and give D/F signals.
- (3) Boats: report "Yes" by short signal, if convoy reached.

Further radio reports came in from time to time, showing that the convoy with its escort had passed the reconnaissance line and that enemy vessels were sighted by all 4 boats. None of the boats, however, seems to have had an opportunity to attack so far. This is attributed to the driving snow which is reported, to the apparently very strong escort, and to the quick development and change of conditions which are apt to occur with such a high-speed convoy, as well as to the fact that the boats sighted the convoy from a position astern.

0655 Radio message 0520/743 received:

Most immediate.

Convoy grid square 4488, N.E. course.
Am submerged because of escort, but am pursuing.
West 5, sea 4, 39 cbm.

"Bugs" (U 629).

0758 Radio message 0735/744/UI received:

1 cruiser, 2 destroyers AC 4518.

"Benker" (U 625).

0813 Radio message 0736/745/UI received:

4438 AC. Forced to submerge by 2 destroyers.

"Queck" (U 622).

0951 Radio message 0526/746 received:

In AC 4468, seen by destroyers and forced to submerge. Quick zig-zag, no depth-charges, am pushing on.

"Sickel" (U 302).

1000 Radio message 0830/747/UI:

1 heavy, 2 light cruisers AC 4512 as escort with convoy. 4 misses on 2 overlapping cruisers. 1000 m. Both ships turning on us.

"Benker" (U 625).

1120 Radio message 0945/748 received:

Cruiser in AC 4511, out of sight, course west, moderate speed. No contact. Request D/F signals.

"Benker" (U 625).

After this no further messages are received from the U-boats for some time. It is now doubtful whether the boats are still in contact with the enemy. But so far none of the boats and in particular not "Sickel" the shadowing boat, has reported that contact is lost.

1103 Radio message 1035/186 received from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten, which shows that at 1030 5 He 115 with aerial torpedoes started on a reconnaissance thrust against the convoy.

There is still nothing definite as to the position of the boats.

Consequently at 1124 Göllnitz and Reche are ordered in radio message 1111/749 to report position, and weather. In radio message 1416/756, Benker, Queck, Bugs and Sickel are requested to report whether they are in contact with the convoy.

1430 Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten reports by telephone that the aircraft "Emil" sighted the convoy in grid square 4641 at 1220, course 70°, while the aircraft "Dora" reports attack at 1230 in AC 4384, but did not observe result. Aircraft "Emil" crashed.

1452 The radio message 1415/191 received from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten gives the report of the aircraft "Emil" (grid square 4641) only, which shows that this report is regarded as more probable.

1436 Reche reports in radio message 1401/752 that he is in AC 4648, wind W-SW 6, sea 5, hail showers, visibility 3-8 miles.

1515 Göllnitz reports by radio message 1230/753 that he is in AC 4591, wind NW 5, sea 4, cloudy, varying visibility.

1532 Radio message 1501/755 received from Sickel.

"So far have pursued enemy in vain, no contact, am in AC 4659."

Reports on the convoy therefore still do not afford a clear picture. They do show however that its average speed is only about 10.5 knots.

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1547 Radio message 1519/756/193 sent:

Most Immediate from Captain U-boats:

- (1) Air reconnaissance reports: At 1220 convoy in AC 4641 course 70°.
- (2) Sea distress case in AC 4641: boat nearby to help.

The case of sea distress mentioned in paragraph (2) refers to the aircraft reported shot down. It is impossible to say which of the boats is in the vicinity of the accident.

1630 Several messages received from the boats show that they have regained contact with the convoy. In radio message 1533/757 Queck reported that he observed the flash of an explosion and smoke clouds at 1405 in AC 4622, but they were immediately hidden by snow squalls. Pursuing, the boat sighted 3 destroyers in snow squalls at 1000 m. at 1505, and was forced to submerge. The course of the destroyers was reported as probably east.

1633 In radio message 1545/758 Reche (U 255) reports his position as AC 4643. Constant carrier with location impulses intercepted 280°.

1645 In radio message 1625/Alfa - Alfa/588 Benker (U 625) reports one heavy, two light cruisers on northerly course in 4655.

U 629 (Bugs) reports by short signal at 1711, that he is not in contact with the enemy.

1704 Radio message 1535/759 Most Immediate received from Göllnitz (U 657), in which he reports 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers in 4622, course 160, high speed: contact lost in snow squall. These last reports seem to indicate that the enemy escort forces are proceeding at high speed on northerly and southerly courses, both to avoid the danger from torpedoes and also to remain level with the convoy. It is very difficult for the U-boats to maintain contact because of the rough sea and snow squalls.

1722 In radio message 1709/760 Queck reports that he is in contact with the rear of the convoy in AC 4639.

U 629 (Bugs) reports no contact by short signal.

U. 625 (Benker) reports in radio message 1715/761 that he has lost sight to westward of the cruiser reported in AC 4652. He requests D/F signals from Queck.

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Queck (U 622) gives good shadowing signals on the convoy. Thus:

Radio message 1826 received. 1839, grid square 5441, course 70°, speed 10 knots. Radio message 1905 received: 1945, grid square 5442, course 75°, speed 12 knots.

He continues to give D/F signals. This information on the enemy was passed on to Luftwaffe on Command Liaison Wave Luftwaffe - Navy in the following message.

2040 Radio message 2025/103 sent:

Most immediate from Captain U-boats:

At 1905 Queck reports enemy sighted in grid square 27 E. 9476, course 75°, 12 knots.

2224 In radio message 2105/772 the following weather forecast is given to the boats:

Weather forecast Sea area Bear Island - North Cape up to 40° E.

Tonight W - NW 5-7 numerous squally snow showers, changing, mostly bad, visibility. Bad weather approaching slowly from the west, reaching 25 - 30° E. by tomorrow noon. West of this NW 4-6, decreasing; isolated snow showers, mist on the coast, otherwise good visibility.

Eastwards no real change.

After 1945 no further shadowing reports received during that evening. Consequently at 2312 all boats were requested by radio message 2255/75 to report on contact with the enemy. Simultaneously Queck (U 622) is to report the situation as it appears to him.

2326 Radio message 2120/774 received from Queck:

2008 Fan of 4 torpedoes on 2 steamers, as it is very light, 3200 m. 2 surface runners. 4 explosions were heard, but no hits observed, as we were pursued by destroyers and depth-charges. Withdrew to reload. Lost contact. Last convoy position AC 5451, course east.

"Queck" (U 622).

The range from which the fan of 4 was fired was certainly great. However the considerable difficulty of breaking through the strong escort screen justifies the action taken. The explosions heard indicate possible successes.

(Signed) Peters.

25 January, 1943.

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Queck reports in radio message 2315/776 that he has regained contact with the forward escort in AC 5541. Benker requests D/F signals from the shadower.

In radio message 1119/779 Queck is requested to repeat D/F signals several times in accordance with Positional War Order, so that the boats can be brought up.

0134 Radio message 0020/778 received:

Convoy strongly escorted, 10 - 12 destroyers and wide escort. Cruisers not in evidence. Contact again broken by snow squalls of long duration. Up to now 8 medium-sized steamers sighted. Formed in two's in line ahead. Speed 10 - 11 knots. General course 90°. Last position AC 5514.

"Queck" (U 622).

All boats lost contact and did not regain it in the next few hours.

0229 Group "Nordwind" is requested in radio message 0214/780 to report immediately if contact is regained. As no contact has been made, a new patrol line was ordered.

0430 Radio message 0415/782/108 sent:

Group Nordwind: unless in a favorable position relatively to convoy, occupy patrol line from AC 5925 lower left hand corner to AC 5854 center, in old formation. Maximum continuous speed.

Captain U-boats.

The boats are at a distance of 12 miles from one another in this patrol line which is drawn up to tally with the presumed direction of approach of the convoy. This line resulted in contact with the enemy in a relatively short time.

0832 U 622 reports "Convoy in AC 5677, general course 100 degrees to 110 degrees, WSW 8, sea 6, very heavy swell, 8 knots. Am sending D/F signals."

0945 Radio message 0927/785 sent:

To group "Nordwind" from Captain U-boats.

Presume convoy proceeding on general S.E. course. Continue to shadow, send in reports and give D/F signals.

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The weather forecast for sea area west of Barents Sea is:

W - S.W. 7-8, squally snow showers otherwise visibility 10 - 15 miles. This afternoon between 20 degrees and 30 degrees E. and north of 72 degrees N. wind decreasing slightly and varying eastwards.

1045 In radio message 0927/113 Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten reports that between 0830 and 0900 4 Ju-88 have started on fan reconnaissance of the convoy from Kirkenes via position line 37 E. 7225 to 4216, 37 E. 9686 to 3675 as far as the ice-limit.

1135 In radio message 0910/786 Queck reports convoy in AC 5687, general course 100 degrees - 110 degrees, speed 12 knots. He reports possibility of enemy aircraft and gives visibility as 10 miles.

1148 In radio message 1105/787 Queck reports that he has been forced to submerge twice because of Martin bombers and has lost contact. Last convoy position AC 5688, course 100 degrees, 10 knots.

An aircraft reported the convoy in AC 5975 at 0958, but said position was inexact. He also reported enemy aircraft to be with the convoy.

This position differs considerably from those known hitherto. The explanation may be an error in fixing, or the branching-off of one part of the convoy, or possibly even a group of escort vessels. To inform the boats of the enemy aircraft with the convoy,

1155 Radio message 1132/789 is sent:

Most immediate, from Captain U-boats.

"Air reconnaissance reports convoy at 0958 in AC 5975 position inexact, enemy aircraft with convoy."

A telephone message from I(a) of Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten reports, the convoy's composition at 1045 hrs. as 2 cruisers, 7 destroyers and 11 merchant ships.

As originally 13 merchant ships were reported it is possible that 2 ships were destroyed yesterday by Queck's attack at 2008.

1349 Radio message 1130/790 received from Bugs, in which he reports several Ju 88 and anti-aircraft fire in grid square 5932. Bugs presumes remote

escort there, and reports he is operating on the convoy.

1318 Convoy is reported by air reconnaissance, time of origin 1240/121, as consisting of 2 cruisers, 7 destroyers and 11 merchant ships, course 200 degrees. As this course is exactly in the direction of Murmansk it is quite possibly correct. However, the following radio message 1500/126, received from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten at 1535, reports: Last convoy position at 1205 was AC 5694, course again 110 degrees.

It would therefore appear that the course of 200 degrees reported was part of a wide zig-zag.

1555 Reche reports in radio message 1515/792 that he is in AC 6715 and that he cannot catch up with the convoy because of heavy sea. The same report comes from Sickel at 1707 in radio message 1600/793. He reports his position in AC 5936.

Thus at present none of the U-boats is with the convoy. But it may be assumed that the boats are in relatively close proximity to it. To convey to the U-boats Command's opinion on the convoy,

1718 Radio message 1640/794 is sent:

From Captain U-boats:

"Last convoy position observed at 1200 is grid square 5936, reported course of 200 degrees doubtful, probably still 110 degrees. Expect alteration of course for Murmansk after dark."

This last opinion is altered when it is reported by radio intercept service, that the English Archangel broadcast, which had been quiet for some time, has started up again and is displaying great activity which is considered to be connected with the convoy.

The boats have had no contact for some time. As there is a danger that they are no longer sure what measures they must take to search and find the enemy, and also to prevent aimless wandering, they are ordered to form a patrol line across the presumed convoy route to Archangel. It cannot indeed be expected that with the prevailing weather conditions, the boats will reach this patrol line in time, but they will be steering in a definite and - in the opinion of Command - a purposeful direction, and moreover there is a possibility that they may re-intercept the convoy while proceeding to their new position.

Hence:-

1805 Radio message 1745/795 sent:

Most immediate.

Group "Nordwind" from Captain U-boats.

In so far as you are not in favorable position relatively to the convoy, proceed to form patrol line from AC 9220 to AC 9150 in same order as before. In the light of latest reports Archangel presumed destination of convoy.

The boats are suffering severely from the continually deteriorating weather.

At 1802 Göllnitz reports from 5991 AC, that he cannot pursue the convoy because of very rough sea.

Bugs also reports that further operation on the "Luftwaffe's convoy" is useless, as his maximum speed is only 7 knots against the heavy sea. He is in AC 5952.

These two messages show that some of the boats appear to be operating on the convoy reported further south, although its position was stated to be inexact.

2049 Benker reports by short signal that he is proceeding as ordered to the patrol line.

2150. Radio intercept message is received reporting that Teriberka has transmitted the international letters of the following British units to its subordinate signal stations: cruisers "Kent", "Bermuda", "Glasgow", one mine-layer and 5 minesweepers or corvettes.

It is possible that the convoy or a part of it is after all making for the ports on the Murman coast. A definite conclusion cannot be drawn from the radio intercept message. It is also possible that part of the convoy is going to Archangel or that the nearby escort forces are branching off, as it is difficult for them to proceed through the ice-free channel, as well as dangerous in view of the air situation.

There is consequently no compelling necessity to alter the ordered patrol-line. Quite apart from the above considerations, an alteration of the patrol line would be useless, as the boats would not be able to reach the new position in view of prevailing weather conditions.

The weather forecast for 26 January (sent to the boats at 0354 in radio message 0330/703) is: S-S.W. 8 - 9, mostly overcast, isolated snow showers, visibility 5 - 10 miles. Sea area near Bear Island N.W - N. 6 - 8, snow showers, otherwise visibility 10 miles.

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From radio intercept service:

British warship - AG (general call sign).
Radio traffic with Murmansk
transmitting urgent operational radio message;
bearing of 57° from main naval D/F station
Kirkenes.

0800 Russian reconnaissance reports German U-boat
in uninterpreted position.

(Signed) Peters.

26 January, 1943.

The last convoy position observed was at noon on
25 January in grid square 5932. Since then there
have been no more reports. The weather is extremely
unfavorable for the boats: we are no longer
certain as to the convoy's intentions. It is
nearing the enemy coastal area which is strongly
patrolled by aircraft.

In these circumstances the operation will be
abandoned.

0239 Radio message 0200/800 sent:

From Captain U-boats:

"Abandon operation. Bugs, Queck, Benker, Gollnitz,
Sickel, Reche: return via position line I, grid
square 5980 to 6473 AC. Speed at your own discretion."

0350 Radio message 0240/701 sent:

From Captain U-boats:

(i) Continue westwards via position line II,
grid square 5483 to 5160 and position line
III, 4570 to 4168, all AC.

(ii) Report position at 1200.

(iii) Bugs and Queck: put in to Narvik via Harstad.

Because of the prevailing weather, no time limit is
set for reaching the position lines, so as not to
hold up the boats unnecessarily. The intended search
of the convoy route will be achieved in any case.

Survey:

In PQ 21 we were again faced by an extremely heavily
escorted and fast convoy, which U-boats have difficulty
in attacking in any case. But the difficulty was

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further increased by the continually deteriorating weather conditions during the operation. Successes could not be verified owing to immediate counter attacks, but, from Queck's report on his attack of the evening of 24 January, and from the fact that later on only 10 steamers were counted in the convoy, it may be presumed that at least two steamers were sunk.

All factors combined to make things difficult for the U-boats. Queck's (U 622) efforts are all the more worthy of recognition, in that he made contact with the convoy again and again even in spite of the enemy's counter-measures. The conduct of Benker (U 625) and Bugs (U 629) also deserves notice in the light of facts so far available. No opinion can be given on the conduct of the other boats taking part, without a more detailed knowledge of their war diaries.

The operation has also shown that the present number of U-boats available in the northern area is insufficient, in particular in view of the strong convoy escorts which are used here.

The boats did not succeed during this operation in breaking through the strong escort ring and to approach near enough to the main target - the merchant vessels - to operate against them at close range. The smaller the number of attacking boats, the more the enemy will be able to concentrate his attention and A/S measures on each of them, and the more difficult will be their task. The number of escort vessels to escort this convoy was almost as great as the number of merchant vessels. Since, owing to the small dockyard capacity, especially at Trondheim, at least half of the total number of boats is always in dock, there are at present never more than 6 boats available for operational duties, and usually only 4 or 5. This number is not sufficient for successful attacks on the strongly escorted convoys which are the rule in Northern Waters.

(Request for increase of boats in the Northern Area, see Admiral Northern Waters Most Secret 70 A.I. ----S.O.s. only and Group North Most Secret ---- 122/43 A.I. S.O.s only).

See Appendix No. I and II.

26 January 1943

From radio intercept service:

Russian signal stations received this morning signal letters from cruisers "Kent", "Glasgow", "Bermuda", minelayer (destroyer ?) "Pictun", corvette "Starboard",

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and trawler "Northern Pride". Presumably these are units of the escort for the present PQ - convoy.

(Signed) Peters.

27 January, 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 302, 622, 625, 629, 657, 255 in reconnaissance patrol line returning along PQ - 21 route.

In port:

U 251, 334, 354, 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 377, 405, 592, 703 Bergen.
U 209, 601 Kiel.
U 586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 355 1500 put out from Bergen to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East))
Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten.) No reports.

III. Reports on the enemy:

Under headings (a) and (b): None.

(c) By radio intercept service: According to air reconnaissance on 24 January, 21 merchant ships of about 130,000 G.R.T. identified in Kola Bay and north of it. Presume running of new QP following on PQ 21 and using same escort.

X-radio intercept report: At noon on 27 January, freighter in Kharlov region: signal station is to report currently on the freighter's maneuvers.

Code - B1677. British warship - AD- 27 January at 1300 in communication with Murmansk; bearing of 91 degrees from Main Naval D/F station Kirkenes.

According to radio traffic 3 submarines (7802, 7804, 7806) at sea. Freighter in Kharlov region: signal station is to report currently on freighter's maneuvers.

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Under headings (d) and (e): No reports.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

Under headings (a) to (c): After abandoning operation against PQ 21 all boats return in reconnaissance patrol-line via 3 fixed position lines along the route of the PQ - convoy.

Reche in radio message 1150:

"1104. Sank single freighter in AC 6751, course 240 degrees, 4000 G.R.T., with double shot. Crew Russians, name could not be ascertained ---".

In addition Queck reports in radio message 2300:

- (ii) Torpedoed steamers were, first: type "Rochester Castle", second: type "Alynbank".
- (iii) Not in range 600m. behind, type, "Clan MacNab".
- (iv) Running time corresponds to distance.

V. Reports of successes:

1 Steamer, 4000 G.R.T.

VI. General situation:

The planned return via the position lines has been successful in that one straggler apparently cut off from the convoy, was intercepted and sunk.

(Signed) Peters.

28 January, 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

- (a) At sea:)
 - (b) In port:)
- As on 27 January.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Probing sea reconnaissance between 15 degrees and 30 degrees E. as far as 75 degrees N.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations.

III. Reports on the enemy:

Under headings (a) and (b): No observations.

(c) By radio intercept service: X-Radio intercept reports:

Staff of Russian Northern Waters - Fleet reported on 28 January: 0940 enemy destroyer in resolved position. 1345, 7 freighters and 1 destroyer at unknown cape. 28 January 0810 "Kharlov" was to report at once, whether allied freighters had been sighted near the signal station.

Under headings (d) and (e): No observations.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 boats proceeding to new attack areas.

Under headings (c) and (d): None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. General situation:

All boats continue to return via position lines. 3 boats have been assigned to new attack areas south of Bear Island, which on the whole are somewhat further south than the previous areas, and have been chosen as a result of information gained about the enemy convoy route in the recent operation.

During the operation U 302 had a battery explosion in one of the torpedoes, because the bow-cap of the tube was closed too late, and he will have to return to port. The boat has been ordered to go to Alta Fjord and to have the repairs executed by the repair ship "Neumark".

(Signed) Peters.

29 January, 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 255, grid square 6360 southern half and 6390, U 657, grid square 6620 and 6650 northern half, U 625, grid square 6660 southern half and 6690. All AB.

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In port:

U 251, U 334, U 354, U 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 405, 592, 703 Bergen.
U 209, 601 Kiel.
U 586 Hamburg.

I. (b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 355, 1730 hrs.) Put into Narvik.
U 622, 629, 1400 hrs.)
U 302, 1900. Put into Kaafjord ("Neumark").

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East): No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Fan reconnaissance against single vessels.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: Reche reports at 0140 single vessel
in AB 6390, course 150 degrees.

(b) By air reconnaissance: No observations.

(c) By radio intercept service: According to radio traffic
submarines Schtsch 403 Schtsch 442, L20, M171
and one further submarine at sea. (7802).
Up to 2130 very lively Murmansk broadcast.

German Espionage Agency Portugal reports in
message 01 on 28 January:

"A diplomatic source in Lisbon confirms the
loading of ships in Glasgow and Liverpool,
Preston also named. It appears that during
the last few days 22 loaded Liberty-freighters
have assembled in Belfast and 18 in Glasgow.
All ships are supposed to form convoy to Murmansk.
Departure date of convoy is said to be 3 February."

Under headings (d) and (e): No observation

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: Reche hunted reported single
vessel and sank it in AB 6373 at 0612.

Under headings (b) to (d): None.

V. Reports of successes:

Radio message 0650/750 from Reche:

0612 in AB 6373 sank Russian steamer type "Mironych".
Transmits "Miniobe" 3 times - - - -.

According to "Groener" 2274 G.R.T.

VI. General situation:

Only 3 boats are at present available to take up positions along Bear Straits (U 255, 625, 657). U 302 had to be detached to have his torpedo tube repaired by the Neumark (Alta Fjord). It will be ready for operations on 2 February at the earliest. U 355 has to remain in Narvik to have his Junkers - compressor repaired. (Repairs should take about 2 days). The patrolling of the Bear Island straits by only 3 boats is insufficient and does not guarantee the interception of convoys, especially as air reconnaissance to the north is not possible because of the weather. A convoy attack by only 3 boats offers small prospects of success.

(Signed) Peters.

30 January, 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

As on 29 January.

In port:

As on 29 January, with the addition of U 302 at Kaafjord, U 355, 622, 629 Narvik.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

None.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Probing sea reconnaissance between 15 degrees and 30 degrees E. as far as 45 degrees N.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Fan reconnaissance starting from the limit of Flieger Fuehrer North (East)'s reconnaissance area, and proceeding westwards.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: AB 6613 1 single vessel, 1000 G.R.T. course 90 degrees.

(c) By radio intercept service: According to radio traffic 5 enemy submarines at sea.

Under headings (d) and (e): No observations.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

Under headings (a) to (c): None.

(d) Miscellaneous: The single vessel reported by Luftwaffe in AB 6613 was not intercepted by the U-boats.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. General situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

31 January, 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:)
) As on 29 January.
In port:)

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Armed reconnaissance in area 38 degrees E. up to 15 degrees E., and up to 74 degrees N.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Fan reconnaissance in sector Tromsø. - AB 7381
- AB 5524.

III. Reports on the enemy:

Under headings (a) and (b): No observations.

(c) By radio intercept service: According to radio traffic 4 enemy submarines at sea.

Under headings (d) and (e): No observations.

IV. Current U-boat operations: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. General situation: Nothing special to report.

(Signed) Peters.

APPENDIX I.

-COPY-

Most immediate, Group North.

Most Secret - S.O.s only - By hand of officer only.

Re: request for increase of U-boat strength in Northern Waters.

I. Situation:

- (a) In view of the general strategic situation, 10 boats were temporarily withdrawn from Admiral Northern Waters at the beginning of September. One lost boat has not been replaced, one boat was detached for open water firing, so that at present only 11 boats are available for operational use. Due to the restricted dockyard capacity, half of these are in process of being overhauled, so that there are hardly ever more than 6 boats in a state of readiness.
- (b) The Luftwaffe too is considerably weakened by withdrawal of units, especially bomber formations of which half have been withdrawn.
- (c) As regards surface forces, no striking success can be expected because of restrictions on their offensive operations against convoys, especially those whose escorts are equal to our forces in strength.
- (d) The attack on PQ-21 has shown once again that the escorts of all Russian convoys are very strong. It is, therefore, particularly difficult for U-boats in such small numbers to break through the ring of escorting vessels and to come within attacking distance of the main target, the merchant ships. Only an increased number of boats can offer any prospects of deflecting the escort vessels and thereby making success more likely.
- (e) Supplies to Russia have been sent at a greater rate during December and January than was expected in Group North Most Secret 1338/42 S.O.s only A Operation by Naval War Staff.
- (f) Russian air units and naval forces have recently been reinforced in the Northern Area.

II. Comments on the situation.

The enemy attaches great importance to the increase of war materials for the Russians in the Northern Area. With corresponding strengthening of the northern sector of the Russian front a large-scale

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offensive might become possible, combined with a major landing in northern Norway. Hence the strengthening of all our forces, particularly of the Luftwaffe and U-boats, is essential both for success in offensive operations, viz. attacking of Russian supply convoys and for successful defensive action viz., defense against enemy landing.

III. Hence request is urgently made to increase U-boat strength at least to the old number of 23 boats.

Admiral Northern Waters
Most Secret S.O.s only 70. A.I.

APPENDIX II.

-COPY-

Emergency: for information of Admiral Northern Waters.

Duplicate: Naval War Staff - for information of Admiral Northern Waters. Most Secret - S.O.s only - by hand of officer only.

- I. Admiral Northern Waters requests U-boat replacements at least up to a number of 23 boats, for the following reasons:-
 - (a) Prospects of success against PQ - convoys, which are always strongly escorted, are slight with only a few boats of which only 6 at a time are at operational readiness.
 - (b) Reinforcement of Russian air and naval forces.
 - (c) Importance of U-boats in preventing landings.
- II. Request and reasons for it coincide with Group's request for 24 U-boats to be allocated to Captain U-boats by April for the use of Admiral Northern Waters.
- III. Whether, in view of the obvious increase in PQ traffic which may perhaps be intended for a Russian offensive in the northern area replacements could possibly be made at an earlier date, as desired by Group, can only be decided at the level of C-in-C U-boats, who has an overall picture of the situation and knows the prospects of success.
- IV. Requirements for task as in Naval War Staff 1st Division, one West 215/43 Most Secret S.O.s only, of 21 January, follow under separate cover.

Group North Most Secret S.O.s only 122/43 A.1.

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Chart.

Wegekarte PQ21 = Track chart PQ21.

U-Bootsstandorte vom 26.1.43 mittags = U-boat positions
at noon, 26 January, 1943.


Aufzulegen auf Karte 1903 G (klein) = To be laid on
chart 1903 G (small).

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WAR DIARY
OF
CAPTAIN U-BOATS NORWAY.


1 - 15 February 1943.

PG/31828



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- I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800.
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Notes on the reconnaissance operations and objectives.
- III. Reports on the enemy:
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- IV. Current U-boat operations:
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 - (d) Miscellaneous.
- V. Reports of successes.
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1 February 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

U255 grid square 6360 southern half and 6390,
U657 grid square 6620 and 6650 northern half,
U625 grid square 6660 southern half and 6690.
All AB.

In port:

U302 Kaafjord, U355, U662, Narvik, U251, 354,
334, 378 Trondheim, U212, 405, 592, 703 Bergen,
U209, 601 Kiel, U586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U629 proceeding from Narvik to Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Fan reconnaissance Tromsø - AB 7357 - 5526.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

1240 U255 (Reche) reports several smoke clouds in
AB6369, south-westerly course, in radio
message 1140.

1309 In radio message 1240 Reche makes a further
report of several escort vessels in AB6383,

1512 and in radio message 1420 of a convoy in
AB6357, about 12 steamers, 12 destroyers
and escort vessels, course west, speed
10 knots.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

No observations.

(c) By radio intercept service:

- (1) From Kiel G.I.S. sub-station:
German Army High Command Foreign Dept./
Intelligence One M reports on 31 January 1943:
German Espionage Agency Portugal reports in
message 13 of 31 January, 1943: We learn
from an official source in Lisbon: convoy
of 34 freighters and 12 tankers for Murmansk
supposed to sail from western English port
on 26 February.

(2) See Appendix V.

Under headings (d) and (e): None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

With reference to Reche's radio message at 1140, Appendix I, 1:

1256 "Smoke clouds, in grid square 6369 on south
1349 westerly course". The 3 U-boats south of
Bear Island are given permission to attack,
(Appendix I, 2). U 255 (Reche) reports
constant contact and is ordered to send D/F
signals. In answer to U 255 (Reche's) D/F
signals as shadower, U 625 (Benker) reports
in short signal 1543 "Have contacted convoy".

During further pursuit of the convoy (course
west, speed 10 knots strong close escort)
U 625 (Benker) at 1845 attacks seven over-
lapping steamers with a fan of four from
2800m. Convoy is composed of about 16
steamers, strong close escort.

Result: 1 hit observed,
3 heard.

Then he was forced to submerge by depth charges.
(Appendix I, 9). In order to attack the
convoy more effectively, U 355 (La Baumc) in
Narvik and U 302 (Sickel) in Kaafjord are
ordered to speed up preparations for operational
readiness..

1337 Both boats were not to be ready until
2 February. At 1337 following radio message is
sent on radio service Paula:

"Neumark" for Sickel from Captain U-boats:
"Report at once earliest time of operational
readiness. If possible, scheduled to put
to sea today."

2143 Sickel reports by teleprinter message at
2143:

"U 302 not operationally ready before 0800 on
2 February."

Because one of its Ju-compressors is being
renewed, U 355 cannot put to sea until basin
trials are concluded, certainly not before
early on 2 February. Both boats are
scheduled to put to sea at the earliest
possible moment.

They are to be employed in accordance with the situation as it will then be. But it is probable that they will only be able to attack stragglers or damaged ships because of the convoy's high speed of advance.

Under headings (c) and (d): None.

V. Reports of successes:

1 hit observed,
3 heard.

VI. General situation:

This is a strongly escorted convoy on the return journey. At present only 3 boats are available to attack it. Since the two boats being repaired in Narvik and Kaafjord will not be ready until 0800 on 2 February, it will probably not be possible to get them up to the convoy in time, owing to the latter's high speed. Three boats is an insufficient number to attack a convoy successfully.

(Signed) Peters.

2 February 1943.

(a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

U255)
U657) About AB5370 with westbound convoy.
U625)

In port:

U251, 334, 354, 378 Trondheim,
U622 Narvik,
U212, 405, 592, 703 Bergen,
U209, 601 Kiel,
U586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U629 proceeding from Narvik to Bergen.
U355 proceeding from Narvik to operational area.
U302 proceeding from Kaafjord to operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Fliieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

Constant reports on the westbound convoy from shadowing boats U 255 (Reche) and U 625 (Benker).

Under headings (b) to (e):

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

0134 Sailing order (App. III, 1) for 0800 from Kaafjord is sent to U 302 (Sickel). U 355 (La Baume) receives sailing order (App. III, 2) for 0800 from Narvik. They are to make for:
"U 302" (Sickel) 5556 AB.
"U 355" (La Baume) 5580 AB.

These boats are thus proceeding to a central position from which they can attack stragglers or damaged vessels if the opportunity arises. They would not be able to close in on the convoy until west of Jan Mayen and even that only if they could proceed at maximum speed without being impeded by seaway. Having regard to the convoy's high speed, it therefore seems useless to employ these boats against it. Use against stragglers and a speedy reoccupation of the Bear Island position promise more success.

0150 "U 255" (Reche) reports in radio message 2205/790:

"At 1930 depth charge from the starboard destroyer astern. Convoy was in AB 6259 course 270 degrees speed 10 knots. Cloudy, N.E.3, moderate visibility."

0221 Radio message 2250/791 received from "U 625" (Benker):

"Intercepted by destroyer while in pursuit. Am in AB 6281. No contact, advancing on course 270 degrees. Last convoy position as in serial number 787, depth charges. Main ballast compressor broken down."

Both boats were thus forced away at about 1900 but are pushing on with good prospects of re-intercepting the convoy.

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0721 Report from U255 (Reche) of 0630 about hydrophone bearing of 150 degrees from grid square 5354 (App. I, 11).
According to this, the convoy must have continued to steer about 270 degrees.
We may expect that the convoy will soon be forced by the ice limit to alter course to south west. The approximate position of the ice limit, based on aircraft reports of 29 to 30 January, has therefore been transmitted to the boats. (App. I, 12).

1000 To date U255 (Reche) and U625 (Benker) have reported constantly. No report has yet been received from U657 apart from a request for D/F signals.

1308 U657 is therefore requested to report its position, so that a clear picture of the boat's operational plans may be gained.

1316 The boats are informed that the planned air operation is cancelled because of the weather.

No particulars to hand about the enemy since 0630.

1543 Reche and Benker are requested for a situation report. After receipt of situation reports from U255 (Reche) as well as position report from U657 (Göllnitz) the following impression is gained:

The boats met at about 1200 approximately in grid square 5550 and agreed on search fans from 210 degrees - 270 degrees, they were well abreast the 10 knot convoy by dead reckoning (App. I, 13 and 14).

After the independent search during 2 February had produced no contact with the enemy, the following order was sent:

2120 Radio message 2120/704:

"Göllnitz, Benker, Reche proceed at once to patrol line AB 4882 to AB 7344. Be there by 0400 on 3 February at the latest.

The boats will then be positioned at 0400 where the convoy, by dead reckoning, should be at 0700. They will be well to windward.

In order to make better use of the daylight and to move the line closer to Jan Mayen, where the convoy will of necessity have to move somewhat closer together, the boats received the following order:

Radio message 2230/706:

"Captain U-boats to Göllnitz, Benker, Reche. From 0400 reconnaissance line 232 degrees speed 7 knots. From 1000 patrol line from 7136 to 7288 AE."

(Signed) Peters.

3 February 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

U255 AB 2320)
U657 AA 9870) On westbound convoy.
U302 AB 6620) Reconnaissance on east course.
U355 AB 6170)

In port:

U622 Narvik,
U251, 334, 354, 378 Trondheim,
U212, 405, 592, 703 Bergen,
U209, 601 Kiel,
U586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U629 put into Bergen.
U625 proceeding from operational area
to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

Constant shadower reports from U255 (Reche)
and U625 (Benker) about westbound convoy.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

1) According to German Naval High Command
radio intelligence, submarine M172 put to
sea from Polyarno on night of 31 January
via Tsip Navolok, probably for an operation.

2) German Espionage Agency Sweden reports
agents' report: If the weather is favor-
able, a fairly large convoy is scheduled
to sail today (1 February) from Canadian
waters for Iceland. Convoy is destined
for unloading in Murmansk area.

The Russians were informed of the above-mentioned sailing by British Embassy here, and requested to provide submarine chasers for the convoy to strengthen its defenses.

Under headings (d) and (e):

None.

IV. Current operations:

0354 Radio Message 0320/707 received from U255 (Reche):

"Convoy in AB 7339, course south."

The convoy has thus steered farther to the south and Reche has intercepted it en route to his position in the patrol line. The southerly course is obviously an intermediate course, the boats are therefore instructed:

0440 Radio message 0440/708:

From Captain U-boats:

Göllnitz, Benker to operate on Reche's report, count on south westerly mean course. Reche to attack and give current reports.

0624 More detailed explanation of Reche's message of 0354 is received, he suspects mean course 240 degrees (App. I, 15).

1008 Report of convoy in grid square 7379 course 240 degrees from U255 (Reche). (App. I, 17). Contact is hereby definitely re-established, at the same time it is now definite that the 2 boats which put to sea on 2 February are too late to join the operation. The air operation planned against the convoy has been cancelled because of the weather. However, there is still a possibility of finding damaged vessels or stragglers. The following order is therefore sent for U302 (Sickel) and U355 (La Baume):

1045 Radio message 1045/712:

From Captain U-boats:

1) Steer for:

Sickel: grid square 6118,
La Baume: grid square 6148.
Then on mean course 90 degrees as far as longitude 20 degrees E.

2) Then attack areas:

Sickel: grid squares 6360 and 6330,
La Baume: grid square 6320 and 6350.

3) All AB.

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- By means of this course instruction the first part of the convoy route will be subjected to another intensive search.
- 1245 Reche reports, convoy was in 7536 AB at 1115 (App. I, 18).
- 1725 Radio message 1445/717 received from U625 (Benker):
- "Intercepted by destroyer when attacking under water. Prevented from firing torpedo. Area AB 7544, 270 degrees. Speed 10 knots. Enough fuel until 2200
- 1740 U625 receives orders to return as soon as the fuel situation necessitates. (App. I, 19).
- 1912 Radio message 1815/720 received from U255 (Reche):
- "Greylock", New York, sunk at 1412 in AB 7552. Hit heard on second 5000 G.R.T. steamer, effect not observed. Have still one bow and two stern plus 2 torpedoes and am pushing on."
- This is probably the steamer "Greylock" 7460 G.R.T. (confirmed by U255's War Diary).
- 2306 The boats still on the convoy receive approach grid squares for 0800 on 4 February:
- Göllnitz 9870 AA,
Reche 2320 AE.
- These grid squares lie on the most probable course of the convoy and are to be occupied if no contact or definite clues are available." (App. I, 20).
- (Signed) Peters.

4 February 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

U302 AB 6360 and 6390.
U355 AB 6620 and 6650.
U657 AA 9850 proceeding via points ordered to new attack areas.
U255 AA 9890 proceeding via points ordered to Narvik.

(b) In port:

U622 Narvik,
U251, 334, 354, 378 Trondheim,
U212, 405, 592, 629, 703 Bergen,
U209, 601 Kiel,
U586 Hamburg.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U625 returning from operational area to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Reconnaissance of ice conditions at Bear Island. 8/10 ice floes north of 74 degrees, no ice within a radius of 3-5 km around Bear Island, loose drifting ice floes only on north coast.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Fan reconnaissance of southern Arctic.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

Shadower reports about westbound convoy from U255 (Reche) and U625 (Benker).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

Army C-in-C in Norway informs us: Report of 28 January 1943 of loading of ships in Glasgow and Liverpool is confirmed from a diplomatic source in Lisbon, Preston is also named. During the past few days apparently 22 laden Liberty ships have arrived in Belfast and 18 in Glasgow. All the ships are to be united in a convoy bound for Murmansk. Convoy sailing date given as 3 February.

Under headings (d) and (e):

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

0345 U255 (Reche) reports in radio message 0200/727:

"Am in AA 9692, hydrophone bearing 280 degrees, frost, fog, visibility 500 m."

0610

It may be concluded from this report that the convoy has continued to steer about 270 degrees. The same boat reports at 0535 from AA 9685 that there is obstruction from drift ice fields. Passage is however possible for ships and boats (App. I, 23).

1359 Meeting with drift ice south of Jan Mayen makes it more difficult for the boats to push on, without causing serious obstruction to the convoy. The boats still on the convoy receive the following order:

Radio message 1412/733:

"Gollnitz, Reche from Captain U-boats.

1821 If no contact by 1600, search on independently. Break off operation at 2000 if enemy not contacted by then. Order for return voyage follows. In radio messages 1836/734 and 1843/735 the boats' return route is prescribed, running close to the convoy route. This makes it possible to intercept any stragglers or damaged vessels. U255 (Reche) is then to put into Narvik to replenish torpedoes, while U657 (Gollnitz) is ordered into a patrol position south of Bear Straits subsequent to combing the convoy route (App. I, 24). Contact with the convoy was not regained. Under these circumstances success is not likely by continuing the operation in the immediate inshore waters of Iceland with only two boats. The boats begin their return voyage according to plan.

2400 Arrival report received from U625 (Benker): "36 hours off entrance to Andfjord."

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Final conclusions about convoy operation 1 - 4 February 1943:

1) During the operation against the westbound convoy it has been proved again that with the number of U-boats available there are only limited prospects of success considering the very strong escorts. According to the report of the commander of "U625" (Benker), he sighted up to 6 destroyers at the same time, some of which were only a short distance away. Only in the most unusual cases is it possible to break through such a strong escort. The boats are forced - if they are to fire at all - to fire from a relatively great distance (2 - 3000 m) and from outside the main screen. On the one hand the prospects of a hit are lessened, and on the other the expenditure in torpedoes (four fans of four) is necessarily high. Both these factors are unfavorable. It has been the general experience that the vessels of the convoy escort maneuver skilfully, are vigilant and make good locations. In order to avoid being located by the escort vessels the U-boats must frequently go to the depth of 4-40m which is best for anti-hydrophone defense, whereby attack on the convoy naturally becomes impossible.

Any change in these specially difficult conditions for the U-boats can only be attained by splitting up the escort, i.e., by an increased number of U-boats attacking as simultaneously as possible.

2) In the operation against this convoy only 3 boats were able to take part. 2 boats lay in Narvik and Keafjord undergoing short term repairs. Because of the high speed of the convoy and owing to the fact that the convoy was first intercepted only when it was already off Bear Island, these boats could not close in in time. The remainder of the boats were in dock. Owing to the dockyard position in the Norwegian area, especially in Trondheim, we cannot at present count on more than 5 U-boats for current operations. In these circumstances, neither can offensive assignments of Captain U-boats - attacking supplies for Russia - be carried out successfully, nor could large-scale defensive measures against enemy landings be carried out effectively, should these become necessary.

3) Naval War Staff's opinion (Naval War Staff/1st Division I.U. 236/42 of 9 December) that because of commitments in the North African area supply traffic in Northern Waters would decrease does not appear to accord with recent experience. Traffic seems to be proceeding at the same strength as formerly. From the size of the steamers, their escort and high speed, it may be concluded that convoys in Northern Waters have specially valuable ships, to whose successful passage the enemy attaches decisive importance.

(Signed) Peters.

5 February 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

at sea:

U302, AB 6360 and 6390,
U355, AB 6320 and 6350;
U657, AB 7612 proceeding via ordered points to
new attack area.
U255, AB 7643 proceeding via ordered points,
then return voyage to Narvik.

In port:

U622 Narvik,
U251, 334, 354, 378, Trondheim,
U212, 405, 592, 629, 703 Bergen,
U209, 601 Kiel,
U586 Hamburg.

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(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U625 (Benkor) on return voyage from operational area to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Fan reconnaissance from Tromsø via 3554 AF, 7667 AB.

III. Reports on the enemy:

Under headings (a) and (b):

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic, 3 Russian submarines at sea.

Under headings (d) and (e):

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

Nothing special.

1220 Short report on operation against westbound convoy from 1 - 4 February 1943 dispatched. (see App. IV, 1).

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. General situation:

No special comments.

(Signed) Peters.

6 February 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

U302, 355 as on 5 February,
U657, AB 5347 proceeding to new attack area.

In port:

U622, 625 Narvik,
U251, 334, 354, 378 Trondheim,
U212, 405, 592, 629, 703 Bergen,
U209, 601 Kiel,
U586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U255 (Reche) returning from operational area
to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):) No operations
Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:) because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance from north coast of Iceland
to Jan Mayen and 17 degrees W.

III. Reports on the enemy:

Under headings (a) and (b):

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 4 enemy
submarines at sea.

Under headings (d) and (e):

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

Nothing to report.

V. Reports of successes:

According to report by commander of U625
(Benker), it may be assumed that at least
2 steamers, of about 7000 tons each, were
sunk by U625. Benker fired one four-fan and one
sternshot. 1 hit observed, 3 definitely
heard, 1 more heard by crew in bow and stern
space. The 7 steamers sighted by Benker
formed, as a result of overlapping, a conti-
nuous line of about 650m, at which the fan
was fired. The enemy's speed was 10 knots,
angle on the bow 80 degrees, range 2000m,
angle of spread 3.5 degrees. Sinking noises
were heard. On surfacing a strong smell of
oil was perceptible when the U-boat passed
over the probable sinking place.

VI. General situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

7 February 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

As on 6 February.

In port:

U622 Narvik, otherwise as on 6 February.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U255, AB 9855 returning from operational area to Narvik.

U625 put out from Narvik for Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East): No operations
Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance between Iceland and Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

Under headings (a) and (b):

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 4 submarines at sea. On afternoon of 31 January 3 British cruisers (possibly, Kent, Glasgow and Bermuda) from Kola Bay to Barents Sea.

Under headings (d) and (e):

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

None.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

General situation:

The three British cruisers reported under III (c) were probably in operation as escort forces for the last westbound convoy, 1 - 4 February, on the route from Russian ports as far as Bear Island. They were not sighted by our U-boats during the action on the convoy after it had passed Bear Island.

(Signed) Peters.

8 February, 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 302 6390 and 6360 southern half.
U 355 6620 and 6650 northern half.
U 657 6690 and 6660 southern half.
All AB.

In port:

U 622 Narvik,
U 251, 354, 354, 378 Trondheim,
U 209, 601 Kiel,
U 586 Hamburg,
U 212, 592, 629, 703 Bergen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 255 returning from operational area to Narvik.
U 625 proceeding from Narvik to Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Fliieger Fuehrer North (East):) No operations
Fliieger Fuehrer Lofoten:) because of weather.

Fliieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance between Iceland and Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

Under headings (a) and (b):

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

3 enemy submarines at sea according to Russian radio traffic.

Under headings (d) and (e): None.

IV. Current U-boat operations: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. General situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

9 February 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

As on 8 February, 1943.

In port:

U622 Narvik,
U251, 334, 354, 378 Trondheim,
U212, 592, 629, 703 Bergen,
U209, 601 Kiel,
U586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U255 put into Narvik 1400,
U622 put out from Narvik 1100 for operational
area,
U625 proceeding from Narvik to Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Fan reconnaissance in Soereissa sector -
AF 1881 - AB 8772.

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance south-west of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

Under headings (a) and (b):

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic 2
enemy submarines at sea.

Under headings (d) and (e):

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(b) General operations to intercept enemy traffic:

U302's attack area moved 9 miles to the south
because of drift ice in AB 6360.

Under headings (a), (c) and (d):

None.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. General situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

10 February 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

U302 AB 6390 and 6630 northern half,
U355 AB 6620 and 6650 northern half,
U657 AB 6690 and 6660 southern half.

In port:

U255 Narvik,
U251, 334, 354, 378 Trondheim,
U212, 592, 629, 703 Bergen,
U209, 601 Kiel,
U586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U622 proceeding into operational area.
U625 proceeding from Narvik to Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Fan reconnaissance from Tromsø via AF 1881 -
AB 8772.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance south-west of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

Under headings (a) and (b):

None.

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(c) By radio intercept service:

2 enemy submarines at sea according to Russian radio traffic.

Under headings (d) and (e):

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

Under headings (b) and (c):

Following order is sent in radio message 2310/787 to Northern Waters U-boats at sea:

"From Captain U-boats:

1) Be in new attack areas at 1700 on 11 February:

Sickel	6390
La Baume	6620
Göllnitz	6660
Queck	6680, all AB.

2) Sickel to establish ice situation south of Bear Island by daily sweeps and to report any material alterations."

From the evening of 11 February an attack area stretching 72 miles from north to south will thus be occupied south of Bear Island.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. General situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

11 February 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

As on 10 February.

In port:

U255 Narvik,
U251, 334, 354, 378 Trondheim,

U212, 592, 629, 703 Bergen,
U209, 601 Kiel,
U586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U625 put into Bergen 1300,
U622 proceeding into operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Probing sea reconnaissance between 18
degrees E. and 30 degrees E. as far as
75 degrees N.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance of Jan Mayen
area.

III. Reports on the enemy:

Under headings (a) and (b):

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

3 enemy submarines at sea according to Russian
radio traffic.
Submarine K21 presumably proceeding from
Olenya Bay to Barents Sea.

Under headings (d) and (e):

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

Under headings (a) and (b):

None.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U302 (Sickel) is ordered to reconnoiter posi-
tion of ice south of Bear Island by daily
sweeps and to report any material alterations.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. General situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

12 February 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

U302 6390,
U355 6620,
U657 6660,
U622 6680, all AB.

In port:

U255 Narvik,
U251, 354, 378 Trondheim,
U212, 592, 625, 629, 703 Bergen,
U209, 601 Kiel,
U586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U334 put out from Trondheim 1800 for Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Fan reconnaissance of Jan Mayen area.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Southern part of Arctic sea as far as Arctic Circle and westward to 0 degrees.

III. Reports on the enemy:

Under headings (a) and (b):

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

4 enemy submarines at sea according to Russian radio traffic. Northern Waters Fleet Staff broadcasts reconnaissance reports, among other things, to all submarines in operational area.

G.I.S. Station Kiel reports on 12 February:

According to agent's report, there are some empty ships in Murmansk ready for the voyage home to America. Will probably put to sea on 9 February, weather permitting.

Under headings (d) and (e):

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

As a result of U302 (Sickel)'s radio message according to which AB 6360 is again ice-free following order is sent to the boats:

Radio message 0940/702:

From Captain U-boats:

Boats Sickel to Queck move attack areas 9 miles northward.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. General situation:

Westbound convoy mentioned under III (c) not yet intercepted by our boats although it should meanwhile have passed Bear Island. We may assume postponement of sailing date because of unfavourable weather. Boats are informed accordingly.

(Signed) Peters

13 February 1943

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

U302 6360 southern half and 6390 northern half
U355 6380 southern half and 6620 northern half
U657 6630 southern half and 6660 northern half
U622 6656 southern half and 6680 northern half

In port:

As on 12 February

I. (b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U334 proceeding from Trondheim to Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):) No operations
Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:) because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West): Sea reconnaissance

Sea reconnaissance south-west of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

Under headings (a) and (b):

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

3 enemy submarines at sea according to Russian radio traffic.

X-radio intercept report. Archangel reports: Icebreakers "Krassin" and "Kaganovich" with 3 (?) allied freighters put to sea at 1200 on 13 February. (Port of departure and destination unknown).

Under headings (d) and (e):

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

Under headings (a) to (c):

None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

U657 (Göllnitz) dispatched to Hammerfest for speedy refuelling. Immediate return to operational area intended.

U622 (Queck) is ordered to occupy Göllnitz's attack area.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. General situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

14 February 1943

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

U302) as on
U355) 13 February.
U662 6630 southern half and 6660 northern half.

In port:

U657 Hammerfest.
Otherwise as on 12 February.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U334 proceeding from Trondheim to Bergen.
U657 put into Hammerfest at 0130 on 14 February.
U251 put out from Trondheim at 1100 for Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Fliieger Fuehrer North (East):) No operations
Fliieger Fuehrer Lofoten:) because of weather.

Fliieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance southwest of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

Under headings (a) and (b):

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

3 enemy submarines at sea according to Russian radio traffic.

Under headings (d) and (e):

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

None.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. General situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

15 February 1943.

I. (a) U-boat positions at 0800:

At sea:

As on 14 February.

In port:

U255 Narvik,
U354, 378 Trondheim,
U212, 592, 625, 629, 703 Bergen,

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U209, 601 Kiel,
U586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 657 put out from Hammerfest at 0300 for operational area.
U334 proceeding from Trondheim to Bergen.
U251 proceeding from Trondheim to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Probing sea reconnaissance between 14 degrees and 19 degrees E. northward to ice limit.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Fan reconnaissance against convoy suspected in Tromsø sector AB 7171 - 5418.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance south-west of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

Under headings (a) and (b):

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic 2 enemy submarines at sea. During the day, reconnaissance reports to all submarines in operational area.

Under headings (d) and (e):

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

Under headings (a) and (b):

None.

(c) Special operations by single U-boats:

U657 has occupied the southern half of AB 6650 and the northern of 6680. Thus the area patrolled south of Bear Island again stretches 72 miles north-south.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

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VI. General situation:

The steamers reported by radio intercept service as putting out of Gorlo Straits on 10 February have to date been intercepted by neither aircraft nor U-boats. Apparently the steamers are employed in coastal traffic.

The empty convoy in Murmansk, bound for the U.S., and ready to sail since 9 February, has apparently not yet commenced its voyage because of unfavorable weather.

On board, 15 February 1943.

(Signed) Peters.

Captain and Captain U-boats Norway.

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Appendix I

Extract of most important radio messages.

1 February 1943.

1. Radio message 1140/777:

Most Immediate. Several smoke clouds in AB 6369, south-west course.

Reche.

2. Radio message 1256/779:

From Captain U-boats.
All free to attack on Reche's report.

3. Radio message 1240/778:

Most Immediate. Several escort vessels AB 6383.

Reche.

4. Radio message 1337/90 (gy) 55 (mq):

Neumark for "Sickel" from Captain U-boats.
Report at once earliest date ready. If possible scheduled to put to sea today.

5. Radio message 1420/781:

Most Immediate. Convoy of about 12 steamers 12 destroyers and escort vessels AB 6357, course west, speed 10 knots.

Reche.

6. Radio message 1630/784:

Most Immediate. Convoy in AB 6294 course west.

Benker.

7. Short signal: 1646:

Am operating on westbound convoy. My position AB 6345.

U255.

8. Radio message 1747/786:

Most Immediate. Convoy is in AB 6295, course 270 degrees, speed 10 knots.

Benker.

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9. Radio message 1845/787:

Most Immediate. Convoy AB 6263, course 270 degrees, speed 10 knots. About 16 steamers. Strong close escort. Found 7 overlapping steamers. At 2800m one hit observed, 3 heard. Crash-dived. Depth charges, am pursuing. 30 cubic meters left, atmospheric pressure 75 mb, seaway 6, clear, east wind.

Benker.

10. Radio message 2358/789:

From Captain U-boats.
2 February. Air reconnaissance by four BV138 and offensive operations by a group of Ju 88 against convoy intended. D/F signals on D/F wave "B".

2 February 1943.

11. Radio message 0630/794:

Am in AB 5354. Noise band round about 150 degrees, wind NE 2, cloud ceiling 200m high, moderate visibility.

Reche.

12. Radio message 1007/795:

From Captain U-boats.
According to air reports, ice limit runs approximately from 5230 to 5750 and roughly in the direction of Jan Mayen. All AB.

13. Radio message 1645/702:

Am in AB 5814. No contact since 1900 yesterday. Met Benker. Am searching on south-westerly course. Port Diesel temporarily out of order. Wind NNW 4, cloudy, moderate visibility.

Reche.

14. Radio message 1640/703:

1. In AB 5550 about 1200. Met boats. Reche steering about 210 degrees. Agreed with "Göllnitz": fan 210 degrees - 270 degrees. So far no contact.
2. Atmospheric pressure 991 millibars, rising, cloudy 200m, wind NNE 3 - 4, snow showers, misty, visibility 3 - 8 miles.
3. Am in AB 5726, 2 bow, 1 stern, plus 2.

Benker.

3 February 1943.

15. Radio message 0440/709:

Most Immediate. At sudden increase of visibility,

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made out 2 large steamers and 2 escort vessels, course S.W. Lost in driving snow, hydrophone bearing 280 degrees. Suspect mean course 240 degrees. Am pursuing. AB 7369.

Reche.

16. Radio message 0747/711:

Escort vessel AB 7387. Suspect port stern escort.

Reche.

17. Short signal 0915:

Enemy's position is AB 7379, course 240 degrees.

U255.

18. Radio message 1115/715:

Convoy AB 7536. Am ahead to port together with second boat. Visibility up to 20 miles, wind north 3, height of cloud 100m.

Reche.

19. Radio message 1740/719:

To Benker:
Return to Narvik West Fjord, as soon as fuel situation makes it necessary.

20. Radio message 2317/722:

From Captain U-boats:
If no contact or definite clues, at 0800 on 4 February:

Göllnitz 9870 AA,
Reche 2320 AE.

4 February 1943.

21. Radio message 0030/725:

No contact, am returning. Request to Harstad for re-provisioning. AA 9938. Cloudy, wind ENE 2, snow showers, atmospheric pressure 1013 millibars, visibility 1.3 miles.

Benker.

22. Radio message 2245/726: (3 February).

Forced to submerge by 3 destroyers in AB 7478. No contact with convoy.

Benker.

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23. Short signal 0535:

Passage impeded by drift ice fields but possible for ships and boats. My position is AA 9685.

U255.

24. Radio message 1836/734:
1843/735:

From Captain U-boats:
Return routes:

- 1) Göllnitz via 9850 AA, 7450, 7550, 7360, 5340, 6150, to 6690 AB,
- 2) Reche via 9890 AA, 7480, 7580, 8170, 5820 AB to Narvik Andfjord. Putting into Hersted optional.

Appendix II

Chart.

4er Faecher	- 4-fan.
1 Treffer beob	- 1 hit seen.
3 Treffer gehorcht	- 3 hits heard.
Aufkl. Str.	- reconnaissance line.
Vp. Str.	- patrol line.
Dpf Greylock versenkt	- steamer "Greylock" sunk.
Treffer auf 5000 BRT Dpf gehörcht	- hit heard on 5000 G.R.T. steamer.
aufzulegen auf Ø Karte 1190G	- Lay on chart 1190G.

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Appendix III, 1.

2 February 1943.

Radio message 0146/158/792:

To Sickel.

1. Put to sea at 0800. At 1000 convoy at Point 56, proceed onwards via LoppHAVET.
2. Make for 5550 AB at speed 10 - 14 knots, weather permitting.
3. Further orders by radio messages.
4. Confirm by radio message.

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Appendix III, 2.

2 February, 1943.

Captain U-boats Norway.

Most Secret.

2 February, 1943.

Sailing order for "U355"

1. Put to sea at 0800 on 2 February. After taking on pilot in Loedingen, proceed via Harstad through Andfjord.
2. Make for 5580 AB at cruising speed 10 - 14 knots weather permitting. Further orders by radio messages.
3. "U302" (Sickel) is putting to sea from Kaafjord at 0800 on 2 February and is making for 5550 AB.
4. U355 and U302 intended to attack damaged vessels and stragglers from the convoy last reported by U255 at 1903 on 1 February, in 6259 AB on course 270 degrees.

