Leila S. al-Imad

The Fatimid Vizierate, 969–1172
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The Fatimid state was the logical outcome of the Ilmī Thālibīs. The da'wah called for the formation of a state based on the political principle of wiping out injustice and of the theocratic and religious subjects from political and social disorder.

The Fatimids had to reconcile their government institutions with their political ideology. They wanted to create a system which would be non-discriminatory and which would benefit the ummah as a whole. They perceived their bureaucracy to be a service-oriented one.

Although the Fatimid caliphate was the product of the Ilmī Thālibīs, it is argued here that the Fatimids practiced a form of separation of state and religion whereby government institutions, although parallel in organization to the da'wah, functioned independently of it. The success of their system depended upon their ability to balance the two parallel institutions without compromising either. Thus they avoided having one
PREFACE

The Fatimid state was the logical outcome of the Ismāʿīlī daʿwah. The daʿwah called for the formation of a state based on the political principle of wiping out injustice and oppression. As perceived by theoreticians, the Fatimid state was to liberate its subjects from political and social chaos and from moral and economic disorder.

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Although the Fatimid caliphate was the product of the Ismāʿīlī daʿwah, it is argued here that the Fatimids practiced a form of separation of state and religion whereby government institutions, although parallel in organization to the daʿwah, functioned independently of it. The success of their system depended upon their ability to balance the two parallel institutions without compromising either. Thus they avoided having one
institution dominate the other, which would have crippled their administration.

The vizier of the Fatimids was the primary individual responsible for the administration. He asserted what one could call the "temporal sovereignty" of the caliph through the different branches of government. The vizier was supposed to see that the bureaucracy functioned as it should, although the bulk of the work fell on government personnel, such as the heads and scribes of the diwāns, who were responsible for continuity in the system. The viziers were initiators of policies which the diwāns implemented. It was those policies, initiated by a few select viziers (three of whom are discussed in detail in Chapter Three), which had long-reaching effects on the system and were responsible for its ability to function even when many viziers did not last in office even one year. The Fatimid bureaucracy functioned, if not perfectly, without major interruptions, because it was stratified; lines of authority were clearly delimited and the scribes and bureau heads functioned according to principles of competence that helped the government to function even when viziers came and went in rapid succession.
A study of the vizierate would not be meaningful without an understanding of both the structure of the bureaucracy and of the Ismāʿīlī element (the daʿwah) and its relationship to the state. For this reason, the first chapter of this book examines both these elements; and the second chapter deals with the theoretical foundations of the vizierate in Ismāʿīlī theology. The third chapter considers the broad characteristics of the sixty individuals who served as viziers, from the conquest of Egypt to the fall of the caliphate and the rise of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī. Three outstanding viziers are chosen as case studies in the delicate interplay between Ismāʿīlī theory and Fatimid practice. A concluding chapter attempts to compare the Fatimid vizierate with its Islamic contemporaries in the Abbasid caliphate and the Seljuk state.

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Leila S. al-Imad
Johnson City, Tennessee
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CHAPTER ONE
THE FATIMID ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS
AND ITS FUNCTIONS

As was the case with other empires, the Fatimid bureaucratic system was created out of necessity. With the expansion of Fatimid boundaries, administering the newly-acquired territories became an urgent task. A bureaucratic apparatus was created by Ibn Killis with the help of Jawhar al-Šiqilli, the commander-in-chief of the caliph al-Muʿizz and the architect of the city of Cairo. It was conceived when the empire’s headquarters were moved to Egypt.

The Fatimids had started their empire in the Maghrib in 297/909; their first capital had been at Qayrawān in Tunisia. ʿUbayd Allāh al-Mahdī moved it to Mahdiyyah on the Tunisian coast in 308/920; it remained the capital until the occupation of Egypt and the building of Cairo after 359/969. During the empire’s early phases, the caliph’s priority was to conquer more land and to spread the faith; this policy was changed when the caliphs moved to Cairo. Administrative personnel in the early years consisted only of those who served in the army.
organization. Jawhar al-Ṣiqillī was the only army general during the early phase of the caliphate to enjoy the prerogatives, duties, and responsibilities of a vizier without being one. It was only natural that this was the case, because al-Ṣiqillī was the sole ruler of Egypt for four years, until al-Mu'izz arrived in his newly-founded capital, Cairo.¹

