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Part II, *Christianity to be Reinterpreted in the Light of Science and American Idealism*, shows the indebtedness of the author to the theories of natural religion of his master, Sir John Seeley. Christianity must be stripped of miracles, guidance from the dead, mediumship and demonism. The humanistic meaning of theological language is analyzed at length; all of the old religious terms are retained and the attempt is made to give them new content in keeping with the new national needs. A long argument is presented for the humanistic significance of prayer "to the God in man." New grounds are sought for the millennial hope, for a material and spiritual heaven, to be attained on the earth by the use of wealth, science and eugenic knowledge. For in the new religious order the church services are to express the democratic faith, and religious coöperation is to become the dynamic of democracy.

In Part III, *Christianity to be Expressed in Scientific Language and Democratic Symbol*, Mr. Coit deals more minutely with the changes in church creed and service that are to be embodied in *A New Manual of National Worship*. He shows how doctrines and hymns have been readily adapted in the past and calls upon the poets for aid in meeting the present need for revision. The psychology of public worship is analyzed to show the effectiveness of religious form and ritual and every aesthetic ethical and social means is to be used to vitalize and enhance the power of democratic ceremony.

Aside from the casual criticism of the rhetorical, hazy, verbose terminology, and the indefiniteness and haphazardness of arrangement of the book, the insuperable objection is to the utopian impracticability of the whole scheme. The organization of a voluntary national religion is opposed by deep-seated traditional prejudices that are firmly institutionalized and slow of change. In considering the book from the theoretic viewpoint, however, it should be admitted that religion is significantly interpreted as comprising those values held by the group to be supremely worth while. God, for instance, is conceived as "that real being which men ought to focus their steadfast and reverend attention upon in order to derive from Him those benefits which are really the greatest blessings to mankind." Yet the fundamental criticism of Coit's religious philosophy is that the identification of religion with national interests outside of the realm of idealism might be dangerously irreligious; for here the highest Christian sanctions are not upheld and nationalism has ever found easy recourse to the use of the force in the name of religion and patriotism. In any case, the world changes, economic and social, which at last make possible the realization of the Christian ideals in international relations, are ignored entirely.

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CORWIN, EDWARD S. *The Doctrine of Judicial Review*. Pp. vii, 177. Price, \$1.25. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1914.

At a time when the American public is beginning to show impatience with a judicial assumption almost unknown in other constitutionally-governed countries, this exposition has especial interest. Judicial review is treated as a natural and inevitable growth, very far from conscious usurpation. This view should tend to allay our impatience, if the courts will but learn to be moderate.

The purpose of the book is to answer the question, "What is the *exact legal basis* of the power of the supreme court to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress?" Dr. Corwin is not satisfied with what were merely the hopes of the framers, but seeks what they understood to be incorporated in the constitution for the purpose of establishing judicial review. He is unable to find any clause which was inserted for the specific purpose of conferring this power upon the courts. Accordingly, he is driven to the conclusion that judicial review was rested by the framers "upon certain general principles which in their estimation made specific provision for it unnecessary."

In his search for these general principles, he criticizes a brilliant essayist who found them in the three doctrines: (1) of the courts as interpreters of the law; (2) of the judiciary as a coordinate branch of the government; and (3) of the right of everybody, including judges, to refuse obedience to an unconstitutional law. Dr. Corwin declares these principles to be mutually inconsistent, for the second, so far as applicable to this question, was a Jeffersonian and Jacksonian idea advanced in opposition to judicial review, and the third is quite untrue. He agrees with President Grant that officers and other citizens are bound by acts of Congress until such acts are declared unconstitutional by the courts. It is therefore in the expansion of the first of these doctrines that the desired general principles are to be found. These principles are three and no more: (1) that the constitution binds the organs of government; (2) that the constitution is law enforceable by the courts; and (3) that the function of interpretation of standing law appertains to the courts alone.