Appendix IV, 1.

Copy.

On Board, 5 February, 1943.

Emergency Group North.

" Naval War Staff/1st Div. for information.
" C-in-C. Cruisers - Ops - " " :
" Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten " " .

Most Secret: Short report on operation against west-bound convoy, 1 - 4 February, 1943.

1. Convoy intercepted at 1140 on 1 February in AB 6369 by U255 (Reche). Course 270 degrees. Speed 10 knots. Composed of 12 - 16 steamers, strongly escorted by 12 destroyers and patrol vessels.
2. All 3 boats in Bear Island passage - U255 (Reche), U625 (Benker), U657 (Gollnitz) - set on convoy.
3. Contact made by U625 (Benker) at 1600 on 1 February, at 1845 attacked convoy in 6263 AB. Fan of four on 7 overlapping steamers. Range 2800m. 1 hit seen, 3 heard. Intercepted by destroyer. Depth charge attack.
4. During course of operation boats several times attacked and forced off by strong escort. Casualties on U625. Contact - lost for a time - regained by reconnaissance line from 4882 to 7344 AB on morning of 3 February.
5. At 1412 on 3 February, steamer Greylock - New York - of 7460 GRT sunk by U255 (Reche), further hit on 5000 ton steamer heard.
6. Contact lost during further course of operation as a result of strong defenses. New patrol line with 2 boats at 0800 on 4 February from AA 7870 to AE 2320. No more contact. Ice limit reached to the north. Operation broken off at 2000 on 4 February.
7. U625 (Benker) dispatched home on evening of 3 February because of lack of fuel. U302 (Sickel) and U355 (La Baume) speedily made ready on 1 February, put out from Nervik and Kaafjord at 0800 on 2 February. No longer possible to contact convoy. Scheduled to attack stragglers and occupy Bear Island position.
8. Position: 3 U-boats in action against convoy.
Result: 1 steamer sunk, 1 steamer torpedoed,
4 hits heard on steamer. Effect not observed because of A/S measures.
The tenacity and good tactics of U255 (Reche) and U625 (Benker) are to be stressed. Attacks were made appreciably more difficult by very strong escort and periods of poor visibility.

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9. Luftwaffe operations severely limited because of weather. No attacks.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most secret 82.

Appendix IV, 2.

Copy

Teleprinter message:

Emergency. Group North.

Most Secret S.O.s only. In connection with Admiral Northern Waters S.O.s only 70 First Admiral's Staff Officer, of 26 January.

During the operation against the westbound convoy 1 - 4 February, it has been proved again that the prospects of success are extremely limited with the number of boats available, owing to the present very strong escorts. Because of the dockyard situation in the Norwegian area, at present no more than 5 boats are available for current operations. In these circumstances neither can the offensive assignments, i.e. attacking supplies for Russia, as mentioned previously, be carried out successfully, nor could large-scale defensive measures against enemy landings be carried out effectively, should they become necessary.

Only 3 U-boats were available to attack the last convoy.

Admiral Northern Waters Most Secret 94 S.O.s only.

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix V.

Copy.

G.I.S. Station Kiel 315 One M. Secret of 1 February 1943.

Secret. Foreign Office Intelligence One M. reports:

U.S.S.R., Great Britain, U.S.A.

Report upon the preparations for the Anglo-American deliveries scheduled for Archangel in 1943. Source Wellington, well-informed agent: Scottish port of Leith is scheduled as port of embarkation for 1943 for transports bound for Archangel. Following plans already drawn up for these deliveries:

The Canadian icebreakers, at present on service in the White Sea, are to be sent to Leith for repairs, where the repair dockyards are being prepared for this purpose.

To relieve Russian dockyards, it is intended to build a good-sized repair dockyard in Archangel where the transports damaged en route are to be repaired. This is considered necessary as the British Admiralty is of the opinion that the Russians will not be able to hold Murmansk much longer.

Tankers will only sail to Archangel from the U.S.A., while 5 colliers will run regularly from Leith to supply bunker coal for the British ships putting out from Murmansk.

Copies to: Admiral Norway, Army C-in-C Norway
Serial 5 Group North and Baltic Naval Station.




CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY
OF
CAPTAIN U. BOATS NORWAY.
CAPTAIN PETERS.

16 - 28 February, 1943.

PG/31829



16 February 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 302 6360 southern half and
6390 northern half.
U 355 6380 southern half and
6620 northern half.
U 622 6630 southern half and
6660 northern half.
U 657 6650 southern half and
6680 northern half, all AB.

In port:

U 255, Narvik.
U 354, 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 592, 625, 629, 703 Bergen.
U 209, 601 Kiel.
U 586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 334 put in to Bergen at 1500.
U 251 put in to Narvik at 1600.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Armed sea reconnaissance - 73 degrees N. - 33 degrees
E. - Cape Teriberski - Kirkenes.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Fan reconnaissance from Bardufoss and Tromsø area.
AB 7171 to 5218.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance southwest of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

1332 Radio message 1158/752 received:
Most immediate. Am pursuing single vessel
in AB 6363, course east, 12 knots.
1547 Radio message 1501/754 received:
Steamer 4000 G.R.T., AC 4121, course NE,
13 knots.

Sickel.

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(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

Naval High Command radio reconnaissance reports strikingly heavy English operational traffic, probably of American origin on the morning of 14 and 15 February with Archangel and Murmansk. Reason not recognized.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

The single vessel, first intercepted by Sickel at 1158 in AB 6363 and again reported at 1547 from AC 4121, course NE, speed 13 knots, tried to escape to the east at high speed by keeping close to the drift-ice limit.

2118

The boats operating on Sickel's single vessel receive instructions in radio message 2118/756 to continue the search till 1400 on 17 February, as Sickel seems to have lost contact meanwhile and Luftwaffe is scheduled to operate on it during the morning of 17 February.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

17 February, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 302	6360	southern half and
	6390	northern half.
U 355	6380	southern half and
	6620	northern half.
U 622	6630	southern half and
	6660	northern half.

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U 657 6650 southern half and
6680 northern half, all AB.

In port:

U 255 Narvik.
U 354, 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 334, 592, 625, 629, 703 Bergen.
U 209, 601 Kiel.
U 586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 251 0700 put out from Narvik for Hammerfest
by inner leads.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Reconnaissance on single vessel reported on previous
day between 29 degrees and 38 degrees as far as
74 degrees 30 minutes N.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance southwest of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

Shadows' reports from U 302 (Sickel) and
U 622 (Queck).

(b) By air reconnaissance:

AC 5113, one merchant ship of 5000 G.R.T.,
course 120 degrees.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to interception of Russian radio traffic,
4 enemy submarines at sea. Submarine M 17 put
out for Barents Sea after trimming in Olenya Bay.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:)

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:)

0241 "U 302" (Sickel) reports in radio message
0050/760: "Contact lost, AC 1893. Hydrophone
bearing 135 degrees (true), wind N.W.5,
visibility 500 m., pursuing."

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- 1200 Fliieger Fuehrer North (East) reports in radio message 112/126: At 0955 27 East 9569 (naval grid square AC 5113) one merchant ship, 5000 G.R.T., course 120 degrees. Thus, single vessel hunted by U 302 (Sickel) and U 622 (Queck) was also intercepted by air reconnaissance and from 1120 to 1145 was attacked in AC 5126 by 4 Ju 88 without visible success.
- 1640 U 622 (Queck) reports in radio message 1507/767:
- (1) No attack by day, as steamer managed to escape because of heavy drift-ice.
 - (2) Have contact in AC 2856, course 100 degrees.
- 1900 U 622 (Queck) reports in radio message 1755/770: "Steamer gone 7 miles into heavy drift-ice, course 110 degrees, AC 2971. Must break off pursuit because of ice danger. Making for old operational area."
- 1940 Corrupt radio message 1602/76S received from U 302 (Sickel): according to which he missed with fan of three in submerged attack; at night after a fan of two, considerable percussion heard in boat after 80 seconds. Presumably pistol failure. Boat abandoned pursuit when port Diesel failed.

In spite of a valiant pursuit and the execution of an attack by U 302 in the most difficult circumstances the boats U 302 (Sickel) and U 622 (Queck) were denied success as a result of unfavorable weather and ice conditions. The steamer made full use of the drift-ice and so eluded further pursuit. The boats are too exposed to ice damage, in particular because of their shutters. Improvement is only possible if the shutters are abandoned. If they were abandoned, however, it would mean a reduction in maximum speed by about 1 knot as well as an increase in fuel consumption, and this course of action can therefore not be recommended.

Hence the U-boats were tactically correct in abandoning the pursuit in view of the danger of ice damage.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

18 February 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 302, 355, 622, 657 in and approaching newly allocated attack areas AB 6360, 6380, 6630, 6650.

In port:

U 255 Narvik.
U 354, 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 334, 592, 625, 629, 703 Bergen.
U 209, 601 Kiel.
U 586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 251 proceeding from Narvik to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East): No sea reconnaissance because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations because of weather.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic 3 enemy submarines at sea.

- (d) By naval forces: None
- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic: None.
- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

(d) Miscellaneous:

1250 U 355 (La Baume) requests permission to put in to Hammerfest to disembark sick man. He is ordered to transfer the sick man at 0800 on 19 February to U 302 in AB 6365, as this boat has been recalled from the operational area because of lack of fuel.

V. Reports of successes:

One Ju 88, operating on the single vessel yesterday, subsequently reported low-level attack from height of 40 m. in 4113 AC. After 2 hits on the bridge, parts of bridge observed floating in the water, ship damaged.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

19 February 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 355 6360)
U 622 6380) All AB.
U 657 6630)

In port:

U 255 Narvik.
U 354, 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 334, 592, 625, 629, 703 Bergen.
U 209, 601 Kiel.
U 586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 251 put into Hammerfest at 2200.
U 302 returning to Hammerfest from operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Probing and strip reconnaissance between 14 degrees and 19 degrees E.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

No sea reconnaissance because of weather.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic 5 enemy submarines at sea.

- (d) By naval forces: None.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

By the enforced withdrawal of U 302, the most southerly position of the attack area occupied hitherto, will be left open until U 251 (Timm) reaches the operational area (provisionally on the evening of 20 February).
Attack areas occupied at present:- see above.

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

20 February 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

- (a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 355	6360)	
U 622	6380)	All AB.
U 657	6630)	

In port:

U 255 Narvik.
U 251 Hammerfest.
U 354, 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 334, 592, 625, 629, 703 Bergen.
U 209, 601 Kiel.
U 586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 251 put out from Hammerfest at 1540.
U 302 returning to Narvik from operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance of Bear Island.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 4 enemy submarines at sea.

- (d) By naval forces: None.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

With the arrival of U 251 (Timm) in the operational area at noon 20 February, the passage south of Bear Island will again be occupied by 4 boats in a north-south formation extending for 72 miles.

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

21 February, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 355 6360)
U 622 6380) All AB.
U 657 6630)

In port:

U 255 Narvik.
U 354, 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 334, 592, 625, 629, 703 Bergen.
U 209, 601 Kiel.
U 586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 251 proceeding from Hammerfest to operational
area.
U 302 put into Narvik at 1400.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance southwest of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 3 enemy
submarines at sea.

- (d) By naval forces: None.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy
traffic: None.
- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.

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- V. Reports of successes: None.
- VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.
- (Signed) Peters.
-

22 February, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 355 6360)
U 622 6380)
U 657 6630) All AB..
U 251 6650)

In port:

U 255, 302 Narvik.
U 354, 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 334, 592, 625, 629, 703 Bergen.
U 209, 601 Kiel.
U 586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 255 put out from Narvik to operational area at 1100.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance, Banak to 75 degrees N. and between 10 degrees E. and Bear Island.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance southwest of Jan Mayen.

CONFIDENTIAL

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance:

1300 A heavy cruiser, 2 destroyers, course 240 degrees, high speed, AA 9853.

- (c) By radio intercept service:

1030 According to Naval High Command radio intelligence, British unit located by direction finder from Kirkenes at 1030, bearing 268 degrees. Transmitting urgent radio messages.

According to Russian radio traffic, 3 enemy submarines at sea, at 1500 1 Schtsch submarine put out for Barents Sea after trimming in Olenya Bay.

- (d) By naval forces: None.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations:

From G.I.S. station, Kiel: German Espionage Agency, Spain, reports on 20 February, 1943 that at Boston ships are being prepared and loaded with war material and provisions for large convoy to Russia. Date of departure from Boston supposedly 25 February, 1943.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic: None.
- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None:

VI. Survey of the situation:

In view of the very heavy Murmansk radio traffic during the past days and the lively activity of ice-breakers at the approaches to the White Sea, it can probably be assumed that the formation (1 heavy cruiser, 2 destroyers) reported by air reconnaissance about 1300 was the same as those units located shortly before by the Main Naval D/F Station, Kirkenes, as transmitting urgent radio messages. Presumably the cruiser gave part escort up to Jan Mayen to a convoy sailing from Iceland to Russia, and was already returning.

(Signed) Peters.

23 February, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 355 6360)
U 622 6380)
U 657 6630) All AB.
U 251 6650)

In port:

U 302 Narvik.
U 354, 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 334, 592, 625, 629, 703 Bergen.
U 209, 601 Kiel.
U 586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 255 proceeding from Narvik to operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Sea reconnaissance in area: North Cape - 16 degrees E., 72 degrees N. - 10 degrees E., 75 degrees N. - Bear Island.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Fan reconnaissance of Tromsø - AB 5184 - AB 7171 up to the ice limit.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance southwest of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 1125 convoy in AB 5869, course 90 degrees, slight speed.

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 2 enemy submarines at sea. Submarine M 172 put out at 1600 for Barents Sea after trimming in Olenya Bay.

This morning, Staff of Russian Northern Waters Fleet gave, among other messages, a reconnaissance report to all submarines in the operational area. Several units were located by direction finder, bearings of 244 degrees to 281 degrees, by Main Naval D/F Station, Kirkenes on 36.19 m.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:)

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:)

1320 Air reconnaissance report of 1125 received: Convoy in 5866 AB, course E.

1334 The 4 boats south of Bear Island and U 255 (approaching) were ordered to form patrol-line at midnight 23/24 February from 6435 to 6816 AB.

According to air reconnaissance report, composition of convoy is 25 steamers and 20 escorts in full screen.

The patrol-line is drawn up for a convoy speed of 10 knots, with the intention of intercepting the convoy at night if possible, and at any rate to remain well to windward so that a new formation can be drawn up at dawn.

1903 Accordingly, an order was sent to form patrol line from 6377 to 6687 at 0600. Proceed at 0100 if up to then no contact with the enemy. The prospects of gaining contact by night are slight, particularly as details of the convoy are gappy so far. The main thing at the moment is not to let the boats get behind the convoy.

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(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

24 February, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 355, 622, 657, 251, 255 in patrol line from
AB 6377 to 6687.

In port:

U 302 Narvik.
U 354, 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 334, 592, 625, 629, 703 Bergen.
U 209, 601 Kiel.
U 586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 629 put out from Bergen to operational area
at 1400.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological and convoy reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance south-west of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

See current operations on convoy.

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) By air reconnaissance:

- 1230 Enemy convoy in AB 6376, mean course east, speed 10 knots.
- 1430 Composition of enemy convoy: 21 merchant ships, about 20 escorts in full screen. Merchant ships in 4 lines - ahead.

(c) By radio intercept service:

In the forenoon Staff of Russian Northern Waters Fleet transmitted reconnaissance reports among other things to all submarines in the operational area.

According to Russian radio traffic, 2 enemy submarines at sea.

Russian submarine M 172 put out from Olenya Bay for Barents Sea in the afternoon.

According to Russian radio intelligence three German U-boats were intercepted on 24 February at 0245, 1650 and 2030. Positions unresolved.

These intercepted U-boats will be 3 of our boats which transmitted at the times given.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

- 0253 So as not to fall behind, considering the convoy's speed of 10 knots by dead reckoning, the patrol-line was ordered to advance at 0800, course 90 degrees, speed 10 knots. As the enemy was not contacted by this means, I considered it correct to intercept the convoy at the place where it would be most heavily concentrated, i.e. south of Bear Island.
- 0935 Boats were therefore instructed to be in patrol - line from AB 6291 to AB 6931 by 1100.

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- 1315 Report received from U 255 (Reche), according to which he located by D/F shadowing aircraft, bearing 306 degrees, from 6932 AB at 1140. It would seem from this that our air reconnaissance has intercepted the convoy ahead of the patrol-line.
- 1343 To obtain further details, the boats were instructed, if possible, to report bearings of air shadower together with position and time.
- 1405 Telephone message from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten on 2 convoy reports of 1230 and 1305.
- 1414 Radio message 1414/752 sent:
"From Captain U-boats:
Permission for all to attack on air report. Convoy at 1300 in 6382 AB, course 90 degrees, speed 8 - 9 knots." Thus, the mean position of the convoy was given to the boats. The convoy was close to the ice-limit and would have been intercepted by the most northerly position in the patrol line.
- 1457 Radio message 1407/753 received: "Convoy AB 6632, easterly course, heavy snow squalls. Queck."
- 1517 Radio message 1517/756:
"From Captain U-boats:
(1) Operate on Queck's report.
(2) Queck: Send D/F signals on "Fritz"; do not attack until further boat reports contact."
- 1520 According to air report the convoy consists of 21 merchant ships and about 20 escort vessels. Escort in full screen, steamers in 4 lines ahead.
- 1525 Further shadower's report is received from "Queck", according to which the convoy was in 4171 AC at 1500. This position lies considerably further north than the first, but is more probable as it coincides roughly with the air reconnaissance positions, "Queck" reports contact currently during the next few hours, roughly every hour.
- 1730 (Göllnitz) gains contact for a short period but is forced off. From 2100 there have been no more shadower's reports.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

(1) The convoy is very strongly escorted and is advancing at a relatively high speed (9 - 10 knots). The prospects of success are slight with the small number of boats available, particularly, as we cannot expect strong support from the Luftwaffe in splitting up the escort and the convoy because of the season and the lack of forces.

(2) Radio intercept service has for the first time given a definite report of detection of U-boats in Northern Waters by enemy radio D/F. Up to the present the danger of radio direction finding in Northern

Waters has been regarded as relatively slight; from now on far greater attention must be paid to extensive radio silence and the U-boats must be trained accordingly.

(Signed) Peters.

25 February, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 355, 622, 255, 251, 657 on convoy in AC 43 right half and 51 left half.

In port:

U 302 Narvik.
U 354, 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 334, 592, 625, 703 Bergen.
U 209, 601 Kiel.
U 586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 629 proceeding from Bergen to operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance in direction of Bear Island and east of it.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats:)
(b) By air reconnaissance:) See current operations
(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 4 enemy submarines at sea.

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According to X-radio intercept report of 25 February, Kharlov and Bololeni were informed that from 1200 on 25 February an unknown number of heavy cruisers are to be expected in Kola Bay.

According to radio traffic from S.O., Destroyer Flotilla: destroyer "Uritski" and 3 others are at sea.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Agent's report. See Appendix V, 1 and 2.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:)

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:)

As no report has been received for 4 hours, it must be supposed that contact has been lost.

0138 Radio message 0138/770:

"From Captain U-boats:

If no contact or definite clues at 0800, form patrol-line from 2787 to 5187 AC in the following order: La Baume, Queck, Reche, Timm, Gollnitz."

0310 Report from "Queck" arrives according to which the boat fired and missed with fan of three in an attack on a destroyer at 2142. The weather in the operational area was wind SW 6 - 7, sea 6, snow shower, visibility bad. After U 657 (Gollnitz) obtained a hydrophone bearing on the convoy at 0110 at visibility of 500 m. in 4282 AC,

0427 radio message 0324/773 was received:

"0300 convoy AB 4269 lower left, course 80 degrees, location 140 miles horizontal. SSW 4, sea 4.

Reche."

Contact has therefore been regained.

0722 "Queck" reports contact by short signal, La Baume and Gollnitz make contact about 0900, so that 4 boats are with the convoy. More current shadowers' reports come in from the boats. Up to now the convoy's course has generally been due east. Air reconnaissance also has a shadowing aircraft on the convoy.

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1021 Attack by 14 Ju 88 is reported for 1130.

A new evaluation of the convoy shows:
22 merchant ships, 1 tanker 8000 G.R.T.,
2 light cruisers, 4 destroyers, 4 torpedo
boats, 10 escorts. According to reports from
U 355 (La Baume) the convoy altered course
about 1100 to S.E.

1609 Boats are informed of ships damaged by
air attack. According to information from
air reconnaissance regarding the air attack
at about 1200, 2 ships were heavily damaged
and one of them probably sunk. Two more
are slightly damaged, among them a tanker.

1850 Position report received from U 251 (Timm).
Boat did not manage to fire at 1200, reports
detached search groups, and from the point of
view of engines is fit for only 12 more
miles.

1921 U 657 (Göllnitz) reports submerged attack
failures because of periscope trouble.

1947 La Baume gives convoy position at 1730 as
AC 5521. Boat was forced to submerge
by destroyer with location gear.

2036 Radio message 2036/793:

From Captain U-boats:

- (1) Presume convoy course south-east during
the night
- (2) Who has contact?
- (3) All boats report position by short signal
at 2300.

This is intended to help the boats to clarify
the situation and to provide data for continuing
the operation. It appears from the position
reports received that "Reche", "Göllnitz" and
"Queck" are roughly level with the convoy
according to the fix taken on the assumption
of a convoy speed of 9 knots; while "La Baume"
and "Timm" are farther behind.

V. Reports of successes:

One merchant ship of 6000 G.R.T. sunk by aircraft,
one merchant ship damaged. 3 merchant ships probably
damaged.

VI. Survey of the situation:

- (1) The heavy cruisers reported by radio intercept
service (see Para. III c) as putting in to
Murmansk as from 1200 on 25 February are probably
connected with this convoy. Last year, too, the
cruisers of the convoy escort were several times

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detected in Murmansk. Nor is there anything new in the S.O. Destroyer Flotilla being at sea on the "Uritski" with 3 other destroyers. When this has happened before, 3 or 4 Russian destroyers were almost always sent to meet the convoy and strengthen its escort.

- (2) A definite conclusion as to the convoy's port of destination cannot yet be drawn. From the recent reports on ice-breaker activity it would seem that the approaches to the White Sea are probably navigable.
- (3) Two boats have reported radar location by destroyers. With the bad visibility this method of defense is particularly effective because, if the boats do not submerge at each location noise, thus abandoning a favorable position, they can be easily surprised and rammed.

The urgent and repeated request for the equipment of Northern Waters boats with radar-location observation apparatus, to protect them from surprises and to facilitate shadowing in snow squalls and bad visibility, is proved even more necessary by these observations.

(Marginal note:- The equipment of boats is now proceeding smoothly. Part of the new boats which have recently been sent from Germany are already equipped.

(Signed) Naval High Command,
Staff Officer, U-boats)

(Signed) Peters.

26 February, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 251, 255, 355, 622, 657 operating on convoy in AC 67 western half and 59 southern half.

In port:

U 302 Narvik.
U 354, 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 334, 592, 625, 703 Bergen.
U 209, 601 Kiel.
U 586 Hamburg.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 629 proceeding from Bergen to operational area.
U 251 proceeding from operational area to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance of Bear Island and east of it.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:)
(b) By air reconnaissance:) See current operations.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic
3 enemy submarines at sea.

According to X-radio intercept report, an
unknown warship, one ice-breaker, 3 patrol
vessels and British minesweeper "Britomard"
left Kola Bay for Barents Sea at 1200.

British unit reported at 1237 aircraft attack
on convoy "Tic-tac" (PQ 22 (?)) 150 miles
NNE of Murmansk.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:)

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:)

0109 Radio message 0109/798 sent:

"From Captain U-boats.

At 0700 form patrol line from 6749 to 8342
in the order Gollnitz, Reche, La Baume,
Queck, Timm."

By this patrol line it was hoped to re-intercept
the enemy at dawn. However this measure was not
carried out, as U 255 (Reche) gained contact
with the escorts astern at 0132 in AC 5658.

0232 The boats were ordered to operate on Reche's
report. According to further shadower's reports
from U 255 (Reche) the convoy has been on a
south-easterly course since 0300 (AC 5697).

0605 Radio message 0511/706 to hand:

"To Captain U-boats.

Only one Diesel clear for 8 knots. Can no
longer reach attack position. Am in 5887. Need
12 fuel pumps at Hammerfest. Timm."

The boat is only at very limited operational
readiness for further duties. From this message
it was not clear whether he was returning. I
presumed that the boat was continuing to operate as
far as possible under the circumstances and
intended to set him on stragglers and damaged
ships should there be any. Actually the boat

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started to return at this time. A corresponding report should have been made.

Contact is maintained by U 255 with one short break. The convoy is steering south. In its morning reconnaissance, the Luftwaffe too picked up the enemy. The boats were informed of the intended attack by 12 Ju 88 at 1130. According to air shadower's report, the convoy at 0848 consisted of 16 merchant ships, 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers in the advance escort. Fighter protection was with the convoy. From the convoy's course it is not yet clearly recognizable, whether it is steering to Archangel or Murmansk. We presume Archangel. The boats were instructed as follows, so as to avoid our own minefields:

- 1151 Radio message 1151/715:
"From Captain U-boats.
(1) Do not proceed south of the line 2215 AW to 7455 AT.
(2) Continue pursuit up to that line, avail yourselves of every opportunity to attack.
(3) Look out for steamers damaged by aircraft."
- 1532 In case contact is not maintained, the boats will be ordered to a formation in area 94 AC.
- 1800 From reports by U 255 (Reche), U 657 (Güllnitz) and U 622 (Queck) it appears that the convoy is steering a SSW course and is making for Kola Bay."
- 1808 Radio message 1724/724 received:
"Convoy 8634 AC, course 210 degrees - 220 degrees. Forced to submerge by 2 destroyers. "Dete" location on 150 c.m. band. Bad visibility, snow squalls. Queck
- In Kola Bay directly off the coast increased A/S measures are to be expected; also a safe distance from our own mined areas in these coastal waters must be preserved, considering the necessarily bad navigational data available to the boats (no fix because of weather).
- Hence a limit to the pursuit is set on the southwest.
- 1925 Radio message 1925/727:
"From Captain U-boats.
(1) Do not proceed beyond following limit: 8544, 8555, 8593, 8915, 8948 AC.

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(2) Radio beacon Vardø["] in operation for five minutes 3 times hourly starting at 00 minutes of each hour."

1957 Queck reports 2 loud noise-bands in different directions 145 degrees and 355 degrees from 8637, presumes convoy is dividing.

2026 To clarify the position radio message 2026/730 sent:

"From Captain U-boats:

- (1) If you have data on either part of the convoy, operate accordingly.
- (2) Otherwise consider Murmansk as convoy's destination.
- (3) After abandoning pursuit, occupy:
La Baume 8640, Göllnitz 8670, Queck 8680, Reche 8920 AC."

From hydrophone bearings by Queck and Reche the approximate convoy position is once more obtained; at 2100 it is roughly in 8913 AC. The boats will no longer be able to attack before reaching the limit of their advance, as ordered.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

- (1) The attempts made to attack during the forenoon failed for various reasons. At this time all 5 boats were in very favorable attacking positions and had contact. They did not succeed in scattering the escort, in order that at least some of the boats might fire.
- (2) The rest of the operation was strongly prejudiced by snow squalls and the consequent drop in visibility to 500 m. In spite of very unfavorable conditions the boats tenaciously pursued their target and tried again and again to maintain contact, if only by hydrophone bearings.

(Signed) Peters.

27 February, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 355	8640)	
U 657	8670)	All AC.
U 622	8680)	
U 255	8920)	

In port:

U 302 Narvik.
U 354, 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 334, 592, 625, 703 Bergen.
U 209, 601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 629 proceeding from Bergen to operational area.
U 251 proceeding from operational area to Narvik.
U 586 proceeding from Kiel to Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance in direction of Bear Island.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance south-west of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats:) See current operations.
(b) By air reconnaissance:)
(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 2 enemy submarines at sea. Submarine M 171 at 1600 put out for Barents Sea via Syad Navolok. Unknown warships, one ice-breaker, 3 patrol vessels and British minesweeper "Britomart" put out from Kola Bay to Barents Sea at 1200.

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"M 172" put out in the afternoon from Olenya Bay for Barents Sea. Among arriving escort vessels of the PQ-convoy are 3 cruisers, one of which is the "Belfast", and minesweeper "Jason".

"Cumberland" (?), "Norfolk" (?), "Sheffield", "Belfast" named among the cruisers expected in Kola Bay from 25 February onwards. The first two names are doubtful.

- (d) By naval forces: None.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The operation against the eastbound convoy is virtually over. The boats lie in the attack areas as last ordered and may be successful against possible stragglers or damaged ships. To judge by the shipping now in Murmansk (about 25 steamers), a west-bound convoy may be due to leave in a few days' time with the escort from the arriving convoy.

- 0256 Radio message 0256/741 sent for instruction:
"From Captain U-boats:
(1) Boats remain in position to attack possible stragglers.
(2) Sailing of west-bound convoy not improbable."

With the arrival of U 629 (Bugs) (shortly to be expected) the present formation of the boats will be slightly altered.

- 1157 Radio message 1157/748 sent:
"From Captain U-boats:
New attack areas from 1500:
La Baume 8670
Queck 8920
Göllnitz 8680
Reche 8930."

- 1340 Report received from Flieger Fuehrer North(East) on sighting of part-convoy at 0730 in 2124 AW, consisting of 7 steamers, one tanker, 3 presumed destroyers. This part of the arriving convoy is proceeding very near the coast to the White Sea, but is now so far east that there is no question of attack by U-boats.

2257 U 629 (Bugs), which has meanwhile been brought up from Bergen, was ordered to proceed to 8680 AC after passing 67 degrees N.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

(1) The convoy put in to Kola Bay on the morning of 27 February. From the time it passed Bear Island, the U-boats maintained almost unbroken contact. But only one attack was made (shot on destroyer which missed), and several attempts to attack failed because of A/S measures or other unfavorable conditions.

(2) The following are to be regarded as causes for the unsatisfactory result:

- (a) Too few boats.
- (b) Strong escort (proportion of steamers to escorts, approximately 1 : 1).
- (c) On the second day in particular, there was exceptionally bad visibility, in which the radio-location gear of the destroyers proved particularly disadvantageous to the boats.
- (d) Relatively high convoy speed, (about 9 knots), which made it more difficult for the boats to keep ahead of the convoy.

(3) As earlier experience with strongly escorted convoys has shown, in the difficult conditions prevailing in Northern Waters the best prospects of success are to be found in the skilfully planned maneuvering of a substantial number of U-boats so that as many of them as possible will be able to take part in a simultaneous attack. This seems to be the only possible way of hauling ahead of the strong remote escort and of drawing off the escort so that at least some of the boats are enabled to attack. The method to be employed in this connection is being worked out and must be put to the test. Such an operation presupposes the use of a greater number of boats.

(Signed) Peters.

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28 February, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 355	8670)	
U 657	8680)	All AC.
U 622	8920)	
U 255	8930)	

In port:

U 302 Narvik.
U 354, 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 334, 592, 625, 703 Bergen.
U 209, 601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 629 proceeding from Bergen to operational area.
U 251 proceeding from operational area to Narvik.
U 586 proceeding from Kiel to Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance of Bear Island.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Probing reconnaissance - Tromsø - AB 7171 - 5955.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance broken off because of weather.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
(b) By air reconnaissance:

According to main photographic reconnaissance report the following ships are in Kola Bay: 8 destroyers, 51 freighters totaling 281,000 G.R.T., 4 tankers together of 40,000 G.R.T., 1 tanker 6,800 G.R.T. in floating dock, 1 tanker 9,300 G.R.T. in drydock, 3 ships of undetermined type.

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(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 3 enemy submarines at sea. Several units and warships in Murmansk area according to British radio traffic. From Staff of Russian Northern Waters Fleet, reconnaissance reports sent among others to submarines in the operational area.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic: None.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

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APPENDIX I.

-COPY-

16 February.

1332 Radio message 1158/752:

Most immediate. Am pursuing single vessel, AB 6363, course east, 12 knots.

1547 Radio message 1501/754:

Steamer 4,000 G.R.T., AC 4121, course N-E, 13 knots.

-Sickel-

2118 Radio message 2118/113/756:
From Captain U-boats:

(1) Boats: operate on "Sickel's" single steamer: continue to search till 1400. Luftwaffe operation intended. From 0800 look out for D/F signals from shadower on "Bruno".

(2) Sickel: report last position.

17 February.

0241 Radio message 0050/760:

Contact lost AC 1893, hydrophone bearing 135 degrees true, NW5, visibility 500 m., pursuing.

-Sickel-

1041 Radio message 1041/765:
From Captain U-boats:

Occupy as follows:

Sickel	6360	
La Baume	6380	
Queck	6630	
Göllnitz	6650,	all AB.

1200 Radio message 1112/126:
All:

At 0955 in 27 E. 9569, 1 merchant ship up to 5,000 G.R.T., course 120 degrees, weather 7-10 under cloud base 700 m., visibility 20 k.m., wind 320 degrees, 20 k.m. per hour.

-Flieger Fuehrer/East-

1640 Radio message 1507/767:
Captain U-boats:

- (1) No attack by day, as steamer has escaped into the heavy drift-ice.
- (2) Have contact AC 2856, course 100 degrees.

-Queck-

1900 Radio message 1758/770:
Captain U-boats:

Steamer has advanced 7 miles into heavy drift-ice. Course 110 degrees, AC 2971. Must abandon pursuit because of danger from ice. Returning to old operational area.

-Queck-

1940 Radio message 1602/768:
Captain U-boats:

- (1) Submerged fan of three in forenoon: miss because of miscalculation of speed.
- (2) At night fan of two: after 80 seconds dull report heard in boat. Presume pistol failure.
- (3) 0230 Port engine failed, pursuit abandoned.
- (4) 6 plus 2 torpedoes 28 cbm.

-Sickel-

19 February.

0012 Radio message 0012/783:
From Captain U-boats:

From 0800/19 February, new attack areas:

La Baume	6360	
Queck	6380	
Göllnitz	6630,	all AB.

23 February.

1320 Radio message 1230/188:
Most immediate. All:

D3-906 reports: at 1125 convoy in 07 E. 7385 (AB 5860), course 90 degrees, slight speed. Aircraft shadowing till 1400.

-Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten-

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1334 Radio message 1334/735:
From Captain U-boats:

(1) Convoy at 1125 in 5866, course east.
(2) Form patrol line from 6435 to 6816:
La Baume, Queck, Gollnitz, Timm and Reche.
All AB.

1550 Radio message 1455/192:
Most immediate. All:

Reported convoy consists of 25 merchant ships,
20 escorts in full screen, deep. Open
cruising disposition, course 100 degrees,
aircraft lost contact at 1245 owing to
bad visibility.

-Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten-

1903 Radio message 1903/740:
From Captain U-boats:

If enemy is not contacted by 0100, proceed to
new patrol-line from 6377 to 6687: be there
at 0600.

24 February.

0253 Radio message 0253/744/107:
From Captain U-boats:

If enemy is not sighted by 0800, patrol-line.
Proceed on 90 degrees, 10 knots.

0935 Radio message 0935/747/115:
From Captain U-boats:

At 1100 be in patrol-line from 6391 to 6931 AB.

1315 Radio message 1156/750:

Am in 6932 at 1140. Radio D/F bearing 306
degrees, 446 kcs., identification signal BIK 1,
SW 4, sea 8, 3/10 cloud, clear visibility.

-Reche-

1343 Radio message 1343/751:
All from Captain U-boats:

Report last bearing, if any, of shadowing
aircraft, with position and time.

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- 1405 Telephone message received from Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:
(1) 1230 17 E. 7745 (AB 6376) convoy, course east, speed 10 knots.
(2) 1305 17 E. 8418 (AB 6381) convoy, course 90 degrees.
- 1414 Radio message 1414/752:
From Captain U-boats:
All permitted to attack on air reconnaissance report. Convoy at 1300 in 6382 AB, course 90 degrees, speed 8 - 9 knots.
- 1430 Radio message 1345/123:
Most immediate. All:
1230 Enemy convoy in 7445, 17 E. (AB 6376), mean course east, moderate speed 10 knots.
-Flieger Fuehrer North/East-
- 1457 Radio message 1407/753:
Convoy AB 6632, course east, heavy snow squalls.
-Queck-
- 1520 Radio message 1430/124:
Most immediate. All:
Composition of enemy convoy: 21 merchant ships, about 20 escort vessels in full screen, merchant ships in 4 lines ahead.
-Flieger Fuehrer North/East-
- 1525 Radio message 1500/754:
Convoy 4171, course 90 degrees, speed 9 knots.
-Queck-
- 1517 Radio message 1517/756/129:
From Captain U-boats:
(1) Operate on Queck's report.
(2) Queck: send D/F signals on "Fritz": do not attack until a further boat reports contact.
- 1704 Radio message 1618/758:
Square 4172, course east, speed 9 knots. Am sending D/F signals.
-Queck-

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1707 Radio message 1556/759:
Am in 4427 AC: last bearing 142 degrees true.
-La Baume-

1752 Radio message 1711/760:
Convoy in 4181 AC, 90 degrees, 9 knots.
-Queck-

1830 Radio message 1758/761:
Remote and close escort with convoy in 4182,
90 degrees, 9 - 10 knots.
-Queck-

2100 Radio message 2009/766:
Convoy in 4169, 75 degrees, 10 knots.
-Queck-

25 February.

0138 Radio message 0138/770:
From Captain U-boats:
If no contact or definite clues, form patrol-line
at 0800 from 2787 to 5187 AC in the following
order: La Baume, Queck, Roche, Timm, Gullnitz.

0149 Radio message 0149/769:
From Captain U-boats:
Report immediately by short signal if drift-ice
limit is met.

0320 Radio message 0216/772:
0110 AC 4282 Hydrophone bearing on convoy,
20 degrees true. Snow squalls. Visibility 500 m.
-Gullnitz-

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0310 Radio message 2234/771:

Captain U-boats:

2142 Fan of three on destroyer, missed stern; another miss on destroyers. Leading destroyer at 2210 set green-red lights at masthead. Contact lost. Convoy position at 2000 AC 4169. SW 607, sea 6, snow showers, overcast, bad visibility.

0427 Radio message 0324/773:

0300 Convoy AB 4269 lower left, course 80 degrees; location 140 cm. horizontal. SSW5, sea 4.

-Reche-

0755 Radio message 0700/774:

Convoy AC 4355, course 90 degrees, WSW 5, sea 4, heavy swell, overcast 3, clouds 500, clear visibility.

-Reche-

0855 Radio message 0808/776:

Convoy 4365 90 degrees, cloud 2 lifting, decreasing, visibility 25 miles. Aircraft.

-Reche-

1050 Radio message 0830/154:

Most Immediate. All:

0745 Convoy in 8438 (AC 4397), 27 E.

-Flieger Fuehrer North/East-

0910 Radio message 0843/777:

Convoy is in AC 5149 top center. Course 90 degrees.

-Queck-

1021 Radio message 1021/785:

From Captain U-boats:

Attacking time of Ju 88 about 1130.

1105 Radio message 1005/783:

Convoy in AC 5171, course SE.

-La Baume-

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- 1150 Radio message 1115/784/158:
Convoy is in 5172, course 90 degrees since 1100.
-La Baume-
- 1221 Radio message 1102/159:
0835 8434 - 27 E. Convoy of 22 merchant ships, 1 tanker 8,000, 2 light cruisers, 4 destroyers, 4 torpedo boats, 10 escort vessels, course 90 degrees, moderate speed (11-17 knots).
-Kirkenes-
- 1249 Radio message 1201/785:
Convoy position 5176 AC, 130 degrees, heavy anti-aircraft fire.
-La Baume-
- 1400 Radio message 1312/786/163:
Convoy is in AC 5188, mean course approximately 125 degrees, escort in more loose disposition.
-La Baume-
- 1850 Radio message 1530/789:
Gained attacking position, but owing to turn to SE at 1200 lost chance of firing. Several search groups well away from the convoy prevent surfacing. Pursuing. Both Diesels still not up to 12 knots.
-Timm-
- 1609 Radio message 1609/788:
Luftwaffe has seriously damaged two ships in the attack at 1200 and probably damaged two, one of which is a tanker. Look out for damaged ships.
- 1921 Radio message 1546/791:
5163 AC at 1300 submerged attack failed because of periscope trouble. fukpjesich(?).
-Göllnitz-
- 1850 Radio message 1609/790/171:
Convoy is in AC 5433, speed 9, course 120 degrees.
-La Baume-

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1947 Radio message 1859/792:

5542 forced to submerge by destroyer with location gear, Hydrophone bearing on convoy - 70 degrees, presume course south. Last convoy position at 1730: AC 5521, course east.

-La Baume-

2036 Radio message 2036/793:
From Captain U-boats:

- (1) Presume convoy course south west during the night.
- (2) Who has contact?
- (3) At 2300 all report position by short signal.

26 February.

0007 Radio message BB 2358:

Short signal: My position is AC 5551. Have lost contact.

U 255 -La Baume-

0109 Radio message 0109/798:
From Captain U-boats:

0700 Göllnitz, Reche, La Baume, Queck, Timm:-
form patrol-line from 6749 to 8342.

0200 Radio message 0035/797:

Am in 5657. Illuminant rockets and depth-charges on bearing of 90 degrees. Going towards location.
-Reche-

0224 Radio message 0132/800:

Have contact with escort astern in 5658.
-Reche-

0212 Radio message 0212/702:
From Captain U-boats:

26 February, air reconnaissance intended by 6 Ju 88 to intercept convoy. Start about 0600. From 0700 onwards look out for D/F signals "B".

0232 Radio message 0232/703:
From Captain U-boats:

Operate on Reche's report.

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- 0400 Radio message 0310/74/704:
Convoy AC 5967, speed 9 knots, course SE, NW 3,
sea 2, overcast visibility 3 miles.
-Reche-
- 0525 Radio message 0445/705:
Convoy AC 5935, course 140 degrees.
-Reche-
- 0605 Radio message 0511/706:
Captain U-boats:
Only one Diesel still fit for 8 knots. Can no longer
reach attacking position. Am in 5887. Need
12 fuel pumps at Hammerfest.
-Timm-
- 0745 Radio message 0604/707:
Contact lost in snow squalls after unsuccessful
attack. Convoy was in AC 5939 at 0500, course
south.
-Reche-
- 0941 Radio message 0941/708:
From Captain U-boats:
If no other data, assume convoy course 150
degrees, speed 9 knots from 0500.
- 0947 Radio message 0658/709:
0520 Convoy contacted. Forced to submerge by
A/S sweep astern. AC 5936. Light slushy ice.
-Göllnitz-
- 0955 Radio message 0709/710:
Convoy in 6747, course 280 degrees. Ice formation
to the south east. Visibility 12 miles. Cloud 500.
-Reche-
- 0959 Radio message 0832/711:
Convoy is in AC 6774, course south, aircraft.
Dead calm. Moderate swell, overcast 6, 500 high.
Snow showers. Visibility 20 miles.
-Reche-
- 1102 Radio message 0952/712:
Captain U-boats:
0818 Short contact in AC 5995 broken by snow
showers. At 0937 forced to submerge by
aircraft. No more contact.
-Queck-

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1130 Radio message 1010/190:

Most immediate. 0848 Convoy in 5220: 37 fighter escorts, 18 merchant ships, 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers ahead, course 150 degrees, moderate speed (11-17 miles).

-Flieger Fuehrer North/East-

1151 Radio message 1151/715:
From Captain U-boats:

(1) Do not proceed south of line from 2215 AW to 7455 AT.

(2) Continue pursuit up to that line, make use of every opportunity to attack.

(3) Look out for steamers damaged by aircraft.

1526 Radio message 1427/719:

Lost contact with escort at 1324 in AC 8163. Forced to submerge. Visibility 6 miles.

-Reche-

1540 Radio message 1415/195:
All:

Attack carried out. No successes observed. Contact lost because of weather.

-Flieger Fuehrer North/East-

1532 Radio message 1532/721:
From Captain U-boats:

If no contact, occupy the following positions from 1830: La Baume 9440, Queck 8690, Reche 9470, Göllnitz 9480 AC.

1645 Radio message 1604/722:

Am in AC 8393. Faint noise band, 225 degrees. Snow squalls, visibility 3 miles.

-Reche-

1712 Radio message 1613/723:

Convoy at 1600 by dead reckoning in AC 8631, course 200 degrees. Contact lost. Heavy snow squalls.

--Göllnitz-

1808 Radio message 1724/724:

Convoy 8634 AC, course 210-220 degrees. Forced to withdraw by 2 destroyers.

"Detelocation on 150 cm. band. Bad visibility. Snow squalls.

-Queck-

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- 1814 Teleprinter message received:
Most immediate. Captain U-boats Norway.
Most secret: Code - B 3441-
- Cancel Main Naval D/F Station Kirkenes G 2601
and insert: British unit "BBU" 26 February
1237 to Murmansk: convoy "Tictac" being attacked
by enemy aircraft in ZCPQ 2051 (7120 N, 3651 O).
Course 195 degrees, speed 8 knots.
"BBU" at 1245 located by D/F 58 degrees.
Main Naval D/F Station Kirkenes,
G 2602.
- 1820 Radio message 1720/104:
All:
- 1425 Convoy in 37 E. 6274 (AC 8357), course
180 degrees. Composition 22 merchant ships,
19 escorts among which are 2 heavy cruisers,
1 light cruiser and 4 destroyers.
-Flieger Fuehrer North/East-
- 1841 Radio message 1841/725/106:
From Captain U-boats:
- Operate on Queck's report.
- 1925 Radio message 1925/727:
From Captain U-boats:
- (1) Do not proceed south west of following
limit: 8544, 8555, 8593, 8915, 8948 AC.
(2) Vardø radio beacon in operation for 5
minutes 3 times hourly, beginning at 00 minutes
each hour.
- 1957 Radio message 1951/726:
- Contact lost AC 8637. Two loud hydrophone
noise bands on 145 degrees and 355 degrees true,
apparently convoy is dividing. Visibility
1000 m. to 1 mile. Snow.
-Queck-
- 2007 By teleprinter:
Emergency Captain U-boats Norway. Secret.
- Code: radio intercept reports message from
British unit: Convoy "Tictac" 195 degrees
at 1237, 8 miles from 71° 20' N. 36° 51' E.
(AC 8553). About 150 miles NNE of Murmansk
attacked by enemy aircraft. Note: It is
probably PQ 22. Position not accurate.
-Naval High Command.
Radio intelligence 1800 Secret-

2026 Radio message 2026/730/110:
From Captain U-boats:

- (1) If you have data on the possible division of the convoy, operate accordingly.
- (2) Otherwise assume Murmansk as convoy's destination.
- (3) After breaking off pursuit occupy:-
La Baume 8640, Göllnitz 8670, Queck 8680,
Reche 8920 AC.

2107 Radio message 2021/729:

Visibility very bad. Noise band 205 degrees -
245 degrees true. Distance of 8 miles. My
position: AC 8665 upper edge left. VVO
(Meteor) 5, BCÜ (Northern Waters) 1.
-Queck-

2255 Radio message 2110/735:

Am in AC 8652. Noise band from 165 degrees -
175 degrees, turning southwards. Snow squalls.
-Reche-

2359 Radio message 2237/736:
Captain U-boats:

Am forced to withdraw to AC 8688 by 2
destroyers with location 140 cm. and depth-
charges. have lost contact. Visibility 1
to 2 miles. NE 2-3, sea 2.
-Queck-

27 February.

0240 Radio message 0045/739:

Am in AC 8691. Was intercepted by destroyer's
location. Am withdrawing northwards for 10
hours to repair one lubricating oil pump and
consequent failure of starboard Diesel.
-Reche-

0256 Radio message 0256/741:
From Captain U-boats:

- (1) Boats remain in attack areas to attack possible stragglers.
- (2) Sailing of westbound convoy not improbable.

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0350 Radio message 0350/743:
From Captain U-boats:

27 February. Air reconnaissance of inshore waters of Kola to western fairway by 1 Ju 88 intended.

1157 Radio message 1157/748/127:
From Captain U-boats:

New attack areas from 1500: La Baume 8670, Göllnitz 8680, Queck 8920, Reche 8930.

1450 Radio message 1315/131:

Most immediate. All:-
0730 in 36 E. 7916 (AW 7124) convoy of 7 freighters 5 - 8,000 G.R.T., 1 tanker 7,000 G.R.T., 3 presumed destroyers, course east, speed 10 knots.

-Flieger Fuehrer North/East.

2257 Radio message 2257/756/160:
From Captain U-boats:

Bugs: Proceed to 8680 AC. Report passing of 32 degrees E. longitude by short signal. Keep 50 miles distance from coast.

28 February.

1115 Radio message 1037/182:
Most immediate. All:

At 0945 46 E. 1730: 10 merchant ships up to 5,000 G.R.T., 3 escorts, 1 tanker mean course 180 degrees. Slight speed.

-Flieger Fuehrer North/East-

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APPENDIX II

(Chart)

Anlage 2 = Appendix 2.

Wegekarte Geleitzug PQ 22 (?) (Tictac) =
Trackchart of convoy PQ 22 (?) (Tictac).

Aufzulegen auf Ø Karte 1903 G =
To be laid on Ø chart 1903 G.

3.er Faecher Einzel (Heck) =
Fan of 3 and single torpedo on stern.

U = U-boat.

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APPENDIX III, 1.

-COPY-

Most Secret

Sailing order for U 629 (Bugs).

- (1) Put out from Bergen on 24 February.
- (2) Proceed to square 66 (six six)AB. Proceed at distance of 50 miles from the coast.
- (3) Eastbound convoy was in 5866 AB at 1125 on 23 February. Operating against it are:
U 251 (Timm), U 255 (Reche), U 355
(La Baume), U 622 (Queck), U 657 (Göllnitz).
- (4) From time of sailing, switch to radio service "Anton", Very Long Wave Northern Waters Service. Report passing of 67 degrees N. by short signal. After receiving confirmation of passing-report switch over to U-boat Northern Waters Wave.

Captain U-boats Norway
Most Secret 406 Al.

APPENDIX III, 2.

-COPY-

Most Secret

Operational Order for "U 251" (Timm).

- (1) Put out from Hammerfest with escort on forenoon of 20 February after refuelling.
- (2) Your attack area will be AB 6650.
- (3) Own boats: See current radio messages.
- (4) Enemy situation:
According to agents' reports we are to expect increased convoy traffic from Reykjavik to Russian ports in February and March.

The appearance of enemy submarines is always possible in the operational area.

- (5) Ice-limit runs approximately from AC 5110 via 1970, 4110, AB 6330 westwards.

Ice reports only on request and if it is impossible to remain in own attack area. Otherwise radio silence except for tactically important reports.

- (6) Contact with single vessel should be reported at once and then every hour. Boats in favorable position will operate on these reports.

- (7) Communications regulations:
U-boat Northern Waters Wave. D/F signals as shadower on "Fritz". In the case of bad radio communications, no short signals.

Whenever possible, append short weather reports and fuel stocks to tactical reports.

- (8) The Regulations for Northern Waters U-boats apply, plus added note on procedure for co-operation with Luftwaffe.

Captain U-boats Norway
Most Secret 336.

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APPENDIX III, 3.

-COPY-

Captain U-boats, Norway.
Serial no. Most Secret 379.

22 February, 1943.

Most Secret.

Operational Order "U 255" (Reche).

(1) Put out from Narvik on 22 February, 1943. Proceed with pilot from Lodingen to Harstad, then via Andfjord to operational area.

(2) Your attack area will be AB 6630.

(3) Own boats lie:

U 355 (La Baume)	6360
U 622 (Queck)	6380
U 657 (Göllnitz)	6630
U 251 (Timm)	6650,

all AB. It is intended to withdraw U 657 after U 255 arrives in the operational area.

(4) Enemy situation:

According to agents' reports we are to expect increased west-east convoy traffic in February and March.

However, apart from the westbound convoy of 1 to 4 February, only one eastbound single vessel has been intercepted on 16 February in AB 6363.

Enemy submarines have lately appeared mainly off Vardø, but a single boat, type "Ursula", was identified on 6 February off Andfjord.

According to Russian radio traffic, an average of four enemy submarines at sea. Their appearance in the operational area is always possible.

(5) Ice limit runs approximately from AC 5110 via 1970, 4110, AB 6360 due west.

Ice reports to be given only on request and if it is impossible to remain in own attack area. Otherwise radio silence except for tactically important reports.

(6) Contact with a single steamer should be reported immediately and then hourly. Boats in favorable position should operate on these reports.

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(7) Communications regulations:

U-boat Northern Waters wave, D/F signals as shadower on "Fritz".

In the case of bad radio communications no short signals. Whenever possible append short weather report and fuel stocks to tactical reports.

(8) The Regulations for Northern Waters U-Boats apply, plus added note on procedure for co-operation with Luftwaffe.

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APPENDIX IV.

-COPY-

Emergency Group North.

Emergency for information of Naval War Staff 1st Div.

Emergency for information of C-in-C (U-boats).

Emergency for information of F.O. (Cruisers).

Emergency for information of Luftflotte 5, Battle Staff Ker

Emergency for information of Luftflotte Command 5, Oslo.

Emergency for information of Flieger Fuehrer North (East).

Emergency for information of Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten.

Emergency for information of 71 Army Corps

(for information of C-in-C).

Clear as multiple address message.

Most secret.

Short report on operation against eastbound convoy
from 24 - 26 February (presumably PQ 22).

(1) Course:

The convoy reported by air reconnaissance in
5866 AB at 1125 on 23 February was intercepted by
U 622 in AB 6395 at 1407 on 24 February. Its route
ran approximately across the following grid squares:-
4170, 4360, 5180, 5520, 5650, 6770, 8630 AC and
on to Kola Bay. Contact was maintained almost
constantly throughout the whole run by corresponding
disposition orders. Convoy last intercepted in
8680 AC at 2030 on 26 February.

(2) Composition of convoy according to air report:

22 steamers, 18 escort vessels: among them
2 heavy, 1 light cruiser, 4-5 destroyers. Four
Russian destroyers went out to meet them
(according to X-radio intercept report).

(3) Operating on convoy: 5 U-boats:

U 251 (Timm), U 255 (Reche), U 355 (La Baume),
U 622 (Queck), U 657 (Göllnitz). Of these, U 251
prematurely abandoned the operation on the
forenoon of 26 February because of Diesel engine
trouble.

(4) Attacks were made, but all without success.
At 2142/25 February U 622 missed with a fan of 3
on a destroyer. Several attempts to attack
failed because of the strength of the escort.

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(5) Escort:

Proportion of steamers to escort forces was nearly 1:1. Strong escort and widely distributed search groups made it more difficult to keep ahead. The generally poor visibility was particularly hampering. For this reason several boats were intercepted by means of the destroyers' radar and attacked. With the small number of U-boats available, it was impossible to penetrate or split up the strong escort. It is commendable that the boats taking part in turn maintained contact with great tenacity.

(6) For several limited periods shadowing was assisted by D/F signals from shadowing aircraft.

-Captain U-boats, Norway
Most Secret 485 AI-

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX V, 1.

Copy of teleprinter message.

Most Secret: G.I.S. Station Kiel wires 545 One M
secret of 25 February 1943. Re: Convoy from
England to Murmansk - Report by Army High Command -
An agent (who is not always reliable) from the German
Espionage Agency Sweden with good connections in
Soviet circles informs on 24 February 1943:
Between 4 and 5 March a large convoy, consisting
of about 45 ships with approximately 175,000 G.R.T.
of war materials will put out from British ports
to Murmansk or Archangel. Cargo consists of 20,000
steel plates and steel castings (spare parts),
10,000 tons of provisions, mostly U.S. canned meat,
2,000 tons of tin (new alloy), 1,500 Liberator
engines, also cylinder oil, medicines and other
material.

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APPENDIX V, 2.

G.I.S. Station Kiel

Kiel, 13 February 1943.

Serial No. 433 IM Secret.

Secret.

To:

Group North
Baltic Station.

Re: Iceland/Russia.

Report on transports from Iceland to Russia and activity of the Americans in Iceland.

Reliable agent of the G.I.S. Station Hamburg, stationed at Copenhagen, who has good connections with people from Iceland and other foreigners reports on 4 February:

During the last six weeks fairly large transports have gone through from Iceland to Russia. The convoys stay as near to the ice-limit or the edge of the pack-ice as possible. At times, when the weather was too bad, convoys have lain in the Icelandic fjords. Now in winter the northern fjords and ports are not used; instead the convoys sail round the north of Iceland and lie in the eastern fjords till about March; among these are: Djupivogur, Eskifjordur, Reydarfjordur, and if necessary Seydisfjordur. In special cases of necessity the transports go right round the island, i.e. along the north-east-south coasts to Reykjavik.

It is being rumored in Iceland that very large convoys may be expected from the end of February to the beginning of March proceeding from the U.S.A. to England and Russia. As previously mentioned, there are in Iceland very large stores of every kind from transports of last summer and autumn. The United States are exerting pressure on the Icelandic deep sea fishers to bring the catches direct to England on their own trawlers, where suitable premiums will be paid to them.

At the beginning of January large quantities of wooden barracks arrived, and in this connection further large consignments of American troops are expected in the near future. Bearing in mind these facts, everything indicates that great efforts will be made in the next few months, since, as is reported from Britain, the English are supposed to have the strong desire to conclude the war at the earliest possible moment.


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With the prolongation of the war, England fears an increasing lack of foodstuffs. The English people are supposed to be extremely frightened of being starved out. In England they regard the U-boats as the greatest and most imminent danger.

Copies also to:

Admiral Denmark, FOIC Baltic Defenses, Army C-in-C, Norway, Naval Chief Command Norway, Luftlotte 5, Luftflotte 3, C-in-C, U-boats, Group West, Flieger Fuehrer Atlantic.

(Signed) Müller.



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WAR DIARY


OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS NORWAY.

CAPTAIN PETERS.

1 - 15 March, 1943.

PG/31830



CONFIDENTIAL

1 March, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 355 8670.
U 657 8680.
U 622 8920.
U 255 8930, all AC.

In port:

U 302 Narvik.
U 354, 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 334, 592, 625, 703 Bergen.
U 209, 601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 251 put in to Narvik at 1215.
U 586 put in to Bergen at 1500.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance North Cape - 75 degrees N. 10 degrees E. - Bear Island.

Sea reconnaissance between 25 degrees and 36 degrees E - 74 degrees 50 minutes N.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather conditions.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:)
(b) By air reconnaissance:) See current operations.

(c) By radio intercept service: According to Russian radio traffic 2 enemy submarines are at sea.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: Reliable agent of G.I.S. station Hamburg reports on 27 February from Copenhagen:

U.S. convoys for Murmansk sail directly on pack-ice limit, no longer call at Iceland.

IV. Current operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

Main photographic reconnaissance report received from Flieger Fuehrer North (East) on shipping in Kola Bay on 28 February, viz. 3 probable cruisers, 8 destroyers, 51 freighters, 4 tankers. The arrival of the convoy in Murmansk is thereby confirmed. Apart from that, in view of the great concentration of shipping in the port, we may expect a westbound convoy to sail soon.

In order to screen the probable route out of Kola Bay more effectively, a new disposition in the form of an arc is ordered.

1039. Radio message 1039/790:

"From Captain U-boats:

Occupy following attack areas, depth of sweep 14 miles, from 1700 on 1 March:

Bugs 8569 lower center.
La Baume 8672 center of upper edge.
Göllnitz 8678 upper right.
Queck 8924 upper left hand corner.
Reche 3919 lower left hand corner."

1540 Received report from Mountain Corps, Norway, stating that at 1435 17 naval units, 5 of them large, were observed on the Liza front sailing north from Kola Bay.

On the basis of former experiences, this information is not absolutely reliable as the observation was made at a very great distance and by soldiers untrained in shipping recognition. But as we are expecting the convoy to sail, it seems nevertheless correct to take action on the message.

Accordingly, a radio message was sent to inform the U-boats.

If the convoy sailed from Kola Bay at 1430 it may pass the U-boat formation any time after 2000. In order that they may not be left to leeward, as it is difficult to intercept in darkness, I have decided to direct the U-boats so that they will be at the probable convoy position, estimated by dead reckoning, at dawn on 2 March.

1859 Radio message 1859/708 sent:

"From Captain U-boats.

If no report on the enemy is received by 2200, proceed to patrol line 8317 - 9127 AC, arriving there at 0800 on 2 March. Order: Bugs, La Baume, Göllnitz, Reche, Queck."

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V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The eastbound convoy put into Kola Bay on 27 February as is now confirmed by an aerial photograph. Since, apart from this, a fairly large number of other ships was confirmed, and the enemy would want to avoid a prolonged concentration of shipping in Murmańsk because of the danger of air raids, it is assumed that a westbound convoy, with the same escort vessels as accompanied the eastbound convoy, is about to sail.

(Signed) Peters.

2 March, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

Bugs, La Baume, Göllnitz, Reche, Queck in patrol line from AC 8317 to 9127.

In port:

U 251, 302 Narvik.
U 354, 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 586, 625, 703 Bergen.
U 601, Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 586 put out from Bergen at 1830.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance round Banak in the direction of 75 degrees N. 0 degrees.
Sea reconnaissance between 25 degrees and 36 degrees E. as far as 75 degrees N.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

(b) By air reconnaissance:

) See current operations.

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- (c) By radio intercept service: According to Russian radio traffic 2 enemy submarines at sea (north coast of Norway).

According to English radio traffic several units or warships are in the Murmansk area. At 1003 Murmansk transmitted air raid warning to convoy or formation "Numeral". (Possibly convoy sailing).

- (d) By naval forces: None.
(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current operations:

- (a) Convoy operations:

0643 Radio message 0550/724 received:

"Convoy in 8625. Course NE. Reche."

According to this the convoy did not pass the U-boat formation until after 2200.

U 255 (Reche) delayed in some way, presumably ran into the convoy from astern, while the other U-boats must now be lying ahead of the convoy.

0708 U-boats receive orders to operate on Reche's report.

U 255 (Reche) reports continued contact, course 40 degrees, speed 9 knots.

1015 Orders sent to U 586 (von der Esch) to put out from Bergen as quickly as possible. The boat is to make for AB 55 with a day's run of 300 miles. Its employment against the westbound convoy is planned west of Bear Island.

On the basis of former convoy courses I suspect a mean northern course, in any case I want to avoid having the U-boats go too far east in their search which might easily bring them astern of the convoy.

1208 Radio message 1208/732 therefore sent:

"From Captain U-boats:

(1) If you make no contact do not search east of 37 degrees 30 minutes longitude. At first expect a mean northerly course.

(2) Air reconnaissance probably during the afternoon." Reche and Queck both report sighting smoke clouds.

1340

1430 Radio message 1325/734 received from Reche:

"Shadowing escort ahead to port of convoy. Grid square 9111. Mean course 25 degrees."

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U 355 (La Baume) and U 657 (Gollnitz) also make contact. According to reports from these two U-boats, shadowing and attacks are greatly hampered by large drift-ice fields.

Contact reported continuously by various U-boats. According to U 622 (Queck) the convoy was in AC 5959, course 310 degrees, at 1900. Queck receives orders to send D/F signals to facilitate the approach of the other U-boats during darkness. At about 2200 U 622 (Queck) was located by radar, and attacked by destroyers with depth charges and forced away. The U-boat suspects that the mean course was altered to 280 degrees about 2000.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

U-boat operations greatly impeded by bad visibility and drift-ice fields. Northern Waters convoys continue to keep close to the ice limit and enter the drift-ice fields extending in front of the ice limit. Steamers and destroyers are not hampered by this drift-ice which greatly restricts the U-boats. It is particularly unpleasant at night when it is difficult to avoid ice floes. U-boats are forced to reduce speed so as not to run into the ice floes head on and endanger the shutters of the torpedo tubes thereby rendering unusable their chief weapon. An underwater attack in drift-ice is generally ruled out because of the danger to the periscope.

(Signed) Peters.

3 March, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 657, 622, 255, 355, 629 in patrol line AC 5279 to 5482 ahead of the convoy.

In port:

U 251, 302 Narvik.
U 354, 378 Trondheim.
U 212, 625, 703 Bergen.
U 601 Kiel.

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(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 586 proceeding from Bergen to operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance Banak - 25 degrees N. 16 degrees E. - 75 degrees N. 26 degrees E. and convoy reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance south-west of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:)
(b) By air reconnaissance:) See current operations.

(c) By radio intercept service: According to Russian radio traffic 2 enemy submarines at sea (north coast of Norway).

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

No reports on the convoy since 2000. Consequently, it becomes necessary to order a patrol line for the next morning to re-intercept the enemy.

0036 Radio message 0036/750 sent:

"From Captain U-boats.

If no contact or further clues by 0600 on 3 March, form patrol line from AC 5279 to AC 5482, in the following order: Göllnitz, Queck, Reche, La Baume, Bugs."

About 2200 U 355 (La Baume) made brief contact in 5945 with starboard escort.

0740 Radio message 0715/755 received:

"0605 in AC 5579 lost zig-zagging destroyer in mist.

Bugs."

It is not impossible that the convoy is running further south than was assumed, for Bugs

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sighted the destroyer south of the suspected mean course line. The patrol line is therefore moved on 20 miles along 230 degrees. Boats will be in their positions at 1200. Sometime after 1400 the convoy must pass the position of the patrol line.

1159 Radio message 1159/758 sent:

"From Captain U-boats.

If no contact by 1400 proceed to position line 4266 to 4569 AC, pass there 2300".

1619 Message received from G8llnitz reporting convoy at 1210 in AC 5542, course 280 degrees. The U-boat had only brief contact.

According to this the convoy had held to its northerly course.

As no other U-boat has succeeded in making contact, a new patrol line from AC 4337 to 4629 has been ordered for 2200. Heavy falls of snow and greatly fluctuating visibility in the operational area.

2241 In case no enemy contact is made until midnight a patrol line from AC 4166 to 4466 is ordered for 0700 on 4 March.

2300 This measure did not come into operation for radio message 2200/763 received:

"Convoy in AC 4623, course NW. La Baume". Contact has thus been re-established roughly according to plan by means of the patrol line. La Baume receives orders to send D/F signals.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

As the convoy consists of steamers in ballast, its speed of advance is dependent upon the weather, and therefore varies. The convoy was only making about 7 knots when on the north-west course. The prospects of success are slight in the continuous snow, and can only increase if the weather improves.

(Signed) Peters.

4 March, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

0220 Radio message 0143/768 received:

"2236 fan of four missed group of steamers, single missed destroyer. Depth charges. Am pressing on, presume westerly course.

La Baume."

According to this the U-boat fired torpedoes shortly after sighting. Reason for failures not yet clear.

0400 Shadower's report received from Queck stating that convoy is apparently trying to sail north to the ice limit.

During the night no other boat was able to make contact. Even Queck only gave this one message and obviously has not had any contact.

0820 Radio message 0820/771 sent:

"From Captain U-boats.

If no contact, take up positions by 1300 in patrol line from AC 4154 to 4454, in same order as before."

It is especially unfortunate that there is no definite information of the course of the ice limit east of Bear Island. The last ice reports of 1 March, from a meteorological aircraft provided only rough information, and moreover the position of the ice limit depends to a large degree on the direction and strength of the wind and therefore is subject to considerable variations. If at all possible, it is most desirable to have a U-boat carry out an ice reconnaissance before the convoy passes the area concerned. The patrol line ordered for 0820 conformed to the latest G.A.F. ice reports which later proved to be inaccurate. The convoy has traversed an area assumed to be covered by ice. The line lay too far south.

1215 Radio message 0930/775 received:

"According to dead reckoning convoy in 4162, visibility 5 miles, frost, fog, NNE 3, freshening.

Reche."

This position estimated by dead reckoning tallies with my view, but lies further north

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than the convoy could steer with ice conditions as assumed hitherto. As no boat has reported obstruction by ice up to now and as I must at all costs have current information on the ice limit position,

1317 radio message 1317/778 sent:

"To all from Captain U-boats.

(1) At 1600 form patrol line from AC 4117 to 4417.

(2) Göllnitz report by short signal when ice limit is reached."

1408 Received message from Göllnitz that the boat was intercepted by 2 destroyers at 1050 in AC 4199.

1412 Bugs reported smoke clouds in grid squares 4126 and 4161 at 1034.

These two messages imply two possible convoy positions about 50 miles apart. The destroyers reported by Göllnitz are probably a search group which has broken away from the convoy and steered south; whereas the convoy itself is further north and steering westwards along the ice limit. This is confirmed by reports sent at 0320 by Bugs and at 0756 by Queck which have only just been received, reporting respectively starshells and destroyers far to the north.

1535 Radio message 1430/782 received:

"Convoy in 4145. Course 270 degrees, speed 8 knots. Attack failed, N.N.W. 4, cloud cover 8, 1012 mb, frost, fog.

Reche."

La Baume began return voyage at about 1700 because of fuel position, received orders to go to Narvik via Andfjord.

The convoy proceeded on a westerly course about 30 miles south of Bear Island then turned south-west because of an ice field south-west of Bear Island.

Reche shadowed it until 1800 and was forced to retire in 6382.

1930 Radio message 1837/790 received:

"Convoy in 6358, course 280 degrees, fast-ice limit 6357.

Bugs."

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The same U-boat reported at 1923 that speed was restricted by thick pack ice and convoy was believed to be steering south west.

As no further reports were received,

2329 Radio message '2329/793 sent:

"From Captain U-boats.

If no contact, form patrol line at 0700 from AB 6142 to 6418 in following order, G8llnitz, Reche, Queck, Bugs."

It is assumed, on the basis of earlier experiences, that the convoy will continue for the time being on a mean westerly course.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

- (i) The lack of air reconnaissance makes it more difficult to intercept the enemy. The convoy has been hugging the ice limit, thus making it difficult for the boats to shadow and attack it.
- (ii) There are distinct signs that the next PQ convoy is about to sail. Firstly, according to a G.I.S. station report a large convoy is believed to have sailed on 25 February from Boston for Murmansk. Secondly, according to information from an agent in Sweden, a fairly large convoy sailed from an English west coast port on 4 and 5 March for Murmansk. According to dead reckoning, the two supply convoys could meet in Reykjavik at the earliest on 9 March, so that allowing for a certain amount of normal delay PQ 23 may be expected to sail from Reykjavik between 15 and 20 March.

(Signed) Peters.

5 March, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 657, 255, 622, 629 in patrol line grid square AB 6174 to 6473 ahead of the convoy.

The shadowing aircraft report composition of convoy: 29 steamers, 8 destroyers, 12 escorts in all-round screen.

1135 Radio message 1135/709 sent:

"From Captain U-boats.

Aircraft report at 1105 in AB 5836 3 heavy cruisers, course 90 degrees. D/F beacons on "Anton".

This cruiser group is keeping in the vicinity of the convoy on greatly varying courses.

1158 The boats are informed of the composition of the convoy.

1255 Radio message 1150/710 received:

"At 0926 in AB 5939 one hit on each of 2 medium freighters. Sinking noises heard.

Reche."

1259 U 586 (von der Esch), putting out from Bergen, received orders to make for AB 55, permission to attack.

U 629 (Bugs) and U 657 (Göllnitz) made contact briefly between 0800 and 1100 but they were both forced to retire. G.A.F. attacked at about 1345 with 14 Ju 88. Report of results not yet available.

1550 Radio message 1430/717 received:

"On surfacing a burning 6000 G.R.T. ship found sinking. At a second place of sinking observed "Executive", New York (4978 G.R.T.). Wind east 6, heavy snow falls, visibility 10 miles.

Reche."

At 1515 aircraft had to abandon shadowing in AB 5949.

2020 Teleprinter message received from Naval War Staff, 1st Division:

"Knowledge of composition of Northern Waters convoys necessary and important. Therefore instruct U-boats to add information of convoy composition to their reports on the enemy."

Meanwhile the convoy's composition has been reported by air reconnaissance. On the whole it may be said that, especially in view of the frequently very poor visibility in Northern Waters, U-boats will not generally be in a

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position to give information on the whole of the convoy, as mostly they see only part of it. In the instructions to the commanders, the U-boats will again be reminded of the importance of information on the convoy's composition, in particular the number and strength of the escort.

- 2112 A new patrol line from AB 7376 to 7936 is ordered for 0700 6 March.
- 2303 Report from Reche of 2 destroyers in AB 8231 at 2104.

The convoy is presumably keeping to its mean south-westerly course, and the patrol line ordered lies in an appropriate position.

V. Reports of successes:

U-boats:

One merchant ship 6000 G.R.T.

"Executive", New York, (4978 G.R.T.) sunk.

Luftwaffe:

One merchant ship 6000 G.R.T. sunk.

One merchant ship 10000 G.R.T. damaged (on fire).

VI. Survey of the situation:

It is noteworthy that with even a slight improvement in the weather several U-boats suddenly made contact and obtained a chance to attack. The U-boats are in general in the vicinity of the convoy, and some are very near. Interception is often greatly hampered by bad visibility. During the afternoon visibility began to worsen and contact was lost. Speedy installation of a radar set on every U-boat is urgently required. A request to this effect was last sent to Admiral Commanding U-boats in Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 543 A.4 dated 2 March, 1943 (see Appendix III, 1).

6 March, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 629, 622, 255, 586, 657 in patrol line
AB 7376 - 7936 ahead of the convoy.

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0415 Radio message 0207/727:

"0010 convoy in AB 8216, course 230 degrees, speed 8 knots. 2 attacks without success, intercepted by destroyer - location. Remote and close escort. Steamers in four lines ahead. Visibility deteriorated to 1500 meters. Am in pursuit. Wind SE. 9, sea 7, misty, cloudy.

Queck."

0524 U 586 (von der Esch) reports that at 1740 on 5 March his jumping wire astern was torn off and is hanging below the screws. Not possible to salvage it because of sea way, U-boat lying stopped in 5885.

0625 Radio message 0625/732 sent:

"From Captain U-boats.

(i) Göllnitz occupy Esch's position.

(ii) Queck report weather at 0700 instead of Esch.

(iii) Esch await improvement in weather."

There is no clear picture of the ice situation south of Jan Hayen. According to dead reckoning the convoy will reach the patrol line about 1400. Therefore,

1155 radio message 1155/735 sent:

"From Captain U-boats.

If no contact by then, set off at 1500. Be in patrol line from AB 7711 to AE 3313 at 0600 on 7 March in same order as before. Search independently until then. Bugs carry out ice reconnaissance in AB 74 and AA 96. Report course of ice limit by 0200."

1159 The morning air reconnaissance, with visibility less than 1000 meters, spots part of the convoy (3 destroyers, 2 escort vessels, 3 steamers) at 0910 in AB 7364. Course 250 degrees. This position is transmitted to the U-boats.

1337 Radio message 1103/736 received:

"To Captain U-boats:

SW. 10, sea 9, visibility 4, cloudy, clouds 300, misty, 988 mb, no contact. Boat can only make 3 knots against the sea. Grid square 8173. Radio message 0707 cancelled.

Queck."

1620 Radio message 1502/737 received:

"Cannot reach position by 0600 on 7 March.
Grid square 5796, wind west 9, sea 7.

Esch."

1714 Radio message 1530/741 sent:

"(i) My position AB 7661. Cannot reach new
disposition before 1800 tomorrow because of
heavy seas. Wind SW.9, sea 8, visibility 12.

(ii) Query: Does today's Armed Forces
communique refer to the steamers I sank.

Reche."

These weather conditions make it extremely
difficult to continue the operation. But
as the convoy consists of empty steamers,
some dispersal is possible in the heavy seas.
If steamers are separated from the convoy
the U-boats still have prospects of success.
The convoy's speed is reduced roughly in
the same proportion as that of the U-boats.
I have therefore decided, in spite of the
weather and the comparatively short way the
convoy still has before it, to continue
operations as far as the coast.

1744 Radio message 1744/742 sent:

"To all from Captain U-boats:

(i) Operation will continue.

(ii) Separation of single steamers from the
convoy possible in this weather.

(iii) Operate further in direction of the
patrol line."

Reche's query is answered as follows after
an examination of the reports of successes
by the Luftwaffe.

1759 Radio message 1759/743 sent:

"To Reche:

(i) Shadowing aircraft reported that on
5 March before the air attack, he
observed 2 steamers sinking (Reche).

(ii) Steamers in Armed Forces communique
were sunk by aircraft."

V. Reports of successes: None.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1304 In order to have a clear picture of the speed of the convoy and positions of the U-boats, I ordered them to send short signals of their positions at 1700.

1541 2 FW 200, which took off on convoy reconnaissance reported on landing that they did not sight the enemy. According to the U-boats' short signals, their positions were as follows for 1600 to 1700:

U 657 (Göllnitz)	AB 7848
U 255 (Reche)	AB 7817
U 622 (Queck)	AB 7567
U 629 (Bugs)	AB 7542

According to this, the boats have on an average only advanced 4 to 5 miles per hour and are lying well apart, across the convoy's course.

1830 Sailing orders for U212 (Vogler) from Bergen issued (see Appendix III, 3).

1946 U 703 (Bielfeld), proceeding from Bergen to Bear Island area received orders to move at a correspondingly greater distance from the coast because of the transfer of the "Scharnhorst".

2127 U 586 (Esch) again ordered to report his position as his signal has not yet been received. Apparently the tearing off of his stern jumping wire has not caused any further trouble as the boat sent position and weather at 1620 on 6 March without any further comment.

2128 Radio message 2128/755 sent:

"From Captain U-boats:

After reaching patrol line continue on course 250 degrees."

I wish to make sure in this way that the boats do not fall to leeward of the convoy's position as established by dead reckoning.

V. Reports of successes: None.

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IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

1407 Radio message 1407/762 sent:

"From Captain U-boats:

(1) Expect convoy speed of up to 6 knots.

(2) Conclusion of operation in 22 degrees W. on 11 March intended."

1440 Radio message 1403/158/Command Wave - (Navy/G.A.F.) received:

"Most Immediate.

At 1200 17 degrees W. 8166 (AA 9666) one light cruiser, course 210 degrees, speed up to 10 miles, lower limit of clouds 300 m, visibility 30 miles, presumably convoy.

Fliieger Fuehrer North (West)."

This report is taken over on to U-boats' radio service, the boats receive instructions to operate on the air reconnaissance. If this should indeed be the convoy, then its average speed since midnight 6 March would have been 4.2 knots. From now on operations are greatly impaired by particularly bad radio communication with the boats. Often it is possible to receive radio messages from the boats only for a few hours each day so that times of up to 20 hours elapse before messages are received. In addition there is an almost complete breakdown of all field telephone communications on the coast and through it communication with the repeater stations is also at times completely interrupted in the absence of radio.

1645 Roche reports at 1406 heavy drift ice in AE 31 area.

The ice position is shown by further greatly delayed ice reports received from U 629 (Bugs) and 255 (Roche): Large continuous ice-field 96 to 9920 to the south. A roughly 20 mile wide ice-free strip extends south-westwards approximately through 9950. South of this in the area from 3210 to 9990, and from 31 to about 3510 another large ice-field.

1810 Radio message 1616/769 received:

"(1) Drift ice as far as 3278.

(2) Suspect mean course of convoy or its parts 230 degrees.

- (3) Until other orders received from Captain U-boats, patrol line from AE 3513 to 3677 occupied, former sequence.

Reche."'

(In this message there was an error in the grid square number which was subsequently corrected in radio message 1746.)

U 255 (Reche) believes there is a continuous ice limit from Jan Mayen south to about 68 degrees N. In view of the bad communications between the boats and the Command it is right that one of the boats should take the initiative and attempt a planned operation.

According to reports from U 629 (Bugs), however, it seems possible at the level of 9950 to proceed south-west with only slight obstruction from ice. If the convoy or single steamers have chosen this route, then the patrol line arranged by U 255 (Reche) is ineffective. I therefore decide to send new orders to the U-boats, taking this possibility into account.

1907 Radio message 1907/771 sent:

"From Captain U-boats.

(i) Make for AE 2370.

(ii) State positions, if necessary by radio message.

(iii) Reche's order cancelled."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

With almost complete absence of radio communications and with the ice limit stretching unusually far to the south it is almost impossible to direct operations from Command. Accordingly a request to improve communications to the Jan Mayen area by creating another radio repeater station near Aalesund is issued. (Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 635 dated 10 March, see Appendix III, 2.)

(Signed) Peters.

9 March, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

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At sea:

U 255, 586, 622, 629, 657 eastern half of AE 23, eastern half 36 and western half of 35.

In port:

U 251, 302, 355, 378 Narvik.
U 354 Trondheim.
U 334, 625 Bergen.
U 601, Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 378 put in to Narvik at 0800.
U 703 proceeding from Bergen to operational area.
U 212 proceeding from Bergen to operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance from Banak 75 degrees N. 0 degrees.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

No sea reconnaissance.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:)
(b) By air reconnaissance:) See current operations.

(c) By radio intercept service: According to Russian radio traffic 3 enemy submarines at sea.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: Report from Naval High Command: German Espionage Agency Portugal reports in message:138 following is learnt from a diplomatic source:-as a result of most urgent representations coming from a special envoy of Stalin's in London, a large convoy with food will shortly sail from Glasgow and other ports to Murmansk.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

A new disposition is ordered for this morning after the receipt of positions as at 1800.

0033 Radio message 0033/778:

"From Captain U-boats:

(1) If no contact by then, form patrol line from AE 2341 to 3445 at 0700 on 9 March in the following order: Bugs, Göllnitz, Reche, Queck, Esch.

(2) Report ice encountered at positions."

In view of the unknown ice conditions, it is not certain whether all the U-boats will be able to take up their positions; it is also possible that some of the boats will encounter ice on the way and not be able to take up their positions in time.

0630 A delayed report is received from U 586 (Esch) stating that the U-boat sighted a single steamer, course 230 degrees, at 1900 on 7 March in AB 8171 but later lost it again because of weather conditions.

1018 The U-boats are informed that the air reconnaissance in the Jan Mayen area planned for today will not take place. A transfer of surface vessels is taking place at present, and the weak forces of the Flieger Fuehrers are not sufficient to carry out reconnaissance and escorting duties for our surface vessels and in addition to that extensive convoy reconnaissance. At present U-boat operations are at most supported by 3 FW 200 in the area south of Jan Mayen. In view of the bad visibility conditions, the small number of U-boats, and the need to have an overall picture of the unusual ice position this number is quite inadequate. Since 8 March the convoy has not been spotted by aircraft. An increase in air strength is urgently required.

No messages are being received from the U-boats. Probably we cannot expect the arrival of this morning's messages before the afternoon. A new disposition north of Iceland is necessary according to our calculations.

1119 Radio message 1119/786 sent:

"From Captain U-boats:

(1) Proceed at 1300 to patrol line from AE 2425 to 2762, be there at 0500 in the following order: Göllnitz, Reche, Queck, Esch, Bugs.

(2) If any other information obtained, send it en route."

1846 Radio message 1738/793 received:

"Because of thick ice fields not yet further west than 3452. Hauling out further south. Wind east 9, sea 8, snowstorm, 973 mb.

Reche."

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1854 Bugs reports in radio message 0703 that he was in AE 3141 at 0700, has not reached his position in the patrol line because of ice.

1936 Radio message 1740/794 received:

"One steamer in AE 3581 and one in 3822.
Course 250 degrees.

Esch."

It is clear from these reports that on the whole the U-boats are still further east than was ordered or believed. The report of the two single steamers shows that the convoy is partly dispersed and the boats still have chances of success against single steamers.

2013 A delayed message is received from Göllnitz stating that he fired a double shot at, but missed a fast single steamer, course 230 degrees, in AE 2669 at 0435. Contact was lost in heavy snow falls while in pursuit.

Because of the complete breakdown of field telephone communications, the following report on the situation is sent in radio message 2116/116 (Command Wave, G.A.F. - Navy) for the information of G.A.F. and Group North.

2116 "From Captain U-boats:

- (1) Operations against the westbound convoy are being continued although severely hampered by ice and weather. Convoy partly dispersed. U-boats and convoy making little speed south of Jan Mayen.
- (2) Continuous ice fields on 8 degrees W. to about 67 degrees 30 minutes N. Pack-ice fields in 2670 and 2680.
- (3) At 0435 on 9 March in 2669 a boat fired at but missed fast single steamer. At 1740 one steamer sighted in 3581 and one in 3822.
- (4) 5 U-boats ordered to form patrol line from 2420 to 2760 on 10 March. All AE."

2335 Bugs reports in radio message 2001/795:

"Shutters of tubes 1 and 2 cannot be opened because of heavy seas. Tube 3 cannot be closed, hence difficulties in submerging. Can transmit radio messages only through rod aerial."

2354 The U-boat receives orders to return to Trondheim and the patrol line is altered accordingly.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic: None.

V. Reports of successes:

VI. Survey of the situation:

It was to be expected that U-boats would be damaged by operating between the ice-fields. As there is still no dock available in Narvik, U 629 (Bugs) had to be sent to Trondheim because of its damaged shutters. The inconvenience of the lack of a dock again makes itself felt. The loss of time involved is especially unfortunate as I intended to have the greatest possible number of U-boats ready for new operations by about the middle of March.

(Signed) Peters.

10 March 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 255, 586, 622, 657 in sea area north east of Iceland with the convoy.

In port:

U 251, 302, 355, 378 Narvik.
U 354 Trondheim.
U 334, 625 Bergen.
U 601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 378 put out from Narvik for Hammerfest at 1130.
U 212, 703 proceeding from Bergen to operational area.
U 629 proceeding from operational area to Trondheim.
U 586 proceed from operational area to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance from Banak to 75 degrees N. 0 degrees.

Sea reconnaissance Nordkyn - Bear Island
- 31 degrees 30 minutes E.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance off Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: See current operations.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By radio intercept service: Naval Main D/F Station Kirkones took a bearing of 282 degrees on British unit (AD) in traffic with Cleethorpes at 2016.
1726 Cleethorpes broadcast:
1542 (time of origin) S.O.S. from American steamer "KEUZ" torpedoed in 66 degrees 53 minutes N. 14 degrees 10 minutes W. (AE 2850).
2206 American steamer "WKYL" reported in S.O.S. she was torpedoed about 110 miles E.N.E. of Langenes (AE 3746).
1900 Russian submarine put out from Polyarno for Barents Sea.
According to Russian radio traffic 4 enemy submarines at sea (north coast of Norway).
Supplement: At 0920 on 2 March 3 British heavy cruisers put out from Kola Bay for Barents Sea (presumably with PQ convoy which received an air raid warning in "Numeral" from Murmansk at 1004 on 2 March).

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

0610 Radio message 0215/799 received:

- "(1) At 2200 in AE 3574 sank 9000 tonner, course 220 degrees.
- (2) 3 torpedoes missed second steamer.
- (3) 8 March 7 torpedoes missed single steamer reported.

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- (4) Suspect single steamer traffic around south of Iceland.
- (5) All torpedoes used: query: return.

Esch."

0639 U 586 (Esch) receives orders to return to Narvik and the patrol line is moved south accordingly.

No further successes can be expected by remaining longer in the area north of Iceland. Only 3 U-boats are left in the operational area, and according to dead reckoning the convoy or its parts must have passed the last U-boat disposition ordered. I therefore decide to order the boats to return. By ordering position lines the area north-east of Iceland will be combed out once more.

1510 Radio message 1510/703, radio message 154/704:

"From Captain U-boats:

- (1) Return at 2000 on 10 March via position lines at the following times:

- I. 2867 to 2916 on 11 March 0700.
- II. 5619 to 6418 on 11 March 2300.
- III. 3519 to 3911 on 13 March 0000.

Then on to Narvik Westfjord.

- (2) All in AE, in the following order:

Queck, Reche, Göllnitz."

1740 Radio message 1158/705 received from Göllnitz, reporting that he chased a single steamer in 2913 and lost it owing to poor visibility.

1725 Queck receives orders, in answer to his query, to move directly from position line I to position line III as he is short of fuel.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes:

U 586 sank 9000 ton single steamer in AE 3574.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The two American steamers reported torpedoed by radio intercept service in the sea area north east of Iceland are obviously those sunk by U 586 (v.d. Esch) and U 255 (Reche).

(Signed) Peters.

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11 March, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 622, 255, 657 in patrol lines AE
2890 to 2910 on return trip along convoy
route.

In port :

U 251, 302, 355, Narvik.
U 354 Trondheim.
U 334, 625 Bergen.
U 601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 354 put out from Trondheim at 0930
for operational area.
U 378 proceeding from Narvik to Hammer-
fest.
U 212, 703 proceeding from Bergen to the
operational area.
U 629 proceeding from operational area to
Trondheim.
U 586 proceeding from operational area to
Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance from Banak to
75 degrees N. 7 degrees E.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance because of weather
conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance southern part of Northern
Waters.

III. Reports on the enemy:

2116 (a) By U-boats: U 255 (Reche) reports in
radio message 2005/715:

"At 1636 on 10 March heavily armed freighter
7000 G.R.T. in AE 2821.
Torpedoed 3 times, two halves left sinking
Call-sign KENZ. Still 1 + 2."

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(b) By air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (West) reports:

AE 9566 5 km. west of Svinoe Island between Bordoe and Viederoe (Faroes) 12 merchant ships of up to 5000 G.R.T., presumably unescorted.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic 3 enemy submarines at sea, (North coast of Norway). U.S. steamer (Richard Blond) 6800 G.R.T. torpedoed at 1642 about 40 miles N.N.E. of Langenes (Iceland - AE 2829). 1819 Sheigra radio station reported: ship sinking slowly, 2 boats alongside, 2 boats adrift.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Reliable agent from G.I.S. station Denmark reported from Iceland on 9 March: agent from Hvalfjordur reports that three large freighters and one heavy cruiser are lying at anchor in Hvalfjordur (Iceland).

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 622, 255, 657 in reconnaissance line proceeding through AE 2867 to 2916, AE 3519 to 3911, and AE 5619 to 6418. In this way the returning U-boats are systematically combing the convoy route for scattered single steamers and damaged ships.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

None.

V. Reports of successes:

U 255 sank a heavily armed freighter of 7000 G.R.T. in AE 2821 at 1636 on 10 March.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The 12 merchant ships reported by aircraft on the west coast of the Faroes are probably supply ships from England to Iceland.

A radio intercept report has again confirmed U 255 (Reche's) success:

VII. The following short report is sent on the conclusion of the operation against the westbound convoy of 2 to 10 March, 1943 (presumably QP 19):

1. Emergency. Group North.
2. Emergency. For information Naval War Staff, 1st. Division.
3. Emergency. For information F.O. Cruisers.
4. Emergency. For information C-in-C U-boats.
5. Emergency. For information Luftflotte 5 Battle Staff, Kemi.
6. Emergency. For information Luftflotte 5 Battle Command, Oslo.
7. Emergency. For information Flieger Fuehrer North (East).
8. Emergency. For information Flieger Fuehrer North (West).
9. Emergency. For information Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Short report of operation against westbound convoy from 2 to 10 March, 1943 (presumably QP 19).

1. Route:

At 1435 on 1 March Mountain Corps Norway sighted a number of naval units sailing from Kola Bay. The five U-boats available were accordingly detailed to operate and U 255 (Reche) intercepted the convoy for the first time at 0550 on 2 March in AC 8625 on a north-easterly course. Afterwards the route lay roughly through AC 9110, 5540, 4350, 4230, 4150, AB 6350, 6480, 8210 but was not properly intercepted after that. Due to weather conditions the convoy was partially dispersed. Single steamers intercepted in 3580, 2920 AE. Last report was of the sinking of a single steamer in AE 2821 on 10 March.

2. Composition:

According to an aircraft report at 0902 on 5 March: 28 steamers, 1 light cruiser, 8 destroyers, 12 escort vessels. Escort in all-round screen. Remote escort of 3 probable heavy cruisers.

3. 5 U-boats operating:

U 255 (Reche), U 355 (La Baume), U 622 (Queck), U 629 (Bugs); U 657 (Göllnitz). Of these U 355 had to return to Narvik on 4 March because of fuel situation. On 5 March U 586 (Esch) replaced him in the operation.

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4. Successes:

On 5 March 1 steamer, 6000 G.R.T., and "Executive" New York (4978 G.R.T.) sunk by U 255 (Reche), two single steamers of 7000 and 9000 G.R.T. respectively sunk on 10 March by U 255 and U 586.

Total: About 27000 G.R.T.

5. Escort:

Effective remote and close escort. In particular radar location by destroyers made it difficult for U-boats to shadow and attack in almost continually bad visibility.

6. Weather and ice:

Convoy continuously steered in the immediate vicinity of the ice limit which greatly hampered the U-boats in their pursuit, shadowing and attacking. In addition heavy snowfalls occurred in the early part of the operation, while in the later part gale conditions lasting for several days made it almost impossible to direct operations from Command. From the first, ice was found to be penetrating southwards from south of Jan Mayen to 67 degrees 30 minutes N. Operating in ice caused damage to one U-boat (shutters).

7. Radio communications:

Bad communication with the U-boats in the Jan Mayen area caused time lapses of up to 20 hours. Another request is made for a very long wave in continuous service as it is still the only sure means of communication between the Command and U-boats. Apart from this, a new radio repeater station in the Aalesund area with a strong transmitter is recommended. Request submitted.

8. German Air Force:

Because of the weather conditions and few aircraft available, insufficient support of the operation by air reconnaissance. We also request an increase in the strength of Luftflotte 5 to at least that of 1 October 1942 as well as the speedy equipment of more sea reconnaissance aircraft with radar sets.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret. 654. A1.

(Signed) Peters.

12 March, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

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(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 622, U 255, U 657 in reconnaissance line from AE 6110 to 6150 on return voyage along convoy route.

In port:

U 251, 302, 355 Narvik.
U 334, 625 Bergen.
U 601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 378 put in to Hammerfest at 2200.
U 212, 703 proceeding from Bergen to operational area.
U 354 proceeding from Trondheim to operational area.
U 629 proceeding from operational area to Trondheim.
U 586 en route from operational area to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance from Banak to 74 degrees 30 minutes N. 3 degrees E.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Probing reconnaissance Bardufoss - AB 7567 - ice limit - AB 8249.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance south-east of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy :

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By radio intercept service: According to Russian radio traffic 3 enemy submarines at sea.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
After the conclusion of operations in the sea

CONFIDENTIAL

area north-east of Iceland, U-boats are proceeding in reconnaissance line through position lines ordered to intercept any single or damaged steamers which may have been dispersed by bad weather.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

1035 The following instructions are sent to U 703 (Bielfeld) in radio message 1035/723:

"Confirm course of ice limit in area west, south to east of Bear Island south to 74 degrees 40 minutes N. Report result by 1000 on 14 March. Avoid ice damage." The main purpose of this ice reconnaissance is to get the most exact information possible for operation "Brausewetter" planned for weather ship "Coburg" (landing of weather transmitter on Bear Island), to supplement a special G.A.F. ice reconnaissance.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

13 March, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 703 on ice reconnaissance off Bear Island.
U 212 in AB 66.

In port:

U 251, 302, 355 Narvik.
U 378 Hammerfest.
U 334, 625 Bergen.
U 601, Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 586 put into Narvik at 1500.
U 255, 622, 657 proceeding from operational area to Narvik.
U 629 proceeding from operational area to Trondheim.
U 354 proceeding from Trondheim to operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance from Banak to 74 degrees N. 0 degrees. Ice reconnaissance in Bear Island area for "Brausewetter".

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Ice reconnaissance between Jan Mayen and Bear Island.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance south-west of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By radio intercept service: According to Russian radio traffic 3 enemy submarines at sea (north coast of Norway).

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 212, U 703, and U 354, who is still en route, will again occupy the passage south of Bear Island from the evening of 14 March in a N.-S. line of 83 miles.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 703 on ice reconnaissance in Bear Island area for operation "Brausewetter" (weather ship "Coburg").

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

14 March, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 703 in Bear Island area on ice reconnaissance.

In port:

U 378, Hammerfest.

U 251, 302, 355, 586 Narvik.

U 334, 625 Bergen.

U 601, Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 302 put out from Narvik for operational area at 1030.

U 354 proceeding from Trondheim to operational area.

U 255, 622, 657 proceeding from operational area to Narvik.

U 629 proceeding from operational area to Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance and at the same time reconnaissance for "Brausewetter" from North Cape through Bear Island to 75 degrees N. 5 degrees E.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance north-west of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By radio intercept service: According to Russian radio traffic 3 enemy submarines at sea (north coast of Norway).

At 1510 6 Russian destroyers confirmed in Murmansk area. Main Naval D/F Station Kirkenes took a bearing of 277 degrees on British unit (AD) at 0515.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 U-boats in passage south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

(1) There is a possibility that the convoys which sailed from Boston and from ports in the west of England have joined off Reykjavik to form a new PQ convoy which may sail any day now. In such an event the convoy might pass Bear Straits some time between 21 and 22 March. I am trying to have the maximum possible number of U-boats ready to operate there from 20 March.

(2) The task of the 6 destroyers confirmed to be in the Murmansk area cannot yet be determined, but it is unlikely that they are connected with either an incoming or departing convoy.

(Signed) Peters.

15 March, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 703, 6360 southern half and 6390.
U 212, 6620 and northern half of 6650.
U 354, 6660 southern half, and 6690.
All AB.

In port:

U 378, Hammerfest.
U 251, 355, 586 Narvik
U 629 Trondheim.
U 334, 625 Bergen.
U 601, Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 629 put in to Trondheim at 0630.
U 586 put out from Narvik for Trondheim
at 0930.
U 255, 622, 657 put in to Narvik at 1000.
U 302 put in to Narvik at 1800.
U 378 put out from Hammerfest for operational
area at 2345.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance and at the same time
reconnaissance for "Brausewetter".

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance south-east and south of Jan
Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic 5 enemy
submarines at sea (north coast of Norway).

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

3 U-boats in position along passage south of
Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 378 (Maeder) is escorting weather ship "Coburg"
for its "Brausewetter" operation from Hammerfest
to ice limit in Bear Island area.

V. Report of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

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APPENDIX II, 1.

COPY.

2 March, 1943.

Radio Message 1100/8.

Most Immediate.

11th U-boat Flotilla from Captain U-boats.

1. U 586 (Esch) sail as soon as ready.
Make for AB 55 with day's run of 300 miles.
2. Confirm.

APPENDIX II, 2.

COPY.

1. Emergency. 11th U-boat Flotilla.
2. Emergency for information Naval Chief Command, Norway.
3. Emergency for information Flieger Fuehrer North (West).
4. Emergency for information Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten.
5. Emergency for information Admiral North Coast.

Clear as single address message.

Most Secret.

Sailing orders for U 703 (Bielfeld):

1. Put out from Bergen 7 March.
2. Make for AB 63. Proceed at a distance of 50 miles from the coast.
3. U 586 (v.d.Esch),
U 657 (Göllnitz),
U 622 (Queck),
U 255 (Reche),
U 629 (Bugs) with westbound convoy in Jan Mayen sea area.
4. On sailing use radio service "Anton", also very long wave Northern Waters Service. Report by short signal when 67 degrees is passed, after receiving confirmation, U-boats Northern Waters Radio Service.

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APPENDIX II, 3.

COPY.

7 March, 1943.

Radio Message 1830/655:

Emergency. 11th U-boat Flotilla from Captain U-boats.

1. U 212 (Vogler) put out from Bergen on 8 March. Make for AB 66.
 2. Radio service "Anton" until confirmation of report of passing 67 degrees N. then Northern Waters Radio Service.
-

APPENDIX II, 4.

COPY.

Radio message 1904/77 of 10 March 1943:

Emergency. U-boat base Trondheim from Admiral Northern Waters.

(Captain U-boats, Norway).

1. U 354 (Herbschleb) put out from Trondheim 11 March.
2. Make for AB 65.
3. Radio service "Anton" until confirmation of report of passing 67 degrees N, then Northern Waters Radio Service.

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APPENDIX II, 5.

COPY.

10 March, 1943.

Captain U-boats Norway.
Ref. No. Most Secret. 624.

Most Secret.

Operational orders for U 378.

1. Put out from Narvik on 10 March. Proceed through Tjeldsund to Harstad, with a pilot from Lüdingen. On 12 March proceed with pilot through West Channel - Finnsnesrennen. to Tromsø.
Move from Tromsø to Hammerfest in a fast convoy according to instructions from Admiral Polar Coast. Commander will report to Al Admiral Polar Coast.
Berth in Hammerfest alongside "Black Watch", ready for special mission with ship "Coburg" (Operation "Brausewetter").
2. For convoy and escort duties see Northern Waters Operational Order No. 3/1943.
When you have left "Coburg" to carry out her special operation, report by short signal after reaching a distance of roughly 50 miles from Bear Island according as ice situation permits. (Short signal "Have executed task").
3. German U-boats: U 255 (Reche), U 586 (v.d.Esch), U 622 (Queck), and U 657 (Göllnitz) operating on westbound convoy in sea area between Jan Mayen and Iceland.
Approaching operational area:
U 703 (Bielfeld) to AB 63, sailed from Bergen 7 March.
U 212 (Vogler) to AB 66, sailed from Bergen 8 March.
U 629 (Bugs) returning from Jan Mayen area to Trondheim. "Lützow" to be moved from Alta to Narvik (Bogen Bay) roughly according to the following time table:
0300 on 11 March put out from Roessholmdjupet. Enter Andfjord, proceed through Topsund and Tjeldsund. Off Sandtorgstraumen after 1300. If necessary, anchor first off Tovik.
4. Enemy situation: Expect eastbound convoy towards the end of March.
5. Captain U-boats Norway Operational Order No.1. applies. (As in Admiral Northern Waters Operational Order No.3/1943).

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6. Wireless silence ordered for "Coburg" as long as she is being escorted by U 378. Any necessary messages from the ship to be transmitted by U 378.
7. Ice position: According to G.A.F. ice reconnaissance ice limit stretches from AB 6230 through AC 6350, 4120 and on to the N.E, all AB. A special G.A.F. ice reconnaissance has been arranged and data will be passed on.
8. Appendix: Admiral Northern Waters Operational Order No. 3/1943 for Operation "Brausewetter".
9. Special attention is drawn to the secrecy of Operation "Brausewetter".

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APPENDIX III, 1.

COPY.

2 March, 1943.

1. Immediate. Admiral Commanding U-boats.
2. Immediate. C-in-C U-boats.

Clear as multiple address message.

Most Secret.

Subject: Equipment of Northern Waters U-boats
with combined radar set.

The last unsuccessful operation against PQ 22 has again shown the vital need for equipping Northern Waters U-boats with radar. Bad visibility, snow drifts, fog as well as very strong defenses make it especially difficult to shadow in the Northern Waters area and often cause contact to be lost. In most cases it can be regained only by forming new patrol lines, involving the loss of valuable time. This is particularly disadvantageous with a comparatively short convoy route. The equipment of U-boats with radar sets would ease matters considerably. To date only 2 U-boats are fitted with old radar sets (U 625 and U 629). A third U-boat (U 601) is at present being fitted in Kiel with radar set K. Six more sets stated to be in transit to Bergen and Trondheim.

It is requested that docks be instructed by you to speed up their installation in Northern Waters U-boats and to ensure that all U-boats, including those operating for the first time in the northern area, are equipped with them. It is assumed that the 9 U-boats joining Captain U-boats, Norway in March as stated in the letter Admiral Commanding U-boats Secret 2984 Z1 dated 26 February have been fitted with radar interception set/radar set as well as VHF sets. A reply is requested.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret. 543 A4.

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APPENDIX III, 2.

10 March, 1943.

1420 teleprinter message sent:

Immediate Naval Chief Command, Norway.
Immediate Group North.
Immediate for information C-in-C U-boats.
Immediate for information Admiral Commanding U-boats.
Immediate for information Naval War Staff, Director
of Naval Communications Service.
Immediate for information Admiral North Coast.

Most Secret.

In the current convoy operations it has again been shown that the signal strength of U-boats operating in the sea area between Iceland and Jan Mayen is insufficient and radio messages of operational content show a time lapse of up to 20 hours. It is therefore necessary to set up another radio repeater station west of Narvik for U-boats' radio service in Northern Waters, which should be capable of receiving the 3 U-boat short waves, and of transmitting first of all on one, and which must have power of at least 800 watts, in order to communicate on the most favorable wave with the radio control of Captain U-boats, Norway. In my opinion the most suitable station for the purpose is the Naval radio station Aalesund, the sets of which would have to be suitably strengthened at once. As increased U-boat operations must be expected shortly, Naval Chief, Norway and Group North are requested for a speedy opinion and decision.

Captain U-boats Norway. Most Secret. 635 A4 U.

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WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

CAPTAIN PETERS

16 - 31 MARCH 1943

PG/31831



16 March, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U703 6360 southern half and 6390.
U212 6620 and 6650 northern half.
U354 6660 southern half and 6690, all AB.

In port:

U251, 255, 302, 355, 622, 657 Narvik.
U629 Trondheim.
U334, 625 Bergen.
U601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U622 1500 put out from Narvik to Trondheim.
U657 1730 put out from Narvik to Bergen.
U378, proceeding from Hammerfest to operational area.
U586, proceeding from Narvik to Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance, and reconnaissance for "Brausewetter" by 1 Ju 88, 1 He 111.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Sea reconnaissance by 2 Ju 88 in north-west area.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance of 2 FW 200 in sea area round Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic 4 enemy submarines at sea (Norwegian polar coast).

According to subsequent information the auxiliary aircraft carrier "Dasher" had possibly been added to QP22's escort or is lined up for later escort service between England and Murmansk or Archangel.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Passage south of Bear Island occupied by 3 U-boats.
The following received sailing orders by radio message:

- 1) U302 (Sickel) for 16 March.
U355 (La Baume) for 17 March, with approach-square AB 66.
- 2) U625 (Benker) for 17 March.
U644 (Jensen) for 18 March, with approach-square 6550 AB and 5950 Ab. (See Appendix I).

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U378 (Maeder) escorting meteorological observation ship "Coburg" (Operation "brausewetter") from Hammerfest to ice limit in Bear Island area.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

17 March, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U703 6360 southern half and 6390.

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U212 6620 and 6650 northern half.
U354 6660 southern half and 6690.
All grid square AB.

In port:

U251, 255, 302, 355 Narvik.
U629 Trondheim.
U334, 625 Bergen.
U601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U302 0700 put out from Narvik to operational area.
U355 1300 put out from Narvik to operational area.
U625 1700 put out from Bergen to operational area.
U586 2047 put in to Trondheim.
U622 proceeding from Narvik to Trondheim.
U657 proceeding from Narvik to Bergen.

II.

Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance and reconnaissance by 1 Ju 88, 1 He 111 for "brausewetter".

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance by 2 FW 200 south-west of Jan Mayen.

III.

Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 4 enemy submarines at sea (Norwegian north coast).

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

According to the listening service, on

9 March the Soviet Arctic Fleet was told that a large convoy going to Russia is led by the cruisers "Sheffield", "Belfast", "Cumberland", "Norfolk" and a fifth unknown cruiser.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1837 Occupation of the passage south of Bear Island is again ordered in radio message 1837/724 as follows:

U703	(Bielfeld)	6392
U378	(Maeder)	6388 lower edge left.
U212	(Vogler)	6638
U354	(Herbschleb)	6655 lower edge left.
U302	(Sickel)	6695
U355	(La Baume)	6922 lower edge left.

All grid square AB, attack areas with depth of sweep 24 miles. In preparation for the next Pq-convoy which is expected to put out from the west coast of Iceland between 17 and 21 March, the passage south of Bear Island stretching from the ice limit about a hundred miles southwards, will be effectively occupied as from the morning of 18 March, on the arrival of U355.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

1619 U378 (Maeder) reported in short signal 1615:

"Have executed operation."

Thus the outward trip of the meteorological observation ship "Coburg" engaged on operation "Brausewetter" has gone according to plan as far as the ice limit in the Bear Island area.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

VII. Plans for attacking next Pq-convoy were given as follows to all authorities concerned, in Captain U-boats Most Secret 767 A1:

- 1) Reconnaissance line with 7 boats on the morning of 20 March approximately from AB 6130 to 6670, advance via position lines to south-west along the ice limit,

speed 6 knots, to approximately AE 2650 to 6130. Remain there in patrol line from about early morning of 25 March.

2) The following boats will operate:
U251 (Timm), U212 (Vogler), U302 (Sickel),
U354 (Herbschleb), U355 (La Baume), U378
(Maeder), U703 (Bielfeld).
U625 (Benker), U644 (Jensen), are on the way
to join them.

3) The position of the U-boat formation southwest of Jan Mayen is to be based on the course of the ice limit and the patrol line should run fairly close to it.

(Signed) Peters.

18 March, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U703 6392,
U378 6388 lower edge left,
U212 6638 lower edge left,
U354 6655, all AB, attack areas depth of
sweep 24 miles.

In port:

U251, 255 Narvik.
U586, 629 Trondheim.
U334, 644 Bergen.
U601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U251 1400 put out from Narvik to operational
area.
U644 1700 put out from Bergen to operational
area.
U622 1530 put in to Trondheim.
U302, 355 proceeding from Narvik to operational
area.
U657 proceeding from Narvik to Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Metecrological reconnaissance by 1 He 111
and reconnaissance for "Brausewetter".

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Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Sea reconnaissance by 2 Ju 88 on expected route of next PQ-convoy.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance by 2 FW 200 south-west of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 4 enemy submarines at sea (north coast of Norway). Submarine M119 put out for the Barents Sea via Tsip Navolok.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

2254 Radio message 2254/736 sent:

"From Captain U-boats:

1) Herbschleb to occupy Maeder's attack area.

Sickel to occupy Herbschleb's attack area.

2) Maeder to depart for dispersal position:

"Coburg" ready to be escorted: new rendezvous position to follow."

This change of grouping within the attack areas was necessary in order to leave "U378" (Maeder) free to escort "Coburg" on operation "Brausewetter". The occupation (in a north-south direction) of the passage south of Bear Island remains essentially the same.

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"U251" (Timm) received sailing orders for 18 March. Boat is to be in AB 65 by 0400 on 20 March. (See Appendix I).

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U378 (Maeder) proceeding to rendezvous position with "Coburg".

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

19 March 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U378 in area south-west of Bear Island.
U703 6392
U354 6388 lower edge left
U212 6638
U302 6655 lower edge left
U355 6922 lower edge left,
all AB, depth of sweep 24 miles.

In port:

U255 Narvik.
U586, 622, 629 Trondheim.
U334 Bergen.
U601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U657 put in to Bergen at 1300.
U625 644 proceeding from Bergen to operational area.
U251 proceeding from Narvik to operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Reconnaissance by 1 Ju 88 for operation "Brausewetter".

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

See reconnaissance north-east of Jan Mayen.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

See reconnaissance by 1 FW south of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 4 enemy submarines at sea. (Norwegian polar coast). One of these boats is returning to Polyarno.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

C. Man Espionage Agency Portugal reports in message 154 of 18 March:

"From the British Consulate Shipping Department it is learned:-

A large convoy for Murmansk is assembling in Belfast. Main cargo:- aircraft and provisions. Further ships are said to be loading in Barrow-in-Furness for departure with same convoy. Estimated date of departure about 20 March.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1402 In radio message 1402/612 the following directions were sent to U-boats U625 (Benker) and U644 (Jensen) which are at present approaching the operational area:

"From Captain U-boats:
New approaches:

- 1) Benker to be in AB 8320 at 0800/21 March.
- 2) Jensen to be in AB 7930 at 1600/22 March.
- 3) You are reminded to report on passing 67 degrees N. and of subsequent switch to Northern Waters very long wave."

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1418 Radio message 1416/746 sent:

"From Captain U-boats:

- (1) At 0600 on 20 March form patrol line from 6135 to 6671. Order: Biclfield, Herbschleb, Vogler, Sickel, La Baume, Timm.
- (2) At 0700 depart at speed of 6 knots for position line I from 5545 to 5979. Pass it at 1000 on 21 March. Benker then extends position line in 8325. Further instructions to follow. All grid square AB."

I am ordering this advance in reconnaissance line via fixed position lines with the intention of meeting the expected PQ-convoy on the fringe of the ice limit as far west as possible, in order to ensure from the outset the longest possible duration for the operation and a more effective attack on the convoy. This ought to be well within the range of possibility, particularly after U 625 (Benker) and U 644 (Jenson) have closed in, as by the evening of 22 March the reconnaissance line, strengthened by the two new arrivals, will be occupied by 8 boats.

1430 In radio message 1430/747 special instructions are given on the use of FAT and warning of FAT, since "U 625" (Benker) is the first U-boat in the northern area to be equipped with FAT torpedoes. (See Appendix VII).

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 378 (Maeder): proceeding to rendezvous position with "Coburg". In radio message 1231/743 Maeder reported his position as AB 6324.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The five heavy cruisers picked up by Luftwaffe intercept service, 4 of which were called by name, lead to the conclusion that the next PQ-convoy will soon put out from Iceland. It is possible that the unusually strong escort to be expected is due to the presence of a considerable portion of our forces in the northern area.

VII. Because FAT is to be used for the first time in Northern Waters (by U 625 (Benker)) the following information is sent to the U-boats in the operational area:

- (1) Benker is equipped with FAT.
- (2) FAT - warning by means of short signal "UFRC" to be given on "Ulli I" at least 10 minutes before firing, valid for 30 minutes.

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- (3) If a boat is inside the convoy when it receives the FAT warning he is to get away immediately or go to at least 20 meters. The danger area lies within 1000 meters distance of the vessels on the outside of the convoy.
- (4) If the FAT is not fired within 30 minutes, a new warning must be given.
- (5) At present FAT is only to be used for surface attack.

(Signed) Peters.

20 March 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U 703, 354, 212, 302, 355, 251 in reconnaissance line 6135 - 6671 AB.
U 378 in area southwest of Bear Island.