It is in the constructive part of Dr. Corwin's argument that he is most convincing, even though he omits significant points made by Dr. McLaughlin and Justice Baldwin. Here Dr. Corwin traces the growth of these general principles between the years 1761 and 1787, showing how rapidly the idea of judicial review developed, though now retarded and now modified by the quick revulsions of a revolutionary period.

The framers of the constitution were familiar with the idea from its progress in the several states, and the debates show that they devised a government in which judicial review was fundamental, though no more specifically expressed than in the state constitutions. So far from concealing their hopes and expectations, they openly proclaimed in the ratifying conventions the doctrine as inherent in the proposed system of federal government.

Opposition to judicial review, however, was sometimes violent in the states and outspoken in the convention. After the new government was set up, the doctrine made gains in both state and federal courts in spite of rising discontent. Then the opponents of judicial review gained control of two branches of the government, but Chief Justice Marshall at the head of the Federalist Supreme Court struck back by a decision which, in the words of Dr. Corwin, "bears many of the earmarks of a deliberate partisan *coup*." This decision, however, became an historic precedent that fastened the doctrine of judicial review upon the country. Therefore, the conclusion is: "The judges do not exercise a revolutionary function in pronouncing acts of the legislature void, but an official function"; and, "So far as constitutional theory is concerned, there is small ground for the complaints levelled by reformers at judicial review."

It may be conceded that the researches of such men as Messrs. Corwin, McLaughlin, Beard, Melwin and Haynes have proved that the American doctrine of judicial review is an evolutionary development, yet it must be answered that it is none the less an anomaly, and now in this period of reform has become a bar to social progress. The courts have made themselves the repository of public policy and legislative discretion. They change laws and constitutions. A superstitious popular reverence has driven them to this improper assumption of power. An enlightened public opinion must drive them back to the exercise of their legitimate functions.

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CRAMB, J. A. *Germany and England*. Preface to an American Edition by Moreby Acklom. Pp. x, 152. Price, \$1.00. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1914.

The introduction given this little volume by the late Lord Roberts in England and by Mr. Joseph H. Choate in America, and the assertions that the questions discussed should have an important bearing on the future foreign policy of the United States add an interest to the book that it would not otherwise merit. The four lectures that it contains were published very early in the present European war with the object of establishing the thesis that the war is not only a supreme but a necessary conflict between two powers, Germany and England, for dominance over the rest of the world. The neutral powers, in the opinions set forth, carry even less weight in world affairs than the present allies of Great Britain and Germany. To question the sanity of a struggle for world empire at this late day in history, and the value of such a thing even if attained by either power, does not seem to have come within the author's view any more than that the other nations of the globe might have a word to say on the subject. With his premise assumed, it is easy enough in the way of the schoolmen, for the author to draw his conclusions.

The lectures chiefly demonstrate the late Professor Cramb's acquaintance, unusual in its scope and interesting for an Englishman's, with a phase of the literature and thought of modern Germany; but they are in no sense convincing as establishing the ultimate and true causes of the war, nor even in proving (unless mere assertion be proof) that Nietzsche, Treitschke, and Bernhardi, that much-heralded trinity, are the dominating or moving spiritual forces behind the thoughts and actions of the German General Staff. Though this book, like Usher's republished *Pan Germanism*, won a ready and deserved sale as a remarkable prophecy of the coming struggle, it was a prophecy as unheeded when it was made as the warnings of Lord Salisbury in 1900 and of Lord Roberts after the Boer War. If the late great field-marshal's own estimate that "nowhere else are the forces which led to the war so clearly set forth" as in this "Reply to Bernhardi," and to the school of thought which von Treitschke, Delbruck, Schmoller and Maurenbrecher are supposed to represent, if this estimate, I repeat, be a true one, if the notes of warning by Mr. Choate and Mr. Acklom for American ears be not misdirected, and if the views expressed of Germany's mind and England's be correct, it is the