In port:

U 255 Narvik.
U 586, 622, 629 Trondheim.
U 334, 657 Bergen.
U 601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 625, 644 proceeding from Bergen to operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Reconnaissance and meteorological reconnaissance by 2 Ju 88 for operation "Brausewetter".

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance by 1 FW 200 south of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

Ncnc.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 4 enemy submarines at sea (north coast of Norway). Lively radio traffic. During the day some tactical signals among other things to submarines. In the evening another U-boat put out from Polyarno for the Barents Sea.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U703, 354, 212, 302, 355, 251 in reconnaissance line advancing south-west. For further instruction of the boats and the newly joined U625 (Benker) the following order was sent in radio message 2206/778:

2206

"From Captain U-boats:

- 1) Boats from Herbschleb to Benker, pass position line I from 5581 to 8325 at 1000 on 21 March.
- 2) With Jensen in the most southerly position pass position line II from 7296 to 7969 at 2000 on 22 March.
- 3) All in grid square AB."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

1249

Following instructions sent to Maeder in radio message 1249/763:

- "1) "Coburg" is stuck fast in the ice east of the island.
- 2) Patrol in part of grid square AB 63 which is free from ice, until "Coburg" arrives at rendezvous."

1920

Following instructions sent to U703 (Bielfeld) in radio message 1920/775:

- 1) As from 2200 released for ice reconnaissance to south-west as far as 13 degrees west; be there on 24 March, 0800.

- 2) Reports should be sent on reaching the ice limit and positions 0 degrees, 7 degrees W. and 13 degrees W.
- 3) Avoid ice damage. Append exact fixes and weather from time to time.

I took this measure with the intention of getting as clear a picture as possible of the present course of the ice limit. In this way we can get an idea of the route of the expected PQ-convoy, and I will then dispose the boats accordingly.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

21 March 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U354, 212, 302, 355, 251, 625 in reconnaissance line, approximately AB 55 southern half to 83 northern half.

U703 on ice reconnaissance, approximately AB 55 southern half.

U378 in area south-west of Bear Island ready to pick up meteorological observation ship "Coburg".

In port:

U255 Narvik.

U586, 622, 629 Trondheim.

U269, 334, 339, 657 Bergen.

U601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U644 proceeding from Bergen to operational area.

U378 proceeding with "Coburg" from Bear Island area to LoppHAVET.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological and ice reconnaissance by 1 He 111 north and west coast of Bear Island. Reconnaissance for "Brausowetter".

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations on account of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance 1 FW 200 south of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 3 enemy submarines at sea (Norwegian north coast).

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U354, 212, 302, 355, 251, 625 in reconnaissance line advancing to sea area between Jan Mayen and Iceland.

1950

Operational orders dispatched as teleprinter message to 11th U-boat Flotilla, for the 2 U-boats recently arrived in the northern area U269 (Harlfinger) and U339 (Basse), as in Appendix I. By this relatively strong concentration of U-boats from 24 March (provisionally 11 boats) in Iceland and Jan Mayen areas, I hope to ensure early interception and effective attack on the expected PQ-convoy.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

0650

U703 (Bielfeld) reports in radio messages

2218

0433/783 and 2102/704 results of ice reconnaissance in area between Bear Island and Jan Mayen.

1027

In radio message 1027/791 U378 (Maeder) is instructed to pick up "Coburg" in AB 3624 (after Coburg's position had been received) and to report "Yes" by short signal, as soon as he has commenced return passage.

1210 After receipt of short signal "Yes" following radio message 1210/796 was dispatched:

"From Captain U-boats:

1) Maeder started return passage to LoppHAVet with "Coburg" at 1135.

2) After passing "Lucie I" "Coburg" is to proceed by the inner leads to Narvik. Maeder is to staer for AB 77 with daily run of 200 miles.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

22 March 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U354, 212, 302, 355, 251, 625 in reconnaissance line, approximately AB 73 - 87.

U703 on ice reconnaissance in advance of reconnaissance line approximately AB 73.

In port:

U255 Narvik.

U586, 622, 629 Trondheim.

U269, 334, 339, 657 Bergen.

U601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U644 proceeding from Bergen to operational area.

U378 proceeding from LoppHAVet to operational area.

U339 1700 put out from Bergen for operational area.

U639 put in to Bergen at 1530.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance - 1 He 111 Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N., 0 degrees - Banak.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Only local sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West).

Sea reconnaissance by 1 FW 200 south of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 4 enemy submarines at sea (north coast of Norway). Transmission of several tactical signals, one of which was to the 4 submarines at sea.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U354, 212, 302, 355, 251, 625 in reconnaissance line advancing to the sea area south-east of Jan Mayen.

1149 Radio message 1149/709 dispatched with following orders:

"From Captain U-boats:

1) At Q200 on 24 March, form patrol line from 9699 AA to 3613 AE, in following order: Herbschleb, Vogler, Sickel, La Baume, Timm, Benker, Jensen.

2) You are reminded to preserve radio silence except for reports of tactical importance. Bielfeld is to make reports, as ordered."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

0732 U378 (Maeder) reports by short signal 0732:

"Have executed operation."

In radio message 1210/796 of 21 March the boat was ordered to make for AB 77 with a daily run of 200 miles after leaving meteorological observation ship "Coburg" at Lucie I (entrance to LoppHAVET). He is expected to arrive in the operational area south of Jan Mayen during the night of 24 to 25 March.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

23 March 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U354, 212, 302, 355, 251, 625, 644 in reconnaissance line, approximately AB 72 to 78.
U703, on ice reconnaissance around Jan Mayen.

In port:

U255 Narvik.
U586, 622, 629 Trondheim.
U269, 334, 639, 657 Bergen.
U601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U378 proceeding from LoppHAVET to operational area.
U339 proceeding from Bergen to operational area.
U269 1700 put out from Bergen to operational area.
U467 and U711 1530 put in to Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance 1 Ju 88 - Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N., 0 degrees - Banak.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Ice reconnaissance 1 Ju 88 in area north-west of Jan Mayen.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance 1 FW 200 south of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 3 enemy submarines at sea (north coast of Norway). Staff of Northern Waters Fleet broadcasts - among other things - several tactical signals to the submarines at sea.

In the afternoon another submarine put out for the Barents Sea via Tsip Navolok.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

In message No. 6159 of 21 March "Hanibal Marine" reports that Admiral Moore is supposed to have sent the following telegram to the British Admiralty: Admiral Stanley, Moscow, informs the Navy Department Washington: The German Fleet, including the "Tirpitz", "Lützow" and "Prinz Eugen", numerous smaller vessels, and very long-range aircraft, have been concentrated in north Norwegian ports. They obviously intend to attempt to annihilate the 5 convoys for Russia in co-operation with the U-boats. Admiral King, representing the Navy Department and Admiral Leahy in the name of the President asked us to allot increased protection in the form of warships and aircraft carriers, to prevent the total destruction of the convoys, consisting of 170 ships (788,000 G.R.T) carrying an incalculable amount of war material.

The present protection for the convoy, especially for the one now under way, is very weak, the protection for the second and third can still be improved while en route, and the fourth and fifth will be protected from the time of their departure by U.S. ships.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U354, 212, 302, 355, 251, 625, 644 in reconnaissance line advancing to the south-east of Jan Mayen.

0130 Radio message 2110/711 of 23 March received from Bielfeld concerning course of the ice limit in area north-east of Jan Mayen. The result of this reconnaissance shows that as a result of the predominantly southerly winds of the last few days the ice limit has shifted about 50 to 60 miles to the north-west. This makes it necessary to alter the position lines of the boats on reconnaissance in the Jan Mayen area, in order to prevent the expected PQ-convoy from slipping by undetected to the northward.

0500 Radio message 0500/702 was therefore dispatched to the reconnaissance line with the following order:

"From Captain U-boats:

All boats in reconnaissance line proceed at 0600 on course 335 degrees, speed 6 knots, for 8 hours."

0501 Simultaneously U703 (Bielfeld) is ordered in radio message 0501/701 to report if a passage north of Jan Mayen would be possible for the convoy.

0535 Radio message 0535/720 dispatched:

"From Captain U-boats:

From 1400, steer for new patrol line from 9631 AA to 7795 AB; be there at 0300 on 24 March."

I intend to leave the patrol line in this position for the time being and then to extend it to the south by 2 boats to intercept any units approaching from Reydar - or Seydisfjordur.

1410 Report received from U703 (Bielfeld) that passage north of Jan Mayen is possible.

U639 (Wichmann) received sailing orders for 24 March, by teleprinter. According to the above, the boat must steer for AE 36 (see Appendix I).

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U703 (Bielfeld) on ice reconnaissance in Jan Mayen and Iceland area.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

1) The report made by G.I.S. station on 21 March (War diary 23 March, Para. III) concerning a greater volume of supplies for Russia, gives further reason to expect an early running of the next PQ-convoy. As the concentration of our surface forces is presumably known to the enemy, we must expect specially strong escorts.

2) The most favorable position for intercepting the convoy in view of the present ice situation is a patrol line from Jan Mayen in a south-easterly direction. As soon as this patrol line has been filled out to the necessary length, it may be possible to place some more boats ahead to intercept the enemy as soon as possible.

3) Luftwaffe operations:

One of the main conditions for a timely interception of the expected convoy (between Iceland and Jan Mayen) is adequate air reconnaissance. Because of the recent widespread movements of surface forces (Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Lützw) and the exercises carried out by Flag Officer, Cruisers in Westfjord (18 - 20 March), the reconnaissance activity of the Luftwaffe in the Bear Island - Jan Mayen area has been of necessity greatly reduced. Thus only a few reconnaissance aircraft could be used between 18 and 23 March to cover this wide area (550 miles), because of the scarcity of available forces.

18 March	2 Ju 88, 2 FW 200.
19 March	1 Ju 88, 1 FW 200.
20 March	1 FW 200.
21 March	1 FW 200.
22 March	1 FW 200.
23 March	1 Ju 88, 1 FW 200.

Also daily meteorological and ice reconnaissance in Bear Island area by 1 - 2 planes (Ju 88 or He 111). Because of this and because of the generally bad visibility conditions in the northern area, at present no guarantee can be given that the area will be covered exhaustively or convoy picked up with certainty. In addition the aircraft on reconnaissance are only sparsely equipped with location gear, so that in foggy weather the danger of the convoy passing unobserved is considerably increased.

An increase in the number of reconnaissance aircraft and their equipment with modern location gear is an urgent necessity as has already been stressed several times elsewhere.

VII. Miscellaneous:

1) The imminent use of FAT in Northern Waters necessitates instruction in the use of FAT in submerged attacks. A corresponding request was made in teleprinter message, Captain U-boats,

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Norway Most Secret 836 A1 of 23 March. (See Appendix II).

2) After a conference with F.O. Cruisers, in connection with the new operational instructions for naval forces in Northern Waters, principles for co-operation between U-boats and surface forces have been given to Group North and F.O. Cruisers. (Teleprinter message Captain U-boats Norway Most Secret 618 A1 of 23 March, see Appendix III).

(Signed) Peters.

24 March 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U354, 212, 302, 355, 251, 625, 644 in patrol line from AA 9631 to AB 7795.

U703 on ice reconnaissance from Jan Mayen to the south-west.

In port:

U255 Narvik.

U586, 622, 629 Trondheim.

U334, 467, 639, 657, 711 Bergen.

U601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U639 1700 put out from Bergen to operational area.

U378 proceeding from LoppHAVET to operational area.

U339 and U269 proceeding from Bergen to operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Fliieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance 1 Ju 88,
Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N., 0 degrees -
Banak.

Fliieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Convoy reconnaissance 3 He 115, 3 Bv 138.

Fliieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance 1 FW 200, 2 BV 138 south
and south-west of Jan Mayen.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 3 enemy submarines at sea (north coast of Norway). In the afternoon an enemy submarine put out from Polyarno to Barents Sea. During the day several tactical signals, among others, one to the submarines at sea.

- (d) By naval forces: None.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

0715 Another report received from Bielfeld on course of the ice limit. He confirms that southwest of Jan Mayen, too, the ice has shifted northwards.

1149 U 378 (Maeder) and U 339 (Basse) were ordered in radio message 1149/727 to occupy positions AE 3336 right edge center and AF 1146 in the patrol line. When U 339 arrives in the operational area at about 1800 on 25 March, there will be a patrol line consisting of 9 boats, 160 miles in length, stretching from Jan Mayen on a bearing of 145 degrees.

1433 After execution of ice reconnaissance Bielfeld was ordered in radio message 1433/729, as follows:

- (1) Patrol passage north of Jan Mayen between 9 degrees and 10 degrees west.
- (2) Report course of ice limit, as soon as the area can no longer be patrolled single-handed.

Thus the passage which exists at present north of the island is also being patrolled. U 467 (Kummer) and U 711 (Lange) received sailing orders for 25 March by teleprinter. Boats are to steer via AB 7880 for AB 7450 and AB 7490, respectively. (See Appendix I).

(c) Special operations by single boats:

None.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

25 March 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U354, 212, 302, 355, 251, 625, 644, 378 in
reconnaissance line, approximately from
AA 9630 to AF 1110.

U703 approximately AA 9370.

In port:

U255 Narvik.

U586, 622, 629 Trondheim.

U334, 467, 657, 711 Bergen.

U601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U711 1715 put out from Bergen to operational
area.

U339, 269, 639 proceeding from Bergen to
operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance Banak - 75 degrees
N., 0 degrees - Bear Island.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Convoy reconnaissance 2 EV 138, 3 He 115, 2 Ju 88.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance 1 FW 200, 1 EV 138 south
and south-west of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

0401 Radio message 0145/732 received from U212 (Vogler):

"Located by vessel in thick fog and pursued. Am in 9667 AA. Wind 0, 1020 mb."

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 3 enemy submarines at sea (north coast of Norway), another is to return to Polyarno during the forenoon.

24 March. 2200. Icebreakers "Mikojan" and "Krassin" with 3 freighters, two of which are "City of Omaha" (6124 G.R.T.) and "Tbilissi" (7169 G.R.T) proceeding from Nikodimski (south of Gorlo Straits) to Iokanka region.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

We cannot establish whether the vessel reported by U212 (Vogler) is a specially assigned U-boat chaser or a vessel from the remote escort of the expected convoy; at the same time there is no report of enemy sighting from air reconnaissance as far as it was flown in this area. However it was decided to have the boats make a reconnaissance of the supposed convoy route along the ice boundary and the following radio message 0445/733 was dispatched:

0445

"From Captain U-boats:
Boats Herbschlob to Maeder inclusive, to proceed at 0530 on course 60 degrees, speed 10 knots."

1625

U354 (Herbschleb) reported in radio message 1526/735 that the course and speed were not possible because of heavy drift-ice.

Throughout the day the boats did not encounter the enemy during their reconnaissance in a north-easterly direction, so in radio message 1655/738, they were ordered as follows:

1655 "At 1800 the patrol line is to put about, and return to old patrol line positions at speed of 6 knots."

From the afternoon of 26 March, therefore, the old positions in the patrol line will again be occupied, extended by U339 (Basse), i.e. with 9 boats from AA 9631 to AF 1146.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

None.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

According to G.I.S. station reports of 18 and 19 March, 2 convoys have sailed from Belfast and Barrow-in-Furness, bound for Reykjavik and Murmansk. According to the same report another large convoy from the U.S. is on its way to the same destination. By dead-reckoning, these convoys should put in to the Iceland ports between 24 and 26 March, so that it is assumed that these ports are rather congested at present. Moreover the large convoys reported as having left Boston and West of England ports at the end of February and beginning of March, and likewise destined for Russian ports, have so far not been intercepted. It is expected that in the near future the Allies will commence sending supplies to Russia on a very large scale, with extra strong escort from Iceland on. This is confirmed by the report from "Hanibal Marine" of 21 March. (See War diary of 23 March.)

(Signed) Peters.

26 March 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U354, 212, 302, 355, 251, 625, 644, 378, 339 in reconnaissance line, approximately from AB 7170 to AB 7880.

U703 approximately AA 9370.

In port:

U255 Narvik.
U586, 622, 629 Trondheim.
U334, 467, 657 Bergen.
U601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U646 1630 put in to Bergen,
U269, 639, 711 proceeding from Bergen to operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance, Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N., 0 degrees - Bardufoss.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Convoy reconnaissance with 3 BV 138 and 3 He 115.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance with 1 FW 200 south and east of Jan Mayen, 1 BV 138 south-west of Jan Mayen, 2 EV 138 in Northern Waters, southern sector.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 3 enemy submarines at sea (north coast of Norway). 2 guardships put out from Tokanka at 0300 for Svyatoi Nos, to meet their own transports and to escort them from the White Sea to Kola Bay. In all probability they are the 3 freighters reported leaving the Archangel region yesterday, to be incorporated in the next returning convoy.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 269 (Harlfinger) in radio message 1055/745 and U 639 (Wichmann) in radio message 1500/748 were ordered to steer via AB 7880 to AB 7810 and AB 7450 respectively. The purpose of this measure is to incorporate these 2 boats in to the patrol line and so leave U 625 (Benker) and U 212 (Vogler) free for reconnaissance ahead of the patrol line.

1340 Teleprinter message received from Luftflotte 5 according to which British reconnaissance aircraft were above a surfaced U-boat at 0643 in 70 degrees 10 minutes N., 6 degrees 35 minutes W. Judging by the position it must be one of the U-boats in the patrol line.

1449 In radio message 1449/746 following directive was sent to the boats in the operational area:

"To all boats from Captain U-boats:

(1) At 0643 British aircraft sighted surfaced U-boat in 7472 AB.

(2) Increased alertness in respect of enemy air reconnaissance is recommended so that formation is not prematurely betrayed."

1510 U 339 (Basse) reported in radio message 1510/749:

"To Captain U-boats:

Was bombed in naval grid square 1146 AF at 0700. Pressure hull ripped in fore compartment, limited ability to dive, am returning to Trondheim."

I am forced to the conclusion that this formation has been detected and that anti-submarine chasers are to be expected. It was decided, therefore, to shift the patrol line about 60 miles in a northeasterly direction. In radio message 1729/750 the boats received the following order:

1729 "At 0400 on 27 March form patrol line from 7155 to 7899 AB, in the same order as before, Harlfinger to occupy the most southerly position in place of Basse."

By the incorporation of U 269 (Harlfinger) in the patrol line in place of U 339, the line retains its numerical strength.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

1452 On Group North's instruction U 703 (Bielfeld) receives the following order in radio message 1452/747:

"From Captain U-boats:

- 1) Carry out continuous ice reconnaissance from the ice-limit southwards as far as 68 degrees N., roughly along the longitude of 13 degrees W.
- 2) Report only if the ice position no longer permits passage by single steamers north of 68 degrees N."

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

It is not clear whether the enemy's measures against our boats at Jan Mayen are advance reconnaissance and anti-submarine measures in connection with the imminent convoy, or whether, as a result of Bielfeld's ice reports, anti-submarine measures and reconnaissance were started by the enemy in this area. The former supposition is the more probable.

(Signed) Peters.

27 March 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U354, 212, 302, 355, 251, 625, 644, 378, 269
in patrol line AB 7155 to AB 7899.
U703 sea area Iceland - Jan-Mayen.

In port:

U255 Narvik.
U586, 622, 629 Trondheim.
U334, 467, 646, 657 Bergen.
U601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U467 1750 put out from Bergen to operational area.
U639, 711 proceeding from Bergen to operational area.
U339 proceeding from operational area to Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance 1 Ju 88,
Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N.,
7 degrees E. - Banak.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Convoy reconnaissance by 5 BV 138.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance by 2 FW 200 area south-west of Jan Mayen, 2 BV 138 Northern Waters -southern sector.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 3 enemy submarines at sea (north coast of Norway).

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Apparently trustworthy agent reports on 26 March from Argentine Embassy circles in Budapest: In the first week of March a strongly escorted convoy put out from Boston. The greater part is destined for Murmansk. The ships carry steel, explosives, aluminum, rails and provisions. A few ships will leave the convoy somewhere in the Atlantic. These ships carry heavy naval guns, radio apparatus and technical precision instruments for England.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1045 Radio message 1045/756 sent:

"From Captain U-boats:
Wichmann to occupy 7899 AB in the patrol line.
As from 1800 other boats are to reduce the distance between them accordingly."

The incorporation of U639 (Wichmann) increases the strength of the patrol line to 10 boats.

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1142 U354 (Herbschleb) was ordered in radio message 1142/758 to determine the distance from his own position to the ice limit and to report if this is more than 5 miles.

1147 Radio message 1147/759 dispatched:

"From Captain U-boats:
Herbschleb, Vogler, Sickel, La Baume, Timm, Benker, Jensen, Maeder, Harlfinger, Wichmann to form group "Eisbär".

1424 Radio messages concerning this patrol line will from now on go out with prefix "Eisbär".
Radio message 1328/762 received from Herbschleb:

"Ice limit 7 miles further south."

So the ice limit has shifted about 20 miles to the south-east again.

U646 (Wulff) received sailing order for 28 March by teleprinter. Boat is to steer for AB 76. (See Appendix I.)

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U703 (Bielfeld) on meteorological and ice reconnaissance in the area between Jan Mayen and Iceland.

2128 The following order was sent on instruction from Group North to U703 (Bielfeld) in radio message 2128/764:

"Occupy AA 98 immediately and report weather between 0400 and 0600 on 28 March."

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

28 March 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U354, 212, 302, 355, 251, 625, 644, 378, 269, 639 in patrol line AB 7155 to AB 7899.
U703 AA 98.

In port:

U255 Nervik.
U586, 622, 629 Trondheim.
U334, 646, 657 Bergen.
U601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U339 1400 put in to Trondheim.
U646 1700 put out from Bergen for operational area.
U711 and U467 proceeding from Bergen to operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance with 1 Ju 88, Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N., 2 degrees E. - Banak. Sea reconnaissance with 1 Ju 88 between 31 degrees and 35 degrees E. to 72 degrees N.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Convoy reconnaissance with 5 He 115 Sørreisa - AB 5279 - AB 7164.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance with 2 FW 200 south-west of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to Russian radio traffic, 4 enemy submarines at sea of which 3 are on the north coast of Norway.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

0045 U711 (Lange) received following order in radio message 0045/767:

"At 1900 on 28 March be in AB 7899."

1328 Following radio message 1328/771 was dispatched:

"From Captain U-boats:

Today at 1900,

1) Benker to make for AB 2349, and to be in position at 0000 on 30 March.

2) Jensen to occupy Benker's position.

3) Maeder, Harlfinger, Wichmann to move up accordingly.

4) Lange to occupy AB 7899."

The withdrawal of U625 (Benker) from the patrol line takes place on directions from Group North. The boat has been assigned a special operation, and on arrival at her new position as ordered, U703 (Bielfeld) will be freed for other operations.

2010 Following order sent in radio message 2010/773:

"1) With the incorporation of Lange in "Eisbär", Benker is detached from this group.

2) At 0600 on 29 March "Eisbär" will proceed so that a patrol line is formed between 9631 AA and 1146 AF by 1600.

3) Continuous radar intercept watch to be kept."

Thus at 0600 on 29 March the patrol line will be back in its old position with 10 boats. U586 (v.d. Esch) and U255 (Reche) received sailing orders for 29 March. Boats are to steer for AB 7510 (see Appendix I).

(c) Special operations by single boats:

1750 U703 (Bielfeld) meteorological and ice reconnaissance assigned by Group North.

Bielfeld was ordered among other things in radio message 1750/772 to alter position for weather reports on 29 March, but not to go south of latitude 69 degrees N.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

29 March 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U354, 212, 302, 355, 251, 644, 378, 269, 639,
711 in reconnaissance line approximately
AB 7150 - AF 1210.
U625 approximately AA 9960, proceeding to
AE 2349.
U703 AA 98.

In port:

U255 Narvik,
U339, 586, 622, 629 Trondheim.
U334, 657 Bergen.
U601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U255 1100 put out from Narvik, U586 1315 put
out from Trondheim to operational area.
U467 and U646 proceeding from Bergen to
operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance by 1 He 111
Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N.,
0 degrees - Banak.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Convoy reconnaissance by 5 BV 138 Tromsø -
AB 64 - 5279 AB.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance by 1 Fw 200 south-west
of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

Submarine "M122" returning from the north,
is to put in to port in the evening.

S.O. of Russian Destroyer Flotilla and the destroyers "Bruno" and "Caesar" put to sea in the afternoon.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U354 (Herbschleb), U212 (Vogler), U302 (Sickel), U355 (La Baume), U251 (Timm), U644 (Jensen), U378 (Maeder), U269 (Harlfinger), U639 (Wichmann), U711 (Lange), in reconnaissance line proceeding to position AA 9631 to AF 1146.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U703 (Bielfeld) on meteorological and ice reconnaissance assigned by Group North.
U625 (Benker) proceeding to AE 4349. Boat is there at disposal of Group North.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

30 March 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

At sea:

U354, 212, 302, 355, 251, 644, 269, 639, 711
in patrol line from AA 9631 to AF 1146.
U703 AA 98.
U625 AE 2345.

In port:

U339, 622, 629 Trondheim.
U334, 657 Bergen.
U601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

Proceeding to operational area are U467 and U646 from Bergen, U255 from Narvik, U586 from Trondheim. U378 is proceeding from operational area to Trondheim. U629 1330 put out from Trondheim to operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance with 1 Ju 88, Banak - Bear Island - 76 degrees N., 2 degrees E. - Banak.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Convoy reconnaissance with 5 He 115, Sørreisa - AB 7164 - AB 5279.
Fan reconnaissance with 3 EV 138 Tromsø - AB 7185 - AB 7787.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance with 2 FW 200 between Jan Mayen, north coast of Iceland and with 4 EV 138 in area between Trondheim, Faeroes and east coast of Iceland.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

On the night of 31 March, submarine "S101" due at Polyarno from the north. Submarine "M171" put out from Olenya Bay in the afternoon for the Barents Sea.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

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IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

0010 Radio message 0010/782 dispatched, addressed all boats:

"Radio silence to be maintained except for enemy reports."

0041 In radio message 0041/784 U 625 (Benker) received following order:

"Be in AE 2345 right edge, center, at 0800."

0047 U 378 (Maeder) reported in radio message 2359/781 of 30 March:

"Starboard diesel out of order, tie-bolt loose. Can do 10 knots. Request permission to proceed Trondheim dockyard. Am in AB 7883, east 3, sea 2, 975 mb."

0130 Radio message 0130/786 dispatched:

"From Captain U-boats:

(1) Harlfinger to occupy Maeder's position immediately.

(2) Wichmann, Lange to move up accordingly.

(3) Kummer to occupy AF 1146 and joins "Eisbär".

(4) Maeder to return to Trondheim. Owing to the necessity of withdrawing U 378 (Maeder), the patrol line is temporarily occupied by only 9 boats, until U 467 (Kummer) will arrive."

0150 On direction of Group North, the following order was sent in radio message 0150/787 to the 3 boats named below:

"From Captain U-boats:

Until further notice,
Wulff will occupy 1230 AF,
Esch will occupy 8780 AB,
Reche will occupy 8570 AB."

These boats are at present approaching from Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik. Radio message 1134/792 was dispatched as addition to radio message 0010/782:

"Only convoy or warships from corvette upwards to be reported. Do not report aircraft."

U 629 (Bugs) received sailing order for 30 March. Boat is to steer for AB 7510.

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1359 In radio message 1359/793 the following order was sent to Bielfeld:

"To be decoded by Bielfeld only. With immediate effect, attack on single vessels absolutely forbidden."

1544 Radio message 1544/794 dispatched:

"To all boats from Captain U-boats:
To be decoded by boats at sea only.
1) With immediate effect for Bielfeld and with effect from midnight 30 March for all other boats north of 67 degrees N. until cancelled, attack on single vessels forbidden.
2) Allow all single vessels sighted to proceed and 10 hours after their passing, report with position and time of origin."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

On instruction from Group North, U625 (Benker) AE 2345 on meteorological and ice reconnaissance.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

31 March 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In operational area:

U354, 212, 302, 355, 251, 644, 269, 639, 711,
467 in patrol line from AA 9631 to AF 1146.
U703 AA 98.
U625 AE 2345.
U255 AB 8570.

In port:

U339, 622 Trondheim.
U334, 657 Bergen.
U601 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

Proceeding to operational area are:
U646 from Bergen,
U586 and U629 from Trondheim.
U378 proceeding from operational area to Trondheim.

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II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance with 1 Ju 88,
Banak - Bear Island - 76 degrees N. 2 degrees
E. - Banak.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Convoy reconnaissance with 5 He 115. Special
mission with 4 BV 138 in sector Tromsø -
AA 9219 - AE 3272.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance with 2 FW 200 south-south-west
of Jan Mayen and with 4 BV 138 southwest of Jan
Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0845 in AB 9817 a submarine (diving).

(c) By radio intercept service:

S.O. Destroyer Flotilla with 4 destroyers off
Murmansk in the afternoon. Destroyers were
addressed in conjunction with submarines.
Russian submarines "K 3", "S 55", "M 122" and
"S 101" in vicinity of north coast of Norway on
30 March.

Submarine "M 171" put out for operations on
afternoon of 30 March.

The submarine "S 101" is expected in Polyarno on
31 March. (Submarine "S 55" appeared first
on 24 March).

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1116 Radio message 1116/704 dispatched to all boats:

"Attention is again drawn to the ban on attacking single vessels until further notice."

1341 Radio message 1341/707 despatched to all boats for information:

"Our own destroyers (6th destroyer flotilla) "Jacobi", "Galster", "Riedel" will be in the area 8250 AB from 0400 on 1 April. Further instructions to follow concerning return passage."

2043 U629 (Bugs) in radio message 2043/709 was ordered to occupy AF 1320 until further notice.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

On instruction from Group North:

U625 (Benker) in AE 2345 on ice and meteorological reconnaissance,
U646 (Wulff) AF 1230,
U586 (Esch) AB 8780,
U255 (Reche) AB 8570 in waiting position.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

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APPENDIX I

Operational and sailing orders:

- No. 1. U302 (Sickel) as in War diary of 16 March 1943, Para. IVb.
- " 2. U355 (La Baume) as in War diary of 16 March 1943, Para IVb.
- " 3. U625 (Benker), U644 (Jensen) as in War diary of 16 March, Para. IVb.
- " 4. U251 (Timm) as in War diary of 18 March, Para. IVb.
- " 5. U269 (Harlfinger), U339 (Basse) as in War diary of 21 March 1943, Para. IVb.
- " 6. U639 (Wichmann) as in War diary of 23 March 1943, Para. IVb.
- " 7. U467 (Kummer), U711 (Lange) as in War diary of 24 March 1943, Para. IVb.
- " 8. U646 (Wulff) as in War diary of 27 March 1943, Para. IVb.
- " 9. U255 (Reche) as in War Diary of 28 March 1943, Para. IVb.
- " 10. U586 (v.d. Esch) as in War diary of 28 March 1943, Para IVb.
- " 11. U629 (Eugs) as in War diary of 30 March 1943, Para. IVb.

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1. APPENDIX TO WAR DIARY OF 16 MARCH, 1943

COPY

Captain U-boats Norway.

Serial No. Most Secret 682.

16 March 1943.

Most Secret

Operational order for "U302"

1. Put out from Narvik on 6 March. Proceed via Tjeldsund to Harstad with pilot from Lødingen. Then proceed on the same day after short revictualing.

2. Steer for AB 66.

3. Own boats:

U703 (Bielfeld) after carrying out ice reconnaissance of Bear Island, in 6360 southern half and 6390.

U212 (Vogler) 6620 and 6650 northern half.

U354 (Herbschleb) 6660 southern half and 6690.

All in grid square AB.

4. Enemy situation:

East-bound convoy to be expected.

5. Ice situation:

From Bear Island as far as AB 6350 to south. More exact details from Bielfeld's ice report.

6. Captain U-boats, Norway Operational Order No. 1 in force.

(Signed) Peters.

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2. APPENDIX TO WAR DIARY OF 16 MARCH 1943

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway.
Serial No. Most Secret 750.

16 March 1943.

Most Secret.

Operational order for "U355" (La Baume).

1. Put out from Narvik on 17 March via Tjeldsund to Harstad with pilot from LÜdingen. Continue passage directly after short revictualling.
2. Proceed to AB 66.
3. Own boats:
U703 (Bielfeld) 6360 southern half and 6390.
U212 (Vogler) 6620 and 6650 northern half.
U354 (Herbschleb) 6660 southern half and 6690.
All in grid square AB.
U378 (Maeder) escorted meteorological observation ship "Coburg" (Operation "brausewetter") from Hammerfest to the ice limit in Bear Island area. Operation began at 2345 on 15 March from Hammerfest.
4. Enemy situation:
Expect convoy bound for Russian ports at the end of March.
5. Ice situation:
Ice limit, according to Bielfeld's reconnaissance of 14 March, runs as follows:
3890 - 3970 - 6310 - 6340 - 6290 - 6370 - 6380 - 6390 - 4140. All AB. Movement to south and south-west by about 10 km. ascertained by air reconnaissance.
6. Captain U-boats Norway Operational Order No. 1 in force.

(Signed) Peters.

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3. APPENDIX TO WAR DIARY OF 16 MARCH 1943

COPY

16 March 1943.

Radio message 2242/?/698:

11th U-boat Flotilla from Captain U-boats.

Sailing order:

1. U625 (Benker) to put out from Bergen on 17 March.
Steer for 6550 AB to be there at midnight of 20 March.

2. U644 (Jensen) to put out from Bergen on 18 March.
Steer for 5950 AB. Be there at 0400 on 22 March.

4. APPENDIX TO LAR DIARY OF 18 MARCH 1943

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway.

Serial No. Most Secret 583.

18 March 1943.

Most Secret

Operational Order for "U251" (Timm).

1. Put out from Narvik on 18 March, 1943. Proceed via Tjeldsund to Harstad, with pilot from Lødingen. Then proceed via Andfjord to operational area on morning of 19 March.
2. Proceed to AB 65: be there at 0400 on 20 March.
3. Own boats:
 - U703 (Bielfeld) 6392.
 - U378 (Maeder) 6388 lower left edge.
 - U212 (Vogler) 6638.
 - U354 (Herbschleb) 6655 lower left edge.
 - U302 (Sickel) 6695.
 - U355 (La Baume) 6922, all in grid square AB. Radius of patrol in attack areas, 24 miles.
 - U625 (Benker) at present proceeding to 6550 AB, put out from Bergen at 1700 on 17 March.
4. Expect convoy bound for Russian ports at the end of March.
5. Ice position:

Ice limit according to Bielfeld's reconnaissance of 14 March runs as follows:
3890 - 3970 - 6310 - 6340 - 6290 - 6370 - 6380 -
6390 - 4140 all AB. Movement to south and south-west of about 10 kilometers ascertained by air reconnaissance.
6. Captain U-boats, Norway Operational Order No. 1 in force.

(Signed) Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. APPENDIX TO WLR DIARY OF 21 MARCH 1943

COPY.

1905 teleprinter message dispatched:

Emergency 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Sailing orders for U269 (Harlfinger) and U339 (Basse).

1. Put out from Bergen on 22 March.
2. Harlfinger to steer for AE 32, Basse for AE 35.
3. Own boats:
U703 (Bielfeld) on ice reconnaissance.
U212 (Vogler), U251 (Timm), U302 (Sickel), U354 (Herbschleb), U355 (La Baume), U625 (Benker) in reconnaissance line advancing to Jan Mayen - Iceland area.
U378 (Maeder) returning with meteorological observation ship "Coburg" from Bear Island area.
4. Radio service "Anton" until confirmation of report of passing 0 degrees is received, then Northern Waters Service. In addition, set watch on Northern Waters very long wave from the time of sailing.
5. Captain U-boats, Norway Operational Order No. 1 in force.

Captain U-boats, Norway
Most Secret 0820.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. APPENDIX TO WAR DIARY OF 23 MARCH 1943

COPY

Teleprinter message dispatched:

Emergency 11th U-boat Flotilla:

Most Secret

Operational order for "U 639" (Wichmann).

1. Put out from Bergen on 24 March.
2. Steer for AE 36.
3. Own boats:
 - U 703 (Bielfeld) on ice reconnaissance.
 - U 354 (Herbschleb), U 212 (Vogler), U 302 (Sickel), U 355 (La Baume), U 251 (Timm), U 625 (Benker), U 644 (Jensen) in reconnaissance line advancing to Jan Mayen - Iceland area.
 - U 378 (Maeder) put out from LoppHAVET 0730 on 22 March.
 - U 339 (Basse) put out from Bergen 1700 on 23 March, proceeding to Iceland - Jan Mayen area.
4. Radio service "Anton" until confirmation of report of passing 0 degrees is received, then Northern Waters Service. In addition set watch on Northern Waters very long wave from time of sailing.
5. Captain U-boats, Norway Operational Order No. 1 in force.

Captain U-boats, Norway
Most Secret 835 A1.

CONFIDENTIAL

7. APPENDIX TO WAR DIARY OF 24 MARCH, 1943

COPY.

Teleprinter message dispatched:

Emergency 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Sailing orders for "U467" (Kummer) and "U711" (Lange).

1. Put out from Bergen on 25 March.
2. "Kummer" to steer for AB 7450, "Lange" for AB 7490, both to proceed via Ab 7880.
3. Own boats:

U703 (Bielfeld) on patrol in passage between Jan Meyen and ice limit.

U354 (Herbschleb), U212 (Vogler), U302 (Sickel), U355 (La Baume), U251 (Timm), U625 (Benker), U644 (Jensen), U378 (Maeder) and U339 (Basse) in patrol line from AA 9631 to AF 1146.

Proceeding from Bergen:

U269 (Harlfinger - put out 23 March), is steering for AE 32.

U639 (Wichmann - will probably put out on 24 March) to steer for AE 36.

4. Radio service "Anton" until confirmation of report of passing 0 degrees has been received, then Northern Waters Service. In addition set watch on Northern Waters very long wave, from time of sailing.
5. Captain U-boats, Norway Operational Order No. 1 in force.

Captain U-boats, Norway
Most Secret 849 A1.

8. APPENDIX TO WAR DIARY OF 27 MARCH 1943

COPY.

Teleprinter message dispatched:

Emergency 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Sailing orders for "U646" (Wulff).

1. Put out from Bergen 28 March.

2. Steer for Ab 76.

3. Own boats:

U703 (Bielfeld) on ice reconnaissance in Jan Mayen - Iceland area.

U354 (Herbschleb), U212 (Vogler), U302 (Sickel), U355 (La Baume), U251 (Timm), U625 (Benker), U644 (Jensen), U378 (Maeder), U269 (Harlfinger) in patrol line from 7155 to 7899.

Proceeding to operational area:

U639 (Wichmann) put out from Bergen 24 March.

U711 (Lange) put out from Bergen 25 March, both are steering for Jan Mayen area.

4. Radio service "Anton" until confirmation of report of passing 0 degrees is received then Northern Waters Service. In addition set watch on Northern Waters very long wave, from the time of sailing.

5. Captain U-boats, Norway Operational Order No. 1 in force.

Captain U-boats, Norway
Most Secret 867 Al.

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9. APPENDIX TO WAR DLRY OF 28 MARCH 1943

COPY.

Captain U-boats Norway.

Serial No. Most Secret 879 A1.

28 March 1943.

Most Secret.

Sailing orders for U255 (Reche).

1. Put out from Narvik 29 March. Proceed via Tjeldsund to Harstad with pilot from Lødingen. Then proceed directly through Andfjord after revictualling.
2. Steer for AB 7510.
3. Own boats:
U703 (Bielfeld) AA 98, U625 (Benker) AE 2349, U354 (Herbschleb), U212 (Vogler), U302 (Sickel), U355 (La Baume), U251 (Timm), U644 (Jensen), U378 (Maeder), U269 (Harlfinger), U639 (Wichmann), U711 (Lange) are in patrol line AA 9631 to AF 1146 and form group "Eisbär".
U467 (Kummer) put out from Bergen 27 March.
U646 (Wulff) put out from Bergen 28 March.
U586 (v.d. Esch) will put out from Trondheim probably 29 March. They will proceed to AB 7510.
4. Ice situation:
Ice limit is running approximately through AB 5670, 5580, 5490, 4680, 4850, 7120, AA 9350, 9550 and on to southwest.
5. Radio service:
U-boat Northern Waters Service.
6. Captain U-boats, Norway Operational Order No. 1 in force.

(Signed) Peters.

10. APPENDIX TO WAR DIARY OF 28 MARCH 1943

COPY.

Teleprinter message of 28 March 1943:

Emergency U-boat base Trondheim.
Emergency for information of 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as single address message.

Most Secret.

Sailing order for U586 (v.d. Esch).

1. Put out from Trondheim 29 March.
2. Steer for AB 7510.
3. Own boats:
U703 (Bielfeld) AA 98, U625 (Benker), AE 2349, U354 (Herbschleb), U212 (Vogler), U302 (Sickel), U355 (La Baume), U251 (Timm), U644 (Jensen), U378 (Maeder), U269 (Harlfinger), U639 (Wichmann); U711 (Lange) are in patrol line AA 9631 to AF 1146 and form group "Eisbär".
U467 (Kummer) put out from Bergen 27 March.
U646 (Wulff) will probably put out from Bergen 28 March,
U255 (Reche) will probably put out from Narvik 29 March. They will proceed to AB 7510.
4. Radio service "Anton" until confirmation of report of passing 0 degrees then Northern Waters Service. In addition set watch on Northern Waters very long wave from time of sailing.
5. Captain U-boats, Norway Operational Order No. 1 in force.

Captain U-boats, Norway
Most Secret 875 Al.

CONFIDENTIAL

11. APPENDIX TO WAR DIARY OF 30 MARCH 1943

COPY.

Teleprinter message dispatched:

Most Immediate: U-boat base Trondheim.

Emergency for information of 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Clear as single address message.

Most Secret.

Sailing orders for U629 (Bugs).

1. Put out from Trondheim 30 March.
2. Steer for AB 7510.
3. Own boats:
 - (a) U703 (Bielfeld) AA 98, U625 (Benker) AE 2349.
 - (b) U354 (Herbschleb), U212 (Vogler), U302 (Sickel), U355 (La Baume), U251 (Timm), U644 (Jensen), U269 (Harlfinger), U639 (Wichmann), U711 (Lange), U467 (Kummer) are in patrol line AA 9631 to AA 1146 and form group "Eisbär".
 - (c) Until further orders the following are in position or approaching:
U646 (Wulff), 1230 AF, U586 (v.d. Esch), 8780 AB, U255 (Reche), 8570 AB, U378 (Maeder) returning to Trondheim.
4. Radio service "Anton" until confirmation of report of passing 0 degrees is received, then Northern Waters Service.
5. Captain U-boats, Norway Operational Order No. 1 in force.

Captain U-boats, Norway
Most Secret 897 A1.

APPENDIX II

APPENDIX TO WAR DIARY OF 23 MARCH 1943.

Teleprinter message dispatched:

Immediate: Naval High Command, Naval War Staff 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Operations.

Immediate: for information of Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Most Secret

1. Because of almost continuous daylight in Northern Waters from about May to September it is intended to use FAT by day also, in the command of Captain U-boats, Norway. Request concurrence, so that it may be tried out without delay.
2. The danger involved in submerged attack by several boats simultaneously is considered not too great, as long as the FAT G 7a is used without Pistol 2. In fact the danger is not substantially greater than under normal firing conditions.
3. The disadvantage of the torpedo track, which gives away the type and firing position, is considered to be outweighed by the advantages expected.
4. In view of the special conditions it is generally intended to increase the use of G 7a in Northern Waters. The following are reasons for the use of FAT G 7a by day:
 - (a) Because of low water temperature G 7c has insufficient running range.
 - (b) Because of strong A/S measures boats are often compelled to fire from a great distance.
5. It would appear that it is seldom possible to give FAT - warning in case of a submerged attack early enough, and for the other boats to take measures far enough in advance, to avoid attacking opportunities being largely blocked to them. It is therefore, proposed to cancel FAT - warning for submerged attack, as long as G 7a is used without Pistol 2.

Captain U-boats, Norway
Most Secret 836 A1.

APPENDIX III

APPENDIX TO WAR DIARY FROM 23 MARCH 1943

COPY

Teleprinter message dispatched:

Immediate: Group North.
Immediate: F.O. Cruisers.

Most Secret.

Reference Group North Most Secret 300/43 S.O.s only of
17 March:

The following are principles for co-operation between
U-boats and surface forces, with concurrence of
F.O. Cruisers, and Admiral Northern Waters:

1. There are no objections to setting U-boats and
surface forces simultaneously on to the same target.
Provision is that surface forces operate by day;
this is in accordance with previous intentions.
2. Whatever the circumstances, U-boats will remain under
control of the operational command station (Captain
U-boats, Norway).

F.O. (Commanding) will, however, give tactical
indications as to the possibility of U-boat attacks,
which may arise in the course of operations. These
will be sent on submarine wave to avoid loss of time.
As far as is necessary, command through Captain
U-boats will then ensue.

3. On the subject of co-operation the following is
contained in Operational Order for U-boats:

"If U-boats and surface forces are simultaneously
attacking the same target, the following orders
come into force:

- (a) U-boats may attack warships, from destroyer
upwards, only if they are definitely identified
as hostile. They are forbidden to attack
warships in poor visibility and in unclarified
positions.
- (b) Surface forces are to treat U-boats as if
every sighted U-boat were hostile: they are
ordered not to attack U-boats however.

Captain U-boats, Norway
Most Secret 618 Al.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY

CAPTAIN PETERS

1 - 15 APRIL 1943

PG/31832

1 April 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U354, 212, 302, 355, 251, 644, 269, 639, 711, 467, in patrol line from AA 9631 to AF 1146.
U703 AA 98.
U625 AE 2345.
U646 AF 1230.
U586 AB 8780.
U255 AB 8570.

(b) In port:

U339, 622 Trondheim.
U657 Bergen.
U601 Kiel.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U378 put into Trondheim at 1315.
U629 proceeding from Trondheim to operational area.
U703 proceeding from operational area to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance by one Ju 88
Banak - Ice Fjord (Spitsbergen) - Bardufoss.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance by one FW 200 south-west of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

Submarine "L20" put out from Polyarno for Barents Sea. Submarine "K3" returned forenoon from northerly direction to Polyarno.

3 Russian submarines at sea (north coast of Norway).

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1216 Radio message 1216/721 sent:

"From Captain U-boats:

1) Bielfeld to proceed to Hammerfest today to refuel. Report estimated time of arrival at point SR1 - 71 degrees 3.5 minutes N., 23 degrees 37.3 minutes E., 36 hours in advance.

2) Establish the course of the ice limit as far as 79 degrees N. and 10 degrees E. on return journey.

3) "Eisbär" to bear in mind Bielfeld's passing."

I intend to recall the boats singly to Hammerfest to refuel after 25 days' seetime, so that when the convoy approaches these boats are also at full operational readiness.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

According to Group North's instructions: U625 (Benker) AB 2345 on ice and meteorological reconnaissance.

U646 (Wulff) AF 1230, U586 (v.d. Esch) AB 8780, U255 (Reche) AB 8570, U629 (Bugs) AF 1320 in waiting position.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

2 April 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U354, 212, 302, 355, 251, 644, 269, 639, 711,
467, in patrol line from AA 9631 to AF 1146.
U625 AE 2345.
U646 AF 1230.
U629 AF 1320.
U586 AB 8780.
U255 AB 8570.

(b) In port:

U339, 378, 622 Trondheim.
U657 Bergen.
U601 Kiel.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U703 proceeding from operational area to
Hammerfest.
U354 proceeding from operational area to
Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological and ice reconnaissance
Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N. 0 degrees.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Two AF 196 reconnaissance of inshore waters.
One Ju 88 east coast of Scotland.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic, submarines K3,
L20, S55, S56 at sea off north coast of
Norway.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

0752 Radio message 0752/729 sent:

"From Captain U-boats:

Occupy at once:

Reche 8255,

Esch 8267,

Bugs 8227,

Wulff 8261, all AB.

Maximum cruising speed. Further orders to follow."

These positions are to be occupied by the boats of Captain U-boats, Norway, in accordance with Group North's instructions as a result of the failure of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla - originally scheduled for this special assignment - which had to withdraw because of engine trouble and damage caused by the seaway. Boats U255 (Reche), U586 (v.d. Esch), U629 (Bugs), and U646 (Wulff) form group "Taifun".

1416 Report from U354 (Herbschleb) to hand, according to which the boat is returning to Narvik because of damage caused by ice to the periscope.

1505 Vogler ordered to occupy Herbschleb's position, the patrol line is correspondingly expanded.

1806 Herbschleb reported his arrival for 1400 on 3 April at the entrance to Andfjord.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

Following positions were occupied according to Group North's instructions:

U625 (Benker) AB 2345,

U646 (Wulff) AB 1230,

U586 (Esch) AB 8780,

U255 (Reche) AB 8530.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

3 April 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U212, 302, 355, 251, 644, 269, 639, 711, 467
in patrol line from AA 9631 to AF 1146.
U625 AE 2345.
U255 Ab 8255.
U586 AB 8267.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U601 (Grau) put out from Kiel northwards.
U354 (Herbschleb) put into Harstad from operational area.
U339 (Basse) put out from Trondheim via inner leads for the south, to be overhauled in Kiel dockyard.
U629 (Bugs) proceeding to 8227 AB.
U646 (Wulff) proceeding to 8261 AB.

(c) In port:

U378, 622 Trondheim.
U657, Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance of AB 2775 - Bear Island, by one Ju 88.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance by one FW, south-east of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing new.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

After consultation with Group North, U255 (Reche) was released out of the boats assigned for special duty and directed to make for 9631 AA to relieve U212 (Vogler).

(c) Special operations by single boats:

The following are in the area around AB 8255 or en route:

U629 (Bugs), U586 (v.d. Esch), U646 (Wulff).

In radio message 1157 these boats are instructed to occupy in this order attack areas with depth of sweep 16 miles in 8227 left edge top, 8255 right upper corner, 8268 left edge center, all AB.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

4 April 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U212, 302, 355, 251, 644, 269, 639, 711, 467 in patrol line from AA 9631 to AF 1146.

U625 AB 2345)

U629 AB 8227) Areas with depth of sweep

U646 AB 8268) 16 miles.

U586 AB 8255)

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U255 proceeding to A. 9631.

U703 proceeding to Hammerfest.

U339 proceeding to Bergen.

U601 proceeding to Kristiansand South.

(c) In port:

U378, 622 Trondheim.

U657 Bergen.

U354 Harstad.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance - Bear Island - 75 degrees N., 4 degrees E.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Two Ar 196 inshore waters reconnaissance between 58 degrees 30 minutes and 62 degrees 30 minutes N. as far as 3 degrees E. No further operations because of weather conditions.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic, Russian submarines K3, K21, L20, M119 at sea off north coast of Norway.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

None.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

Four boats for special assignment from Group North in position according to I (a).

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

- (a) As there are still no definite indications of the expected convoy, I intend to withdraw the boats at sea after 25 days' seetime as systematically as possible, and to keep them in readiness after refuelling and repairs. The present arrangement of placing four boats at the disposal of Group North for a special assignment is proving a great drawback. It will be very difficult to maintain both a sufficient number of boats to patrol the convoy route, and four boats for Group North's assignment for any length of time. Regular and systematic relief can hardly be maintained while this assignment lasts, on the basis of only 21 boats.
- (b) Air reconnaissance is severely limited by the weather, information on the convoy route from Iceland to Bear Island is therefore insufficient. The area in question has not been exhaustively reconnoitered for four days, or else reconnaissance was cancelled because of weather conditions.

(Signed) Peters.

5 April 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U255, 302, 355, 251, 644, 269, 639, 711, 467
in patrol line from AA 9631 to AF 1146.

U625 AA 95)
U629 AB 8227) areas with depth of sweep
U646 AB 8268) of 16 miles.
U586 AB 8255)

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U212 returning to Narvik.
U703 returning to Hammerfest.
U339 returning to Bergen.

(c) In port:

U378, 622 Trondheim.
U354 Narvik.
U657 Bergen.
U601 Kristiansand South.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological and ice reconnaissance from Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N. 0 degrees E. - Banak.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Fan reconnaissance by 3 BV 138 only as far as AB 8515 - AB 8276 or AB 8217 - AB 8265 or AB 9565 because of icing up and technical defects. Area not exhaustively covered.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 FW 200 in area south-east of Jan Mayen, visibility varying considerably. 3 BV 138 reconnaissance of inshore waters south of 67 degrees N., 2 Ar 196 south of 62 degrees N. to 59 degrees 30 minutes N.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

7 Russian submarines at sea (K3, K21, L20, S56, Schtsch 422, M119, M171) according to radio traffic.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

On Group North's instructions, U625 (Benker) is stationed in area M 95 as a meteorological boat. He is to report the weather north of 69 degrees N. twice daily.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

6 April 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In the operational area:

U 255, 302, 355, 251, 644, 269, 639, 711, 467
in patrol line from AA 9631 - AF 1146.
U 625 AA 95)
U 629 AB 8227) Areas with depth of sweep
U 646 AB 8268) 16 miles.
U 586 AB 8255)

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 601 proceeding to Bergen.
U 212 returning to Narvik.

(c) In port:

U 339, 657 Bergen.
U 378, 622 Trondheim.
U 354 Narvik.
U 703 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One He 111 meteorological reconnaissance Banak -
75 degrees N., 0 degrees - 74 degrees N., 0
degrees 9 minutes E. - Banak. Flying route
only partly covered.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Four BV 138 fan reconnaissance Tromsø - 4896 AB -
9672 AA - Tromsø. Not exhaustive.

Two He 115 fan reconnaissance Sørreisa - 4981 AB -
5486 AB - Sørreisa. Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of inshore waters only.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

Since 1000 on 6 April, destroyer "Uritski" and 2 more submarines, 9 in all (also K1, M105) at sea.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

None.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

Four boats continue to be in position for Group North's special assignment.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

1) We may conclude from the nine Russian submarines which have been established at sea for the first time that the Russians have especially strong patrols at the exits to our leads and intend to attack our own convoy traffic. As a destroyer was mentioned in radio traffic in conjunction with submarines the possibility of mining operations cannot be excluded. So far no effects or special requirements for our own U-boats have resulted from this increased number of Russian submarines.

2) If the number of nine boats for patrolling the convoy route off Jan Mayen is to be maintained, the extra four boats for Group North's special assignment can only be provided until 13 April, since only very few new boats are at present available for operational use. A further prerequisite is the relief of each boat after 25 days at sea, in order to be able to carry out the expected convoy operation with boats which are well provided with fuel. I have reported these circumstances to Group North, in order to make the position clear:

"Emergency Group North.

Most Secret. To maintain the patrol of the convoy route with nine boats off Jan Mayen on a basis of 28 days at sea for each boat, including return voyage, the boats will only be able to operate on the special assignment till 13 April.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret 998 Al."

(Signed) Peters.

7 April 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U255, 302, 355, 251, 644, 269, 639, 711, 467
in patrol line from AA 9631 - AF 1146.

U625 AE 2345)

U629 AB 8227) Areas with depth of sweep

U646 AB 8268) 16 miles.

U586 AB 8255)

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U601 proceeding to Bergen.

U339 proceeding to Kristiansand South.

U212 returning to Narvik.

(c) In port:

U657 Bergen.

U378, 622 Trondheim.

U354 Narvik.

U703 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One He 111 meteorological and ice reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - Spitsbergen - Hope Island - Banak.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Two FW 200 south and south-west of Jan Mayen.
Visibility 30 - 50 km.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

Eight Russian submarines at sea.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

None.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U625 (Benker) has been in rendezvous position AE 2345 again since 0000 on 7 April according to Group North's instructions. His weather reporting assignment is completed. Since 1000 on 7 April U629 (Bugs), U646 (Wullf) and U586 (v.d. Esch) have been proceeding to their new positions. As from 0400 on 8 April they are to occupy:

U629 AB 8255)
U646 AB 8281) areas with depth of sweep
U586 AB 8745) 30 miles.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

8 April 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U255, 302, 355, 251, 644, 269, 639, 711, 467
in patrol line from AA 9631 - AF 1146.

U625 AE 2345

U586 AB 8745

U646 AB 8281 left edge bottom, area with
depth of sweep 30 miles.

U629 AB 8255 right upper corner.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U339 proceeding to Kiel.

(c) In port:

U601, 657 Bergen,
U378, 622 Trondheim,
U212, 354 Narvik,
U703 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological and ice reconnaissance Banak - Spitsbergen - Banak. On west coast of Spitsbergen on the average 4/10 drift-ice, ice solid on inner fjords.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 Fw 200 south and southwest of Jan Mayen.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

At sea according to radio traffic, 7 submarines off north coast of Norway, 3 Russian destroyers in Murmansk area.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

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- (c) By G.I.S. stations:
None.
- IV. Current U-boat operations:
- (a) Convoy operations:
None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
None.
- (c) Special operations by single boats:
None.
- V. Reports of successes:
None.
- VI. Survey of the situation:
Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

9 April 1943.

- I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:
- Positions at 0800:
- (a) In operational area:
- U255, 302, 355, 251, 644, 269, 639, 711, 467
in patrol line from AA 9631 - AF 1146.
U625 AB 2345
U586 AB 8745
U646 AB 8281 left edge bottom, area with
depth of sweep 30 miles.
U629 AB 8255 right upper corner.
- (b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:
- U339 proceeding to Kiel.
- (c) In port:
- U601, 657 Bergen.
U378, 622 Trondheim.
U212, 354 Narvik.
U703 Hammerfest.
- II. Air reconnaissance:
- Flieger Fuehrer North (East):
- One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance
Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N.,
0 degrees - Banak.

Fliieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Four BV 138 broke off reconnaissance in first third of reconnaissance area because of deterioration in the weather.

Fliieger Fuehrer North (West):

Two FW 200 between Iceland and Jan Mayen. Three BV 138 fan reconnaissance Trondheim - Faeroes - east coast of Iceland.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

At sea according to radio traffic: 6 submarines off north coast of Norway, 5 destroyers in Murmansk area.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

None.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

None.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

By order of Naval War Staff 2nd Division/ C.in C. U-boat Operations, U334 is left with the 11th U-boat Flotilla, and used as an open water firing boat. Captain U-boats, Norway has to furnish a boat at immediate readiness for the Atlantic. U378 (Maeder) has reported for

this purpose. Boat will be ready to put to sea from Trondheim on 12 April. At the same time the commander of U334, Lieutenant Staudinger, is being appointed elsewhere and there is so far no replacement. Until a new commander is appointed by Admiral Commanding U-boats, U334 will have to be commanded for open water firing by one of the commanders who happen to be in Bergen with the 11th U-boat Flotilla.

(Signed) Peters.

10 April 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U255, 302, 355, 251, 644, 269, 639, 711, 467
in patrol line from AA 9631 - AF 1146.

U625 AB 2345.

U586 AB 8745.

U646 AB 8281 left edge bottom, area with depth
of sweep 30 miles.

U629 AB 8255 right upper corner.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U339 proceeding to Kiel.

(c) In port:

U601, 657 Bergen.

U378, 622 Trondheim.

U212, 354 Narvik.

U703 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One He 111 meteorological reconnaissance in
direction of Bear Island.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Five Bv 138 between 6830 north and 72 north as
far as the ice limit. Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Two FW 200 south-west of Jan Mayen. Three
BV 138 in area Trondheim - Faeroes - east coast
of Iceland.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

A report indicates that a small cablelayer is being moved from Molotovsk to Kola Bay. This again confirms that as a result of constant icebreaker activity it is possible to pass through the White Sea without difficulty. The Russians have thus succeeded in keeping the route to Archangel open during the whole of the ice period. Six strong icebreakers were constantly engaged in keeping open a navigable channel.

Six Russian submarines off the north coast of Norway, five Russian destroyers at the entrance to Kola Bay.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

None.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

None.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

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11 April 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U255, 302, 355, 251, 644, 269, 639, 711, 467
in patrol line from AA 9631 - AF 1146.

U625 AE 2345.

U586 AB 8745.

U646 AB 8281 left edge bottom, area with depth
of sweep 30 miles.

U629 AB 8255 right upper corner.

(b) U-boatshomeward and outward bound:

U339 proceeding to Kiel.

(c) In port:

U601, 657 Bergen.

U378, 622 Trondheim.

U212, 354 Narvik.

U703 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak -
Bear Island -.75 degrees N., 0 degrees -
Banak. Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Four EV 138 between 68 degrees 30 minutes N.
and 72 degrees N., as far as ice limit.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

One FW 200 south west of Jan Mayen. One
EV 138, four Ar 196 reconnaissance of inshore
waters.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

0955 AE 3112 special steam trawler 800 - 1000 G.R.T.,
course 30 - 50 degrees, speed 15 knots, length
45 - 50 meters, armed.

(c) By radio intercept service:

At 0700 on 11 April a convoy put out from Kola
Bay consisting of the Russian destroyer "Uritski",

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the British minesweepers "Camelia", "Jason" and one further minesweeper. Two allied tankers (Onhill and Mereson) proceeding towards Gorlo Straits.

Five Russian submarines off the north coast of Norway.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

The air report of 0955 has been transmitted to the boats; because of Group North's special assignment which is still in progress they received instructions not to attack the vessels in order to avoid all confusion.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

None.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

12 April 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U255, 302, 355, 251, 644, 269, 639, 711, 467
in patrol line from AA 9631 - AF 1146.

U625 AB 2345

U586 AB 8745

U646 AB 8281 left edge bottom, area with
depth of sweep 30 miles.

U629 AB 8255 right upper corner.

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(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U339 proceeding to Kiel.

(c) In port:

U601, 657 Bergen.
U378, 622 Trondheim.
U212, 354 Narvik.
U703 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak -
Bear Island - 75 degrees N., 0 degrees -
Banak. Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

One FW 200 from Trondheim - 67 degrees 40
minutes N., 19 degrees - Trondheim.

Four EV 138 between 63 degrees N. and 66
degrees N. as far as 12 degrees W.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

0605 Short signal to hand from U255 (Reche). At
1900 on 11 April one steamer in AA 9623. It
was established by enquiry that this is the
trawler reported by aircraft at 0955 on 11 April,
which is probably scheduled to take supplies to
Jan Mayen.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic, 5 Russian submarines
at sea off north coast of Norway.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

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(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

None.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

None.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Special:

A query was sent to C-in-C U-boats in order to clear up which is the competent authority to inform U-boats about Swedish ships, and the following reply has been received:

All boats on the Atlantic coastal radio service are informed by C-in-C U-boats, Northern Waters boats on radio service "Antol" are informed by Captain U-boats north of Bergen. (See Appendix 2.)

(Signed) Peters.

13 April 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U255, 302, 355, 251, 644, 269, 639, 711, 467
in patrol line from AA 9631 - AF 1146.

U625 AE 2345.

U586 AB 8745.

U646 AB 8281 left edge bottom, area with depth
of sweep 30 miles.

U629 AB 8255 right upper corner.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U378 proceeding into Atlantic.

(c) In port:

U334, 601, 657 Bergen.

U622 Trondheim.

U212, 354 Narvik.

U703 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - 75 degrees N., 0 degrees - Banak. Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Four BV 138 between 68 degrees 30 minutes N. and 72 degrees N. as far as ice limit. Not exhaustive.

Two He 115 anti-submarine hunt Andenes.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Two FW 200 between 68 degrees N. and 70 degrees N. as far as 21 degrees 30 minutes W.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

A submarine submerging in AF 4694, course 220 degrees, possibly an enemy boat.

(c) By radio intercept service:

Five Russian submarines off north coast of Norway.

Five destroyers and 2 M.T.B.s at sea in Murmansk area.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

The boats set aside for Group North's special assignment have now been released by Group North and assigned new positions to relieve boats which had been at sea longer than they.

2311 Radio message 2311/2344/726/727 sent:

"From Captain U-boats:

1) The following to join Group "Eisbär" as reliefs in patrol line:

Bugs AA 9663 upper center at 1100 on 15 April.

Wulff AB 7472 upper left at 0800 on 15 April.

Esch AB 7728 lower center at 2100 on 14 April.

2) When relieved the following are to commence their return voyage to Hammerfest: Sickel, La Baume, Jensen.

3) Benker to proceed immediately to Hammerfest. "Eisbär" to bear in mind Benker's passing.

4) Boats on return voyage report after passing 2 degrees E. whether the execution of large-scale repairs or docking necessary, otherwise short signal position and "No".

The attack ban on single ships is still in force, boats will receive corresponding instructions.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

None.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

14 April 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U255, 302, 355, 251, 644, 269, 639, 711, 467
in patrol line from AA 9631 - AF 1146.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U586, 629, 646 proceeding to positions in
patrol line as reliefs.

U625 returning to Hammerfest.

(c) In port:

U339, Kiel.

U334, 601, 657 Bergen.

U622 Trondheim.

U212, 354 Narvik.

U703 Hammerfest.

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II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - 75 degrees N., 0 degrees - Banak. Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Five BV 138 between 68 degrees 30 minutes N. and 72 degrees N. as far as ice limit. Not exhaustive.

Two He 115 anti-submarine hunt Andenes.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 FW 200 Jan Mayen area.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

1044 Report to hand from U302 (Sickel) according to which the boat avoided a four fan in AA 9639 at 0746 and heard an end of run detonation.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

Radio traffic with 4 Russian submarines established off north coast of Norway.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

The appearance of an enemy submarine in the area of our patrol line constitutes a great danger for the boats. I therefore sent the following directive:

1343 Radio message 1343/735:

" 1) "Eisbaer", after 2200, to move 50 miles on a bearing of 50 degrees at a speed of 8 knots.

2) Reche to fix distance from ice limit or report ice hindrance by short signal.

3) Wulff to relieve at 0400 and Bugs at 0700 in the new positions."

Departure orders for U601 are sent to 11th U-boat Flotilla. (See appendix).

(c) Special operations by single boats:

None.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

15 April 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U255, 629, 646, 251, 586, 269, 639, 711, 467 in patrol line from AB 7154 - 7898.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U625, 302, 355, 644 returning to Hammerfest.

(c) In port:

U339 Kiel.
U334, 601, 657 Bergen.
U622 Trondheim.
U212, 354 Narvik,
U703 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - 75 degrees N., 0 degrees - Banak.
Flying route only partially covered.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance because of weather.
One He 115 anti-submarine hunt near Andenes.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 FW 200 Denmark Straits. 4 Ar 196 reconnaissance of coastal waters off west coast of Norway.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

Six Russian submarines off north coast of Norway.

(d) By naval forces:

None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

0825 Short signal from U255 (Reche) received regarding drift-ice fields in AB 7157. Thus the most northerly position of the patrol line has been correctly placed at the ice limit. U625 (Benker) reports that he will be off Hammerfest at 1800 on 16 April. U355 (La Baume) will be off Hammerfest at 1000 on 17 April. U302 (Sickel) and U644 (Jensen) received instructions to proceed to Narvik via Westfjord. U302 (Sickel) gives arrival report at entrance to Westfjord for 2200 on 16 April.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

None.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I.

COPY.

Teleprinter message to Emergency 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Departure orders for U601 (Grau).

1. Put out from Bergen on 15 April.
2. Steer for AB 7570.
3. Own boats:
See current radio traffic.
4. Following orders in force until rescinded:
 - (a) Attack ban for single ships.
 - (b) Let pass single ships sighted and report with position and time 10 hours after passing.
5. Radio service "Anton" and very long wave U-boats Northern Waters Service after putting to sea. U-boats Northern Waters Service on receipt of confirmation of 67 degrees N. passage report.
6. Operational Order No. 1 Captain U-boats, Norway is in force.

Captain U-boats, Norway.
Most Secret 1088 A1.

APPENDIX 2.

COPY.

Teleprinter message: Immediate. Naval War Staff/2nd
Division.
C-in-C U-boats,
Operations.-
Immediate. Group North.

Most Secret:

Subject: Briefing about Swedish ships and command of
Atlantic boats proceeding through Northern
Waters.

1. Request confirmation, that Captain U-boats,
Norway is competent to instruct only the boats
under his command. Captain U-boats commands
his boats inside his area to and from Bergen.
Group North is in command of movements between
home and Bergen.
2. In my opinion, the command and briefing of
Atlantic boats putting in and out through the
southern sector of Northern Waters from and
to Bergen and Kristiansand South is Naval War
Staff 2nd Division's affair.

Captain U-boats, Norway.
Most Secret 1051 Al.

COPY.

Teleprinter message: Immediate Captain U-boats, Norway.
Immediate Group North.

Most Secret.

Reference Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret 1051 Al.

Competent authority to brief about Swedish
ships.

1. Naval War Staff 2nd Division C-in-C U-boats
will brief all boats on coastal wave.
2. Boats set apart for Northern Waters on radio
service "Anton" will be briefed by you.

C-in-C U-boats.
Most Secret 2013 Al.

WAR DIARY
OF
CAPTAIN U-BOATS NORWAY.
CAPTAIN PETERS.

16 - 30 April, 1943.

PG/51833

CONFIDENTIAL

16 April, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 255, 629, 646, 251, 586, 269, 639, 711,
467 in patrol line from AB 7154 to AB 7898.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 601 proceeding to operational area Jan Mayen.
U 625, 355 returning to Hammerfest.
U 302, 644 returning to Narvik.

(c) In port:

U 339 Kiel.
U 334, 657 Bergen.
U 622 Trondheim.
U 212, 354 Narvik.
U 703 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological and ice reconnaissance
Banak - Ice Fjord - Hope Island - Banak, not
exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

No sea reconnaissance.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

Five Russian destroyers at sea in Kola Bay area.
Six Russian submarines off north coast of Norway.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

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(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

According to dead reckoning, U 644 (Jensen) should be transmitting an estimated time for putting into Westfjord.

In radio message 1045/764 the boat was requested to give a position report.

In radio message 1158 U 703 (Bielfeld) received the following departure orders:

- (1) Put to sea on 17 April according to instructions from Sea Defense Commandant.
- (2) Steer for AB 7580.
- (3) Own boats: see current radio traffic.
- (4) Attack ban on single ships for the present. Report single ships sighted 10 hours after passing with position and time.
- (5) Report crossing 5 degrees E. westwards by short signal.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

17 April, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 255, 629, 646, 251, 586, 269, 639, 711, 467
in patrol line from AB 7154 to AB 7898.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 601, 703 proceeding to operational area, Jan Mayen.
U 355 returning to Hammerfest.
U 302 returning to Narvik.
U 644 has not reported position.

(c) In port:

U 339 Kiel.
U 334, 657 Bergen.
U 622 Trondheim.
U 212, 354 Narvik,
U 625 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One He 111 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N. 0 degrees - Banak, not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

One FW 200 north of Iceland, visibility 2-100 km.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

Five Russian submarines off the north coast of Norway appeared in radio traffic. Traffic between British units and Murmansk and Archangel was intercepted. (Probably minesweepers stationed there.)

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1905 Short signal from U 255 (Reche) to hand:

"Navigable passage 70 miles wide."

The boat is in the most northerly position in the patrol line. According to this report the ice limit has moved a good deal during the last few days. In order to ensure a proper patrol of the convoy route, a new disposition of the boats will be necessary. I must also have a clear picture of the ice situation in the Jan Mayen area.

2111 Radio message 2111/785 sent:

(1) Reche to carry out ice reconnaissance between 5 degrees W. and 13 degrees W., to confirm whether it is possible to pass north of Jan Mayen, and to report result after passing 13 degrees W. to the west.

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- (2) The following to occupy attack areas with depth of sweep 30 miles:

Bugs 7174 bottom right,
Wulff 7188 lower right corner,
Timm 7454 right edge bottom,
Esch 7469 left center,
Harlfinger 7735 left center,
Wichmann 7819 top left,
Lange 7875 top left,
Kummer 7889 upper edge center.

All AB.

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.

- (d) Miscellaneous:

U 644 (Jensen) was again requested for a position report and was ordered to put into Westfjord if his radio transmitter had broken down. U 302 (Sickel) received order:

- (1) Put out from Narvik at 1000 on 18 April.
- (2) Proceed to Trondheim keeping 50 miles from the coast. Steer for point Ha 1 (Frohavet). Report estimated time of arrival there 36 hours in advance.
- (3) Radio service "Anton" after putting to sea. No passage report.

- V. Reports of successes: None.

- VI. Survey of the situation:

The U-boats south of Jan Mayen have been in this area since 24 March. Since the enemy, in two cases at least, has sighted and attacked our own U-boats (U 339 attacked by aircraft on 26 March, U 302 by submarine on 14 April), he must suspect the convoy route Reykjavik-Murmansk to be patrolled off Jan Mayen by German U-boats. In spite of this disadvantage a patrol line near Jan Mayen and the ice limit seems to me the most suitable for intercepting a PQ-convoy. This is the only suitable position besides Bear Island Straits, where traffic converges, in any case as long as the ice situation prevents passage north of Bear Island and Jan Mayen. I must therefore leave the boats in the Jan Mayen area for the present, since a withdrawal to the Bear Island passage would mean too great a reduction in the area suitable for attacks.

(Signed) Peters.

18 April, 1943

- I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

CONFIDENTIAL

(a) In operational area:

U 255, 629, 646, 251, 586, 269, 639, 711,
467 in patrol line from AB 7154 to AB 7898.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 601, 703 proceeding to Jan Mayen operational
area.

U 644 has not reported position.

(c) In port:

U 339 Kiel.

U 334, 657 Bergen.

U 622 Trondheim.

U 212, 302, 354 Narvik.

U 355, 625 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak-
Ice Fjord - Banak. Bear Island area and west
coast of Spitsbergen ice free.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

One FW 200 as far as north-west corner of
Iceland. Visibility about 50 km.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

Four Russian submarines established at sea.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

0930

Report of passing 67 degrees N. received from
U 601 (Grau). Boat instructed to relieve U 251
(Timm) at 1200 on 19 April in AB 7454 in
patrol line. Timm then to return to Narvik.

CONFIDENTIAL

1203 U 255 (Reche) ordered to carry out patrol north and west of Jan Mayen after carrying out ice reconnaissance.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

19 April, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 255 on ice reconnaissance between 5 degrees W. and 13 degrees W.

In attack areas, each depth of sweep 30 miles

U 629 7174 bottom right,

U 646 7188 right lower corner,

U 251 7454 right lower edge,

U 586 7469 left center,

U 269 7735 left center,

U 639 7819 top left,

U 711 7875 top left,

U 467 7889 upper edge center.

All AB.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 601, 703 proceeding to operational area Jan Mayen.

U 302 proceeding to Trondheim for overhaul.

U 644 has not reported position.

(c) In port:

U 339 Kiel,

U 334, 657 Bergen,

U 622 Trondheim,

U 212, 354 Narvik,

U 355, 625 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N., 0 degrees - Banak. Only partially covered, owing to bad visibility.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

5 BV 138 between 71 degrees N. and 73 degrees 30 minutes N. as far as ice limit. Not exhaustive. Three aircraft broke off flight prematurely because of icing up.

CONFIDENTIAL

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

One FW 200 north of Iceland. Visibility 20-90 km.
Two BV 138 and eight Ar 196 in operation
as air escort on west coast.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

At sea according to radio traffic: three
Russian submarines, three destroyers on
exercises in Vaenga Bay.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

After crossing 5 degrees E. U 703 (Bielfeld)
is ordered to relieve U 269 (Harlfinger)
at 0900 on 20 April at position 7735 in
patrol line.

Harlfinger then to return to Narvik.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

There are still no indications of the running
of the next PQ-convoy, which has been due for a
long time. The enemy is apparently delaying
supplies to Russia in favor of other plans. At
least, he has probably not at present sufficient
forces left over from other commitments to escort
a PQ-convoy sufficiently well to meet the threat
of the recent concentration of German surface
units with superior strength.

(Signed) Peters.

20 April, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 255 on ice reconnaissance west of Jan Mayen.
U 269, 467, 586, 601, 629, 639, 646, 711 in
attack areas south-east of Jan Mayen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 703 proceeding to operational area, Jan Mayen.
U 302 returning to Trondheim.
U 251 returning to Narvik.
U 644 has not reported position.

(c) In port:

U 339 Kiel.
U 334, 657 Bergen.
U 622 Trondheim.
U 212, 354 Narvik.
U 355, 625 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak -
Spitsbergen - Banak. Only partially covered.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

One FW 200 Denmark Straits as far as north-west
coast of Iceland. Visibility 1-50 km.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

4 Russian submarines established off north coast
of Norway.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 212 (Vogler) received departure orders (see
Appendix I). The boat is scheduled to relieve
U 639 (Wichmann). The attack ban on single
ships has been lifted by Group North, and the
boats were informed accordingly in radio message
2157.

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(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

U 644 (Jensen) was again requested for a position report.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

21 April, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 255 west of Jan Mayen.

U 467, 586, 601, 629, 639, 646, 703, 711 in attack areas south-east of Jan Mayen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 212 proceeding to operational area Jan Mayen.

U 251, 269 returning to Narvik.

U 644 has not reported position.

(c) In port:

U 339 Kiel.

U 334, 636, 657 Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - 75 degrees N., 0 degrees - Banak. Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

One FW 200 Denmark Straits to north-west coast of Iceland. Visibility 0 - 40 km.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

Two Russian submarines appeared in radio traffic.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

U 255 (Reche) reported the course of the ice limit as ordered. The present disposition of the boats corresponds to the ice situation. U 269 (Harlfinger) reported estimated time of arrival at entrance to Westfjord as 0700 on 23 April.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Since U 644 (Jensen) has not carried out the order to return and has not answered three requests for position reports on 16, 17 and 20 April, I must regard the boat as missing, and have reported as follows to Naval War Staff/2nd. Div. C-in-C, U-boats, Ops., Group North and Admiral Commanding U-boats:

"U 644 (Jensen) is missing. Last reported at 1819 on 20 March on radio service "Anton" that it had passed 67 degrees N. Boat was ordered by radio message 1149/709 to take up position in patrol line AE 3613 as from 0200 on 24 March. It was to remain in patrol line south of Jan Mayen. Was relieved at 2100 on 14 April by U 586 (Esch) in AB 7728. Then U 644 was ordered to return to Narvik. Was ordered in radio message 2005/755 on 15 April to steer for Narvik via Westfjord. Boat was requested for position reports on 16, 17 and 20 April, was to put into Westfjord if radio had broken down. Because of the special assignment to be carried out for Group North and because the next PQ-convoy was expected, all boats at sea had been ordered to keep radio silence except for important tactical reports. No report has been received and so far the boat has not returned. It is possible that U 644 was sunk by a British submarine. According to U 251 (Timm), who put in on 21 April, the British submarine had already been sighted on 8 April in AB 7478. (Erroneously not reported because of radio silence.) The same boat probably fired a 4-fan at U 302 (Sickel) on 14 April in AA 9639. U 251 met U 644 on 7 April in patrol line.

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- V. Reports of successes: None.
- VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.
- VII. Reports:
Short report about enemy operation from U 302
(Sickel) for 17 March - 17 April (see Appendix II).

(Signed) Peters.

22 April, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 255 west of Jan Mayen.
U 467, 586, 601, 629, 639, 646, 703, 711 in
attack areas south-east of Jan Mayen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 212 proceeding in to operational area,
Jan Mayen.
U 251, 269 returning to Narvik.

(c) In port:

U 339 Kiel.
U 334, 636, 657 Bergen.
U 302, 622 Trondheim.
U 251, 354 Narvik.
U 355, 625 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak -
Bear Island - AB 2755 - Banak. Flying route only
partly covered. Photographic reconnaissance of
Murmansk carried out.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Four BV 138 between 71 degrees 30 minutes N. and 74
degrees 30 minutes N. as far as ice limit. Not
exhaustive. One He 115 anti-submarine hunt off
Andenes.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

One FW 200 Denmark Straits.

CONFIDENTIAL

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Aerial photograph of Murmansk showed normal occupation by one U-boat, 16 freighters totalling 69300 G.R.T.

Apparently one destroyer in Murmansk-Rosta.

(c) By radio intercept service:

Two Russian U-boats established in radio traffic.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

0835

U 212 (Vogler) reported crossing 5 degrees E. to the west, and was ordered to relieve U639 (Wichmann) at 0400 on 22 April at position AB 7819 in patrol line. Wichmann to return to Hammerfest.

It appears from U 251 (Timm's) report that this boat definitely sighted a British submarine as early as 8 April in the disposition off Jan Mayen, but omitted to report it because of the radio silence ordered. This decision of the Commander's did not correspond to the needs of the situation. Even though restrictions in the transmission of radio messages were placed on the boats because of the special assignment ordered by Group North, and because the boats are disposed in an area of enemy air patrols (Jan Mayen), the appearance of an enemy submarine in our patrol line is of such decisive importance that a report was definitely required. To instruct the boats on this point I therefore sent radio message 1125/768:

"From Captain U-boats:

Striking reinforcement of enemy air reconnaissance and the appearance of enemy submarines are also to be regarded as tactically important reports."

I also drew the attention of the boats to the ever present danger from enemy submarines in radio message 1241/770.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

- (1) So far boats have been relieved after about 28 days at sea and this has proved a successful arrangement. The largest possible number of boats is thus always available for a convoy attack.
- (2) There is still danger to our boats from an enemy submarine operating in the same area. I hope my instructions have evoked the necessary caution in the boats, and I hope the less rigid disposition ordered will have lessened the enemy's chances of attack.

The patrol of the convoy route by disposing the boats in attack areas, as ordered today, gives individual boats more freedom of movement, has the advantage of a certain depth as opposed to the patrol line, and, because of the less rigid dispositions, cannot be easily recognized as a connected formation when flown over by enemy air reconnaissance.

(Signed) Peters.

23 April, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 255 west of Jan Mayen.
U 212, 467, 586, 601, 629, 646, 703, 711 in attack areas south-east of Jan Mayen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 269 returning to Narvik.
U 639 returning to Hammerfest.

(c) In port:

U 339, Kiel.
U 334, 636, 657 Bergen.
U 302, 622, Trondheim.
U 251, 354, Narvik.
U 355, 625, Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance as far as 75 degrees N., 0 degrees. Flying route only partly covered.

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Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Four BV 138 between 71 degrees 30 minutes N. and 74 degrees 30 minutes N. as far as ice limit. Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

One FW 200 Denmark Straits. Visibility over 50 km.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

0420 One submarine AC 7279, course north.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to available data, 5 Russian submarines in operational area off north coast of Norway. Only one boat appeared in radio traffic.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1410 U 212 (Vogler) relieved U 639 (Wichmann) at 0400 at position AB 7819 top left in patrol line. Departure orders for U 636 and U 657 for 24 April from Bergen dispatched (see Appendix I).

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

VII. Reports: Short report from U 251 (Timm) from 18-21 April (see Appendix).

(Signed) Peters.

24 April, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

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(a) In operational area:

U 255 west of Jan Mayen.
U 212, 467, 586, 601, 629, 646, 703, 711 in
attack areas south-east of Jan Mayen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 639 returning to Hammerfest.

(c) In port:

U 339, Kiel,
U 334, 636, 657 Bergen,
U 302, 622, Trondheim,
U 251, 269, 354 Narvik,
U 355, 625 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak -
Bear Island - 75 degrees N., 0 degrees -
Banak - not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

5 BV 138 between 71 degrees 30 minutes N. and
76 degrees 30 minutes N. as far as ice limit.
Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

One FW 200 north of Iceland.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

Five Russian submarines in operation
off north coast of Norway.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

According to a report from Stockholm of
22 April, a convoy for Murmansk was supposed
to put to sea from Canada on 19 April.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

None.

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

U 639 (Wichmann) reports that he will be off Hammerfest at 1200 on 25 April. U 269 (Harlfinger) receives departure orders for Bergen (see appendix 1).

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

(1) According to a communication from Luftflotte 5 (HQ section I 2526/43 Most Secret of 10 April), in future long range reconnaissance in the Northern Arctic as well as in European Northern Waters will lapse as a result of the present fuel situation.

According to Luftflotte 5's directive, reconnaissance is only to be carried out in strength if it must be assumed as a result of special reports that convoys or chains of single ships are moving in these areas. Long range reconnaissance to intercept eastbound convoys in the maritime area north of Iceland is also to be limited - in accordance with a similar directive - to daily operation of at most 2 aircraft. These measures will seriously reduce the effectiveness as regards sea reconnaissance of Luftflotte 5's already scanty forces. As long as nine or more boats can be put into operation to patrol the Jan Mayen area, there is still a fairly good chance that passing convoys will be intercepted. But if this number is reduced in order to carry out necessary repairs on U-boats, it may be necessary to move the patrol line up to the Bear Island passage as traffic has to converge even more at that point. Otherwise there will be a risk that convoys will not be intercepted at all or only so late that they cannot be attacked.

(2) The reinforcement of Luftflotte 5, so urgently required, has not so far taken place. Owing to this shortage in aircraft there is still no prospect that convoys will in future be subjected to air attacks severe enough to remove some of the burden of convoy operations from the U-boats, either through damaging the convoy itself or by scattering its escort.

VII. Reports:

Short reports - see appendices.

U 269 (Harlfinger) 23 March - 23 April 43,
U 355 (La Baume) 18 March - 17 April 43,
U 625 (Benker) 17 March - 16 April 43.

(Signed) Peters

CONFIDENTIAL

25 April, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 255 west of Jan Mayen.

U 212, 467, 586, 601, 629, 646, 703, 711 in attack areas south-east of Jan Mayen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 269 proceeding from Narvik to Bergen.

U 639 returning to Hammerfest.

U 636, 657 proceeding from Bergen to operational area Jan Mayen.

(c) In port:

U 339 Kiel.

U 334 Bergen.

U 302, 622 Trondheim.

U 251, 354 Narvik.

U 355, 625 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One He 111 meteorological reconnaissance as far as Spitsbergen - Hope Island, not exhaustive.

Two BV 109 visual reconnaissance Kola Bay.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Four He 115 and two Ju 88 between 71 degrees 30 minutes and 75 degrees 30 minutes N., as far as ice limit, exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

One FW 200 Denmark Straits as far as north-west corner of Iceland.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Visual reconnaissance of Kola Bay showed 24 fairly large ships and 19 small vessels.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to G.A.F. radio intercept service, British reconnaissance aircraft were informed at 1320 on 24 April that restrictions on bombing U-boats north-east of the line 63 degrees N., 0 degrees - Shetlands were in force.

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Our boats have been informed of the danger of submarines in the given area by radio message 1823/752.

Five Russian submarines in operational area off polar coast of Norway.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

According to an agent's report, a small convoy (5 ships, medium size) put to sea from Reykjavik on 24 April. Probably routine Iceland - England supply convoy.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1240 Departure orders for U 625 (Benker) for 26 April from Hammerfest to operational area Jan Mayen were dispatched. (See Appendix I.)

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The presence of 24 fairly large vessels and 19 smaller ones means that Kola Bay is relatively strongly occupied. Moreover the formation of the next QP-convoy should be due soon.

(Signed) Peters.

26 April, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 255 west of Jan Mayen.
U 212, 467, 586, 601, 629, 646, 703, 711 in attack areas south-east of Jan Mayen.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 636, 657 proceeding from Bergen to operational area Jan Mayen.
U 269 proceeding from Narvik to Bergen.

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(c) In port:

U 339 Kiel.
U 334 Bergen.
U 302, 622 Trondheim.
U 251, 354 Narvik.
U 355, 625 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N., 0 degrees - Banak. Flying route exhaustively covered.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations..

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

One FW 200 Denmark Straits, good visibility.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic three Russian submarines at sea off Norwegian coast.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1155 Teleprinter message C-in-C U-boats Ops. FS.02605 A 2 received:

"C-in-C of the Navy has decided that U 304 (Koch) is to proceed to the Atlantic, not to Northern Waters. Note: 5th U-boat Flotilla to report sailing date."

1640 Teleprinter message Group North/Fleet Most Secret 62271 A 1 received.

"Naval War Staff/1st. Div. wires in 12531 Most Secret of 26 April.

Since U-boats can operate against shipping in the North Atlantic with greater prospects of success than in Northern Waters, the following is ordered:

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Group North to keep twelve boats, so that normally there will be four boats in the operational area; reinforcements will be provided by C-in-C U-boats if there are clear indications of the approach of a convoy or of a landing. The risk that U-boats will arrive too late for an operation must be accepted. Group to report numbers of boats becoming free and date of their transfer. Note for Group North: Submit corresponding report as soon as possible."

The following considerations now arise: With the small number of boats remaining to me, only four can be at sea at the same time. Effective patrolling of the convoy route off Jan Mayen can be carried out only by a larger number of boats. To remain in the area with a few boats promises very little success, having regard to the size of the area. Since our air reconnaissance is insufficient there is no doubt of the possibility of a convoy passing the area unnoticed and that our few boats will then be left behind completely. We are therefore left with the necessity of moving the patrol of the convoy route to the Bear Island passage, abandoning the longer combat route. There I shall be able to operate even a few boats - especially as long as there is still no passage north of Bear Island because of the ice - with prospects of success against east- and westbound convoys as well as against single ships. Apart from the boats at sea, I shall endeavor to have three to four boats constantly ready in Hammerfest to put out at short notice and operate for short periods against a specific target.

2208 U 625 (Benker) who put out from Hammerfest today, was redirected to the Bear Island area:

"From Captain U-boats:

Benker now to steer for AB 63."
In order to fulfil the demand for the transfer of boats, I shall have to withdraw part of those at sea and divide them between Bergen and Trondheim for re-equipment and overhauling. I shall now let the 5 boats still remaining at sea proceed in a reconnaissance line from the Jan Mayen area to Bear Island area.

2229 Radio message 2229/2247/768/769 sent:

"From Captain U-boats:

(1) Form patrol line from 7165 to 7823, order: Grau, Esch, Bielfeld, Vogler, Lange. Depart at 0800 on 27 April at 8 knots for position line I from 5485 to 8251, then on to position line II from 6324 to 6677, all AB.

- (2) Return voyage: Reche, Kummer, Bugs to Bergen, start at 2247, Hildebrandt, Wulff, Gollnitz to Trondheim, steer for Marstein or Frohavet. Report arrival either at once or 36 hours in advance of arrival."

I have given the required report about the allocation of the boats with the rough dates of when they will be ready to operate in the Atlantic, by teleprinter message:

2300 "Emergency Group North/Flect.
" " " " " for information Naval War Staff,
" " " " " 1st Div.
" " " " " War Staff,
" " " " " 2nd. Div.
" " " " " C-in-C U-boats.
" " " " " Admiral Commanding
" " " " " U-boats.
" " " " " 11th U-boat Flotilla.
" " " " " U-boat base Trondheim.

Admiral Northern Waters (by postagram)

Most Secret:

Reference Group North/Fleet Most Secret
62271 A one (not to all addressees).

- (1) The following are reported free for Atlantic operations:

U 269 (Harlfinger) will put into Bergen on 27 April, ready for action at Bergen about 15 May.

U 334 (Ehrich) at present on open water firing until 30 April, ready for action at Bergen about 20 May.

U 355 (La Baume) now ready in Hammerfest will be dispatched to Trondheim on 27 April. Ready for action about 3 May, Trondheim.

U 467 (Kummer) at present at sea, is being withdrawn.

Ready for action about 10 May, Bergen.

U 629 (Bugs) at present at sea, is being withdrawn.

Ready for action at Bergen about 15 May.

U 636 (Hildebrandt) outward bound, is being withdrawn, ready for action at Trondheim about 2 May.

U 646 (Wulff) at present at sea, is being withdrawn, ready for action at Trondheim about 10 May.

U 657 (Gollnitz) outward bound, is being withdrawn, ready for action at Trondheim about 2 May.

- (2) According to C-in-C U-boats, Ops. teleprinter 02605 A2, U 304 (Koch) will go from Kiel to the Atlantic.

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U 339 (Basse) at present at Kiel, is scheduled for use as a training vessel, and will be withdrawn from the command of Captain U-boats, Norway.
U 644 (Jensen) probably missing.

(3) The following twelve boats thus remain with Captain U-boats, Norway:

U 212 (Vogler), U 251 (Timm),
U 255 (Reche), U 302 (Sickel),
U 354 (Herbschleb), U 586 (v.d.Esch),
U 601 (Grau), U 622 (Queck),
U 625 (Benker), U 639 (Wichmann),
U 703 (Bielfeld), U 711 (Lange).

Captain U-boats Norway Most Secret 1229 A1."

2315 Since U 355 (La Baume) is also scheduled to be transferred, the boat received orders to sail from Hammerfest to Tromsø on 27 April:

Departure orders for U 355 (La Baume):

- (1) Put out from Hammerfest on 27 April.
- (2) Proceed to Trondheim (Frohavet) keeping 50 miles from the coast.
- (3) U-boat Northern Waters Service as far as 67 degrees N. Radio service "Anton" on receipt of confirmation of 67 degrees N. passage report. Note for Sea Defense Commandant, Hammerfest: Escort for departure is requested.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 1230 A1.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Operational possibilities have been greatly reduced by the transfer of eleven boats. Effective attacks on convoys are hardly possible on the shorter combat route with fewer U-boats. It is doubtful whether Atlantic boats can be brought up in time if there are indications that a convoy is running. Further, we may count on difficulties when taking over at short notice boats which are not familiar with conditions in Northern Waters.

(Signed) Peters.

27 April, 1943.

I, U-boat positions and alterations of positions:

Positions at 0800:

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(a) In operational area:

U 601, 586, 703, 212, 711 in reconnaissance line from AB 7165 to AB 7823.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 625 proceeding to AB 63.
U 255, 269, 467, 629 returning to Bergen.
U 636, 646, 657 returning to Trondheim.

(c) In port:

U 339 Kiel.
U 334 Bergen.
U 302, 622 Trondheim.
U 251, 354 Narvik.
U 355, 639 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - Ice Fjord - Banak. Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

One FW 200 Denmark Straits.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

One Russian submarine off Norwegian coast according to radio traffic.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1213 U 625 (Benker) ordered on ice reconnaissance in area 63, 38, 39 AB.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

2016 U 467 (Kummer) reports estimated time of arrival at Marstein as 0800 on 29 April.

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- V. Reports of successes: None.
- VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

28 April, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 601, 586, 703, 212, 711 proceeding in
reconnaissance line to position line I from
AB 5485 to AB 8251.
U 625 on ice reconnaissance north of Bear Island.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 255, 467, 629 returning to Bergen.
U 355 proceeding from Hammerfest to Trondheim.
U 636, 646, 657 returning to Trondheim.

(c) In port:

U 339 Kiel,
U 269, 334 Bergen.
U 302, 622 Trondheim.
U 251, 354 Narvik.
U 639 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak -
Bear Island - South Cape - Hope Island - Banak.
Exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

One FW 200 Denmark Straits.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic, 3 Russian submarines at sea off north coast of Norway.

Russian Northern Waters Staff reports enemy U-boats at 1540 in 72 degrees XX minutes N., XX degrees 30 minutes E., at 2025 in 73 degrees 32 minutes N., XX degrees 15 minutes E.

Reports tally approximately with radio messages transmitted by U 625 (Benker) and U 586 (v.d.Esch), so that we may assume fixing by radio D/F. Positions where given, agree approximately.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Since the boats in the reconnaissance line are still moving, I shall let them report their positions in order to have a definite basis for their new disposition. It is necessary to ascertain the extent of repairs required by the returning boats U 586 and 711, therefore

1112 Radio message 1112/786 sent:

"From Captain U-boats:

(1) Grau, Esch, Bielfeld, Vogler, Lange report passing 10 degrees E. by position short signal.

(2) After reaching position line II Lange scheduled to be withdrawn to Narvik, Esch to Hammerfest. Esch, Lange to report if large-scale repairs necessary:

The position reports were duly received during the evening. Boats are on the route ordered."

1606 Radio message 1510/791 received:

"(1) Ice limit: 6333 thence 100 degrees to 3986, 3971, 3823. Further 330 degrees. Thick drift-ice fields to the south.

(2) Wind S.W.1, cloudy, visibility 6 miles, snow showers, atmospheric pressure 1009 millibars.

Benker."

This is the result of the ordered ice reconnaissance. It shows that a passage north of Bear Island is still impossible. It is thus correct to dispose

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the boats south of the island. Four boats are available for this purpose. I intend to have the area patrolled as far as 90 miles south of Bear Island, and am disposing the boats in overlapping attack areas.

1959 Radio message 1959/702 sent:

"From Captain U-boats:

After passing position line II occupy attack areas with depth of sweep 30 miles. Benker: 6328, Grau: 6347 center lower half, Bielfeld: 6622 upper edge center, Vogler 6641 right center, all AB."

2000 Radio message 1850/93/667 received:

"Avoided both two-fan and single shot in AF 7668.

Kummer."

Luftflotte 5's data of 25 April regarding a submarine position north-east of the Shetlands is thus confirmed. A corresponding warning is telephoned to C-in-C U-boats for transmission on Atlantic Coastal Wave to Atlantic boats putting to sea. Also teleprinter transmission to Luftflotte 5 and Group North (see Appendix IV).

2040 Report received from Esch regarding breakdown of radar set condenser and cooling pump (replacement). Boat requests permission to return to Trondheim.

2319 Radio message 2319/708 sent:

"From Captain U-boats:

Esch to return to Hammerfest after reaching position line II, Lange to Hammerfest." After the arrival of U 354 (Herbschleb) and U 711 (Lange), together with U 639 (Wichmann) there will be three boats ready for action in Hammerfest.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

U 354 (Herbschleb) received following departure orders for 28 April to proceed via inner leads from Narvik to Hammerfest.

"(1) Put out on 28 April.

(2) Move along inner leads to Hammerfest. After Loedingen, with pilot to Harstad, on from there on 29 April with pilot as far as Tromsø. From Tromsø onwards with escort. Commander to arrange escort with First Admiral's Staff Officer in Tromsø."

(3) U-boats Northern Waters Service."

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V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

In teleprinter message Group North/Fleet Most Secret 02294 (see Appendix III), Group North agrees with my proposed allocation of boats.

(Signed) Peters.

29 April, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 601, 586, 703, 212, 711 proceeding to position line II from 6314 to 6677 AB.
U 625 south of Bear Island.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 255, 467, 629 proceeding to Bergen.
U 355, 646 proceeding to Trondheim.

(c) In port:

U 339 Kiel.
U 269, 334 Bergen.
U 302, 622, 636, 657 Trondheim.
U 251 Narvik.
U 354 Harstad.
U 639 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N., 0 degrees - Banak, not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

One FW 200 Denmark Straits as far as north-west of Cape Iceland.

III. Reports on the enemy:

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- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By radio intercept service:
According to radio traffic, 5 Russian submarines off north coast of Norway.
- (d) By naval forces: None.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
In radio message 1117/717 U-boats are reminded of the constant danger of submarines off the entrances to the fjords on the Norwegian polar coast.
- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.
- (d) Miscellaneous:
U 711 (Lange) reports that he will be off Hammerfest at 0700 on 30 April.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

To clarify the situation as regards anti-submarine activity in the anti-submarine areas Northern Waters - southern sector, and North Sea - eastern sector, I have sent the following directive regarding notification of the putting in and out of Northern Waters boats to the authorities concerned:

"Most Secret:

Notification of disposition of Northern Waters U-boats so that anti-submarine activity may be unrestricted in the areas Northern Waters - southern sector - and North Sea - eastern sector.

- (1) Boats putting out from Bergen, Trondheim: Captain U-boats' departure orders are sent to Group North/Fleet, Flotilla or U-boat base Trondheim. At the same time Coast Admirals are notified of the intended departure by teleprinter message from Captain U-boats. Flotilla or U-boat base Trondheim also sends departure report or any alterations of sailing dates to Group North and Coast Admirals.
- (2) Notification regarding boats putting into Bergen and Trondheim is given by teleprinter message by Captain U-boats if the authorities concerned are not on the corresponding radio service.

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Arrival report also to addressees as under para (1) above.

- (3) Short term prohibitions transmitted by means of radio and teleprinter message.

Captain U-boats Norway Most Secret 1279 A1."

(Signed) Peters.

30 April, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

In attack areas, depth of sweep 30 miles,

U 625 6328
U 601 6347 center lower half,
U 703 6622 upper edge center,
U 212 6641 right center.

All AB.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 354 proceeding via inner leads to Hammerfest.
U 586, 646 returning to Trondheim.
U 711 returning to Hammerfest.

(c) In port:

U 339 Kiel.
U 255, 269, 334, 467, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 622, 636, 657 Trondheim.
U 251 Narvik.
U 639 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 78 degrees N., 0 degrees - Banak. Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

One FW 200 Denmark Straits.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By radio intercept service:

In radio traffic, two Russian submarines established off Norwegian coast, were receiving orders to return to port. Possibly icebreakers "Lenin" and "Sedov" proceeding towards Belushya Bay. According to this, it would seem that this base has been opened up again after the end of the ice period.

- (d) By naval forces: None.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Radio message 1103/729 sent:

"From Captain U-boats:

- (1) Count on the possible appearance of enemy submarines also in the Bear Island area.
- (2) Our own boats were located by D/F by Russian shore stations while transmitting radio messages, therefore use short signals as far as possible."

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.
- (d) Miscellaneous:

After consultation with 11th U-boat Flotilla U 586 (Esch) received instructions in radio message 1406 to go to Bergen, not Trondheim. Nauen very long wave transmitter 13000 m. broke down at 2100. After 0000 on 2 May the 18000 m. wave is being substituted in routines.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

VII. Reports:

Short reports from boats U 255, 467, 629 and 639 received (see Appendix).

(Signed) Peters.

APPENDIX I.

Sailing orders from 16 - 30 April, 1943.

- No. 1. U 212 (Vogler) according to War Diary of 20 April, para. IV. (b).
- " 2. U 269 (Harlfinger) according to War Diary of 24 April, para. IV. (d).
- " 3. U 636 (Hildebrandt) and U 657 (Göllnitz) according to War Diary of 23 April 1943. para. IV. (b).
- " 4. U 625 (Benker) according to War Diary of 25 April, para. IV. (b).

COPY.

Captain U-boats, Norway.

Serial No. Most Secret 1146 A1. On Board, 20 April 43.

Most Secret.

Departure orders for "U 212" (Vogler).

- (1) Put out from Narvik on 20 April.
- (2) Proceed via Westfjord. Steer for AB 7830. Report crossing 5 degrees E. to the west by short signal.
- (3) Own boats:

The following are in attack areas each with depth of sweep 30 miles.

Bugs 7174, bottom right, Wulff 7188 right lower corner,
Grau 7454 right edge bottom, Esch 7469 left center,
Bielfeld 7735 left center, Wichmann 7819 top left,
Lange 7875 top left, Kummer 7889 upper edge center.

All AB. These boats form "Eisbaer".
U 269 (Harlfinger) returning to Westfjord.
U 251 (Timm) will be at point VI at 0500 on 21 April, putting into Narvik.

- (4) The following orders are in force until further notice:
 - (a) Attack ban on single ships.
 - (b) Let single ships sighted pass, and report with position and time 10 hours after passing.

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- (5) Radio service: U-boat Northern Waters Service.
- (6) Operational Order No.1, Captain U-boats Norway is in force.

(Signed) Peters.

Captain U-boats, Norway.

Serial No. Most Secret 1213 A1.

24 April, 1943.

Most Secret.

Departure orders for "U 269".

- (1) Put out from Narvik on 24 April.
- (2) Proceed via Westfjord and onwards to Bergen keeping 50 miles from the coast, steer for Korsfjord.
- (3) Own boats: U 71 approaching from Atlantic en route for Bergen, was south of Iceland on 22 April. U 636, U 657 putting out from Bergen on evening of 24 April, proceeding into operational area Jan Mayen.
- (4) Swedish ship "Tamara" outward bound on 22 April from Vinga lightship.
- (5) Radio Service "Anton" after putting to sea.

No 67 degrees N. passage report.

Report estimated time of arrival at Marstein 36 hours in advance.

(Signed) Peters.

COPY

Teleprinter message.

Emergency. 11th U-boat Flotilla.

Most Secret.

Departure orders for U 636 (Hildebrandt) and U 657 (Gollnitz).

- (1) Put out from Bergen on 24 April.

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(2) Steer for: Hildebrandt AF 1160,
Göllnitz AF 1140.

(3) Own boats:

(a) Group "Eisbaer" in attack areas each
with depth of sweep 30 miles:

Bugs 7174 bottom right, Wulff 7188 right
lower corner,
Grau 7454 right edge bottom, Esch 7469
left center,
Bielfeld 7735 left center, Vogler 7819
top left,
Lange 7875 top left, Kummer 7889 upper
edge center.

All AB.

(b) Roche at ice limit north-west of Jan Mayen.
Wichmann returning to Hammerfest.

(c) Atlantic boat U 71 proceeding to Bergen
from Atlantic, was south of Iceland
on 22 April.

(4) Swedish ship "Tamara" outward bound for
Atlantic on 22 April from Vinga lightship.

(5) Radio service "Anton" after putting to
sea and Northern Waters very long wave.
U-boats Northern Waters Service on receipt
of confirmation of 67 degrees N. passage report.

(6) Captain U-boats, Norway Operational Order
No.1 is in force.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 1199 A1.

COPY.

Teleprinter message:

Emergency U-boat Base Hammerfest.

Most Secret.

Departure orders for U 625 (Benker).

(1) Benker to put out from Hammerfest on 26 April.

(2) Steer for AB 7150.

(3) Own boats:

U 255 (Roche) west of Jan Mayen.
U 629 (Bugs) 7174 bottom right, U 646 (Wulff)
7188 right lower corner,
U 601 (Grau) 7454 right edge bottom, U 586
(v.d.Esch) 7469 lower center,
U 703 (Bielfeld) 7735 left center, U212 (Vogler)
7819 top left,

CONFIDENTIAL

U 711 (Lange) 7835 top left, U 467 (Kummer)
7889 upper edge center.

All AB.

U 636 (Hildebrandt) and U 657 (Göllnitz)
putting out from Bergen 24 April, steering
for AF 11.

- (4) U-boats Northern Waters Service.
- (5) Captain U-boats Norway Operational Order No.1.
is in force.
- (6) Communications Regulations and especially
para 31 of operational order are in force for
radio traffic and reports. Striking
reinforcement of enemy air reconnaissance
and the appearance of enemy submarines are
to be treated as tactically important reports.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 1222 A1.

APPENDIX II

COPY

Teleprinter message:

Immediate Captain U-boats, Norway.

Most Secret.

Subject: Short report, third operation of
U 302, 17 March to 17 April, 1943.

17 March Put out from Narvik at 0610. Made fast
at Harstad at 1125. Put out from Harstad
at 1358.
18 March At 2000 occupied attack area AB 6931.
19 March At 0200 new attack area AB 6683.
20 March At 0600 occupied position AB 6537 in
reconnaissance line.
21 March At 1000 in position line I in AB 5947.
22 March At 2000 in position line II in AB 7654.
24 March At 0145 occupied position in patrol line
in AB 7447.
27 March At 0400 allotted new position in patrol
line in AB 7432; at 1900 occupied
position in AB 7432.
29 March At 1600 occupied new position in AB 7447.
2 April At 2400 occupied new position in AA 9662.
14 April At 0738 boat evaded fan of four. End of
run detonations could be heard.
15 April At 0330 occupied new position in AB 7185.
At 0700 commenced homeward voyage.
17 April At 0945 put into Narvik.

U-boat Base Trondheim Most Secret 287.

Immediate Naval War Staff, 1st Div.
Immediate Naval War Staff, 2nd Div. C-in-C U-boats.
Immediate Group North/Fleet.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 251 (Timm)

18 March Put out from Narvik, 21 April put into
Narvik.
19 March Harstad.
20 March At 0600 in reconnaissance line AB 6671.
Occupied various position lines south-
east of Jan Mayen according to Captain
U-boats' orders. No traffic.

CONFIDENTIAL

8 April British submarine sighted, evaded it in order not to betray position since no attack possible.

19 April Returned.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 1198 A1.

Immediate Naval War Staff/1st. Div.
Immediate Naval War Staff/2nd. Div. C-in-C U-boats. Ops.
Immediate Group North Fleet.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 269 (Harlfinger).

Put out from Bergen 23 March.

Put into Narvik 23 April.

From 27 March in patrol line south of Jan Mayen.

No special observations. 11 aircraft sighted up to 20 April in Jan Mayen area, several of them definitely ours.

Own drifting mines in AB 70.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 1221 A1.

COPY

Teleprinter message.

Immediate Captain U-boats, Norway.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 625 17 March to 16 April.

17 March Put out from Bergen.

19 March Passed 67 degrees N. at 1430.

21 March In patrol line AB 8325 at 0300, from 21 to 28 March carried out alterations of position ordered in patrol line.

26 March British biplane sighted in AB 7755.
Exchanged recognition signals with Jensen in AB 7756 on 26 March.

27 March Joined Group "Eisbär", in accordance with orders.

28 March Proceeded to AE 2349. Left Group "Eisbaer".

30 March At 0800 am in AE 2345 right edge center as ordered. Visibility good on the average. British air reconnaissance observed in AE. An average of one machine daily. Reported weather in AA 95; 5 - 6 April.

6 April Attached to Group "Passat".

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 April An in AE 2345 at midnight. Very good visibility.
- 14 April Returned to Hammerfest.
- 16 April Put into Hammerfest.

U 625 Most Secret 142 A $\frac{1}{2}$.

Teleprinter message:

Emergency Captain U-boats, Norway.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 355 18 March to 17 April, 1943

- 18 March Put to sea from Harstad. Proceeded via AB 6920 to AB 7470. In operational area from 24 March to 15 April.
- 17 April Put into Hammerfest.
- 10 April Crash-dived because of enemy aircraft. Type not recognized. No location in AB 7444.
- 14 April At 0215 intercepted by location on 133 en. horizontal in AB 7447. Small vessel sighted shortly afterwards. Probably enemy submarine. Attack not possible because of poor visibility and location. Otherwise no incidents.

U 355 Most Secret 92/43.

Teleprinter message:

Captain U-boats, Norway.

Short report from U 639 (Wichmann) on operation from 18 March to 25 April, 1943

- 18 March Put out from Kristiansand.
- 20 March Bristol Blenheim in AN 1513.
- 22 March Made fast at Stavanger. Put out from Stavanger. Made fast at Bergen.
- 24 March Put out from Bergen for AF 36.
- 25 April "Hampton" aircraft in AF 8771. In AF 7931 aircraft of unknown type.
- 26 March Steered for AB 7450 via AB 7880.

CONFIDENTIAL

27 March In AB 7899 in patrol line.
28 March "Hampden" aircraft in AB 7899.
29 March Patrol line moved, new position AB 7799.
2 April Submarine Type 7C in AE 3333.
15 April New patrol line AB 7824. Aircraft of unknown type in AB 7852 at 0704. Submarine type 7C in AB 7845. Attack area around AB 7819 top left. Aircraft of unknown type AB 7812.
22 April U-Bielfeld in AB 7816. U-Bielfeld in AB 7813.
23 April Returning to Hammerfest. U-Vogler in AB 7832.
25 April Put into Hammerfest.
U 639 (Wichmann).

Teleprinter message:

Immediate Captain U-boats, Norway.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 255 (Reche) on sixth operation from 29 March to 29 April.

29 March Put out from Narvik for AB 8570. Group "Taifun".
2 April To AB 8255. Assignment "Thusnelda". On 3 April to AA 9631 in patrol line. Group "Eisbaer". At 1815 on 11 April while on ice reconnaissance in AA 9635 one funnel sighted on north-easterly course. Lost in snow.
14 April Moved 50 miles on course 50 degrees and carried out ice reconnaissance.
18 -
26 April Ice reconnaissance and patrol north-west of Jan Mayen.
27 -
29 April Returning to Bergen.

11th U-boat Flotilla Most Secret 791.

Teleprinter message:

Immediate Captain U-boats, Norway.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 629 (Bugs) on third operation from 30 March to 29 April.

30 March Put out from Trondheim at 1345. Made for AB 7510.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 31 March At 2400 (AU AF 2829) ordered to occupy AF 1320 until further notice.
- 2 April In Group "Taifun" in AB 8227 with depth of sweep 16 miles.
- 7 April In Group "Passat" in AB 8255 right upper corner.
- 15 April In Group "Eisbaer", position in patrol line 7158.
- 17 April Attack area AB 7174 bottom right, depth of sweep 30 miles.
- 28 April Returned thence to Bergen at 0000.
- 29 April Put into Bergen at 1700.

11th U-boat Flotilla Most Secret 794.

Teleprinter message:

Immediate Captain U-boats, Norway.

Most Secret.

Short report from U 467 (Kummer) on first operation from 20 March to 29 April.

Put out from Kiel on 20 March, put into Bergen on 23 March.

Put out from Bergen on 27 March, put into Bergen on 29 April.

Operated from 31 March until 17 April in AF 1146 in a patrol line, then until 27 April in AB 7889 as attack area. No vessels were sighted or reported by other boats. On 28 April evaded a two fan and a single shot in AF 7668. Aircraft sighted:

- 2 April 4 engined land based aircraft in AF 1157.
- 4 April Flying boat (not BV 138) in AF 1158.
- 8 April Land-based aircraft in AF 1149.
- 8 April 2 land-based aircraft in AF 1151.
- 8 April 2 land-based aircraft in AF 1181.
- 10 April Land-based aircraft in AF 1143.
- 10 April Land-based aircraft (probably Hampden - Herford) in AF 1143.
- 18 April Twin engined land-based aircraft in AB 7883.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mines sighted.

30 March AF 1137.

31 March AA 1146.

8 April AF 1151.

19 April AB 7889.

20 April AB 7883.

28 April AF 8724.

29 April 1 mile west of Hellesøy.

All but the last two sunk by gunfire.

11th U-baot Flotilla Most Secret. 793.

APPENDIX III.

COPY

Teleprinter message:

Most Immediate for information of Captain U-boats,
Norway.

For action:

Most Immediate German Naval High Command.
Most Immediate for information of Captain
U-boats, Norway.

Most Secret.

Subject: Transfer of Northern Waters boats for
use in the Atlantic.

Reference: (1) Naval War Staff 1st Div. Most Secret
12153 of 26 April.

(2) Captain U-boats, Norway 1229 Most Secret
of 26 April.

Group North/Fleet agrees with the proposal
made in reference (2) by Captain U-boats,
Norway regarding the transfer of Northern
Waters U-boats for use in the Atlantic.

Group North/Fleet 02294†

APPENDIX IV.

COPY

Teleprinter message. 28 April 1943.

Most Immediate Naval War Staff/2nd Div. C-in-C
U-boats Ops.

" " Luftflotte 5.

" " for information of Group North.

Most Secret.

Subsequent to telephone conversation between First Admiral's Staff Officer Captain U-boats and Duty Admiral's Staff Officer C-in-C U-boats Ops. "U 467" (Kummer) reports in radio message 1850/93/667 of radio service "Anton":

"Have just evaded two-fan and single shot in AF 7668."

According to Naval Liaison Officer with Luftflotte 5 1A 2905/43 Most Secret of 25 April (not to C-in-C U-boats), British reconnaissance planes were instructed at 1320 on 24 April that restrictions on bombing U-boats north-east of the line 63 degrees N. 0 degrees longitude to Shetlands were in force.

Footnote by Captain U-boats, Norway:

British submarine positions in area north-east of Shetlands confirmed by attack on Kummer. Northern Waters boats warned in radio message 1823/752 on 25 April.

Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 1271 A1.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY
OF
CAPTAIN U-BOATS NORWAY.
CAPTAIN PETERS.
1 - 15 May, 1943.
PG/31834

1 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

In attack areas, depth of sweep 30 miles,
U 625- 6328, U 601 - 6347 lower center,
U 703 6622 upper edge center, U 212 6641
right center, all AB.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 586 returning to Bergen.

(c) In port:

U 339 Kiel.
U 255, 269, 334, 467, 629, Bergen.
U 302, 355, 622, 636, 646, 657 Trondheim.
U 251 Narvik.
U 354, 639, 711 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance, Banak -
Bear Island - 75 degrees N., 0 degrees -
Banak. Exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 FW 200 north coast of Iceland to 18 degrees W.,
3 BV 138 between 62 degrees N. and Arctic circle
as far as 3 degrees E.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0745 enemy naval forces in AF 4284.
Sighted in smoke, silhouette of a large unit,
a battleship or aircraft carrier, also 2
smaller units, and 3 units making smoke.
Course, speed, composition, not ascertained.
Visibility 400 m.

1919 AF 7663 a submerging submarine. None of our boats in the area in question.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic, 4 Russian submarines at sea.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic: None.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

U 586 (v.d.Esch) reports that he will be off Hellesby by 1200 on 2 May.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

We cannot at present surmise the purpose of the enemy group reported by air reconnaissance. It is just possible, though in the circumstances not very likely, that it is connected with a convoy at present under way. Perhaps the appearance of the enemy forces may be explained in connection with the moving of the "Nuernberg" Group. Transmission of the enemy report to our U-boats in the Bear Island area is not necessary until more details have been obtained by further air reconnaissance.

The Luftwaffe has planned increased reconnaissance in the area in question for the coming day.

(Signed) Peters.

2 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

In attack areas depth of sweep 30 miles:
U 625 6328, U 601 6347 lower center,
U 703 6622 upper edge center, U 212 6641
right center, all AB.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 586 returning to Bergen.

(c) In port:

U 339 Kiel.
U 255, 269, 334, 467, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 622, 636, 646, 657 Trondheim.
U 251 Narvik.
U 354, 639, 711 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 He 111 meteorological reconnaissance, Banak -
Bear Island - 75 degrees N., 0 degrees - Banak.
Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

5 BV 138 to ascertain position of enemy naval
forces (reported on 1 May) between 70 degrees
30 minutes N. and 73 degrees N. Visibility 2-5 km.
4 He 115 coastal waters reconnaissance.
Visibility 2-5 km.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 FW 200 between north coast of Iceland and
Jan Mayen. Visibility 0-30 km. 3 BV 138
coastal waters reconnaissance west of Trondheim.
Visibility 1-15 km.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

0530 In AF 5579 a surfaced submarine. (None of
our U-boats are in this area.)

Reconnaissance on enemy report of 1 May
remained ineffective.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic, 3 Russian submarines off Norwegian north coast.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

According to an agent's report, a convoy of 18 ships from Belfast and 23 ships from Glasgow is to sail for Murmansk on 5 or 6 May. Convoys are to combine at Stanton Banks.

A convoy is believed to have left Canada for Murmansk on 28 April.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

The 4 boats south of Bear Island were moved 25 miles to the west in order to increase the area over which convoy attacks can be launched.

1407

Radio message 1407/766 sent:

Benker, Grau, Bielfeld, Vogler from Captain U-boats:

- (1) Move attack areas by 25 miles in direction 270 degrees.
- (2) Boats named to form Group "Monsun".

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

(a) Detailed air reconnaissance was unable to bring confirmation of the enemy sighting report of 0745 on 1 May. Visibility conditions in the reconnaissance area were particularly unfavorable.

(b) The necessity of withdrawing the boats from the Jan Mayen position was reported through Admiral Northern Waters to Group North/Fleet in S.O.s. only 290/43 Al, of 27 April 1943.

Thereupon the following teleprinter message from Group North/Fleet was received in 516/43 Ops. S.O.s only:

"Most Secret: S.O.s only: By hand of officer only: Re your teleprinter message Most Secret S.O.s only 290/43 Al, of 27 April 1943:

- (1) The difficulties of intercepting convoys in time with the small forces available are fully recognized. They were brought to the attention of C-in-C (Navy) and Naval War Staff orally. A change in the position through the release of more boats for the Northern area cannot be expected at present.

- (2) The best opportunity for an early interception of convoy traffic, as long as the ice-limit is so far south, is considered to be given by a loose disposition of at least 4 boats approximately between 0 degrees and 10 degrees E., close to the ice-limit, and at the same time increasing the reconnaissance area allocated to each boat. A strengthening of the patrol line by increasing the number of boats to five or six whenever the approach of a convoy is suspected and a corresponding movement of the U-boats to positions of readiness, would be desirable.
- (3) A renewed request to Luftflotte 5 for increased reconnaissance would be useless because of lack of forces, and is therefore not intended."

For the following reasons I consider the occupation of the position suggested by Group North/Fleet in para. 2 as unpromising:

- (1) The drift-ice limit is not constant enough at this time of year in the area in question to make it possible for the U-boats to keep close to it at the most favorable point with any degree of certainty. The ice conditions, particularly in this area, are extremely variable at present.

It is entirely possible, that northwest of such a point close to the ice there may be wide stretches of ice-free sea, and convoys might thus pass through them unobserved. We must expect the enemy to carry out the necessary air reconnaissance for this purpose.

- (2) Our own limited air reconnaissance is at present not in a position to determine currently the exact course of the ice limit.

For the reasons mentioned I consider the occupation of the Bear Island position as much safer for intercepting convoys. In view of a forthcoming conference on the whole question, I shall bring the above point of view to the notice of Admiral Northern Waters.

VII. Reports:

Short report U 586 (v.d.Esch) on enemy operation of 29 March - 2 May. (See Appendix II).

(Signed) Peters.

3 May 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

In attack areas depth of sweep 30 miles,
U 625 6317 left edge center, U 601 6259
lower edge center, U 703 6611 left edge
center, U 212 6553 lower edge left, all AB.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

(c) In port:

U 339 Kiel.
U 255, 269, 334, 467, 586, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 622, 646, 657 Trondheim.
U 251 Narvik.
U 354, 639, 711 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 He 111 meteorological reconnaissance, Banak -
Bear Island - 75 degrees N., 0 degrees - Banak.
Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

2 FW 200 between Iceland and Jan Mayen. Visibility
1 - 40 km.
3 Ju 88 coastal waters reconnaissance between 55 degrees
30 minutes N. and 60 degrees N. as far as 0 degrees
longitude. Visibility 30 - 50 km.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic, 3 Russian
submarines off Norwegian polar coast.
According to information from Main Naval
D/F Station Kirkenes our assumption that
Russian radio intelligence is locating our
own boats through their radio transmissions
is confirmed. Russian D/F stations have
so far been identified in Tsip Navolok, Kanin
Nos and Archangel.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic: None.
- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

A summary of the considerations included in this war diary on 2 May regarding the disposition of the U-boats in the Bear Island passage were reported through Admiral Northern Waters to Group North/Fleet by teleprinter message S.O.s only 296/43 A1:

"Most Secret. S.O.s only: By hand of officer only - report in answer to Group North/Fleet Most Secret 516/43 A Ops.:

- (1) Disposition of boats according to para 2.) of the report under reference involves the great risk that the convoy may pass by unobserved to the north-west, for the drift-ice limit is constantly altering and behind its foremost edge against which the boats would have to be positioned, lie great expanses of ice-free water.
- (2) A prerequisite for this disposition, which is more favorable for an early interception of the convoy, would be current ice-reconnaissance by the Luftwaffe, which however according to para.3) of the report under reference is out of the question.
- (3) Therefore the Bear Island position is the most favorable, for here there is the greatest chance of intercepting the convoy, in particular as the ice situation still does not permit a passage to the north of the island.
- (4) The disadvantage of a late interception of the convoy and the consequent difficulty of engaging the enemy must be accepted as against the risk of letting the convoy pass unobserved.

- (5) Owing to the reduction in the number of U-boats and the lack of air reconnaissance, important tactical preconditions for operating the boats against the convoy, namely, its early interception as well as satisfactory sea reconnaissance, are lacking."

VII. Reports:

Short report U 646 on enemy operation from 23 March to 30 April (see Appendix II).

(Signed) Peters.

4 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

In attack areas depth of sweep 30 miles:

U 625	AB	6317	left edge center.
U 601	AB	6259	lower edge center.
U 703	AB	6611	left edge center.
U 212	AB	6553	left edge bottom, all AB.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

(c) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 467, 586, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 622, 646, 657 Trondheim.
U 251 Narvik.
U 354, 639, 711 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 He 111 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N., 20 degrees W. - Banak. Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

2 Ju 88 probing reconnaissance between 70 degrees 30 minutes N. 73 degrees N. up to ice limit. Not exhaustive.

CONFIDENTIAL

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 FW 200 between north coast of Iceland and 30 degrees N. as far as north-west coast of Iceland. Aerial photographs of Seydisfjordur and Reydarfjordur. 1 Ju 88 east coast of Iceland. Visibility 5 - 30 km.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance:

1620 AB 6788 one probable destroyer, course 280 degrees, moderate speed. 1820 in Seydisfjordur 3 steamers, each about 5,000 G.R.T. Reydarfjordur unoccupied.

- (c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic, one Russian submarine identified off Norwegian coast.

- (d) By naval forces: None.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic: None.
- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.
- (d) Miscellaneous:

By order of Admiral Commanding U-boats, U 339 (Basse) is released to 22nd U-boat Flotilla, as from 1 May.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

VII. Reports:

Short report U 703 (Bielfeld) on enemy operation from 7 March to 5 April has been received late (see Appendix II).

(Signed) Peters.

5 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

In attack areas depth of sweep 30 miles:

U 625	6317	left edge center.
U 601	6259	lower edge center.
U 703	6611	left edge center.
U 212	6553	left edge bottom, all AB.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

(c) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 467, 586, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 622, 646 Trondheim.
U 251 Narvik.
U 354, 639, 711 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak -
75 degrees N., 0 degrees - Banak. Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Probing by 3 BV 138, between 70 degrees 30 minutes N. and
72 degrees 30 minutes N. Route only partially examined.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 FW 200 between north coast of Iceland and
69 degrees N. and westwards to north-west point of
Iceland. Visibility 2 - 30 km.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By radio intercept service:

One Russian submarine according to radio
traffic off Norwegian polar coast.

- (d) By naval forces: None.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic: None.
- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.
- (d) Miscellaneous:

0000 U 601 (Grau) reports that Naval Lieutenant Zoske was killed by a barrel premature 2 cm.

0027 The boat is directed to remain in position. Relief intended for 10 May.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

VII. Reports:

Short report U 711 (Lange) on enemy operations from 20 March to 30 April. (See Appendix 2).

(Signed) Peters.

6 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

In attack areas depth of sweep 30 miles:

U 625	6317	left edge center.
U 601	6259	lower edge left.
U 703	6611	left edge center.
U 212	6553	lower edge left, all AB.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

(c) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 467, 586, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 622, 646 Trondheim.
U 251 Narvik.
U 354, 639, 711 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 He 111 Banak - Bear Island - Ice Fjord - Banak.
Not exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 FW 200 between north coast of Iceland and
68 degrees N, westwards as far as the ice limit.
Visibility 10 - 50 km.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic, one Russian submarine
off Norwegian coast.

- (d) By naval forces: None.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic: None.
- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.
- (d) Miscellaneous:

"Meteor" put in to Hammerfest where he is
to operate a radio repeater in co-operation
with Naval Communications Officer, Hammerfest.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

7 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

Group "Monsun" in attack areas, depth of sweep 30 miles:

U 625	6317	left edge center.
U 601	6259	lower edge left.
U 703	6611	left edge center.
U 212	6553	lower edge left, all AB.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

(c) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 586, 629	Bergen.
U 302, 355, 622, 646	Trondheim.
U 251	Narvik.
U 354, 639, 711	Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 He 111 meteorological reconnaissance - Banak - Ice Fjord - Banak, almost exhaustive.

1 Ju 88 reconnaissance along Kola coast as far as Western Fairway.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North(West):

1 FW 200 between north coast of Iceland and 68 degrees N, as far as the ice limit.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

0710 In 9145 AE south of Iceland, one submerging U-boat (probably one of our own boats proceeding to the Atlantic).

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic, 4 Russian submarines off Norwegian coast.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Re escort protection for Russian convoys report from Army High Command Intelligence Service I n.: A sailor from a British freighter learned the following in Edinburgh at the beginning of April:

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- (1) About 10 April a British formation of 4 light cruisers, 8 destroyers, 1 destroyer escort ship type Tyne, 2 submarines and 2 modern vedettes, sailed for the Arctic Ocean.

Purpose: Escorting Murmansk supply convoys.
Port of departure Dunbar.

- (2) 7 British and American submarines, among them Talismann 15 and Tetrarsh 21, also American V 41 and V 55 are said to have left for the Norwegian sea area. We must expect more submarine groups being sent to protect Russian convoys.

- (3) In Dunbar assembly of Anglo-American warships.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic: None.
(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

8 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

Group "Monsoon" in attack areas, depth of sweep 30 miles:

U 625	6317	left edge center.
U 601	6259	lower edge left.
U 703	6611	left edge center.
U 212	6553	lower edge left, all AB.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 251 1700 put out from Narvik for Hammerfest.

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(c) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 467, 586, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 622, 646 Trondheim.
U 251 Narvik.
U 354, 639, 711 Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

1 Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance: Spitsbergen to 7930 N. Not exhaustive. Reconnaissance and attacks on ships off Kola Bay.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

3 BV 138 probing convoy reconnaissance between 70 degrees 30 minutes N. and 73 degrees 30 minutes N. as far as the ice limit. Not exhaustive. Two aircraft abandoned reconnaissance prematurely.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

1 FW 200 between north coast of Iceland and 68 degrees N.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

1120 Submerging submarine AE 2423 (enemy submarine).

(c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic, 4 Russian submarines off Norwegian coast.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

None.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

U 251 (Timm) received transfer order from Narvik to Hammerfest. (See Appendix I).

U 354 (Herbschleb) receives sailing order from Hammerfest to operational area. (See Appendix I).

V. Reports of successes:

Luftwaffe reports 1 submarine, type M 20, sunk while putting in to Kola Bay, 1 destroyer probably damaged.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

9 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625	6317	left edge center.
U 601	6259	lower edge left.
U 703	6611	left edge center.
U 212	6553	lower edge left, Group "Monsoon", all AB.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 467, 586, 629	Bergen.
U 302, 355, 622, 646	Trondheim.
U 354, 639, 711	Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1430	U 354	put out from Hammerfest to operational area.
	U 251	proceeding from Narvik to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance 1 Ju 88 Banak - Ice Fjord - Banak.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance 1 FW 200 between north coast of Iceland and 68 degrees N.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By radio intercept service:

Convoy of 10 allied freighters, 2 British minesweepers and 2 corvettes put out from Ponoï for unknown destination.

- (d) By naval forces: None.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations:

Untried source reported from Oslo on 7 May:
Convoy went from point 56 degrees W, 57 degrees N. to point 17 degrees E, 71 degrees N. on 3 May.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
4 U-boats in formation south of Bear Island.
- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.
- (d) Miscellaneous:

As the Luftwaffe intends to employ aerial torpedo 350, the following definitive ruling was sent to all concerned, after individual questions had been cleared up with Luftflotte 5 and Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten and North (West):
For the intended use by the Luftwaffe of aerial torpedo 350 the following rules were agreed on with Luftwaffe stations. (For details of this aerial torpedo see "Officer in Charge, aerial torpedo weapon" Az 201 Serial No.190/43 Secret of 30 January, 1943, by direction No.4, reprint January 1943, and C-in-C Luftwaffe Ops.-Staff Ia. No.300/42 Secret, of 29 January, 1942):

- (1) Employment in areas where U-boats are operating:
 - (a) Torpedoes must not be released by indications of radar sets only without additional visual recognition of the target, because danger to U-boats operating on the convoy or in the immediate vicinity of the target cannot be eliminated.
 - (b) When used by a closed bomber formation, the same conditions apply for co-operation with U-boats as for normal bombing or aerial torpedo attacks. Exact timing of attacks and exact determination of target area essential.

- (2) Employment in areas free from U-boats:
- (a) No restrictions if Captain U-boats, Norway has declared the relevant operational area free. This declaration will be made in accordance with U-boat positions and intentions.
 - (b) At present free for use of aerial torpedo 350:- sea area north of 66 degrees N. and west of 5 degrees W.
 - (c) Announcement of intended use and of target area through the competent Flieger Fuehrers to Captain U-boats, Norway at least 8 hours in advance.
- (3) The same ruling is proposed, as far as is necessary, for Naval forces.
- Additional note for Naval War Staff
2nd Div. C-in-C U-boats, Ops:
Report to Atlantic boats putting in or out through Denmark Straits is requested.
- Additional note for Luftflotte 5:
Final agreement with this ruling is requested from Group North/Fleet, Admiral Northern Waters and Captain U-boats, Norway.

V. Reports of successes:

Luftwaffe seriously damaged 1 guardboat off Kola Bay by a direct hit on the stern.

VI. Survey of the situation:

- (a) The convoy reported in III.c. (10 freighters), is probably a coastal transport, or possibly a part convoy for Murmansk.
- (b) The convoy mentioned in III.e. presumably comes from Canada and is destined for a Russian port. Arrival at Reykjavik probably 9 May.
- (c) The following teleprinter message was received by Admiral Northern Waters from Group North/Fleet in Most Secret S.O.s only 528/43. A1 of 9 May:

Most Secret S.O.s only. By hand of officer only:

"New data on the course of the ice limit east of Jan Mayen coincided for the most part with Ice Atlas Naval Publication No. 2213 A, May (mean ice limit)."

Disposition of U-boats according to Group North/Fleet Most Secret S.O.s only 516/43 A Ops. of 1 May para.2) therefore no longer applicable. A disposition off Bear Island is more suitable, but it will be necessary to move the U-boats further north as the ice limit recedes. Operational disadvantages arising in this way must be accepted.

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Luftflotte 5 has agreed to carry out new ice-reconnaissance in the Jan Mayen sea area as far as 2 degrees E.

Thus my views, a summary of which was reported to Group North/Fleet by Admiral Northern Waters in teleprinter message S.O.s. only 296/43 A1 of 2 May, have been proved correct.

(Signed) Peters.

10 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625	6317	left edge center)	
U 601	6259	lower edge left)	Group
U 703	6611	left edge center)	"Monsoon".
U 212	6553	lower edge left)	

All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 467, 586, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 622, 646 Trondheim,
U 639, 701 Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1645 U 251 put in to Hammerfest.
U 354 proceeding from Hammerfest to the operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North(East):

1 Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Ice Fjord - Banak.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Probing reconnaissance by 3 BV 138 between 70 degrees 30 minutes N. and 73 degrees 30 minutes N.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

No sea reconnaissance in Northern Waters area.

CONFIDENTIAL

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By radio intercept service:

3 Russian submarines operating off Norwegian polar coast.

- (d) By naval forces: None.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 U-boats in formation south of Bear Island.

- (c) Special operations by single boats:

As the exact course of the ice-limit north and east of Bear Island is not properly known, and the findings of air reconnaissance are by no means exhaustive, I intend to put U 354 (Herbschleb) on ice reconnaissance.

1033 Radio message 1033/712 sent:
Herbschleb from Captain U-boats:

Execute ice reconnaissance from 22 degrees to 17 degrees E. Report southernmost points of drift-ice limit by positional short signals on 22 degrees, 19 degrees and 17 degrees E. longitude.

V. Reports of successes:

One freighter 2 - 3,000 G.R.T. and a submarine sunk by Luftwaffe off northwest point of Fisher Peninsula.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

11 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) In operational area:

U 625	6317	left edge center.)	
U 601	6259	lower edge left.)	Group
U 703	6611	left edge center.)	"Monsun".
U 212	6553	lower edge left.)	

All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 about AB 3960.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 467, 586, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 622, 646 Trondheim.
U 251, 639, 701 Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North(East):

Meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Ice Fjord -
Banak by 1 Ju 88. Reconnaissance of Kola Bay
by 2 BF 109.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance between Iceland and 70
degrees N. by 2 FW 200, and over Denmark Straits
by 1 FW 200.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
(b) By air reconnaissance: None.
(c) By radio intercept service:

5 Russian submarines at sea (north coast
of Norway).

- (d) By naval forces: None.
(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

As a result of the ice reports from U 354 (Herbschleb) a new situation has arisen. North of Bear Island is an ice-free channel of about 20 miles. I must contend with the possibility of a convoy passing through this, and have therefore decided to leave one boat north of Bear Island. I intend to continue patrolling up to 70 miles to the south of the island; further south traffic is not expected at this time of year.

1210 Radio message 1210/727 sent:
From Captain U-boats:

As from 2200 on 11 May:

- (1) Attack areas, depth of sweep 30 miles: Benker 6328, Bielfeld 6374 lower center, Vogler 6622 lower edge center, all AB.
- (2) Herbschleb: after ice reconnaissance patrol of passage between ice limit and Bear Island.
- (3) Grau: return to Narvik, Andfjord.

With the few U-boats at my disposal it is not possible for more than 4 boats to occupy the Bear Island passage, unless I abandon my plan of keeping a reserve of 2-3 boats for operations on the expected convoys. Moreover in the continuous daylight I consider 4 boats to be sufficient for patrolling this sea area.

- (c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 on ice reconnaissance north of Bear Island.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

12 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625 6328.
U 703 6347 lower center.
U 212 6622 lower edge center.
U 601 6641 right center.
All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 approximately AB 3980.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 467, 586, -629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 622, 646 Trondheim.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 251, 639, 701 put out from Hammerfest
to operational area at 0400.

1400 U 646 put out from Trondheim for Atlantic.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Sea reconnaissance for expected convoy between
26 degrees and 39 degrees E. and up to 74 degrees
30 minutes N. and to ice limit by 3 Ju 88 and 1 BV
138. Meteorological and convoy reconnaissance
Banak - AT 8110 - AU 1150 - Banak by 1 Ju 88.
Meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island -
Ice Fjord - Banak by 1 He 111. Convoy reconnaissance
between 20 degrees and 29 degrees E. up to 74 degrees
10 minutes N. by 1 BV 138.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Fan reconnaissance by 4 BV 138.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance between north coast of Iceland
and 68 degrees 30 minutes N. and up to 23 degrees
W. and ice limit by 1 FW 200.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance:

0020 Following information was telephoned by
Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

"Probably about 20 merchant ships put
out from Kola Bay.
On 10 May at 0020 all the ships (about 28
freighters) were still in the bay.
On 11 May at 2100 only 9 ships remained.
From 0200 on 12 May convoy reconnaissance
by Ju 88 and BV 138 intended off Kirkenes from
Banak and Billefjord."

0052 Following teleprinter message received
from Luftflotte 5 in Most Secret lc 2188:

(1) According to visual reconnaissance
there were about 15 - 20 ships fewer at
2100 on 11 May than reported by visual
reconnaissance on the night of 8 May.
According to an aerial photograph of
6 May there were 19 freighters, 2 tankers,
4 destroyers and 1 small warship present.

(2) Thus a QP-convoy has sailed on the
evening of 10 May under cover of bad weather.
It is possible that it will join up with the
ships reported by radio intercept on
9 May in West Fairway. Reconnaissance
will have to discover whether the QP-
convoy steered north immediately to reach
the usual convoy route or whether it
sailed for ships' rendezvous at Belushya
Bay (Novaya Zemlya) or went to Archangel
(less probable).

0115 Following teleprinter message received
from Luftflotte 5 in Most Secret Ia 3305:

"Since a QP-convoy has apparently put out,
we must expect approach of a PQ-convoy.
Flieger Fuehrer North (West): Immediate
patrol of Iceland - Jan Mayen sea area to
the ice limit. Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:
Patrol of sea area north-east and east of
Jan Mayen to the ice limit."

(c) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarines M 104, M 122, S 51, Schtsch 402, 403 off Norwegian polar coast. Submarine M 122 sailed for Barents Sea in the evening.

Submarine M 105 expected from open sea.

(d) By naval forces: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Office of Foreign Intelligence:

Office of Foreign Intelligence informs:

(1) Untried source reports on 12 May:-
On 7 May, 1943 large convoy put out from the U.S. for Murmansk.

(2) Agent of G.I.S. Station Denmark reports from Reykjavik:

On 11 May at 1000 a convoy of 7 ships put out in ballast, 2 of 5,000 G.R.T., the rest of 3,000 G.R.T. each.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Air reconnaissance of Flieger Fuehrer North (East) on 11 May confirmed the assumption that a convoy of about 20 merchant ships (presumably a westbound convoy) has left Kola Bay. Although we cannot have further details until day reconnaissance on 12 May, I have decided to increase the strength of the formation in the Bear Island passage now, as a preparatory measure. I shall let U 601 (Grau) break off his return to Narvik and occupy AB 6641 right center, depth of sweep 30 miles. I am ordering immediate readiness for the boats U 251 (Timm), U 639 (Wichmann), U 711 (Lange) which are lying in Hammerfest, in radio message 0109/100.

0109

0131

To the same boats radio message 0131/739 sent with sailing orders: As soon as ready for sea, proceed to approach point AC 42.

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As the morning reconnaissance has yielded no further details to permit any definite conclusions on the situation, I have decided to station the boats approaching from Hammerfest east of Bear Island in fairly large attack areas and at the same time to order a reconnaissance of the course of the ice-limit to the east.

1215 Therefore the following order was sent in radio message 1215/743:

"From Captain U-boats:

(1) Owing to poor visibility, morning reconnaissance did not intercept the convoy which is supposed to have sailed.

(2) All boats to occupy attack areas, depth of sweep 40 miles. Wichmann 1855, Lange 1957 right lower corner, both AC.

(3) Timm to execute ice reconnaissance from 21 degrees E. to 35 degrees E. Report results on "Anton". I consider this ice reconnaissance to the east as particularly important for a further assessment of the possible convoy route, especially as with the present unfavorable visibility conditions in this sea area air reconnaissance is relatively incomplete."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 251 on ice reconnaissance east of Bear Island.

(d) Miscellaneous:

0131 Radio message 0131/739 sent:

"Sailing orders for Timm, Wichmann, Lange: Put out to sea as soon as ready via SR 1; make for AC 42."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Today's air reconnaissance yielded no positive data to confirm my previous assumption of the sailing of a westbound convoy. It must however be borne in mind that in parts, visibility was bad and that the area could not be exhaustively examined. It is therefore necessary to keep the previous positions occupied until definite information has been obtained. It is possible that the

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reduced number of ships is connected with an intended thinning-out of shipping in Kola Bay. The coastal convoy traffic recently observed and the occupation of Iokanka harbor by 17 small- or medium-sized merchant ships would seem to support this view.

VII. The following directives were received in teleprinter message Group North/Fleet S.O.s only 519/43 Al of 12 May: S.O.s only, by hand of officer only:

"The Luftwaffe report of 2200 on May 11 regarding the disappearance of 15 to 20 merchant ships, viewed in conjunction with the radio intercept report of May 9 regarding the sailing of 10 freighters from the West Fairway, makes it appear probable that a QP-convoy has put out.

Group North/Fleet expects a northerly course, daily run 180 to 100 miles, and position by dead reckoning on evening of 12 May approximately between 34 degrees and 36 degrees E. Admiral Northern Waters and Captain U-boats, Norway have acted correctly in ordering 3-hours' readiness for the group of U-boats in the operational area, in retaining Grau in the operational area and in ordering the sailing of 3 more U-boats.

For the time being take no further measures, as there are not sufficient details for operating the operational group of surface vessels, and further information must be brought in by the Luftwaffe. On confirmation of the QP-convoy simultaneous running of a PQ-convoy may be expected, especially as ice conditions are now more favorable for convoy traffic. Certain indications of this emerge from the agent's report of 6 May, if previous experience can be relied upon. In that case the two convoys will pass each other about 14 May at approximately 8 degrees to 12 degrees E. Again, confirmation can only be given by the Luftwaffe. Luftflotte 5 has been requested for corresponding reconnaissance. Group North/Fleet S.O.s only 519/43 Al."

(Signed) Peters.

13 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625 6328.
U 703 6347 lower center.
U 212 6622 lower edge center.
U 601 6641 right center.
All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.

U 354 Approximately AB 3980.
U 639 1855, U 711 1977 right lower
edge, all AB, depth of sweep 40
miles.
U 251 Approximately AC 1500 southern half.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 467, 586, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 622 Trondheim.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North(East):

Meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear
Island - 75 degrees N - Banak by 1 Ju 88.

Meteorological and sea reconnaissance Banak -
Belushya - Kolguev - Banak by 1 Ju 88.

Sea reconnaissance along the Kola coast and
West Fairway as far as Archangel by 2 Ju 88.
Sea reconnaissance Banak 74 degrees 10 minutes N.
20 degrees E., 74 degrees 10 minutes N. 29 degrees E.,
73 degrees 50 minutes N. 22 degrees E. - Banak by
1 BV 138. Reconnaissance of inshore waters
between Kola inlet and Kildin Island by 2
FW 190.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance between north coast of
Iceland and 68 degrees 30 minutes N. to 23 degrees and
and ice limit by 1 FW 200.

Sea reconnaissance of sea area off east coast
of Iceland by 2 BV 138.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance:

Shipping in Russian ports and coastal
convoy traffic.

- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

(1) Russian submarines "S 51" and "Schtsch
402" off the north coast of Norway.

(2) At 1800 a Russian submarine of the
M class put out from Polyarno to Barents Sea.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy
traffic:

1402 Radio message 1402/752 sent:
From Captain U-boats:

(1) Sailing of PQ-convoy has not been
confirmed.

(2) Wichmann: to relieve Bielfeld in attack
area AB 6347 lower center, depth of sweep
30 miles, at 1200 on 14 May.

(3) Timm: ice reconnaissance south of
76 degrees N. only. Report results by
radio message at 35 degrees E. After
that, you are scheduled to relieve Vogler.

(4) Grau to return to Narvik Andfjord,
Lange to Hammerfest, Bielfeld, when relieved,
to Hammerfest; if the extent of repairs
required makes it necessary for you to call
at Narvik, add "Narvik" to short signal
report of your approach."

Now that the situation has been clarified
it is no longer necessary for more than
4 boats to occupy the sea area off Bear
Island; I have therefore decided to
withdraw 2 boats.

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V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The following survey of the situation was received in Group North/Fleet Most Secret 02481 A1 of 13 May:

As a result of today's air reconnaissance reports a QP-convoy is no longer expected: at 1830 5 merchant ships of up to 5,000 tons, 4 escort vessels in AC 2124, course 300 degrees; at 2200 Iokanka occupied by 3 merchant ships of up to 5,000 tons, 14 merchant ships each 1,000 tons; and according to aerial photographs Kola Bay is occupied by 66,000 tons of shipping. The disappearance of ships from Kola Bay is probably due to attempts to evade fighter-bomber attacks on anchorages. If tomorrow's reconnaissance yields no further information, operational group to return to normal readiness from 1200, measures by U-boats as directed by Admiral Northern Waters.

(Signed) Peters.

14 May, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625 6328.
U 703 6347 lower center.
U 212 6622 lower edge center.
All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 approximately AB 3980.
U 639 approximately AC 41.
U 251 approximately AC 24.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 467, 586, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 622 Trondheim.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 601 returning from operational area to Narvik.
U 711 put in to Hammerfest.

1800

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II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Hope Island - Banak by 1 Ju 88. Armed reconnaissance of Fisher Peninsula and Kola inlet by 6 FW 190 fighter-bombers. Sea reconnaissance in area Ingøy - 75 degrees N, 13 degrees E. - 75 degrees N 33 degrees E. - 74 degrees 30 minutes N. 35 degrees E. - Vardø by 4 Ju 88 and 1 He 111.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance in area between north coast of Iceland and 68 degrees 30 minutes N. as far as 23 degrees W. by 1 FW 200. Afternoon reconnaissance:- sea reconnaissance of east coast of Iceland with 2 BV 138. Sea reconnaissance of the area between the north coast of Iceland and 68 degrees 30 minutes N. as far as 23 degrees W. with 1 FW 200 (morning reconnaissance).

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
(b) By air reconnaissance:

At 0010 in AE 2744 1 submerging submarine.
At 0310 one submarine off north coast of Fisher Peninsula (sunk). At 1232 in AC 8164 a submerging submarine, course west. At 1350 in AC 6269 a submarine, course west.

- (c) By naval forces: None.
(d) By radio intercept service:

(1) Russian submarines "Schtsch 402" and "M 122" off north coast of Norway.
(2) At 1216 Staff of Russian Northern Waters Fleet informed Russian submarines in the operational area of eastward freighter movements in Rolvsøysund.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

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IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 U-boats in sea area north and south of Bear Island.

- (c) Special operations by single boats:

1604 U 251 (Timm), after carrying out ice reconnaissance as far as 35 degrees E, has reported the following course of the ice limit: AC 1472, 1558, 2419, 2593.

V. Reports of successes:

One submarine sunk by Luftwaffe off north coast of Fisher Peninsula.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The submarines reported under IIIb) are enemy boats. Otherwise nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

15 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

- (a) In operational area:

U 625 6328.
U 639 6347 lower center.
U 212 6622 lower edge center.
All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 approximately AB 39 eastern half.
U 251 approximately AC 19.

- (b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 467, 586, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 622 Trondheim.
U 711 Hammerfest.

- (c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1300 U 601 put in to Narvik.
1600 U 703 put in to Hammerfest.

CONFIDENTIAL

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N., 0 degrees - Banak by 1 Ju 88.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance in the area between north coast of Iceland and 68 degrees 30 minutes N. and westwards to the ice limit by 1 FW 200.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

- (1) Russian submarines "S 51", "Schtsch 402" and "M 106" off north coast of Norway.
- (2) Radio messages of 14 May from Staff of Russian Northern Waters Fleet to submarines in the operational area contained among other things:
"12 May. Battleships "Tirpitz" and "Scharnhorst" in Altafjord. (See IIIId) 2) of 14 May."

- (e) By G.I.S. stations:

Office of Foreign Intelligence informs:
Reliable agent from G.I.S. Station Denmark reported from Iceland on 14 May 1943:
"Convoy of 9 heavily laden ships of average tonnage put in to Reykjavik on forenoon of 14 May."

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 submarines in sea area north and south of Bear Island.

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I.

Sailing and Transfer Orders.

- No. 1 U 251 (Timm) as in War Diary of
8 May 1943, para. Ib.
- No. 2 U 354 (Herbschleb) as in War Diary
of 9 May 1943, para. Ic.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I, 1.

COPY

Captain U-boats, Norway.

On board, 8 May, 1943.

Serial No. Most Secret 1390.

Most Secret.

Transfer Order for "U 251" (Timm).

- (1) Put out from Narvik 8 May.
- (2) Proceed via Tjeldsund to Harstad with pilot from L dingen.

Then proceed to Troms  for revictualling on 9 May, with district pilot through Finnsnesrennen.

Proceed from Troms  to Hammerfest with escort according to directions of Admiral Polar Coast.
- (3) Commander should report to A I Polar Coast after putting in to Troms .
- (4) Anchorage at Hammerfest alongside "Black-Watch".
- (5) Ensure that after switching off radio in Hammerfest, all serial numbers of "Northern Waters Service" will reach the boat via Naval Communications Officer, Hammerfest.
- (6) Readiness in Hammerfest will be ordered currently.
- (7) For transfer U-boat Northern Waters service.

pp. Oesten.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I, 2.

COPY

Teleprinter message of 8 May, 1943:

I. Emergency U-boat Base Hammerfest.

Most Secret

Sailing order for "U 356" (Herbschleb).

- (1) Put out from Hammerfest on 9 May after arrival of Naval Lieutenant Murrn.
- (2) Proceed to AC 4150.
- (3) Own boats:

Group "Monsun" is in attack areas, depth of sweep for each boat 30 miles:

U 625 (Benker)	6317 left edge center.
U 601 (Grau)	6259 lower edge left.
U 703 (Bielfeld)	6611 left edge center.
U 212 (Vogler)	6553 lower edge left.
All AB.	

- (4) U-boat Northern Waters Service.

Captain U-boats, Norway - Most Secret 1386 Al.

II. Emergency Sea Defense Commandant Hammerfest.

Emergency Admiral Polar Coast.

Most Secret

"U 354" (Herbschleb) has orders to put out from Hammerfest on 9 May: sailing escort has been requested. Departure route possibly via Zoppahavet.

Captain U-boats, Norway - Most Secret 1387 Al.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II

COPY

Teleprinter message:

Immediate Captain U-boats, Norway.

Short report of U 586 (v.d.: Esch) fourth operation,
29 March to 2 May.

29 March Put out from Trondheim, proceeded to AB 8785.
2 April Occupied AB 8267 as ordered.
3 April Occupied AB 8745 as ordered.
8 April Occupied AB 8745 as ordered.
14 April Occupied AB 7728 in patrol line as ordered.
15 April Occupied AB 7571 in patrol line as ordered.
18 April Occupied AB 7435 in attack area as ordered.
27 April Occupied AB 7278 in reconnaissance line at
0800 as ordered.
28 April Reached position line I AB 5734 at 0900.
29 April Reached position line II AB 6344 at 1000, and
commenced return trip to Bergen as ordered.
2 May Put into Bergen at 1400.

Experiences:

New conning tower slows down diving time by
 $1\frac{1}{2}$ minutes in sea more than 4.

Illness:

Two new cases of jaundice from infection and
one suspected case. This is the eighth case
since putting out from Kiel on 26 February.

11th U-boat Flotilla. Most Secret 137.

CONFIDENTIAL

Teleprinter message:

Immediate Captain U-boats Norway.

Short report of U 646, first operation,
23 March to 30 April 1943

While at sea no contact with the enemy.

Put out from Kiel for Bergen on 23 March, then via AF 8417, AF 4627, to AF 1230.

Up to 3 April AB 8261.

Up to 14 April AB 8267.

Up to 17 April in patrol line in AB 7472.

Up to 27 April in AB 7188. Then returned to Trondheim via AF 1211 and AB 5539.

Small and large ice-floes met only in AB 7180 from 18 to 25 April.

Aircraft sighted:

30 March At 1304 in AF 4624 (BV 138).
31 March At 0832 in AF 1676 (BV 138).
8 April At 1158 in AB 8275.
13 April At 0810 in AB 8284 (BV 138).
19 April At 0844 in AB 7122 (BV 138).
29 April At 1540 in AF 5282 (2 aircraft).

Drifting mines:

29 March At 1050 in AF 8445.
30 March At 0200 in AF 4958.
31 March At 0830 in AF 1676.
5 April At 0000 in AB 8292 (sunk by gunfire).
9 April At 2020 in AB 8279 (" " ").
23 April At 1140 in AB 7421 (" " ").
28 April At 1220 in AF 1642 (" " ").
28 April At 1705 in AF 1694 (" " ").
28 April At 2145 in AF 2717 (" " ").
29 April At 1225 in AF 5243 (" " ").
29 April At 1315 in AF 5246 (" " ").
29 April At 1910 in AF 5131 (" " ").
29 April At 1945 in AF 5535 (" " ").
29 April At 2050 in AF 5535 (" " ").
29 April At 2105 in AF 5535 (" " ").
29 April At 2210 in AF 5539 (" " ").

U-boat Base Trondheim. Most Secret 317.

CONFIDENTIAL

Teleprinter message:

Immediate Naval War Staff 1st Div.
Immediate Group North.
Immediate Naval War Staff 2nd Div. C-in-C U-boats Ops.

Most Secret:

Short report of U 703 (Bielfeld) sixth operation

7 March Put out from Bergen.
5 April Put into Hammerfest.
12 March) Ice reconnaissance off Bear Island.
13 March) Ice reconnaissance off Bear Island.
14 March Attack area AB 6360.
20 - 24 Proceeded in reconnaissance line to Jan Mayen
March area.
26 March. Ice reconnaissance off Jan Mayen.
1 April. Return passage.

Aircraft:

23 March In AA 9364 1 Mosquito.
29 March In AA 9869 1 Beaufighter.

Otherwise no contact with the enemy.

Delay owing to transmission as postagram from
Hammerfest.

" Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret 1342 A1.

CONFIDENTIAL


Teleprinter message:

Immediate Captain U-boats, Norway.

Short report of first operation of U 711 (Lange),
20 March to 30 April.

20 March Put out from Kiel with escort to Bergen.
25 March At 1700 put out from Bergen to Jan Mayen operational area. In AF 8772 altered course to 344 degrees.
26 March At 0645 sank drift-mine. At 1800 10 drift mines sighted.
29 March At 0700 in AF 7899 altered course to 242 degrees. At 1600 reached position AF 1146 as ordered, joined Group Eisbaer.
31 March At 1135 in AF 1114 sighted twin-engined land-based plane. At 1400 in AF 1114 sighted 4-engined land-based plane (Consolidated).
2 April At 1740 in AF 1114 sighted Sunderland.
3 April At 1247 in AF 1114 sighted Hampden.
4 April At 1110 in AF 1114 aircraft sighted.
8 April At 1930 in AF 1114 sank mine.
14 April At 2200, course 50 degrees, speed 8 knots.
15 April At 0400 reached new position in AB 7859. Occupied AB 7875.
27 April At 0800, at a speed of 8 knots, went to position line I, from 5485 to 8251. Then to position line II, from 6314 to 6677. All AB. Captain U-boats at 0100 ordered alteration of course to 48 degrees. At 0800 reached outgoing position AB 7823, in reconnaissance line. At 0958 in AB 7595 sighted drift-mine.
28 April At 0600 in AB 8251 sighted 3 drift-mines. At 0700 reached AB 8251 in position line I. At 1715 in AB 5989 sank drift-mine.
28 April At 1810 radio message 1810/794 sent:
My position is AB 5995. U 711. 0815 sank drift-mine. 0950 reached position line II.
30 April 0730 took on escort. 1002 put in to Hammerfest. Total run: On surface: 5,233.5 miles; submerged: 311.6 miles; total, 5,545.1 miles.

11th U-boat Flotilla. Most Secret 847.



CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY


OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, NORWAY.

CAPTAIN PETERS.

16 - 31 MAY, 1943.

PG/31835



CONFIDENTIAL

16 May 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625 6328. U 639 6347 lower center.
U 251 6622, lower edge center, all AB,
depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 approximately AB 39, eastern half.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 467, 586, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 622 Trondheim.
U 601 Narvik.
U 703, 711 Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1715 U 212 put in to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N. - Banak carried out by 1 Ju 88. Armed reconnaissance of Kola inlet as far as Fisher Peninsula carried out by 3 FW 190. Reconnaissance of coastal inshore waters as far as West Fairway carried out by 1 Ju 88.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Strait carried out by 1 FW 200.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Coastal convoy traffic along Murman coast.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarines "S51" and "Schtsch 402" off north coast of Norway.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

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IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1 U-boat north of Bear Island, 3 U-boats south of it in formation.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

U 622 (Queck) received orders in Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret 1481 A1 to move to Hammerfest (see Appendix I).

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing to report.

VII. U-boat reports:

Short reports from "U 601" (Grau) and "U 703" (Bielfeld). See Appendix II).

(Signed) Peters.

17 May 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625 6328.

U 639 6347 lower center.

U 251 6622 lower edge center.

All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.

U 354 approximately AB 39, eastern half.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 467, 586, 629 Bergen.

U 302, 355, 622 Trondheim.

U 601 Narvik.

U 703, 711, 212 Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1600

U 622 (Queck) put out from Trondheim for Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bellsund - 75 degrees N. 5 degrees W. - Banak carried out by 1 He 111, not exhaustive, nothing observed. Reconnaissance of coastal inshore waters as far as West Fairway carried out by 1 Ju 88.

Armed reconnaissance of shipping traffic from Fisher Peninsula to Kola inlet carried out by 4 FW 190. Nothing observed.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits carried out by 1 FW 200, nothing observed.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Coastal convoy traffic along Murman coast.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By intercept service:

Staff of Russian Northern Waters Fleet on 16 May informed Russian submarines off Norwegian polar coast of German destroyers in North Cape area.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Agent of many years' standing with good connections in Soviet circles, whose reports, however, have not always been confirmed, reports the following on 28 April:
"8 submarines, until recently at Archangel, were transferred to Murmansk on the orders of the Naval Staff. On 22 March there were 2 air force brigades each with 80-90 aircraft and 4 naval air squadrons of about 40-50 aircraft in Archangel. The latter have been transferred to Murmansk at the same time on the orders of the Naval Staff."

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 U-boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

"U 703" (Bielfeld) received instructions by radio message to move to Narvik.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing to report.

VII. U-boat reports:

Short report from "U 703" (Bielfeld) for the period from 17 April to 15 May 1943, see Appendix II.

(Signed) Peters.

18 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625 6328. U 639 6347 lower center.
U 251 6622 lower edge center, all AB,
depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 approximately AB 39, eastern half.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 467, 586, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355 Trondheim.
U 601 Narvik.
U 212, 703, 711 Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1600 U 703 put out from Hammerfest for Narvik.
U 622 proceeding from Trondheim to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance:

- (1) of Spitsbergen by 3 Ju 88 (2 aircraft broke off operations because of technical trouble).
- (2) Banak - Bear Island - Ice Fjord - Banak by 1 Ju 88. Nothing observed, only partly examined. Reconnaissance of coastal inshore waters to West Fairway (entrance to White Sea) carried out by 1 Ju 88 (aircraft overdue). Armed reconnaissance between Fisher Peninsula and Kildin carried out by 2 FW 190, no detailed examination.

CONFIDENTIAL

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance between north coast of Iceland and 68 degrees 30 N. and westward to the ice limit, carried out by 1 FW 200. Nothing observed. Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits carried out by 1 FW 200. Nothing observed.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

1 submarine in A 5451 at periscope depth. Coastal convoy at entrance to White Sea (West Fairway).

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 U-boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing to report.

VII. U-boat reports:

Short report from "U 601" (Grau) for the period from 15 April to 15 May 1943, see Appendix II.

(Signed) Peters.

19 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625 6328. U 639 6347 lower center,
U 251 6622 lower edge center, all AB,
depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 approximately AB 39, eastern half.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 467, 586, 629, Bergen.
U 302, 355 Trondheim.
U 601 Narvik.
U 212, 711 Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1145 U 622 proceeding from Trondheim to Hammerfest.
1700 U 703 put in to Narvik.
U 703 put out for Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75 degrees N. 0 degrees - Banak carried out by 1 Ju 88. Not exhaustive, nothing observed. Reconnaissance of coastal inshore waters from Kola coast to West Fairway carried out by 1 Ju 88. Meteorological and shipping reconnaissance from Fisher Peninsula to Kola inlet by 2 FW 190, not examined in detail.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by 1 FW 200. Nothing observed.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

2 destroyers and 1 escort vessel as well as 7 patrol vessels off Kola coast.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Very few radio messages to Russian submarines off north coast of Norway. Only "S 56" mentioned by name.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 U-boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

(d) Miscellaneous:

"U 703" (Bielfeld) received orders to move to Trondheim.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing to report.

VII. U-boat reports:

Short report from "U212" (Vogler) for the period from 20 April to 16 May 1943, see Appendix II.

(Signed) Peters.

20 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625 6328, U 639 6347 lower center.
U 251 6622 lower edge center, all AB,
depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 approximately AB 39, eastern half.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 467, 586, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355 Trondheim.
U 601 Narvik.
U 212, 711 Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1600 U 467 put out from Bergen for Atlantic.
U 622 proceeding from Trondheim to Hammerfest.
U 703 proceeding from Narvik to Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N. 0 degrees - Banak by 1 Ju 88. Only partially examined. Reconnaissance of shipping traffic from Fisher Peninsula to Kildin by 6 FW 190. Nothing observed. Photographic reconnaissance of Kola Bay and from Kola to Vaenga.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by 1 FW 200.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance: One patrol vessel stationary in AE 2733.

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

A few radio messages to Russian submarines off the north coast of Norway; only "Schtsch 402" mentioned by name.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 U-boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing to report.

VII. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 711 (Lange) for the period from 12 April to 14 May 1943, see Appendix II.

(Signed) Peters.

21 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625 6328.

U 639 6347 lower center.

U 251 6622 lower edge center.

all AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.

U 354 approximately AB 39, eastern half.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 586, 629, Bergen.

U 302, 355, 703 Trondheim.

U 601 Narvik.

U 212, 711 Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0400 U 703 put out from Trondheim.

1540 U 622 put in to Hammerfest.

CONFIDENTIAL

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N. 0 degrees - Banak by 1 Ju 88. Nothing observed.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by 1 FW 200.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

3 patrol vessels, 1 torpedo boat in Denmark Straits, course 90 degrees, moderate speed.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarines "S 51", "M 116" and "Schtsch 402" off Norwegian polar coast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic

4 U-boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing to report.

VII. Miscellaneous:

Captain U-boats in conference with Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten at Bardufoss on the use of aerial torpedo 350 in convoy attacks.

(Signed) Peters.

22 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625 6328.
U 639 6347 lower center.
U 251 6622 lower edge center, all AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 approximately AB 39, eastern half.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 586, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 601 Narvik.
U 212, 622, 711 Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear Island - Krossfjord - 74 degrees 30 minutes N. 5 degrees W. - Banak by 1 He 111, nothing observed, only partially examined. Reconnaissance of shipping traffic from Fisher Peninsula to Kildin by 4 FW 190 and 4 BF 109. Photographic reconnaissance of the harbors of Archangel, Melotovsk and Eina Bay.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by 1 FW 200, nothing observed.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Coastal convoy traffic off Fisher Peninsula.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

(1) Russian submarines "S 51", "S 56", "Schtsch 402" off Norwegian polar coast.

(2) Staff of Russian Northern Waters Fleet on 21 May informed Russian submarines in the operational area of 2 eastbound convoys, one from Tromsø and one from Vadsø.

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) Russian submarines in the operational area were informed in the evening of air reconnaissance of Vardø (3 freighters).

(c) By G.I.S. stations:

Reliable agent reported from Copenhagen on 3 May: The majority of U.S. troops in Iceland will be moved to England and Scotland at the end of May or beginning of June. At the same time further troops are expected from the United States.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 U-boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing to report.

(Signed) Peters.

25 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625 6328. U 639 6347 lower center.
U 251 6622 lower edge center, all AB,
depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 approximately AB 39, eastern half.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 586, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 601 Narvik.
U 212, 622, 711 Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flioger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - Ice Fjord - 75 degrees N. 0 degrees - Banak by 1 He 111, nothing observed.

CONFIDENTIAL

Reconnaissance of shipping traffic from Fisher Peninsula to Kola Bay by 2 FW 190, nothing observed. Photographic reconnaissance of Kola Bay.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by 2 FW 200, nothing observed.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

The following in Kola Bay according to aerial photo: 5 destroyers, 5 submarines, 2 tankers (18,800 G.R.T.), 8 freighters (32,000 G.R.T.), NB: Not completely covered.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarines "S 56", "L 22" off Norwegian polar coast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 U-boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

The following teleprinter message (re the conference in Bardufoss on 20 May between Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten, Admiral Northern Waters and Captain U-boats on the use of aerial torpedo 350 in convoy attacks) was sent in Admiral Northern Waters Most Secret 934 dated 23 May, 1943, to Luftflotte 5, Flieger Fuehrer North (East), Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten, Flieger Fuehrer North (West), F.O. Cruisers and for information to Group North Fleet.

Most Secret.

Subject: Use of aerial torpedo 350 in convoy attacks.

Ref. (1) Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret 1399
Al dated 9 May, 1943.

Ref. (2) Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten 1712/43
Most Secret dated 10 May (not to
all stations).

In a joint conference between Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten, Admiral Northern Waters and Captain U-boats, Norway, the possibility of using aerial torpedo 350 in convoy attacks was again examined in the light of new knowledge and of considerations regarding precision in location and methods of attack, and the following was decided:

- (1) Use of aerial torpedo 350 by a closed bomber formation without visual identification of the target in areas where U-boats are operating at the same time is possible in the following conditions:
 - (a) Disposition of the convoy shall be ascertained with such precision with the aid of radar and in connection with the intended attack, that the torpedo will be dropped with certainty inside the inner escort screen. At the same time the approximate course of the enemy at the time of the attack must be determined.
 - (b) Continuous shadowing of the convoy by aircraft with radar sets and transmission of enemy position and course immediately after the aerial torpedo attack must be ensured.
 - (c) The exact time of attack must be transmitted by the Command Station to Captain U-boats in time for the U-boats to be able to move away from the convoy.
 - (d) Underwater movements of U-boats (see ref. (2)) throughout the duration of the aerial torpedo attack until the automatic sinking of the torpedo are not practicable as their low underwater speed would prevent the U-boats from maintaining their position ahead of the convoy, which is an essential precondition for attack.
- (2) The use of aerial torpedo 350 against convoys that are being attacked by surface forces is not possible in view of the ever-changing situation and the difficulty of identifying friend and foe as long as our own formation is in the convoy's sea area.
- (3) It appears necessary to ensure the fulfilment of the condition in (1a) by carrying out practical tests in the form of training exercises.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing to report.

(Signed) Peters.

24 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

In operational area:

(a) Positions at 0800:

U 625 6328, U 639 6347 lower center.
U 251 6622 lower edge center, all AB,
depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 approximately AB 39, eastern half.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 586, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 601 Narvik.
U 212, 622, 711 Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear Island -
Ice Fjord - 77 degrees N. 7 degrees E. - Banak by 1
He 111 and 1 Ju 88. Nothing observed, not exhaustive.
1 He 111 broke off operations owing to technical
trouble. Reconnaissance of coastal inshore waters
as far as Cape Kerets by 1 Ju 88. Nothing observed.
Only Morjovets examined. Armed reconnaissance from
Fisher Peninsula to Kildin in four waves by 8 FW 190.
Nothing observed. Photographic reconnaissance of
Kildin, Cape Kanin Nos, Iokanka Harbor and Kola Bay.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by 1 FW 200.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

(1) One merchant ship 2000 - 3000 G.R.T. course
270 degrees, in AE 1964.

(2) One merchant ship, course 90 degrees, in
AE 1969. Both with air escort.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarines "S 56" and "L 22" off Norwegian
polar coast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 U-boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

1320 U 354 (Herbschleb) reports his position in AB 3536 in short signal 1247/755. The U-boat had to patrol the passage north of Bear Island and report the ice limit by position short signal in case the ice was retreating very much to the north. Because of U 354's last position report I consider it necessary to have him sail east along the ice limit in order to have a clear idea of the possibilities of a convoy or single ships passing that way.

1421 I therefore ordered U 354 (Herbschleb) in radio message 1421/757 to report the course of the ice limit by position short signals on the 19 degrees, 21 degrees, 23 degrees and 25 degrees E. longitudes.

(d) Miscellaneous:

U 711 (Lange), in Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret 1536 A1, received the following sailing orders:

Emergency. U-boat Base Hammerfest -
Most Secret.

Sailing orders for "U 711" (Lange).

(1) Put out from Hammerfest on 25 May.

(2) Occupy attack area AB 6328 by 0000 on 27 May, depth of sweep(?) miles.

(3) German U-boats: Group "Monsun", attack areas, depth of sweep 30 miles:
U 625 6328, U 639 6347 lower center,
U 251 6622 lower edge center, all AB,
U 354 north of Bear Island.

(4) U-boats Northern Waters Radio Service.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Further air reconnaissance must reveal whether the merchant ships reported by aircraft under III (b) are single steamers sailing to and from Russian ports or coastal traffic between Reykjavik and Reydar or Seydis.

(Signed) Peters.

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25 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625, 6328. U 639 6347 lower center.
U 251 6622 lower edge center, all AB,
depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 in sea area north of Bear Island.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 586, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 703, Trondheim.
U 601 Narvik.
U 212, 622, 711 Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1600 U 711 put out from Hammerfest for the operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Ice Fjord -
75 degrees N. 5 degrees W. - Banak.
Nothing observed, almost exhaustive.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits in 3 waves, of 1 FW
200 each. Of these one not yet reported, one with
nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Merchant ships of 2000 - 3000 G.R.T. intercepted by
radar at a distance of 60 km and attacked in Denmark
Straits. Results not observed.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarines "S 56" and "L 22" off Norwegian
polar coast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Reliable agent from G.I.S. station Denmark reports
from Iceland: On the evening of 22 May a convoy of
7 laden ships of average tonnage put in to Reykjavik.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 U-boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

According to a report from U 354 (Horbschleb) the ice limit is at present running north of Bear Island as follows: AB 3536, 3694, AC 1479, 1793, 1883.

This shows that there is an ice-free passage in the northern and north-eastern sector of Bear Island about 60 miles wide as far as 74 degrees 30 minutes N., but an ice sack stretches east of Bear Island southward to about the level of the island. For the present I consider it sufficient for one U-boat to occupy this passage.

1747

I therefore sent orders to U 354 (Horbschleb) in radio message 1747/722: "After carrying out ice reconnaissance, patrol the passage between the ice limit and Bear Island at its narrowest point. Report major variations in the ice limit by position short signal."

(d) Miscellaneous:

U 586 (v.d.Esch) received the following sailing orders in Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret 1519 A1:

(1) Put out from Bergen on 26 May.

(2) Proceed to Hammerfest at a distance of 50 miles from the coast, pick up escort off SR 1.

(3) German U-boats:

U 625 6328, U 639 6347 lower center, U 251 6622 lower edge center, all AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.

U 354 on ice reconnaissance north of Bear Island.

U 711 putting out from Hammerfest towards evening on 25 May, relieving Benker.

(4) Radio service "Anton" until receipt of confirmation of signal reporting 67 degrees N. passed, then U-boats Northern Waters Radio Service. Also U-boats Northern Waters very long wave after sailing.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Peters.

26 May, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625 6328, U 639 6347 lower center.
U 251 6622 lower edge center, all AB,
depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 in sea area north of Bear Island.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 586, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 601 Narvik.
U 212, 622 Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1800 U 601 put out from Narvik for Hammerfest.
U 711 proceeding from Hammerfest to operational
area.
U 251 proceeding from operational area to Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological and ice reconnaissance: Banak -
Bear Island - 76 degrees N. 22 degrees E. - Ice
Fjord - 75 degrees N. 5 degrees W. - Banak by 1 He 111.
Last part of route only partially examined.
Nothing observed.
Reconnaissance of shipping traffic from Fisher
Peninsula to Kola inlet by 6 FW 190 in three waves.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by 1 FW 200 and
east of Denmark Straits by 1 BV 138, nothing to report.
"Holzauge" carried out by 1 FW 200, nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

(1) Shipping in Motovski Bay successfully attacked.

(2) Meteorological Reconnaissance Squadron I reported
at 0755 convoy in AM 1465: 8 merchant ships of
about 3000 G.R.T. each, 1 merchantman of about
10,000 G.R.T., 5 escort vessels, mean course 60
degrees, slight speed.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarines "S 56", "L 22", "Schtsch 403", "422", "M 105" off Norwegian polar coast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1240 Radio message 1240/788 sent after "U 711" (Lange) had sailed from Hammerfest:

"To Benker from Captain U-boats. Lange will relieve Benker at 0000 on 27 May when Benker will begin return voyage to Narvik - Andfjord."

1346 The planned withdrawal of "U 625" (Benker) from the operational area was, however, not effected since "U 251" (Timm) had already begun the return voyage to Trondheim as the tiebolt of one of its cruising diesels had broken. Therefore, the following order was sent in radio message 1346/789:

"From Captain U-boats. Contrary to radio message 1240/788 Lange to occupy attack area AB 6622 lower edge center, depth of sweep 30 miles. "Benker" will be relieved later. "Timm" report passing 67 degrees N."

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

U 601 (Grau) received the following sailing orders in Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret 1564 dated 26 May.

- (1) Put out from Narvik on 26 May.
- (2) Proceed through Tjeldsund to Harstad, with a pilot from Lodingen. Then on with district pilot through Finnsnesrennen to Tromsø for revictualing. Proceed from Tromsø to Hammerfest in convoy according to Admiral Northern Waters' instructions. After putting in to Tromsø, the Commander is to report to Al Admiral Polar Coast.
- (3) Berth alongside Black Watch in Hammerfest. At Hammerfest continuous readiness is ordered.
- (4) During move "U-boats Northern Waters Radio Service". Ensure that during dockyard period in Hammerfest all serial numbers of "U-boats

Northern Waters Radio Service" reach the
U-boat via Naval Communications Officer.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The convoy reported by G.A.F. in III (b) (2) is presumably one of American supplies for the Shetlands. Further information through air reconnaissance is awaited. Otherwise nothing to report.

(Signed) Peters.

27 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625 6323, U 639 6347 lower center.
U 711 6622 lower edge center. All AB.
Depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 in sea area north of Bear Island.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 705 Trondheim.
U 212, 622 Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2130 U 586 put out from Bergen for Hammerfest.
U 251 proceeding from operational area to Trondheim.
U 601 proceeding from Narvik to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Ice Fjord - 75 degrees N, 5 degrees W. - Banak by 1 He 111. Almost exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits between north coast of Iceland and 69 degrees N. in 2 waves, each of 1 FW 200. Nothing to report.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarines "L 22", "S 56",
"Schtsch 403", "422" and "M 105" off
Norwegian polar coast.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 U-boats in formation north and south of
Bear Island.

- (c) Special operations by single boats:

U 212 (Vogler) available for hydrophone
training with 6th Destroyer Flotilla in
Altafjord.

- (d) The following plans were received in Group
North/Fleet, Ref. No. Most Secret. 2135/43 W,
dated 10 May.

"Re: Setting up of meteorological observation
stations in the Northern area 1943/44.

The Chief of Staff of Naval War Staff has
provided for the setting up of the following
meteorological reporting stations in the
northern area in Ref. No. Naval War Staff
H 676/43 W. Director of Naval Meteorological
Service la Most Secret, dated 22 April, 1943:

(1) Manned stations:

- (a) On the east coast of Greenland independently
of the further course of operation
"Holzauge" (cover name "Bassgeiger").
For this purpose a ship specially
strengthened against ice damage must be
ready in Northern Norway by the middle
of August 1943. It will then winter
in the ice.
- (b) On Northeastland (Spitsbergen).
A ship, specially strengthened against
ice damage, must be ready in Northern
Norway by the beginning of August 1943,
and will return after setting up the
station (cover name "Kreuzritter").

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U-boat escort to northwest exit of Hinlopen Straits. On the return voyage the ship will also fetch the remaining equipment of station "Nussbaum" which will not be manned again. Ship might set up a meteorological radio transmitter on the site of the former station "Nussbaum".

- (c) In the western part of Franz Josef Land (Alexandra Land), or, as an alternative, on Victoria Island or on the ice ledge in the southern part of Franz Josef Land (cover name "Schatzgräber"). For this operation a ship specially strengthened against ice damage must be ready in Northern Norway by the beginning of August 1943 and will return after completing its mission. U-boat escort, if possible, together with "Kreuzritter".
- (d) Meteorological reporting ship "Hessen" in October 1943 is to penetrate the ice northwest of Spitsbergen in order to drift from there with the ice (cover name "Einsiedler").
- (2) Meteorological radio transmitters will be set up on Bear Island and Hopen Island by meteorological ship "Coburg".
- (3) A U-boat will
 - (a) evacuate "Nussbaum" personnel at the beginning of August and
 - (b) lay meteorological buoys: - south of Jan Mayen, on 73 degrees N. 8 degrees E, in the Barents Sea.

An attempt will also be made to set up a meteorological radio transmitter on Jan Mayen."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing to report.

(Signed) Peters.

28 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625 6328. U 639 6347 lower center.
U 711 6622 lower edge center, all AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 in sea area north of Bear Island.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 212, 622 Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 251 proceeding from operational area
to Trondheim.
U 601 proceeding from Narvik to Hammerfest.
U 586 proceeding from Bergen to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological and ice reconnaissance:

Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75 degrees N.
3 degrees E. - Banak by 1 Ju 88. Exhaustive,
nothing to report. Reconnaissance of shipping
traffic from Fisher Peninsula to Kola inlet by
2 FW 190 broken off because of weather conditions.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by 1 FW 200
with radar.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

3 patrol vessels on easterly course in
AE 1941.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarines "L 20", "22", "S 56",
"Schtsch 403", "422", "M 105" off Norwegian
polar coast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Office of Foreign Intelligence IM reports:

"Untried source reports from Oslo on
28 May: A convoy sailed from the United
States on 26 May in the direction of
England. It is possible that the convoy
will split up off Iceland and some ships
go on to Murmansk."

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 U-boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 212 (Vogler) available for hydrophone training with 6th Destroyer Flotilla in Altafjord.

(d) Miscellaneous:

(i) U 622 (Queck) received the following sailing orders in Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret. 1595 A1:

(1) Put out from Hammerfest at 0800 on 29 May.

(2) Proceed via AC 4170. Occupy attack area AB 6328 at 1300 on 30 May, depth of sweep 30 miles.

(3) German U-boats (Group "Monsun"):

U 625 6328, U 639 6347 lower center, U 711 6622 lower edge center, all AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 north of Bear Island.

(4) U-boats Northern Waters Radio Service.

(ii) U 302 (Sickel) received the following sailing orders in Captain U-boats, Norway, Most Secret 1603 A1:

"(1) Put out from Trondheim on 29 May.

(2) Proceed to Hammerfest at a distance of 50 miles from the coast, pick up escort at SRL.

(3) Radio Service "Anton" until receipt of confirmation of signal reporting 67 degrees N. passed, then U-boats Northern Waters Radi Service. Also U-boats Northern Waters very long wave after sailing."

(iii) The following plans received by Admiral Northern Waters in F.O. Cruisers. Most Secret. 144/43 S.O.s only dated 28 May:

"Most Secret. S.O. only. - By hand of officer only:-

A. The following preparations are considered necessary for a possible repetition of Kara Sea/Siberian sea route operation in the summer of 1943 by the "Lützow" led

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and escorted by the whole of the Battle Group:

- (1) Holding in readiness suitable intercept service teams.
 - (2) Holding in readiness Captains with ice experience, and interpreters, as for "Scheer", for unit command and "Lützow" (Captains Kraul and Kröpsch).
 - (3) Planning and preparation for ice reconnaissance by U-boats.
 - (4) Technical preparations. One or two BV 138 with reserve crews, spare parts, and gear for refuelling at sea from U-boats and ships (pipe lines, couplings, etc.) to be taken along.
 - (5) Preparation of index chart of the area between Novaya Zemlya and Wilkitzki Straits incorporating navigational information, gained by "Scheer", from War Diary "Wunderland", and a similar chart with grid squares (naval and G.A.F.) (combination of 1934 Secret, 1936 Secret, 1937 Secret) and supplying the Battle Group with these charts.
 - (6) Supplies of charts of Franz Josef Land and other material for the selection of suitable oiling points. (Ice conditions).
- (B) In our opinion the operation will have to be carried out as follows: "Lützow" will be escorted by Battle Group up to about 75 degrees N. The latter will then turn away with a tanker (supply ship) to Franz Josef Land while "Lützow" proceeds eastwards. Afterwards they will join forces again, or, if necessary, the Battle Group will support the "Lützow" in difficult situations. Return together."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing to report.

(Signed) Peters.

29 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625 6328. U 639 6347 lower center.
U 711 6622, lower edge center, all AB,
depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 in sea area north of Bear Island.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 629 Bergen.
U 302, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 212, 622 Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0800 U 622 put out from Hammerfest for operational area.
1400 U 302 put out from Trondheim for Hammerfest.
2015 U 251 put in to Trondheim.
2030 U 601 put in to Hammerfest.
U 586 proceeding from Bergen to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance:

- (1) Banak - Ice Fjord - 75 degrees N. 5 degrees W. -
Banak by 1 He 111. Almost exhaustive, nothing
to report.
- (2) Banak - Belushya Bay - Banak by 1 He 111.
Exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by 2 FW 200,
nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats:)
- (b) By air reconnaissance:) None.
- (c) By naval forces:)
- (d) By radio intercept service:
Russian submarines "L 22", "Schtsch 403",
"422", "M 105" off Norwegian polar coast.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

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IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 U-boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Peters.

30 May, 1943

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 625 6328.

U 639 6347 lower center.

U 711 6622 lower edge center, all AB,
depth of sweep 30 miles.

U 354 in sea area north of Bear Island.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 629 Bergen.

U 251, 355, 703 Trondheim.

U 212, 601 Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 586 proceeding from Bergen to Hammerfest.

U 302 proceeding from Trondheim to Hammerfest.

U 622 proceeding from Hammerfest to operational
area.

U 625 proceeding from operational area to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear Island -
Ice Fjord - 75 degrees N. 5 degrees W. - Banak by
1 He 111. Almost exhaustive, nothing to report.

Sea reconnaissance: Banak - 71 degrees 50 minutes
N. 49 degrees 30 minutes E. 69 degrees 40 minutes N.
44 degrees 30 minutes E. - Banak by 1 Ju 88. Not
completely examined because of weather conditions.
Nothing to report. Reconnaissance of shipping
traffic from Fisher Peninsula to Kola inlet by 2
FW 190. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by 2 FW 200 in 2 waves. Nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats:)
- (b) By air reconnaissance:) None.
- (c) By naval forces:)

(d) By radio intercept service:

- (1) Very few radio messages to an unknown number of unnamed submarines in the operational area (Norwegian polar coast).
- (2) Convoy consisting of 2 tankers, 1 freighter, 1 destroyer, escort vessels 10 and 19, corvette "Camelia" and minesweeper "Britomart" sailed at 1830 on 29 May from unknown point to Archangel.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:
4 U-boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.
- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.
- (d) Miscellaneous:

The following comments on F.O. Cruiser's proposal (see War Diary, entry of 28 May) was received in Group North/Fleet Most Secret S.O.s only 563/43 Al dated 30 May:

"Most Secret. S.O.s only. By hand of officer only.

Ref. Battle Group. Most Secret 144/43 Al S.O.s only, dated 27 May 1943.

- (1) Repetition of "Wunderland" depends on overall position. Earliest date August. Decision on execution and forces taking part to be given later. Nevertheless, it is correct to make the arrangements set down in A (1-6). Attention is drawn to the comments in Group North Most Secret 1247/42 Al dated 14 November 1942 on war diary "Wunderland". It is assumed that the measures mentioned in (1), (2), (5) and (6) are

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being taken by Naval War Staff. Group North/Fleet considers it desirable that Naval War Staff collect their latest available information and experiences of the North Siberian sea route gained from operation "Wunderland" to be used as a basis for its repetition. Early receipt of C-in-C Luftwaffe's permission for use of 2 BV 138 is necessary.

- (2) Naval War Staff is requested to inform us whether
 - (a) the compass difficulties of ship-borne aircraft which arose during "Wunderland" have been removed or are likely to be removed by the date in question;
 - (b) we may reckon on continuous information from radio intercept service regarding ice and shipping traffic on the North Siberian sea route. Otherwise it will be necessary to send a U-boat with a radio intercept service team to the Kara Sea at an early date. Transmission by Japanese of dates of sailing of east - west convoys important.
- (3) Admiral Northern Waters is charged
 - (a) to submit proposals for the use of U-boats on reconnaissance and ice patrols and for direct co-operation between surface forces and U-boats in the Kara Sea;
 - (b) to institute practice refuellings between BV 138 and ships, destroyers and U-boats, to collect all useful experiences in this respect and to lay down strict instructions on equipment for all possible emergencies;
 - (c) to revise the short signal manual and to insert any supplements necessary for the repetition of "Wunderland".
- (4) Naval War Staff is requested to supply temporarily a copy of War Diary "Wunderland".

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The Archangel convoy reported under III (d) is probably one of the normal coastal convoys repeatedly picked up by radio intercept service. Otherwise nothing to report.

(Signed) Peters.

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31 May, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 622 6328,
U 639 6347 lower center,
U 711 6622 lower edge center, all AB,
depth of sweep 30 miles.

(b) In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 629 Bergen.
U 251, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 212, 601 Hammerfest.

(c) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 625 put in to Narvik at 1545.
U 586 put in to Hammerfest at 1415.
U 302 proceeding from Trondheim to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flioger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - South Cape -
75 degrees N. 5 degrees E - Banak by 1 Ju 88. Not
exhaustive, nothing to report. Reconnaissance of
shipping traffic from Fisher Peninsula to Kola inlet.

Flioger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations.

Flioger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by 2 FW 200,
nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Convoy traffic to Kola Bay.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarines "K 1", "L 22" and "Schtsch 422" off
Norwegian polar coast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

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(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 U-boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

"U 212" (Vogler) available for hydrophone training with 5th Destroyer Flotilla in Altafjord.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing to report.

VII. U-boat reports:

Short report from "U 625" (Benker):

26 April 1943 put out from Hammerfest,

31 May put in to Narvik.

Ice reconnaissance in AB 36, 38, 39.

Following attack areas occupied:

From 29 April 6328,

2 May 6239 right edge center,

11 May 6328. All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.

Enemy not sighted.

Sank by gunfire 10 drifting mines (probably Mark 19) in AB 63 between 22 and 31 May. Nine of them fairly rusty, not overgrown, one almost new.

(Signed) Peters.

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APPENDIX I

COPY

Teleprinter message:

- To (1) Emergency Group North/Fleet.
(2) Emergency U-boat base, Trondheim.

Clear as single address message.

Most Secret.

Sailing orders for "U 622" (Queck).

- (1) Put out from Trondheim on 17 May.
- (2) Proceed to Hammerfest at a distance of 50 miles from the coast, pick up convoy at point SR 1.
- (3) German U-boats:
 - U 625 (Benker) 6328,
 - U 639 (Wichmann) 6347 lower center,
 - U 251 (Timm) 6622 lower edge center, all AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
 - U 354 (Herbschleb) north of Bear Island as far as ice limit.
- (4) Radio Service "Anten" until receipt of confirmation of signal reporting 67 degrees N. passed, then U-boats Northern Waters Radio Service. Also U-boats Northern Waters very long wave after sailing.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret 1481 Al.

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APPENDIX II

Immediate. Naval War Staff 1st Division;
" Naval War Staff 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats,
Operations;
" Group North/Fleet;
" Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Clear as single address message.

Most Secret.

Subject: Short report from "U 703" (Bielfeld).

17 April, 1943, put out from Hammerfest,
15 May, put in to Hammerfest.
Made for and occupied: AB 7580, AB 7735 left center on
20 April, AB 7519 on 27 April then proceeded in reconnaissance
line through position lines ordered.
29 April 6622 upper edge center,
3 May 6375, 11 May 6347 lower center, all AB, depth of
sweep 30 miles.
14 May took over sick man from "U 625" (Benker) in AB 6328
and commenced return voyage. Nothing to report.
19 April sighted twin-engined land aircraft in AB 8437.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret. 1487 Al.

Immediate. Naval War Staff, 1st Division;
Emergency. Naval War Staff 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats,
Operations;
Immediate. Group North/Fleet;
" Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Clear as single address message.

Most Secret.

Subject: Short report from "U 601" (Grau).

15 April 1943, put out from Bergen,
15 May, 1943, put in to Narvik.
Occupied AB 7454 until 27 April then proceeded in
reconnaissance line via position lines ordered.
From 28 April attack areas southwest of Bear Island.
Enemy not encountered. Drifting mines: AF 8170,
AB 6168, 6265, 6248, 6259, 6268, 6621, 9318.
Eight of these Mark IV, one of these destroyed.
4 May 2nd Officer of the Watch, Lt. Zoske fatally
injured by barrel premature of 2 cm anti-aircraft 38.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret. 1489.

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Immediate. Naval War Staff 1st Division;
Immediate. Naval War Staff 2nd Division, C-in-C U-boats, Operations;
Immediate. Group North/Fleet;
Immediate. Admiral Commanding U-boats.

Clear as single address message.

Most Secret.

Subject: Short report from "U 212" (Vogler)

20 April put out from Narvik through West Fjord to approach AB 7830.
At 0400 on 23 April relieved Wichmann in attack area AB 7819 top left depth of sweep 30 miles.
At 0800 on 27 April occupied AB 7557 in reconnaissance line and proceeded through 8212 to position in AB 6644.
29 April to 2 May 1600 occupied attack area AB 6641 right center, depth of sweep 30 miles.
From 2100 2 May to 1400 11 May occupied attack area AB 6553 (depth of sweep 30 miles).
From 2400 11 May to 0400 16 May occupied attack area AB 6622 lower edge center (depth of sweep 30 miles).
16 May put in to Hammerfest.

Special events:

- (1) At 1625 on 21 April periscope in AF 2378, distance 1500 meters.
- (2) At 2245 on 28 April confirmed searcher on 1.27 meters in radio location set. (Signal strength 5, location band surface vessels.)
- (3) 1001 - 1035 on 2 May confirmed searcher on 1.36 meters in radio location set (probably aircraft).
- (4) 27 drifting mines sighted throughout whole operation (especially in AB 65 and 66). 8 drifting mines destroyed.

Captain U-boats, Norway. Most Secret. 1513.

Subject: Short report from "U 711" 12 to 14 May, 1943.

0157 12 May radio message 0057/738 received:-


0233 radio message 0131/739 received:-

0410 put out from Hammerfest escorted by 2 R-boats.
0635 left escort at SR 1, course 6 degrees. Made for AC 4200.
0705 2 Arado 196 approached, exchanged recognition signals.
1340 radio message 1215/743 received. 1343 sighted U-boat Wichmann to port. 1340 course 19 degrees made for AC 1977.

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
At 1322 on 13 May listening sweep 2 heard S/T transmitter, operated on short and long, high-pitched and low-pitched notes. No more hydrophone bearings, broke off operation. 1521 radio message 1402/752 received. 1930 began return voyage. 2207 radio message 2207/762 Beta Beta sent. 0255 on 14 May radio message 0133/764 received. 0637 twin-engined land aircraft sighted, probably Me 110 or 153. 1540 picked up R-boat escort. 1805 put in to Hammerfest. No operation with torpedoes.

U-boat Base, Hammerfest. Most Secret. 113.



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WAR DIARY
OF
CAPTAIN U-BOATS NORWAY.
CAPTAIN PETERS.
1 - 15 JUNE, 1943.
PG/31836



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1 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Position at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 622 6328.
U 639 6347 lower center.
U 711 6622 lower edge center.
All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 sea area north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 255, 269; 334, 629 Bergen.
U 251, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 625 Narvik.
U 212, 586, 601 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1145 U 302 put in to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 78 degrees N 24 degrees E - Hope Island - Banak by 1 Ju 88. Reconnaissance almost exhaustive.

Sea reconnaissance: Kirkenes - AC 9342 - AC 9945 - Kirkenes by 1 Ju 88. Exhaustive.

Reconnaissance of shipping Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet by 14 FW 190.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Sea reconnaissance west of Denmark Straits by 3 FW 200 in two waves. Nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

(1) A hut with radio installation and 3 men was located on Hope Island.

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- (2) a submarine submerging in AC 8826.
- (3) One merchant ship of 2 - 3,000 G.R.T., course 270 degrees, speed 7 - 8 knots, AE 2774.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:
- (1) Russian submarines "K 21", "L 22", "Schtsch 422", "M 105" off the Norwegian polar coast.
- (2) At 1800 on 31 May unidentified ship putting out from "Belushya" (Novaya Zemlya), bound for Archangel.

At 1100 guardship No. 28 putting out to escort this ship from Iokanka to Barents Sea.

The two ships reported were sighted at 0805 on 1 June from Kolguev North on a bearing of 360 degrees, at a distance of 20 miles, course west.

- (3) Kolguev North reported as follows at 0845 on 31 May: Two ships, one of them probably the steamer "Hentzen" (1,336 G.R.T.) proceeded out of sight on a bearing of 250 degrees, 15 miles off, course 250 degrees.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations:

A reliable agent reported the following from Stockholm on 6 and 9 May:

Russian naval bases in the Arctic:

Murmansk in Kola fjord:

Until the autumn of 1942, Murmansk was used as a supply port and for repairing ships up to the size of cruisers. Owing to air attacks, Murmansk is now only used for replenishing supplies.

Polyarno (west of Kola fjord, not far from the mouth of the fjord):

It was intended to build a large naval base here with repair docks and supply facilities for warships. However, this intention has not been carried out and so far the port has only been used as a provisional port-of-call for smaller ships.

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Archangel and the new base at Molotovsk on the delta of the Dvina river northwest of Archangel are the most important places for equipping, repairing and supplying ships. In Archangel, there are at least two docks in which merchant ships are built, and also docks which are used by fairly large ice-breakers. So far, we do not know the capacity of the war industries within and without the city.

Outlying bases for supplying stores are as follows:

Iokanka on the Kola peninsula and Belushya Bay on the southwest coast of Novaya Zemlya.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

4 U-boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

- (1) The ships' traffic from Belushya reported by radio intercept service under III.) 1.) and 2.) shows that the west coast of Novaya Zemlya and Koston Straits are again navigable for shipping.
- (2) Both the steamers reported north of Kolguev are in our opinion vessels engaged in coastal traffic and are presumably proceeding to supply isolated bases.

VII. U-boat report:

The following short report from "U 251" (Timm) was received at the submarine base at Trondheim in Secret 436 dated 1 June:--

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"Tenth operation 22 April to 29 May, 1943. Put out from Hammerfest on 12 May. Established course of ice limit. Then took up position AB 6622. 26 May broke tie-bolt of starboard Diesel, put in to Trondheim for dockyard assistance. Drifting mines: 24 - 26 May, AB 6621, 6622, 6623, seven sunk by gunfire, 26 May - 29 May AB 6837, AF 5324, 5896 sighted three, of British origin. All slightly overgrown, paint badly corroded. Estimate their age as 1 - 2 years. No mines detonated."

13th U-boat Flotilla commissioned in Trondheim on 1 June, 1943. S.O. Lieutenant Commander Rüggeberg.

The U-boat base at Trondheim has ceased to be under the 11th U-boat Flotilla and will become part of the 13th U-boat Flotilla.

(Signed) Peters.

2 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 622 6328.
U 639 6347 lower center.
U 711 6622 lower edge center.
All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 sea area north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 629 Bergen.
U 251, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 625 Narvik.
U 212, 302, 586, 601 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound: None.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N. 0 degrees - Banak by

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1 Ju 88. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Reconnaissance over coastal inshore waters from AC 7263 to AC 4739 by 2 Ju 88, nothing to report.

Shipping reconnaissance Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet by 6 FW 190. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by 1 BV 138 and 1 FW 200. Nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Very few messages transmitted to Russian submarines off the Norwegian polar coast, of which only "L 22" was mentioned by name.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Four boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.

- (d) Miscellaneous:

2040 Radio message 2040/739 received from "U 622" (Queck):

"Captain U-boats: Port diesel only partially clear on 5 cylinders, 2 cylinder covers torn off, welding unsuccessful. Query: remain in the operational area or put in to a repair port."

As it is necessary under these circumstances to withdraw this boat from the operational area, I have sent the following sailing orders to "U 212" (Vogler) in Captain U-boats, Norway
Secret 1645 A1:-

- (1) Put out from Hammerfest on the morning of 3 June.

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- (2) Proceed via AC 4170. Occupy attack area AB 6328 on 4 June at 1400, depth of sweep 30 miles.
- (3) Our boats (Group "Monsun"):
U 622 6329.
U 639 6347, lower center.
U 711 6622, lower edge center,
All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 north of Bear Island.
- (4) U-boats Northern Waters Radio Service.

The following radio message was received from the Naval High Command, Naval War Staff 1st Division 1 Ops. 1557 A Secret S.O.s only:

Secret S.O.s only - by hand of officers only:

- (1) Your views requested on the question of detailing three or four U-boats to the West Siberian Sea during the summer of 1943.
- (2) The Naval War Staff considers operational opportunities and prospects of success to be comparatively favorable.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

3 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 622 6328.
U 639 6347 lower center.
U 711 6622 lower edge center,
All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354, sea area north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 255; 269, 334, 629 Bergen.
U 251, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 625 Narvik.
U 212, 302, 586, 601 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1115 U 212 put out from Hammerfest for the operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N. 0 degrees - Banak by 1 Ju 88. Not exhaustive. Nothing to report.

Aerial photographic reconnaissance between Kola and Vaenga.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance over the Denmark Straits by 2 FW 200. Nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None..

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Kola Bay occupied between Kola and Vaenga by 5 destroyers, 4 submarines, 2 tankers totalling 17,500 G.R.T., 12 freighters totalling 35,000 G.R.T.; off Norov Tsyp Navolok, 1 destroyer and 2 patrol vessels attacked successfully. The destroyer probably damaged, patrol boats probably sunk.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarines "S 102" and "M 106" off the Norwegian polar coast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

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IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Four boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.
- (d) Miscellaneous:

1842 U 622 (Queck) received radio message 1842/746 to return to Hammerfest at 1400 on 4 June.

2310 U 639 (Wichmann) reported in radio message 2310/751: "Main periscope jammed. Tear in fuel tank 2I, therefore dismantling of battery cells necessary. Request Trondheim dockyard."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

4 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 622 6328.
U 639 6347 lower center.
U 711 6622 lower edge center.
All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354, sea area north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 629 Bergen.
U 251, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 625 Narvik.
U 302, 586, 601 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 212 proceeding from Hammerfest to the operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N. 0 degrees - Banak by 1 Ju 88. Not exhaustive. Nothing to report.

Reconnaissance over inshore waters off the Kola coast - West Fairway by 1 Ju 88.

Reconnaissance Kirkenes - Kolguev - Belushya Bay - Kirkenes by one Ju 88.

Reconnaissance on shipping from the Fisher Peninsula to Kola inlet by 6 FW 190. Nothing to report.

Aerial photographic reconnaissance over Kola Bay.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of the Denmark Straits by 2 FW 200, 1 FW 200 with radar and 1 BV 138, in two waves. BV 138 broke off reconnaissance in AF 4592 because of weather conditions. Nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Moderate coastal convoy traffic along the Kola coast.

Port of Iokanka occupied by: 2 freighters, 2,000 G.R.T. each, 5 freighters of 5,000 G.R.T. each.

Occupation of Kola Bay unaltered.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarines "S 102" and "M 106" off the Norwegian polar coast.

The freighter proceeding from Belushya (mistakenly identified by Kolguev as the steamer "Hertzen" - see "Reports on the enemy: By radio intercept service", in this war diary on 1 June) put out from Iokanka on 2 June. This confirms the radio intercept service report of freighter traffic from and to Belushya (south-west coast of Novaya Zemlya), whereas air reconnaissance reported on 4 June: "Port Belushya frozen up, no occupation, no navigable channel observed."

If the air report is correct, the west-going vessel reported by Kolguev North on 31 May and 1 June can only have come from the mainland ports on the Pechora sea.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

According to a reliable agent's report 11 American submarines of the S class (800 tons), assembled in Aberdeen on 7 May for patrol duties in the area North Sea/Norway.

IV. Current U-boat operations:(a) Convoy operations: None.(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Four U-boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.(d) Miscellaneous:

After the receipt of U 639's (Wichmann's) message on 3 June regarding his restricted war readiness in the operational area (attack periscope jammed, tears in the internal fuel tank), "U 568" (von der Esch) was given the following sailing orders in Captain U-boats, Norway Secret 1662 A1:-

"(1) Put out from Hammerfest forenoon, 5 June.

(2) Proceed via AC 4170, occupy attack area AB 6347 lower center on 6 June at 1200, depth of sweep 30 miles.

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(3) Our boats (Group "Monsun"):

U 212 6328.
U 639 6347 lower center.
U 711 6622 lower edge center.
All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.

(4) U-boats Northern Waters Radio Service."

The following reply to Naval War Staff 1st Div. I Ops. 1577 A S.O.s only was dispatched in Captain U-boats, Norway Secret 21 by hand of officers only:

"Naval War Staff 1st Div., Group North/Fleet, Admiral Northern Waters.

Secret, S.O.s only, by hand of officers only:

Naval War Staff I Ops. 1577 A S.O.s only, dated 1 June re the use of U-boats in the West Siberian Sea.

(1) Operation of four U-boats in the West Siberian Sea considered promising. Favorable ice conditions and a long period of operation are necessary, as we can only count on meager and intermittent traffic in the operational area.

(2) Length of the operation in the operational area is about 6 weeks.

Period: About the beginning of August till the middle of September. Use of the same boats throughout the duration of the operation.

(3) The following proposals are made for the execution of the operation:

(a) One boat to make an ice reconnaissance in the middle or end of July in the area round the northern tip of Novaya Zemlya and subsequently if ice conditions are favorable, to mine the harbor entrances to Dikson by 24 TMB's in accordance with the proposal in Admiral Northern Waters S.O.s only 332, dated 28 May, to Group North. After carrying out the mining operation, the boat is to carry out ice patrols in the area off the northern point of Novaya Zemlya. It is only to withdraw if the ice conditions are exceptionally favorable.

- (b) After the initial reports on the ice conditions, three further boats to put out via the northern tip of Novaya Zemlya. A continuous patrol of the convoy route is to be made by the boats, one in each of the areas, AT 62, 64, AS 42, 43, as well as XA 74 and 75 approximately. Advantages of this disposition: early interception of convoys, if any; the long convoy route in both directions which makes effective action possible with the small number of boats available. The operation is to be supported by air reconnaissance over the inner Kara Sea.
- (c) Tests should be made whether the supply of BV 138's by a U-boat off Novaya Zemlya is possible.
- (d) The embarkation of a small radio intercept team on each of the three southern boats would seem useful. It would be necessary for the Naval High Command to make radio reconnaissance tests.
- (4) For the main task of Northern Waters U-boats, that is, for convoy operations and the provision of information for the employment of surface forces, only four boats will remain after the four will have left for the Kara operation, for the remainder will be in dock. In view of the general U-boat situation, we cannot at the moment expect the allocation of further boats for Northern Waters assignments. Consequently the main task of Northern Waters boats - patrol of the convoy route, intercepting, shadowing and attack of PQ- and QP-convoys - can only be carried out on a very small scale.
- (5) The above consideration has not taken into account the proposals made in Admiral Northern Waters S.O.s only 332 of 28 May to Group North suggesting further minelaying operations nor the execution of the plans of the Director of the Naval Meteorological Service.
- (6) Admiral Northern Waters has been informed of the above plans which have his approval.

Additional note for Group North: A renewed examination of the problem of mining the entrance to Dikson in connection with the forthcoming operation has shown that it is possible to lay the mines while submerged."

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A corresponding outline of our views has been dispatched in Admiral Northern Waters Secret 346 A1 S.O.s only of 6 June, addressed to:

Group North/Fleet, for information F.O. Cruisers.

Secret S.O.s only, by hand of officer only.

"Re previous communications F.O. Cruisers S.O.s only 144, dated 27 May, Group North/Fleet S.O.s only 563, dated 30 May, Naval War Staff I Ops. 1577 B dated 1 June, and Naval War Staff I Ops. 1577 A dated 1 June, the following summary of our views is submitted:

- (1) The following additions have been made to the tasks laid down in Group North S.O.s only 300, dated 17 March:
 - (a) Operation against enemy merchant shipping on the North Siberian Sea route.
 - (b) Mining operations against shipping routes and ports according to Reg. No. S.O.s only 355, dated 10 April, 1943.
 - (c) Installation of meteorological stations according to Reg. No. Secret 2135, dated 10 May, 1943.
- (2) For the execution of the assignment under (a) above, both surface forces and U-boats may be used. According to our opinion it is beyond doubt that there will be increased traffic along this route so that it should provide worthwhile targets for attack. The successful operation of the "Lützow" will be far more difficult this year, as the enemy will be prepared for a repetition of operation "Wunderland", and will arrange air reconnaissance of the entire area correspondingly. Surprise will probably be ruled out. The main weight of the attack will therefore fall on the U-boats, in accordance with the proposal submitted in Captain U-boats S.O.s only 21, dated 4 June. The presence of four or even three U-boats in the operational area during a period of six weeks will make possible the patrol and reconnaissance of the entire area within which we could suitably launch our attacks. On the basis of the reports of the U-boats as well as on information from Japan, which it is hoped will

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arrive on time, regarding east to west convoys, it will then be possible to operate the "Lützow" or even a strong operational group against such shipping. Such an operation can be very successful, especially as U-boat attacks will tend to drive the ships into the bays where they can then be destroyed by the "Lützow"'s guns.

Whether the surface forces to be engaged in the operation should be disposed in a waiting position somewhere off Franz Josef Land, or whether, if the "Lützow" is used a rendezvous position in that area would be suitable, must be decided at the time. It will have to be remembered that a prolonged stay even in this area cannot be concealed from the enemy's air reconnaissance. But as soon as the enemy will have detected the surface forces he will hold back any convoys until he has had time to take counter-measures. In such a case the U-boats too would lose their prospects of success. Moreover, there is also a possibility that a superior battle group advancing from the west will cut off our forces.

- (3) The tasks under (1) (b) and (c) shall be carried out by U-boats which will also have to patrol the straits of Spitsbergen and Bear Island.

Requirements will be as follows:

- (a) For the North Siberian Sea route and for ice patrol around the northern point of Novaya Zemlya: four boats.
- (b) Patrol of Spitsbergen and Bear Island straits at least four boats. This number is in fact not large enough to guarantee the interception of passing convoys.
- (c) Minelaying tasks: two boats.
- (d) For meteorological radio stations: two boats.

Consequently, for the execution of all these tasks twelve U-boats would be needed. This means that apart from the two boats which have been requested in S.O.s Only 332, dated 28 May, four more boats would have to be assigned to Captain U-boats in order to maintain a continuous occupation of the Bear Island passage by four U-boats and to ensure successful attacks on PQ-convoys. There will always be at least four boats in the repair docks.

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If the request for further boats cannot be granted, we shall have to concentrate our forces. In our opinion the greatest success is likely by assigning four boats for operations along the North Siberian Sea route. Apart from that, it is essential that four boats should remain for patrolling the Spitsbergen and Bear Island passages. The execution of further tasks is not possible. In the extreme case it might just be possible that the tasks involved in the setting up of the meteorological radio stations might be carried out by the patrol boats, but this entails that at times only three boats would be left in position along the PQ-convoy route. Finally, it must not be forgotten that after the return of the boats from the Siberian Sea in the middle of September, all Captain U-boats' boats will be in a state of exhaustion, mechanically as well as in respect of their personnel, so that a successful attack on a PQ-convoy running at that time will be out of the question.

- (4) Air reconnaissance of the Kara Sea by BV 138's would only be possible to a depth of 1,450 km., and is thus subject to severe restrictions. It would therefore be of great value if two BV 138's could operate in conjunction with surface vessels as suggested by F.O. Cruisers. A request for one aircraft and a suitable crew for the purpose of fuelling exercises, etc., has been submitted to Luftflotte 5 in S.O.s only 339, dated 2 June, the aircraft to be available by the beginning of July.
- (5) In case supplies to Russia through Northern Waters, either in convoys or by means of single ships which, if the ice limit recedes sufficiently, could proceed north of Spitsbergen, recommence before the start of operations as under (2) above, the concentration of all forces on the destruction of these supplies is considered essential.

Additional note for F.O. Cruisers: Not all the previous communications are known to F.O. Cruisers, but the present memorandum will be sent to him as it surveys the whole of our case as submitted to Admiral Northern Waters."

In connection with the considerations regarding the plans for the Kara Sea operation Group North/Fleet makes known the following intentions in Secret S.O.s only 558 A1:

"To: Naval War Staff,
for information Admiral Northern Waters,
for information Captain U-boats, Norway.

Secret S.O.s only, by hand of officer only.

As the ice of the Barents Sea and the Kara Sea breaks up, it is intended to make full use of all opportunities to employ U-boats, both for minelaying and for torpedo attacks. It is expected that substantial losses may be inflicted on enemy shipping in the following ways:

- (a) Through widespread minelaying operations:
 - (1) along the shipping route south of the island of Kolguev;
 - (2) in the approaches to the Pechora Straits;
 - (3) off the Yugorski Straits (western and eastern entrance);
 - (4) off the Ob and Yenisei rivers.
- (b) Through torpedo attacks:
 - (1) against supply traffic to Novaya Zemlya and single ships in the Barents Sea;
 - (2) against East-Asiatic traffic in the Kara Sea.

Detailed plans to follow.

These plans can only be carried out if the number of Northern Waters U-boats is reinforced. Naval War Staff has therefore been requested to allocate to Captain U-boats three boats by the end of June and six further boats by the middle of July; at least six of these boats should be equipped with minelaying gear.

The U-boats in the Kara Sea will, at the same time, be used for reconnaissance in connection with the possible repetition of operation "Wunderland".

A speedy decision is requested."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

5 June

I. U-boat positions and

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 212 6328, U 639 6347 lower center.
U 711 6622 lower edge center.
All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 sea area north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 255, 269, 334, 629 Bergen.
U 251, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 625 Narvik.
U 302, 586, 601 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1100 U 586 put out from Hammerfest for the
operational area.
2000 U 334 put out from Bergen for the Atlantic.
2300 U 622 put in to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear
Island - Hornsund - 75 degrees N. 0 degrees -
Banak, by 1 He 111. Not exhaustive, nothing
to report.

Reconnaissance of shipping off the Fisher
Peninsula - Kola inlet - by 2 FW 190 and 11
BF 109 in 4 waves.

Photographic reconnaissance of Motka Bay
(a continuation of Motovski Bay).

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance west of Denmark Straits by
2 FW 200.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
(b) By air reconnaissance:

In an attack on shipping off the Fisher
Peninsula and Kola Bay, 2 merchant ships
(4,000 and 2,000 G.R.T.) were sunk.

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Disposition of shipping in Motka Bay:
1 merchant ship 3,500 G.R.T. (on the beach),
1 tanker 1,000 G.R.T., 3 M.T.B.s, several
small craft.

Two merchant ships of 3-4,000 G.R.T. each in
AE 1793 and 1768 respectively, course 100
degrees.

One merchant ship of 3-4,000 G.R.T., course 210
degrees in AE 1773.

- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service:

Few radio messages to Russian submarines
off the Norwegian polar coast; "S 102" and
"M 106" were mentioned by name.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Four boats in formation north and south of
Bear Island.

2037 U 639 (Wichmann) received orders in radio
message 2037/770 to return to Narvik-Andfjord
on 6 June at 1200.

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

6 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 212, 6328. U 639 6347 lower center.
U 711 6622 lower edge center.
All AB, depth of sweep, 30 miles.
U 354 sea area north-east of Bear Island.

In port:

U 225, 269, 629 Bergen.
U 251, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 625 Narvik.
U 302, 601, 622 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 586 proceeding from Hammerfest to the operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - 75 degrees N. 0 degrees - Banak by 1 Ju 88. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Shipping reconnaissance: Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet and Motka Bay by 6 BF 109 and 4 FW 190.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance over the Denmark Straits by 4 FW 200 in 2 waves and 1 BV 138.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Shipping: Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet, consisting of 6-7 small coastal freighters. AE 1726, 12 merchant ships of 1-2,000 G.R.T. each, course 120 degrees, speed 7-8 knots.

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In the Denmark Straits: one patrol ship, one corvette and 2 merchant ships of 2-3,000 G.R.T. each, course 270 degrees, one merchant ship 3,500 G.R.T., course 90 degrees.

- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service: None.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Four boats in formation north-east and south of Bear Island.

0858 U 354 (Herbschleb) reported in radio message 0858/774: "Through passage impossible."

2151 U 354 (Herbschleb) reported his position in AB 3998.

Owing to the southward shifting of the ice, it can now be assumed definitely that the passage to the north of Bear Island is closed.

I intend therefore, to let U 354 (Herbschleb) reconnoiter the ice limit west of Bear Island as far as the South Cape of Spitsbergen, as the Luftwaffe did not succeed in making an exhaustive reconnaissance of this area during the last few days.

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The convoy reported by the Luftwaffe north-west of Iceland, in the Denmark Straits, is probably a fairly large convoy heading for the ports in the north or east of the island.

The comparatively low tonnage of the ships (1-2,000 G.R.T.) excludes the possibility of this being an east-going convoy bound for Russian ports.

(Signed) Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 212 6328. U 586 6347 lower center.
U 711 6622, lower edge center.
All AB, depth of sweep, 30 miles.
U 354 approximately AB 3990.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629 Bergen.
U 251, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 625 Narvik.
U 302, 601, 622 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 639 proceeding from the operational area to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak Island - South Cape 75 degrees N. 5 degrees W. - Banak by 1 He 111. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Reconnaissance of shipping Fisher peninsula - Kola inlet by 4 FW 190. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by 2 FW 200. Broken off prematurely owing to engine trouble, nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
(b) By air reconnaissance: None.

The vessel reported to have put into Iokanka from Belushya (see war diary of 4 June, para. III.) was patrol ship No. 19, which has apparently been wintering in Belushya.

In spite of this report, it is still doubtful whether Belushya is already sufficiently free from ice for shipping. So far no movements of freighters to and from this port have been reported, so that an incorrect position report is possible (see air reconnaissance of.....).

(c). By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Four boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

1042 The following order was transmitted to "U 354" (Herbschleb) in radio message 1042/704: "Establish the position of the ice limit west of Bear Island as far as South Cape, Spitsbergen. Report by short signal if passage is possible, otherwise report result only on request."

2020 Radio message 2011/724 received from "U 354" (Herbschleb): "Passage impeded by drift-ice fields, it is however possible for ships and boats."

With the advance of the season the ice in the region north of Bear Island has broken up to such an extent that we can no longer count on this passage being completely barred. It consists of more or less dense drift-ice fields which alter their position according to the direction and strength of the wind. For these reasons, it is necessary to have one boat to keep watch over the ice conditions north of Bear Island.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

8 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 212 6328. U 586 6347 lower center.
U 711 6622 lower edge center.
All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354, sea area north northwest of
Bear Island.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629 Bergen.
U 251, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 625 Narvik.
U 302, 601, 622 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1600 U 639 put in to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear
Island - 75 degrees N. - degrees - Banak by 1
Ju 88.

Reconnaissance of shipping Fisher Peninsula -
Kola inlet by 7 FW 190. Nothing to report.

Photographic reconnaissance: Archangel,
Pummanki, Subovska and Fisher Peninsula.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance west of Denmark Straits by
1 FW 200. Nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
(b) By air reconnaissance: None.
(c) By naval forces: None.

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(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarine "Schtsch 403" off the Norwegian polar coast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Three boats in formation south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

"U 354" (Herbschleb) on ice reconnaissance Bear Island - South Cape, Spitsbergen.

(d) Miscellaneous:

The following sailing orders were sent to U 302 (Sickel) in Captain U-boats, Norway Secret 1697 A1:

- "(1) Put out from Hammerfest on the morning of 9 June.
- (2) Proceed via AB 5550 and occupy the eastern half of AB 38 at 0000 on 11 June.
- (3) Our boats (Group "Monsum"):
U 212 6328,
U 586 6347 lower center,
U 711 6622 lower edge center.
All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 354 north of Bear Island.
- (4) U-boats Northern Waters Radio Service."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

CONFIDENTIAL

9 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 212 6328.
U 586 6347 lower center.
U 711 6622 lower edge center.
All AB, depth of sweep, 30 miles.
U 354 sea area north-north-west of Bear
Island.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629 Bergen.
U 251, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 625, 639 Narvik.
U 302, 601, 622 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1100 U 302 put out from Hammerfest for the
operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear
Island - South Cape - 75 degrees N. 0 degrees -
Banak by 1 He 111. Not exhaustive, nothing
to report.

Reconnaissance of shipping Fisher Peninsula -
Kola inlet by 4 FW 190.

Reconnaissance over inshore waters as far
as West Fairway (Gorlo Straits) by 1 Ju 88.
Nothing to report.

Photographic reconnaissance: Iokanka port,
Molotovsk, Kola Bay to Murmansk, Vaenga.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance over the Denmark Straits by
1 FW 200 equipped with radar.

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III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
(b) By air reconnaissance:

- (1) 3,000 G.R.T. steamer in the Kovdosero Sea (Kandalakskaya Bay) set on fire by aircraft gunfire.
- 1050 (2) Three destroyers in AE 3526, speed 10 knots, course 60 degrees.

- (c) By naval forces: None.
(d) By radio intercept service:

Few messages to submarines off the Norwegian polar coast; "Schtsch 403" mentioned by name.

- (e) By G.I.S. stations:

- (1) Out-station in Finland reports:
Agent reports:
At the present time about 40 freighters are lying loaded in Belfast and Glasgow, which are to form a convoy to Murmansk. The convoy will sail about 6-7 June. This report is probably reliable.
- (2) A reliable agent from G.I.S. sub-station, Hamburg reports as follows from Stockholm on 20 May: 8 Russian submarines have moved from Archangel to Murmansk.
Note from G.I.S. sub-station Hamburg:
Date has been asked for, presumably the middle of May.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Three boats in formation south of Bear Island.

- (c) Special operations by single boats:

"U 354" (Herbschleb) on ice reconnaissance between Bear Island and South Cape of Spitsbergen.

- (d) Miscellaneous:

Boats in the U-boat base at Hammerfest received orders in Captain U-boats, Norway Secret 1722 Al, to be at 3 hours' readiness.

"U 625" (Benker) received the following sailing orders in Captain U-boats, Norway Secret 1723:

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- "(1) Put out from Narvik on 10 June.
- (2) Proceed via Tjeldsund and Finnsnesrennen to Tromsø with district pilot from Lødingen. Revictual quickly in Harstad.
- (3) On putting into Tromsø, commander to report to Al Admiral Polar Coast. Proceed from Tromsø to Hammerfest in convoy in accordance with the instructions of Admiral Polar Coast.
- (4) Berth at Hammerfest alongside "Black Watch". Readiness will be ordered currently. Make certain that while berthing at Hammerfest, all series numbers "U-boats Northern Waters Radio Service" are sent to the U-boat via the naval communications officer.
- (5) While moving use "U-boats Northern Waters Radio Service"."

The following teleprinter message was received in Group North/Fleet S.O.s only 580/43 Al on the proposals made (see war diary 28 May 1943) by Captain U-boats with regard to operational opportunities in the Kara Sea.

"Secret S.O.s only, by hand of officers only:

- (1) The favorable view taken of the possibilities of operating U-boats in the West Siberian Sea is fully endorsed. The U-boat disposition suggested in 3 (a) to (b) corresponds with our own plans. See, in this connection, Group North/Fleet Secret S.O.s only 571/43 Al, dated 10 June.
- (2) These plans can, however, only be carried out if Group North/Fleet's request for increasing the numbers of U-boats is granted. Any substantial weakening of Northern Waters U-boats for their main task by giving them additional assignments cannot be supported."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The three enemy destroyers reported under III (b) may be moving to a Russian port. In this case they will be intercepted by the U-boats in the Bear Island passage.

(Signed) Peters.

10 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 212 6328.
U 586 6347 lower center.
U 711 6622 lower edge center.
All AB, depth of sweep, 30 miles.
U 354 sea area north-north-west of Bear Island.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629 Bergen.
U 251, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 639 Narvik.
U 601, 622 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0630 U 625 put out from Narvik for Hammerfest.
U 302 proceeding from Hammerfest to the operational area.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - South Cape - 78 degrees N. 24 degrees E. - Hope Island - Banak by 1 He 111. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Reconnaissance of shipping: Fisher Peninsula and Kola inlet by 6 FW 190. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance over the Denmark Straits by 2 FW 200.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
(b) By air reconnaissance:

A convoy group consisting of 16 merchant ships of 2-3,000 G.R.T. each, and 12 patrol vessels lying stopped in AE 1992.

1 cruiser, 1 patrol boat and 3 merchant ships in AE 2759 proceeding towards the group.

Heavy anti-aircraft fire.

Thirteen armed steam trawlers of up to 800 G.R.T. each in the Denmark Straits.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarine "Schtsch 403" off the Norwegian polar coast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Four boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

1117 The following instructions were sent out to the boats in the operational area in radio message 1117/795:

"From Captain U-boats: According to Luftwaffe report, at 1050 on 9 June, 3 destroyers were in AE 3526 proceeding at 10 knots on a course of 60 degrees. Transfer to the east is presumed."

1159 "U 354" (Herbschleb) received orders in radio message 1159/799 to return to base and to report the position of the ice limit between Bear Island and Spitsbergen after passing 73 degrees N.

The boat may choose between putting into Hammerfest or Narvik in accordance with the amount of repairs it will need.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 354 (Herbschleb) on ice reconnaissance between Bear Island and South Cape, Spitsbergen.

(d) Miscellaneous:

The following comments on the combined use of surface forces and U-boats for operations in the Kara Sea, addressed to Naval War Staff 1st Div., were received in Group North/Fleet Secret S.O.s only 571/43 A1:

"S.O.s only - by hand of officers only:

(I) Admiral Northern Waters expressed the following opinion on Naval War Staff I Ops. 1577/43 A Secret S.O.s

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only dated 1 June: compare Admiral
Northern Waters Secret S.O.s only 346
Al paragraph 2.

(II) Comments by Group North/Fleet:

- (1) (Not included in this war diary, as it concerns operations by surface forces only.)
- (2) Group North/Fleet submits the following proposals, which were reached after careful consideration of F.O. Cruisers' opinions:
 - (a) Early dispatch of at least 3-4 U-boats, one of them with a radio intercept team on board, together with 2 BV 138, to the West Siberian Sea. Task: attack on enemy shipping and at the same time reconnaissance of the operational area, including ice patrol, to obtain information as to whether there are any suitable operational opportunities for the operational group of surface forces or any part of it.
 - (b) If U-boat reconnaissance and other information seem to indicate that surface operations will meet with success, a section of the operational group should then be dispatched and carry out any tasks which may present themselves. The disposition of the main body of the operational group must be decided in accordance with the situation as it will be after the enemy has sighted the group.
 - (c) If the U-boat reconnaissance indicates that use of the operational group is not likely to be successful, or that the operations can be carried out by U-boats alone, use of the operational group should be dispensed with and U-boat warfare intensified instead.
 - (d) A final decision can only be made after the results of the U-boats' operations and other reconnaissance are known. Meanwhile plans and practical preparations for a group of surface vessels should be got under way, so that it can operate at short notice.

(III) The preparatory measures requested in Group North Secret 563/43 Al S.O.s only under (1) and (2) are a matter of urgency. The Naval War Staff is requested to confirm that the preliminaries are being attended to.

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(IV) AS soon as the Naval War Staff has given its final decision, operational directions will be submitted."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The shipping concentrations off the north coast of Iceland (16 steamers, 13 steam trawlers) which were twice reported by the G.A.F. are probably the same ships, that is, large-scale escorted coastal traffic.

(Signed) Peters.

11 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 212 6328.
U 586 6347 lower center.
U 711 6622 lower edge center.
All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 302 AB38, eastern half.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629 Bergen.
U 251, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 639 Narvik.
U 601, 622, 625 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 354 proceeding from the operational area to Narvik.
0800 U 625 put in to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - South Cape - Southeastland - Hope Island - Banak by 1 Ju 88.
Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Meteorological and ice reconnaissance of Novaya Zemlya by 1 He 111. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

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Reconnaissance of Pechora Bay, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Reconnaissance of northwesterly sea area by 1 BV 138 with radar. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance Denmark Straits by 2 FW.200.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

1700 Radio message 1409/747 received from "U 302" (Sickel):
"One destroyer in AB 3959, course 270 degrees, high speed. Am searching the sea area."

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Shipping concentration off the north coast of Iceland as yesterday (intercepted by radar).

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarines "S 102", "Schtsch 403", "M 106" off the Norwegian polar coast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

1103 Four boats in formation north and south of Bear Island. "U 302" (Sickel) received orders in radio message 1103/741 to patrol the passage north-east of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

0936 "U354" (Herbschleb) reported the following course of the ice limit in radio message 0936/736: AC 1746, AB 3937, 3686, 3648, 3298.

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- V. Reports of successes: None.
- VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

12 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 212 6328.
U 586 6347 lower center.
U 711 6622 lower edge center.
All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 302 sea area north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629 Bergen.
U 251, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 639 Narvik.
U 601, 622, 625 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1700 U 354 put in to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75 degrees N. 5 degrees E. - Banak by 1 Ju 88. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Sea reconnaissance AB 6655 to 6555 via AB 3366 and 2365 as far as the ice limit and 78 degrees N. by 3 BV 138. Almost exhaustive.

Reconnaissance of shipping, Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet by 2 FW 190 and 2 Me 109.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Sea reconnaissance between 69 degrees and 71 degrees N. by 1 BV 138 with radar. No visual reconnaissance, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance Denmark Straits between the North coast of Iceland and 69 degrees N. by 1 FW 200.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

1416 U 711 (Lange) reported British carrier-borne aircraft in radio message 1408/764.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

In attacks on shipping in Motovski Bay, two merchant ships of 4,000 and 2,000 G.R.T. respectively, were damaged. Two men were sighted on Bear Island at the radio station at Tunheim.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Little radio traffic to Russian U-boats off the north Norwegian coast "K 1" was mentioned by name.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Four boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

The following sailing orders were sent out in Captain U-boats, Norway Secret 1763 A1 to:

"U 251 (Timm):

(1) Put out from Trondheim on 13 June.

(2) Proceed to Harmerfest at a distance of 50 miles from the coast. Join convoy at point SR 1.

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- (3) Radio service "Anton" until confirmation of passing 67 degrees N. has been received, then use U-boats Northern Waters Radio Service. After putting out, set watch on U-boats Northern Waters very long wave.
- (4) While proceeding to Hammerfest, carry out trials on U-boat short wave D/F ranges and very short wave radio telephony ranges which obtain between U-boats and aircraft. A plane for this purpose will be supplied by Flieger Fuehrer North (West). Instructions via communications officers of the 13th U-boat Flotilla and Flieger Fuehrer North (West)."

"U 354 (Herbschleb):

- (1) Put out from Narvik through Westfjord on the morning of 13 June.
- (2) Proceed to Trondheim via point "GR 2" at a distance of 50 miles from the coast.
- (3) Radio service "Anton"."

The following teleprinter message was received in Naval War Staff 1st Div. Ops.-
1698 Secret S.O.s only:

"Secret S.O.s only, by hand of officer only:

- (1) Three U-boats for operations in the Kara Sea are being allocated to Captain U-boats, Norway. Date depends on how soon the sea area off Novaya Zemlya will be clear of ice. The tasks of the boats will be:
 - (a) Attacks on enemy shipping.
 - (b) Reconnaissance of sea areas in connection with operation of the "Lützow".
 - (c) Possibly landing a sabotage unit.
Further details on this point to follow. Report operational plans, and request boats in good time.
- (2) Prepare the "Lützow" for operation. The final decision will be made as soon as detailed information makes it possible to assess the conditions for the operation.

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It is not intended to allocate destroyers because:

- (a) destroyers will restrict the freedom of movement of the "Lützow" because of their relative inability to resist ice, and
 - (b) the "Lützow" is intended to remain in the operational area for a long period and this would be impossible together with destroyers owing to the latter's small radius of action.
- (3) Battleships to assist the "Lützow" only in case of emergency. Owing to the fuel situation, they will probably merely be kept in readiness in Altafjord.
- (4) The getting under way of preliminaries in accordance with Group North/Fleet 563 is hereby confirmed. Details to follow."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

13 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 212 6328.
U 586 6347 lower center.
U 711 6622 lower edge center
All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 302 sea area north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629 Bergen.
U 251, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 354, 639 Narvik.
U 601, 622, 625 Hammerfest.

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(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1200 U 354 put out from Narvik for Trondheim.
2000 U 251 put out from Trondheim for Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance and shipping reconnaissance:

(a) Banak - Hope Island - 78 degrees N. 24 degrees E. - South Cape - Ice Fjord - 75 degrees N. 0 degrees - Banak by 1 He 111. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

(b) Banak - Matochkin Straits - Kara Sea - west of Novaya Zemlya as far as 77 degrees 30 minutes N. 55 degrees E. - Banak by 1 He 111. Almost exhaustive, nothing to report.

Sea reconnaissance: Banak - 73 degrees 30 minutes N. 24 degrees 30 minutes E. - 74 degrees 50 minutes N. 22 degrees 10 minutes E. - 75 degrees N. 10 degrees 30 minutes E. - 73 degrees N. 13 degrees 30 minutes E. by 2 Ju 88 with radar. Nothing to report.

Vardø - 74 degrees N. 26 degrees E. - 76 degrees N. 26 degrees E. - 75 degrees 30 minutes N. 43 degrees E. - 74 degrees 20 minutes N. 44 degrees 20 minutes E. - 71 degrees 20 minutes N. 49 degrees 40 minutes E. by 3 Ju 88 and then by 3 He 115. Nothing to report.

Reconnaissance of shipping Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet by 2 FW 190.

Reconnaissance of inshore waters by 3 Ju 88 and 3 He 115. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance Denmark Straits by 1 FW 200. Nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

1730 "U 711" (Lange) reported in radio message 1708/777:

"Enemy destroyer proceeding in a westerly direction at high speed; my position is AB 6385."

2330 "U 711" (Lange) in reply to query reported in radio message 2146/782:

"Probably Hunt class."

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(b) By air reconnaissance:

500 G.R.T. coastal freighter sunk in Ura Bay.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Very little radio traffic to Russian submarines off the Norwegian polar coast, "K 1" was mentioned by name.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Four boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special tasks by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

"U 639" (Wichmann) received the following sailing orders in Captain U-boats, Norway
Secret 1721:

(1) Put out from Narvik on 14 June via Westfjord.

(2) Proceed to Trondheim via point "HA 1" at a distance of 50 miles from the coast.

(3) Radio service "Anton".

The following instructions were received in Naval War Staff I Ops. 1699 Secret S.O.s only:

"S.O.s only, by hand of officers only.

Subject : Wunderland II (Translator's note: Wunderland = operations of the "Scheer" against Russian shipping in White Sea during summer 1942.)

Reference: Group North/Fleet 563 S.O.s only,
Naval War Staff, 1st Div. I Ops.
1698 S.O.s only.

(1) Request to Naval War Staff for radio intercept team for the U-boat to be submitted at least 2 weeks before sailing. It will be necessary to equip the U-boat with four long wave receivers.

(2) The preparation of charts in accordance with F.O. Cruisers 144 will be completed by the end of June.

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- (3) Collate the latest information with the experiences of "Wunderland I".
- (4) The application for 2 BV 138 is running.
- (5) Radio intercept service information on ice and shipping traffic on the North Siberian Sea route cannot be counted on, even from Northern Norway.
- (6) Information on the sailing dates of convoys from Japan has been requested. Very little is expected, owing to the deterioration of the situation in the Aleutians.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

There appears to be a connection between the report on 9 June of 3 destroyers, and the two sighted on 11 and 13 June north and south of Bear Island. It is also possible that the carrier aircraft sighted there by "U 711" (Lange) on 12 June was working with them. The observation by the Luftwaffe of 2 men at the radio station on Bear Island on 12 June points to an operation on Bear Island, possibly the installation of a weather transmitter. Flieger Fuehrer North (East) has consented to attack this station (near Tunheim). In case of necessity, a U-boat with an army assault detachment will be kept in readiness.

(Signed) Peters.

14 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 212 6328.
U 586 6347 lower center.
U 711 6622 lower edge center. All AB,
depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 302 sea area north of Bear Island.

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In port:

U 255, 269, 629 Bergen.
U 251, 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 639 Narvik.
U 601, 622, 625 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1030 U 639 put out from Narvik for Trondheim.
U 622 put out from Hammerfest for the operational area.
U 354 proceeding from Narvik to Trondheim.
U 251 proceeding from Trondheim to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75 degrees N. 0 degrees - Banak by 1 Ju 88. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Meteorological and ice reconnaissance: Banak - Yugorski Straits (eastern exit) - Banak by 1 He 111. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Sea reconnaissance of AC 7442 - 7265 - AB 2686 - 3555 by 2 Ju 88 with radar. Nothing to report.

Shipping reconnaissance Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet by 5 FW 190.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by 2 FW 200 in 2 waves. One wave with radar. Nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Three small coastal freighters and one patrol vessel proceeding from Motovski Bay toward the Barents Sea.

(c) By naval forces: None.

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(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarines including "S 102" off the Norwegian polar coast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Four boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

U 251 (Timm) making U-boat short wave D/F range tests and very short wave R/T tests with 1 FW 200 (Flieger Fuehrer North (West)).

(d) Miscellaneous:

U 622 (Queck) received the following sailing orders in Captain U-boats, Norway Secret I771 A1:

- (1) Put out from Hammerfest forenoon of 14 June.
- (2) Occupy attack area AB 6622 lower edge center, depth of sweep 30 miles, at 0800 on 15 June.
- (3) Our boats (Group "Monsun"):
U 212 6328,
U 586 6347 lower center,
U 711 6622 lower edge center.
All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 302 north of Bear Island.
- (4) U-boats Northern Waters Radio Service.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

VII. U-boat reports:

Short reports:

- (1) U 639 (Wichmann):
Sailed from Hammerfest on 12 May, put into Narvik on 8 June. From 13 May to 6 June, occupied attack area AB 6347 lower center, depth of sweep 30 miles. Sighted 14 drifting mines, type not identified, partly corroded and overgrown. Six of them sunk by gunfire. Enemy not sighted.

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(2) U 354 (Herbschleb):

Sailed from Hammerfest on 9 May, put into Narvik on 12 June. From 10 May, ice reconnaissance and patrol of passage north of Bear Island.

On 14 May at 1530, sighted two patches of smoke over the northwest coast of Bear Island. Sighted only our own aircraft.

(Signed) Peters.

15 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

Positions at 0800:

(a) In operational area:

U 212 6328.
U 586 6347 lower center.
U 622 6622 lower edge center.
All AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 302 sea area north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629 Bergen.
U 355, 703 Trondheim.
U 601, 625 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1030 U 354 put into Trondheim.
1840 U 639 put into Trondheim.
U 711 proceeding from operational area to Hammerfest.
U 251 proceeding from Trondheim to Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Fliieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological and ice reconnaissance: Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - Great Fjord - along the coast as far as 81 degrees N. 20 degrees E. - Hinlopen Straits - Southeastland - Hope Island - Banak by 1 He 111. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Shipping reconnaissance Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet by 10 FW 190 in 5 waves.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance Denmark Straits by 1 FW 200 with radar, in 2 waves, nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

- (a) By U-boats: None.
- (b) By air reconnaissance: None.
- (c) By naval forces: None.
- (d) By radio intercept service: None.
- (e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

- (a) Convoy operations: None.
- (b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Four boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

1047 The following instructions were transmitted to the boats in the operational area in radio message 1047/798:

"Timm is armed with 6 F.A.T. torpedoes, type II (G 7E-F.A.T.). Standing war orders No. 306 are in force for the operation of F.A.T., type II. As these orders are not yet generally available, an extract is given below:

- (1) As G 7E only has a short run and the F.A.T. only covers a small area, there is no need for an F.A.T. warning, but the normal procedure for firing may be used.
- (2) Boats in front of a convoy are to take up submerged positions approximately 2,000 meters ahead of the convoy for making an attack."

- (c) Special operations by single boats: None.
- (d) Miscellaneous:

The following radio message was sent out in Captain U-boats, Norway Secret S.O.s only 28 to Group North/Fleet, for the attention of Naval War Staff, 1st Div., and Naval War Staff 2nd Div., C-in-C U-boats, Ops.:

CONFIDENTIAL

"Secret S.O.s only, by hand of officers only:
From Naval War Staff 1 Ops. 1698 and 1699
Secret S.O.s only:

- (1) U 601 (Grau) scheduled for minelaying operation Dikson. Boat is also available for ice reconnaissance and for supplying BV 138. Three boats for offensive operations and one with a radio intercept team on board (Northern Waters boats - numbers of boats will be reported at the beginning of July) are to attack shipping in the Kara Sea from positions as given in Captain U-boats, Norway Secret 21 S.O.s only, dated 4 June, and at the same time are to carry out reconnaissance for the "Lutzow".
- (2) It is requested that the three boats just allocated, if possible from the 11th U-boat Flotilla, shall be clear for operations in Narvik by 15 July (intended for operations against Northern Waters convoys).
- (3) The radio intercept team must embark on U 703 (Bielfeld) in Trondheim by 14 July. One man should arrive about 10 days earlier to make sure that the 4 receivers are properly installed. The radio intercept team is expected to consist of seven men.
- (4) Request that six copies each of the necessary charts are sent to Captain U-boats at Narvik by 10 July.
- (5) The supply of the BV 138 by a U-boat is considered feasible provided that the U-boat is stationed within the range of the aircraft reckoned from the catapult ship (Tromsø - or Kirkenes). Approximately grid square AT 26 or 28, which are protected by the coast line, are suggested as refuelling positions, where the flying boat will have to land on its outward and homeward flight when on reconnaissance of Wilkitzki Straits. It appears that for technical reasons it will be necessary for the aircraft to return to the G.A.F. station after each complete operation.
- (6) Admiral Northern Waters approves of the above proposals."

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The following comments were sent to Group North/Fleet in Captain U-boats, Norway Secret S.O.s only 29:

"Secret S.O.s only, by hand of officer only:


Subject: Minelaying operations by U-boats.

As, according to Naval War Staff I Ops. 1698 Secret S.O.s only, dated 12 June, only three further boats have been allocated to us, it will only be possible to carry out the following tasks out of those proposed in Admiral Northern Waters Secret S.O.s only 332, dated 28 May: Paragraph 1: Belushya Bay and assignments that fall within the framework of the intended Kara Sea operation. Paragraph III: Port Dikson. Admiral Northern Waters has been informed and has given his approval.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.



CONFIDENTIAL.

WAR DIARY
OF
CAPTAIN U-BOATS NORWAY.
CAPTAIN PETERS.

16 - 30 June, 1943.

PG/31837



CONFIDENTIAL.

16 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In operational area:

U 212 6328,) all AB, depth
U 586 6347 lower center,) of sweep 30
U 622 6622 lower edge center,) miles.
U 302 sea area north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629 Bergen.
U 354, 355, 639, 703 Trondheim.
U 601, 625 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0710 U 711 put into Hammerfest.
U 251 proceeding to Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Metcorological reconnaissance: Banak - South Cape - 75 degrees N. 5 degrees E - Banak by one Ju 88. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.
Reconnaissance of Belushya Bay, Pechora estuary and Iokanka by one Ju 88.
Photographic reconnaissance of Kola Bay.
Reconnaissance of shipping traffic Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet by 6 FW 190 and two BF 109, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuchrer Lofoten:

No operations.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by one FW 200.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Small freighter traffic - 22 vessels in all - in Ponoï estuary and along Kola coast.
In Kola Bay: two destroyers, seven submarines, one patrol vessel, 12 freighters totalling 41,300 G.R.T. Three tankers totaling 19,500 G.R.T.

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One merchant ship of 2-3000 G.R.T. and 6 armed trawlers in AE 1988, course 330 degrees, moderate speed. Merchant vessel damaged by bombs.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Very little radio traffic with Russian submarines off Norwegian polar coast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Four U-boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous: -

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

17 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In operational area:

U 212 6328,) all AB, depth of
U 586 6347 lower center,) sweep 30 miles.
U 622 6622 lower edge center,)
U 302 sea area north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629 Bergen,
U 354, 355, 639, 703 Trondheim.
U 601, 625 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1330 U 251 put into Trondheim.
0800 U 711 put out from Hammerfest for Narvik.

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II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear Island 75 degrees N. 0 degrees - Banak by one Ju 88. Not exhaustive. Nothing to report.

Reconnaissance of shipping traffic Fisher Peninsular - Kola inlet by two FW 190. Nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by one FW 200 with radar and one BV 138 with radar in two waves, and two FW 200 (evening reconnaissance).

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Bombing attack on enemy radio station on north-east coast of Bear Island (near Tunheim) by seven Ju 88. Installations destroyed, no people observed near the station.

AE 2859 four unarmed trawlers.
AE 6326 one merchant vessel of up to 1000 G.R.T., course 320 degrees.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Agent reported that 11 American submarines of the S-class (800 tons) have arrived in Aberdeen for patrol service North Sea/Norway. This report is considered accurate, as Britain has probably concentrated her submarines in the Mediterranean area. The report of an attack in the Skagerrak may therefore be connected with the American submarines. We must in future expect the appearance of American submarines off the Norwegian coast, especially in the area of Admiral West Coast.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Four boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Renewed engine trouble on U 251 (Timm) makes it necessary to dispatch the boat to a home dockyard for a thorough overhaul. Transfer orders have therefore been sent (by telephone via 13th U-boat Flotilla).

The following teleprinter message to 11th U-boat Flotilla was received in C-in-C U-boats, Ops. FS/01720 A2, for information of Captain U-boats, Norway:

Most Secret:

"Delivery of 3 boats is scheduled for beginning of July for temporary use against Northern Waters convoys.

Immediate information requested as to whether U 269, U 629 and U 355 will be at operational readiness by then."

The following was then sent to Naval War Staff, 2nd Div. C-in-C U-boats, Ops. pp. in Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 1839:

Most Secret:

"Subject: Allocation of U-boats for use in Northern Waters.

Reference: C-in-C U-boats, Ops FS/01720 A2, of 17 June.

(1) The following boats of the 11th U-boat Flotilla will be at operational readiness at the beginning of July:

U 269 (Harlfinger), U 355 (La Baume),
U 629 (Bugs), U 636 (Hildebrandt).

(2) The following will be sent out from home in the immediate future:

U 470 (Grave), U 713 (Gosejacob), U 736 (Reff).
Exact date not known here.

U 420 (Reese) at present ready to put to sea at Kristiansand (South).

(3) The following are proposed for operations in Northern Waters:

U 355 (La Baume) as well as two of the new boats coming from home, (see para. 2). The last two will thus be able to gain experience, as they are scheduled to carry out relatively easy assignments in Northern Waters.

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(4) U 251 (Timm) will again be out of commission for a long period owing to a rent in its flange plate as well as renewed engine trouble. It will be necessary to replace both engines at a home dockyard. Since 1 October 1942, this boat has only been on offensive operations for two months, for the rest of the time it has been in dock. In view of the small number of U-boats and the many special assignments from July to September, the allocation of a replacement for U 251 is urgently requested. U 420 (Reese), at present ready to put to sea in Kristiansand (South) is proposed, or alternatively, a new boat from home scheduled for the 11th U-boat Flotilla."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation: Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

18 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In operational area:

U 212 6328,) all AB, depth
U 586 6347 lower center,) of sweep 30
U 622 6622 lower edge center.) miles.
U 302 sea area north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629 Bergen.
U 251, 354, 355, 639, 703 Trondheim.
U 601, 625 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1730 U 711 put into Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75 degrees N. 5 degrees E - Banak by one Ju 88.

Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Sea reconnaissance: Banak - western entrance to Matochkin Straits - northern tip of Kolguev - Banak by one He 111. Not exhaustive, broken off because of technical trouble at 73 degrees 30' N. 51 degrees E.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by two FW 200.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Five patrol boats, one merchant ship of 1500 G.R.T. off north coast of Iceland.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service: None.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Four U-boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

The following order was sent to U 212 (Vogler) in order to confirm the result of the air bombing of the enemy radio station on the north-east coast of Bear Island (near Tunheim):

1436 Radio message 1436/734:

"(1) Enemy meteorological radio station - probably unoccupied - on north-east coast of Bear Island near Tunheim (Chart D 155) bombed by G.A.F. No men observed.

(2) Confirm results by means of an armed landing party as soon as weather permits, observing due caution, and report. Landing stage at Tunheim seems suitable for a landing.

(3) Reduce absence from operational area to a minimum.

(4) Report leaving attack area and execution of assignment by short signal."

(d) Miscellaneous:

In C-in-C U-boats, Ops. teleprinter message 01818/A2 the request from Captain U-boats regarding the allocation of U-boats for operations in Northern Waters was decided as follows:

Most Secret:

"Reference Most Secret Captain U-boats, Norway 1839 of 17 June:

"U 269" "U 355" and "U 629" are placed at your disposal for the duration of special assignments in Northern Waters.

"U 636" replaces the homeward bound "U 251". Homebased boats putting to sea are scheduled for Atlantic operations and have been briefed accordingly."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

A patrol of the Iceland - Archangel traffic in addition to the Kara Sea operation can only be carried out when the four newly allocated boats arrive.

The present total of 15 boats is not sufficient for carrying out simultaneously the comprehensive mining operation planned as well as the installation of meteorological apparatus, as three to four boats at a time will always be in dock.

VII. U-boat reports:

As a result of questions which arose from the commander of U 354's (Herbschleb's) verbal report, a supplement to the boat's short report has been received:

"Radio station on north-east coast of Bear Island consists of a lattice tower about 30 m. high, under it a fair-sized building. On the west coast of the island, on the southern edge of the plain lying to the north, a radio rod mast about 8 m. high. Near it a little hut, a roof resting on posts and a mattress-like structure."

(Signed) Peters.

19 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In operational area:

U 212 6328,) all AB, depth of
U 586 6347 lower center,) sweep 30 miles.
U 622 6622 lower edge center.)
U 302 sea area north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629 Bergen.
U 251, 354, 355, 639, 703 Trondheim.
U 711 Narvik.
U 601, 625 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

0900 U 251 put out from Trondheim for Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75 degrees N. 30 degrees E - Banak by one Ju 88. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Shipping reconnaissance Kola coast as far as West Fairway by one Ju 88. Not exhaustive.

Reconnaissance of shipping traffic Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet by two FW 189.

Meteorological reconnaissance of Fisher Peninsula by two BF 109.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by one FW 200 with radar. Set broke down.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

AW 2129 to 2137 six coastal vessels, three patrol vessels hove to, probably fishing.

AW 2679 a probable submarine on southerly course. Ponoï estuary five coastal vessels totaling 2,300 G.R.T. and two possible M.T.B s. Drifting wreckage off south coast of Fisher Peninsula.

5 patrol vessels, one merchant ship of 1500 G.R.T. off north coast of Iceland.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 1623 Kolguev North reported that a convoy consisting of 11 ships was sighted at 1500 on a

bearing 316 degrees 20 miles away, course 90 degrees. At 1740 Kolguev North reported convoy out of sight on bearing 315 degrees.

Footnote: Destroyer "Uritski", minesweepers Nos. 59 and 63 are probably with the convoy.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Four U-boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

1445 Since I must expect further appearances of enemy aircraft in the Bear Island sea area and must take account of this fact in operational considerations, I have dispatched radio message (1445/745), as follows:

"Group "Monson" to report at once by short signal enemy aircraft, especially carrier-borne aircraft, definitely recognized, giving time of sighting and course. Remember that carrier-borne aircraft have a flying time of only 4 hours."

1645 In order to close the gap arising south of Bear Island for the duration of U 212's absence from the operational area, U 586 (v.d. Esch) and U 622 (Queck) have been ordered

1645 in radio message 1645/745, to move their attack areas 20 miles to the north.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

1607 U 212 (Vogler) reports in radio message 1607/742 that he has left the operational area for his special assignment.

U 601 (Grau) at the disposal of 6th Destroyer Flotilla for hydrophone and location exercises in Kaafjord.

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The eastbound convoy off Kolguev may be destined for Belushya or Pechora estuary. G.A.F. is to establish convoy's destination by further reconnaissance. According to radio intelligence of 18 June the entrances to the Kara Sea were still firmly iced up, on 21 June 6/10 broken ice was drifting in the direction of the Kara Sea. We may thus expect traffic to the Kara Sea within a short time.

VII. Plans:

Conference on 19 June with A Ops., Flieger Fuehrer North (East) and "Tirpitz"'s aircraft crews in Kirkenes on the subject of co-operation between U-boats and BV 138 flying boats during the operation "Wunderland II". It is planned to supply two aircraft from a U-boat on the north-east coast of Novaya Zemlya and to operate intermittent or constant reconnaissance as far as Wilkitzki Straits.

(Signed) Peters.

20 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In operational area:

U 212 6328,) All AB, depth of
U 586 6347 lower center,) sweep 30 miles.
U 622 6622 lower edge center.)
U 302 sea area north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629 Bergen.
U 354, 355, 639, 703 Trondheim.
U 711 Narvik.
U 601, 625 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

2300 U 251 put into Bergen.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - 75 degrees N. 5 degrees E. - South Cape - Bear Island - Banak by one Ju 88. Not exhaustive.

Reconnaissance: Kirkenes - Kolguev - Belushya - Kara Straits - Kolguev - Kirkenes by one Ju 88. Broken off because of technical trouble, nothing to report.

Reconnaissance of Bear Island and photographic reconnaissance of Tunheim by one BV 138.

Reconnaissance of shipping traffic Kola coast
as far as West Fairway by one Ju 88.
Reconnaissance of shipping traffic Fisher
Peninsula - Kola inlet by four FW 190.
Reconnaissance for "Nussbaum" by one Ju 88.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten: No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by one FW 200
and two BV 138 in two operations.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Hut near landing place Tunheim set on fire
by own U-boat fire. Roughly in the center of
Bear Island are three houses, one of them
in good condition and apparently recently
repaired.

Coastal convoy traffic off Kola coast:
Four freighters of up to 1000 G.R.T., four
patrol vessels, two guardships.

In Motka Bay (south coast of Fisher
Peninsula): one freighter of 400 G.R.T.
probably damaged.

Submarine submerging in AB.9363.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service: Radio transmissions
to submarines off Norwegian polar coast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Four U-boats in formation north and south of
Bear Island.

0210 Teleprinter message Most Secret 02719 A1
(for information) received from Group North Fleet:
Most Secret. Main Naval D/F Station Kirkenes
Most Secret. 1910 of 19 June (see radio intercept
report of previous day):

"Report permits of following interpretation:

(1) Coal traffic approaching Pechora Sea.

(2) QP - convoy possibly assembling in
Belushya Bay, clarification only possible
by G.A.F. reconnaissance.

Luftflotte 5 is therefore requested for

reconnaissance of the coast as far as Pechora estuary, also for inspection of Belushya Bay and sea area south of 72 degrees N. eastwards to 48 degrees E."

0645 After the completion of U 212 (Vogler)'s special assignment
radio message 0645/758 sent:

"Group "Monsun" to occupy old positions."

1736 Radio message 1736/768 sent:

"From Captain U-boats:

Vogler, Esch, Queck to move attack areas one position to the north, in order to have "U 622" (Queck)'s former position occupied again as soon as possible."

(c) Special operations by single boats:

0619 "U212" (Vogler) reported in radio message 0556/756:
"Have carried out assignment."

1120 Following radio message (0705/762) received from U 212 (Vogler):

"Captain U-boats:

Enemy automatic meteorological radio station not found. Two radio stations with written data in Norwegian only were found destroyed. All houses in ruins. Recent traces of the presence of men not observed."

1640 The following Most Immediate teleprinter message was received from Naval Communications Officer Tromsø:

"Nussbaum" reported at 1632:

"Enemy landing near station."

1655 Most Immediate teleprinter message received from Naval Communications Officer Tromsø:

Short signal from "Nussbaum" received 1650:

"Are withdrawing to K.R.A. Request to be taken off by U-boat as quickly as possible. Are in readiness at K.R.A. Am discontinuing transmission."

Following teleprinter message for transmission to "Nussbaum" sent to Naval Communications Officer Tromsø:

"A U-boat will try to take off "Nussbaum". If there is no ice hindrance the boat will be at

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rendezvous 2 late on the afternoon of 21 June. Will show a yellow flag on conning tower as recognition signal."

1718 Order sent to U 302 (Sickel) in radio message 1718/767:

1837 Steer for AG 7430 at maximum continuous speed outside ice limit, and following instructions in radio message 1837/770:

"Own meteorological party on Mitra Cape, Spitsbergen forced into Cross Bay by enemy landing. Is waiting to be taken off at rendezvous 79 degrees 14.5 minutes N. 10 degrees 10 minutes E., dead south of glacier 1, at the foot of the southern lateral moraine. Rubber dinghy with engine probably available there. Show yellow flag on staff as recognition signal. Pick up party, taking all due precautions."

2029 Radio message 2029/772 sent for Sickel's information:

"One Ju 88 is executing ice reconnaissance of west coast of Spitsbergen and Cross Fjord and one BV 138 is carrying out a rescue attempt."

2053 Radio message 2053/773 sent:

"Two FW 200 are flying armed reconnaissance west coast of Spitsbergen to Cross Fjord. Further reconnaissance is in progress west of that point."

2315 Radio message 2315/775 sent to U 302 (Sickel):

"At rendezvous 2, beware of reefs extending up to one mile off the coast."
(Note: from "Knospe"'s report of 18 June, 1942.)

(d) Miscellaneous:

Since the Bear Island area is still only occupied by 3 boats as a result of Sickel's special assignment, the following departure orders were sent to U 625 (Benker) in Captain U-boats, Norway Most Secret 1869 A Ops.:

"(1) Put out from Hammerfest early on 21 June.

(2) Occupy attack area AB 6622 lower edge center, depth of sweep 30 miles, at 0000 on 22 June.

(3) Own boats (Group "Monsoon"):

U 586 6328, U 622 6347 lower center, both AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.

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U 212 north of Bear Island,
U 302 west coast of Spitsbergen.

(4) U-boats Northern Waters Service."

Group North/Fleet sends following survey of situation regarding Northern Waters area in teleprinter message Most Secret 02731:

"Enemy attack on Spitsbergen meteorological station regarded in connection with the now established fact of the sighting of three carrier-borne aircraft as well as two destroyers on 12 June, gives rise to the following considerations:

- (1) The enemy may be erecting a sea and air base at Spitsbergen fjord possibly with the help of an auxiliary aircraft carrier, to protect Russian convoys. Removal of meteorological station would be merely a part of this plan.
- (2) Carrier-borne aircraft and destroyers were not operating to reconnoiter and guard the convoy route, but to erect this base, and the aircraft carrier was probably in the area west of Spitsbergen, which was not covered by our reconnaissance. Owing to lack of forces and fuel, Group North/Fleet's proposed one-time reconnaissance of this area can only be undertaken if definite indications of the enemy's presence are first provided. Lack of knowledge on this point may tempt us to suppositions for which there is at present no evidence, such as Group North's suggestion of the erection of an enemy base.

Group however proposes reconnaissance of the fjords and west coast of Spitsbergen, at the latest after the return of the U-boat sent to take off the meteorological party; the U-boat may perhaps contribute the results of its own reconnaissance in this area."

V. Reports of successes: None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

- (1) It is possible that the enemy has erected a meteorological set on Bear Island somewhere else than at Tunheim. It subsequently appears from U 354 (Herbschleb)'s verbal report that this boat believes it observed a radio station also on the west coast.
- (2) Group North/Fleet's opinions regarding the enemy attack on the Spitsbergen meteorological station corresponds with our views. Sending U 302 (Sickel) on a reconnaissance of the area in question after it has picked up the meteorological party, is now under consideration.

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VII. U-boat reports:

Short report from U 711 (Lange):

"Put out from Hammerfest 25 May, put into Hammerfest 16 June. Occupied AB 6622 lower edge center, depth of sweep 30 miles, as attack area.

13 June in AB 6385 operated unsuccessfully on enemy destroyer (possibly of the Hunt Class) owing to dipping as a result of a failure at the torpedo tubes.

Aircraft sighted:

7 June, flying boat alarm at 1155.

12 June, biplane with fixed undercarriage (British carrier-borne aircraft) alarm at 0510, 0740 and 0843.

13 June, twin-engined land-based aircraft alarm at 0250.

15 June, returned to Hammerfest."

(Signed) Peters.

21 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In operational area:

U 586 6328,

U 622 6347 lower center, both AB, depth of sweep 30 miles.

U 212 sea area north of Bear Island.

U 302 proceeding from Bear Island to west coast of Spitsbergen (Crossfjord).

In port:

U 255, 251, 269, 629 Bergen.

U 354, 355, 639, 703 Trondheim.

U 711 Narvik.

U 601, 625 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1100 U 625 put out from Hammerfest for operational area.

1400 U 251 put out from Bergen for Kiel.

II. Air reconnaissance:

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Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - 75 degrees N 10 degrees E - Banak by one Ju 88. Not exhaustive, nothing to report.

Reconnaissance for "Nussbaum" (west coast of Spitsbergen) by one Ju 88, nothing to report.

Reconnaissance of shipping traffic Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet by four FW 190 in two waves, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Reconnaissance Tromsø - Jan Mayen - Spitsbergen as far as ice limit on 78 degrees 30 minutes N. Only partly covered, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Reconnaissance of Denmark Straits by two FW 200 in two operations and one BV 138. Nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Coastal vessel (100 G.R.T.) sunk 8 km. west north west of Cape Majakka by direct hit from a bomb. Three vessels of 500-1000 G.R.T. and one freighter of 1500 - 2000 G.R.T. off north coast of Iceland.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarine "L 22" off Norwegian polar coast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Three boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

Naval Communications Officer Tromsø reported by teleprinter message:

"No radio communication with "Nussbaum" since 1650 on 20 June. Radio message not yet transmitted."

1711 Following instructions sent to "U 302" (Sickel) in radio message 1711/703:

- "(1) Report arrival at rendezvous 2 by time short signal.
- (2) If meteorological party not contacted, repeat attempt twice daily.
- (3) In the intervals investigate rendezvous 1 at 79 degrees 20.5 minutes N. 10 degrees 57 minutes E. at foot of glacier 3 on edge of southern lateral moraine."

U 601 (Grau) at disposal of "Scharnhorst" for hydrophone and location exercises in Altafjord.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

It is quite possible that the U-boat which has been sent to the rendezvous was held up by ice hindrance, or that the meteorological party has been delayed. In that case the U-boat will have to repeat the attempt. Subsequently it is to examine the abandoned station at Cross Bay once more and then make a reconnaissance of the west coast of Spitsbergen for enemy forces. In particular, a base in Bellsund is suspected.

(Signed) Peters.

22 June, 1945.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In operational area:

U 586 6328,) All AB, depth of
U 622 6347 lower center,) sweep 30 miles.
U 625 6622 lower edge center.)
U 212 sea area north of Bear Island.
U 302 off west coast of Spitsbergen (off Cross-
fjord).

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In port:

U 255, 269, 629 Bergen.
U 354, 355, 639, 703 Trondheim.
U 711 Narvik.
U 601 Hammerfest.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1600 U 251 proceeding from Bergen to Kiel.
U 601 put out from Hammerfest for Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

Meteorological reconnaissance: Banak - Bear Island -
South Cape - Crossfjord - 75 degrees N 5 degrees E -
Banak

One Ju 88 on photographic reconnaissance of air-
fields on Spitsbergen and Barentsberg. Barentsberg and
Ice Fjord not visible. Photographic reconnaissance
Pechora estuary as far as Naryan Mar and Iokanka harbor.
Nothing to report. Eight FW 190 reconnaissance of
shipping traffic Fisher Peninsula as far as Kola
inlet.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Two FW 200 reconnaissance of Denmark Straits.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

One fishing smack sunk by aircraft fire off Kola
inlet. Three fishing vessels hove to in Denmark
Straits at AE 1991.

(c) By naval forces:

None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Submarines "L22", "S 51", "S 101", "M 105" off
Norwegian polar coast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

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IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Four boats in formation north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

0039 "U 302" (Sickel) received the following instructions in radio message 0039/788:

"(1) After taking meteorological party on board, cautious reconnaissance of the abandoned station, as far as charts permit.

(2) Then, if possible, investigate Ice Fjord and Bollsund, where enemy vessels and bases are suspected. Be prepared for counter-measures. Aircraft was shot at on 12 June, off Barentsberg (Ice Fjord)."

Further, in radio message 0059/789:

"Air reconnaissance reported nothing sighted in target area "Nussbaum" at about 1100. In the bay in 7258 bottom left six bomb craters in the ice."

0422 "U 302" (Sickel) reported arrival at rendezvous at 2000.

1314 ordered in radio message 1314/795:

"Report taking meteorological party on board by short signal "Yes" and time."

"U 601" (Grau) in Kaafjord to discuss oiling of BV 138 with the battle group.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

With reference to the following supplement to "U 354" (Herbschleb)'s report: The radio station Herbschleb believes to have seen, should first be searched for by another boat and more closely investigated.

VII. U-boat reports:

Supplement to "U 354" (Herbschleb report of 12 June, 1943. When requested for further particulars about the radio station sighted

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on the west coast of Bear Island the boat reported:

- (1) Teleprinter message U 354 G 714:.....On the west coast of the island on the southern coastal edge of the northern plain, one radio rod mast about 8m. high. Near it a little hut, a roof resting on posts and a mattress shaped structure.
- (2) Teleprinter message Admiral Commanding U-boats Adjutant, of 22 June:..... A rod mast about 10m. high on west coast at 74 degrees 27 minutes, 18 degrees 49.5 minutes. Near it a little hut, a mattress-shaped structure, a roof resting on posts. Assume it to be a radio station. Possible to land at this point.

Lieutenant (s.g.) Herbschleb.

(Signed) Peters.

23 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In operational area:

U 586, AB 6328,) Attack areas
U 622, AB 6347 lower center,) depth of sweep
U 625 AB 6622 lower edge center.) 30 miles.
U 212 sea area north of Bear Island.
U 302 returning from west coast of Spitsbergen.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629, 636 Bergen.
U 354, 355, 639, 703 Trondheim.
U 711 Narvik.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 251 Kiel.
U 601 Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Fliieger Fuehrer North (East):

One BV 138 reconnaissance of radio station on Bear Island, not visible. One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fjord - 75 degrees N 5 degrees E as far as Banak,

not exhaustive. Eight FW 190 armed reconnaissance Fisher Peninsula as far as Kola inlet. No enemy observation owing to weather conditions. One Ju 88 Motka Bay - Kapikani and Kilen harbor photographic reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

Two BV 138 with radar sea area on either side of Bear Island as far as ice limit and up to South Cape, Spitsbergen.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

One FW 200 morning and evening reconnaissance of Denmark Straits with radar. No enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

One motor minesweeper attacked and badly damaged off Kola inlet. Four coastal vessels course north-east off north coast of Iceland, two escort vessels, one merchant ship of 2000 G.R.T., four merchant ships of 1500 G.R.T. each, course 160 degrees, and six armed trawlers, course 60 degrees. Bombed a submarine in Andenes area (AB 9869).

(c) By naval forces:

None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Submarines "L 22", "S 101", "S 51" and "M 105" off polar coast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Four boats north and south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

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0338 "U 302" (Sickel) reported by short signal that the meteorological party was picked up at 1700 (22 June).

Received following order:

1220 Radio message 1131/709:

"(1) Report execution of Spitsbergen reconnaissance by short signal; anything important, also as regards "Nussbaum", immediately by radio message.

(2) Proceed to report ice limit at 17 degrees, 19 degrees and 21 degrees E by short signal, giving last three grid square numbers."

As a result of the additional report from the commander of "U 354" (Herbschleb), U 586 (Esch) received the following orders:

1415 Radio message 1310/711:

"(1) Investigate radio station believed to be on west coast of Bear Island north of Langbukta, making landing if possible, with all due caution.

(2) "Herbschleb" reported:

Rod mast, small hut, mattress-shaped structure, a roof resting on posts.

(3) Confirm by short signal "Yes" and tenths of minutes of latitude above 74 degrees. Anything important by radio message."

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

24 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In operational area:

U 586 west coast of Bear Island.
U 622 AB 6347 lower center,) Depth of sweep
U 625 AB 6622 lower edge center.) 30 miles.
U 302 returning from ice reconnaissance west and south of Spitsbergen.

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In port:

U 255, 269, 629, 636 Bergen.
U 354, 355, 639, 703 Trondheim.
U 711 Narvik.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1145 U 251 put into Kiel.
1950 U 601 put into Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flioger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75 degrees N 5 degrees E - and Banak, not exhaustive. One Ju 88 sea reconnaissance Kirkenes - Belushya - Kara Straits - Kolguev - Kirkenes, broken off.

Flioger Fuehrer Lofoten:

During night 23/24 reconnaissance of sea area on either side of Bear Island as far as ice limit and south Cape of Spitsbergen; only partly covered.

Flioger Fuehrer North (West):

One FW 200 and one BV 138 reconnaissance Denmark Straits.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

(b) By air reconnaissance:

In AC 1546 oil patch was discovered, pointing in the direction of Hope Island. Off the north coast of Iceland sighted one fishing vessel of 500 G.R.T., 2 freighters, two patrol boats, 7 fishing smacks, fishing. In AF 4543 one submarine submerging, course 30 degrees.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarines "S 51", "S 101", "M 105", "L 15", and "L 22" off Norwegian polar coast.

(e) By G.I.S. stations: None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations: None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

One boat north, three boats south of Bear Island in attack areas.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

No report from "U 302" (Sickel).

0125

"U 586" (Esch) inquired, regarding his assignment, in radio message 0100/721:
"Query: destroy."

Reply in radio message 0210/722:

"Take photographs if possible, then destroy effectively. Beware of land mines and explosives."

Since the description of the station sighted by "Herbschleb" on the west coast of Bear Island suggests that it is a radar installation, "Esch" has been given the following instructions:

2350

Radio message 2336/730:

"In case radar set is found, more detailed information such as distance apart and arrangement of dipoles will be of value. Explosives in the set possible."

(d) Miscellaneous:

0737

Teleprinter message Most Secret 17952/43 received from Naval War Staff 1st Div.:

"The imminence of large-scale enemy operations is indicated by the appearance of a total of six battleships and two aircraft carriers in the Western Mediterranean, reported on the afternoon of 23 June. We must expect the enemy to commence offensive operations simultaneously in other maritime areas. Special alertness is therefore enjoined."

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

As, in the case of an enemy landing, Atlantic boats on their way out will be put into operation in Northern Waters, an application was made that they should be issued as well with Northern Waters cypher material, so that unified transmission of orders will be possible, if the need arises.

(Signed) Peters.

25 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In operational area:

U 586 south-west of Bear Island.) All depth
U 622 AB 6347 lower center,) of sweep
U 625 AB 6622 lower edge center.) 30 miles.
U 212 sea area north of Bear Island.
U 302 returning from ice reconnaissance west and
south of Spitsbergen.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629, 636 Bergen.
U 354, 355, 601, 639, 703 Trondheim.
U 711 Narvik.
U 251 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

None.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Hope Island - Banak, not exhaustive.

Five Ju 88 with radar on sea reconnaissance north of Fisher Peninsula as far as 72 degrees N, exhaustive, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Two FW 200 morning reconnaissance of Denmark Straits, no enemy sighted. One FW 200 with radar and one BV.138 evening reconnaissance of Denmark Straits.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

One merchant vessel of 3-4000 G.R.T. course 100 degrees in Denmark Straits (AE 1871).

(c) By naval forces:

None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Submarines "L 15", "S 51", "M 105" off Norwegian polar coast.

In Belushya area one guardship and two minesweepers. Belushya has announced the flight of 10 aircraft from Naryan Mar to Belushya on 25 June.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

One U-boat north, three south of Bear Island in attack areas. The most southerly of these, U 625 (Benker) reported port engine failure; has been ordered in radio message 1855/749 to remain in position until relieved.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

1250 Radio message 0841/735 from "U 302" (Sickel):

"(1) "Kohler" of the party is wounded and a prisoner, stations occupied.

(2) Gunfire near Barantsberg. Ice Fjord and Bellsund not completely covered. Query: await better weather."

Sickel then received following order:

1348 Radio message 1348/740:

"After carrying out ice reconnaissance as ordered, "Sickel" to put into Hammerfest via SR 1. Then scheduled for further operations."

1000 "U 586" (Esch) who was assigned reconnaissance of west coast of Bear Island, reported in radio message 015/732.

"Nothing resembling Herbschleb's description sighted from Cape Duner to Cape Harr. Possibly misled by enemy height of 33m." (?)

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This would seem to dispose of the enemy radio station.

1344 Radio message 1344/739:

"Esch Bear Island assignment concluded, return to old position."

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Air reconnaissance has shown that the harbor at Belushya is partly ice-free and accessible. The convoy reported on 19 June and the transference of the aircraft indicate renewed extension of the base.

Belushya minelaying operation could now be carried out most effectively; there is however no prospect of the mines being available at Troms until the middle of July.

(Signed) Peters.

26 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In operational area:

U 586 AB 6328,) All depth
U 622 AB 6347 lower center,) of sweep
U 625 AB 6622 lower edge center.) 30 miles .
U 212 sea area north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629, 636 Bergen.
U 354, 355, 601, 639, 703 Trondheim.
U 711 Narvik.
U 251 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 302 to relieve U 625.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75 degrees N, 5 degrees E. to

Banak, not exhaustive. Ten FW 190 and two BV 109 shipping reconnaissance and attack on shipping targets in Motovski Bay.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Two FW 200 reconnaissance of Denmark Straits, nothing to report.

Four BV 138 east of Iceland as far as 10 degrees W.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

In Motovski Bay one coastal freighter of 200 G.R.T. and one motor minesweeper as well as a fishing smack sunk; one coastal freighter 50 tons, two motor minesweepers damaged. A submarine surfaced west of Kristiansand (AF 9819).

In AE 6815 east of Iceland, attack on transport sailing vessel of 300 G.R.T. course 150 degrees.

(c) By naval forces:

None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Submarines "S 150", "L 15", "M 105", "S.55" off Norwegian polar coast. Flight of 7 aircraft MTB II to Belushya was announced.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Reykjavik reports:

At 0800 on 26 June, convoy of 5 ships, one destroyer and 5 patrol vessels put to sea.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

One boat north, and three south of Bear Island in attack areas. "U 625" (Benker) reported at 1305 that his starboard engine too is only partly clear.

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1633 Following radio message 1529/764 was therefore sent:

"(1) "Sickel" to relieve "Benker" at 0000 on 27 June in AB 6622 lower edge center, depth of sweep 30 miles, and to hand over meteorological party and report on special assignment.

(2) "Benker" then to return to Andfjord Narvik.

(3) "Sickel" to report relief by short signal "Yes".

(c) Special operations by single boats:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

The breakdown of yet another boat creates a critical situation as regards future plans.

Request for further allocation has been submitted.

(Signed) Peters.

27 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In operational area:

U 302 AB 6622 lower edge center.
U 586 AB 6328.
U 622 AB 6347 lower center.
U 212 sea area north of Bear Island.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629, 636 Bergen.
U 354, 355, 601, 639, 703 Trondheim.
U 711 Narvik.
U 251 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 625 returning to Narvik.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 5 degrees E. - Banak; not exhaustive.

Four FW 190 in two waves shipping
reconnaissance Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet,
nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Two FW 200 reconnaissance Denmark Straits.
Two BV 138 sea reconnaissance east of Iceland between
64 degrees 30 minutes and 66 degrees 30 minutes N.
no enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

North of Iceland (AE 1942 to 2791) a total of
6 fishing smacks, course 270 - 300 degrees,
unarmed.

(c) By naval forces:

None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Submarines "K 21", "S 51" off Norwegian
polar coast.

Belushya is expecting Russian aircraft on
the afternoon of 27 June.

Commandant Fisher Peninsula Coastal
Defenses has ordered that all officers,
non-commissioned officers and men are to
be instructed in the correct handling of
anti-gas equipment and in decontamination.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

One boat north, 3 boats south of Bear Island.
As the ice limit is receding north-
eastwards,

2314 radio message 2255/776 has been sent:

New attack areas for "Monsun" after 0400

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on 28 June: "Vogler" 3833, "Esch" 3949,
"Queck" 6328, "Sickel" 6371, all AB, depth
of sweep 30 miles.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

0331 U 302 (Sickel) reports by short signal that
he has handed over the meteorological party
"Nussbaum" to "Benker" and has relieved him.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Departure orders for "U 601" (Grau):

- (1) Put to sea via HA 1, forenoon of 28 June.
Radio service "Anton" until confirmation of
passing 67 degrees N. Proceed at a distance
of 50 miles from the coast and via LoppHAVET.
Hammerfest optional.
- (2) Be in Kaafjord at 0800 on 2 July for oiling
exercise.
- (3) Then via inner leads to Narvik.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Nothing special.

(Signed) Peters.

28 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In operational area:

U 212 AB 3833)
U 586 AB 3949)
U 622 AB 6328) all depth of sweep 30 miles.
U 302 AB 6371)

In port:

U 255, 269, 629, 636 Bergen.
U 354, 355, 601, 639, 703 Trondheim.
U 711 Narvik.
U 251 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

1400 U 625 put into Narvik.

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1300 U 601 put out from Trondheim for Hammerfest.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One He 111 and one Ju 88 meteorological and sea reconnaissance Banak - Belushya - Kara Straits - Kolguev - Banak. Kara Straits not covered, west of 50 degrees E. not exhaustively covered, east of there exhaustively covered. One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75 degrees N. 5 degrees E. - Banak; only partly covered. Six FW 190 shipping reconnaissance Fisher Peninsula Kola inlet, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

One BV 138 probing reconnaissance in sea area northeast of Jan Mayen, no enemy sighted.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Two BV 138 sea reconnaissance between 62 degrees 40 minutes N. and 64 degrees 20 minutes N. westward to 1 degree W., nothing to report. Two FW 200 with radar reconnaissance of Denmark Straits, no enemy sighted.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats: None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Four freighters totaling 8,000 G.R.T., two coastal vessels, several fishing smacks, Belushya harbor.

(c) By naval forces: None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Russian submarines "K 21", "S 51" off Norwegian polar coast.
Destroyers "A", "C", "E".
Minesweepers 55, 40, 42 and 62 off Belushya.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

Reykjavik reports that at 0850 on 26 June a convoy of about 15 loaded freighters has arrived.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

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(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Two U-boats north, two south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats: None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

Benker to inquire whether he can be made clear for one minelaying operation before a longer period in dock.

Transfer orders for "U 625" (Benker):

- (1) Put out from Narvik at 2300 on 28 June via Westfjord.
- (2) Proceed via Trondheim, keeping 50 miles from the coast, via approach point HA 1 (Frohavet).
- (3) Radio service "Anton".

V. Reports of successes:

According to short report from Sickel (U 302) motor boat of about 30 tons sunk by gunfire in Lilliehook Fjord on 24 June. Three tents ashore shot up.

VI. U-boat reports:

Short report from "U 625" (Benker) from 21 June to 28 June 1943.

21 June put out from Hammerfest, 28 June put into Narvik.

22 June. Occupied attack area AB 6622, depth of sweep 30 miles at 0000.

23 June. Mine, type Mark XX, badly corroded, sunk by gunfire.

27 June. Took on meteorological party "Nussbaum" from U 302 (Sickel) at 0030.

Returned to Narvik because of engine trouble.

Short report from "U 302" (Sickel) about taking off meteorological party "Nussbaum" from Spitsbergen.

20 June. At 1900 boat received order for assignment while in position north of Bear Island.

21 June. Arrived at rendezvous 2 at 2000. Owing to weather conditions and against a background of gray boulders, the party could not be made out. Moved away to sea.

22 June. Searched coast. Back at rendezvous at midday. Nothing sighted. Endeavored to attract the attention of the party, probably worn out by their exertions, by means of 4 shots with machine gun C 30. This was successful, sighted people ashore, but green star signal hardly visible against background there. Took five men of meteorological party on board in

two trips with the dinghy. During night of 23/24 June put into Cross Bay to reconnoiter meteorological station. Ny-Aalesund investigated first, nothing observed. In Lilliehookfjord in front of the meteorological station, a motor boat of about 30 tons with davits and ship's boat. Several tents on shore. Motor boat sunk by gunfire. Judging by the explosion there must have been a large reserve of petrol on board. Two men in the boat probably killed. Tents then shot up. No direct hits but damage by shrapnel may be assumed.

Nationality of party ashore not made out. Two store sheds in Ny-Aalesund set on fire by shots at about 0300.

25 June. At 0200 attempted to penetrate into Ice Fjord while surfaced. No vessel off Barentsberg, but gunfire encountered, one shot of about 8.8 caliber. Gørfjord investigated except for Finnessham anchorage. Nothing to report. In Bellsund, only Van Muyden Bay investigated, nothing observed because of heavy mist.

27 June. At 0000 handed over meteorological party to "U 625" (Benker) south of Bear Island.

Experience gained:

- (1) For the case that the U-boat is not successful in picking up the party at a first attempt and radio communications are no longer certain, the party should know from earlier arrangements that the U-boat will repeat the attempt at certain definite times, say every 12 hours. This will prevent the party from losing heart in case the U-boat is not sighted or is seen turning back to sea.
- (2) Recognition signals must be laid down in advance (red signals for fog) (large battle ensign on the conning tower of U-boat), light signals.
- (3) Star signals are inadequate, especially green stars, against a background of green moss.
- (4) People ashore between the rocks of a moraine cannot be made out. The group should have instructions to place itself, if possible, before a suitable background.
- (5) It would be an advantage for the U-boat to be painted white for the purpose of going up fjords.
- (6) Incendiary ammunition is necessary for attacking targets on shore.

Captain U-boats Norway Mest Secret - 1996 Al.

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VII. Survey of the situation:

- (1) The seizure of the meteorological station "Nussbaum" seems to have been carried out from Barentsberg, on the basis of good reconnaissance data, as soon as the ice began to break up. Defense or recapture with the aid of the U-boat would have been an unnecessary operation in view of the plans that had been made for this station.
- (2) The development of Belushya seems to be making considerable progress. The execution of the minelaying assignment in the Bay itself has become more and more doubtful, owing to the late delivery of the mines.

(Signed) Peters.

29 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In operational area:

U 212 AB 3833,
U 586 AB 3949,
U 622 AB 6328,
U 302 AB 6371.

All depth of sweep 30 miles.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629, 636 Bergen.
U 354, 355, 639, 703 Trondheim.
U 711 Narvik.
U 251 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 601 proceeding from Trondheim to Hammerfest via Narvik.

0300 U 625 put out from Narvik for Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 38 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - 75 degrees N, 5 degrees E - Banak. Nor near Spitsbergen covered, nothing to report.

Ten FW 190 shipping reconnaissance in five waves
Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Two FW 200 reconnaissance of Denmark Straits,
not exhaustive. Two BV 138 reconnaissance as
far as east coast of Iceland, broken off
prematurely because of weather conditions.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

Off Murmansk (AC 8859) one merchant vessel
of up to 1000 G.R.T., course 120 degrees, AC 8852
one coastal vessel of 500 G.R.T., course
180 degrees.. Near Fisher Peninsula
(AC 8733) one M.T.B., course north-west,
set on fire by two BF 109 and sunk.

Near Vardö (AC 8422) one BV 138 made depth-
charge attack on a submarine. Course 300
degrees.

(c) By naval forces:

None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

Submarines "M 105" and "S 54" (for first
time) off Norwegian polar coast.

Since 17 June increasing Russian radio
traffic - Belushya - Archangel, appearance
of destroyers, guardships and minesweepers
off Belushya, transfer of 17 aircraft to
date leads us to conclude that special
preparations in the Belushya area are under
way.

(e) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Three boats north, one south of Bear Island.

1142 Radio message 1126/718 sent:

"Group "Monsoon" to occupy in old order and with depth of sweep 30 miles: 3647, 3914, 3958, 6328, all AB."

Moving the attack areas northward has become necessary because of the retreat of the ice limit.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

None.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Survey of the situation:

Belushya is obviously being equipped to guard the Barents Sea and the entrances to the Kara Sea and as an assembly point for QP-convoys, in the same way as last year.

(Signed) Peters.

30 June, 1943.

I. U-boat positions and alterations of position:

(a) Positions at 0800:

In operational area:

U 212 AB 3647,
U 586 AB 3914,
U 622 AB 3958,
U 302 AB 6328.

All depth of sweep 30 miles.

In port:

U 255, 269, 629, 636 Bergen.
U 354, 355, 639, 703 Trondheim.
U 711 Narvik.
U 251 Kiel.

(b) U-boats homeward and outward bound:

U 601 proceeding from Trondheim to Hammerfest via Narvik.

U 601 put in at 0900, out at 1700.

1840 U 625 put into Trondheim.

II. Air reconnaissance:

Flieger Fuehrer North (East):

One Ju 88 meteorological reconnaissance Banak - Bear Island -

South Cape - 75 degrees N, 5 degrees E - Banak.

Not exhaustive.

Eight FW 190 shipping reconnaissance Fisher Peninsula - Kola inlet, nothing to report.

Flieger Fuehrer Lofoten:

No sea reconnaissance.

Flieger Fuehrer North (West):

Two FW 200 reconnaissance of Denmark Straits, nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

(a) By U-boats:

None.

(b) By air reconnaissance:

None.

(c) By naval forces:

None.

(d) By radio intercept service:

At 1815 on 29 June one minesweeper from Matchkin Straits via Karmakuli to Belushya.

Two minesweepers, two guardships off Belushya.

On 30 June submarine "S 54" off Norwegian polar coast.

(c) By G.I.S. stations:

None.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

(a) Convoy operations:

None.

(b) Operational measures to intercept enemy traffic:

Three U-boats north, one south of Bear Island.

(c) Special operations by single boats:

None.

(d) Miscellaneous:

C-in-C U-boats Ops. wired in Most Secret
272/43 S.O.s only A 2:

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(1) C-in-C of the Navy has ordered that the 4 boats U 387, U 277, U 307 and U 713 which are at present proceeding into the Atlantic, are to be placed under the command of Captain U-boats, Norway for the duration of the special assignments in Northern Waters. A decision will be taken during the next few days regarding the allocation of a further two boats.

(2) All four boats have instructions to put into Bergen; further orders from Captain U-boats, Norway.

V. Reports of successes:

None.

VI. Plans:

Of the 19 boats now available, four are scheduled for operation "Wunderland II" with two boats in reserve, three boats, with two in reserve, for minelaying operations, two for the installation of meteorological radio sets, the remainder for patrolling the passage at Bear Island and for necessary dockyard overhauls.

VII. Survey of the situation:

With the new allocation of boats, it now seems certain that most of the eight mine-laying operations planned so far (Belushya, Yugorski Straits, Pechora Straits) as well as the "Wunderland" project and the continued patrol of the Bear Island passage, can all be carried out. In the course of these operations opportunities will arise for the installation of two meteorological shore transmitters and two meteorological radio buoys.

(Signed) Peters.