With the acquisition of Egypt and Syria, it became evident that the caliph needed to centralize his government and to organize it into a civilian bureaucracy. Al-Mu'izz realized that the only way to rule the vast area was with the help of strong, efficient administrators. Thus he named Ibn Killis as his vizier. Along with Jawhar, Ibn Killis was responsible for the establishment of the Fatimid administration which, it has been argued by Sha'bān and by other historians, was "the most centralized administration ever known in Islam."²

¹ Although al-Ṣiqillī was the ruler of Egypt for four years, he did not take any title or claim to the place. He remained a general and his rule could be construed in modern terminology as an interim military governorship.

even more centralized than the Ottoman Empire itself, a statement many historians will find disturbing. Be that as it may, such a hierarchical administration was a necessity for the Fatimid state. A state based on an articulate religious philosophy and da'wah "required utter obedience in a hierarchically stratified social order," or else its message could not be realized nor its universality become a reality.³

Although al-Ṣiqilli had power to direct the Fatimid state for at least four years, it was Ibn Killis's initiative and his innovative spirit in government that made him famous as the architect of the stratified Fatimid bureaucracy. During al-Mu'izz's and Jawhar al-Ṣiqilli's era, Ibn Killis's genius in statecraft became evident when he was given authority over taxation, treasury, prisons, endowments, police force, and all other related matters.⁴ His ability to organize and to create an administrative system for the Fatimids became

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apparent after his successes in managing the fisc. His tax reforms, which were fair and equitable, will be discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three in detail. Having discovered the talents of Ibn Killis, al-Mu‘izz named him as his first vizier, which did not mean that al-Siqillī lost his prominence as the caliph’s chief consultant and as commander-in-chief of the army. Al-Mu‘izz combined the talents of both men in order to secure the best possible government at the onset of his rule in Egypt and Syria. Their tolerance of the diversity of their subjects helped make the transition from Ikhshīdī to Fatimid rule possible. Moreover, prevailing conditions prior to the Fatimid takeover helped make the transition and the adjustment to Fatimid rule a smooth process.

Prior to the Fatimid invasion, Egypt had been struck by drought. Between 351/963 and 360/970, the Nile was very low, which meant that peasants could not irrigate their fields, and crops failed. This led to widespread famine and hardship among the peasantry.

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5 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti‘āq, I, 144: wa khalīfatuhu al-Qāʿid Jawhar; and Ibn Zulāq ‘Alī, Tārīkh Mīṣr wa faḍāʿiluhā, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 1817, fol 47v, who speaks of Jawhar as the commander of the army, the vizier, and the organizer of the kingdom of al-Mu‘izz.
the land and thus could not cultivate it. The lack of crops, especially of wheat, led to famine. Prices of commodities rose, becoming prohibitive even for the rich. The plague spread and hundreds of people died. Historians of this era speak of the inability of people to bury their dead and to their resorting to throwing corpses into the Nile. To add to the natural disaster which struck Egypt, the military situation was unstable as well. Kāfūr al-Ikhshīdī was unable to stop the Qarāmiṭah who attacked Bilād al-Shām in 352/963 and who raided and plundered Egyptian pilgrims on their way to Mecca in 355/965. Kāfūr was also incapable of defending Egypt’s southern border with the Sudan. The Nubian king over-ran the southern part of Egypt, plundered and devastated it, and then retreated from the area, leaving behind an impoverished population. Kāfūr could not really order his army to the battlefield, mainly because he could not pay their wages, a situation which led them to mutiny.

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7 Ibid., p. 125.
The Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, Kāfūr’s nominal suzerain, was incapable of sending an army to counteract the invading force of the Fatimids. Anyway, the caliph was a mere figurehead; actual power rested in the hands of the Buyids (334–447/945–1055). The imminent threat to the Buyids was not from the Fatimids, however, but from the Byzantines, who were invading the northern provinces of the Abbasid caliphate. For the Buyids to turn to the west and to send an army to stop the Fatimid attack on Egypt was understandably a low priority. As for Bilād al-Shām, the situation was no better. Sayf al-Dawlah al-Ḥamdānī, the ruler of Aleppo, took over Damascus and had plans of his own to conquer Egypt, which prompted Kāfūr to organize his forces and fight Sayf al-Dawlah in the battle of Marj ‘Adra near Damascus; the latter lost the battle and fled to Aleppo. Kāfūr followed him to Aleppo and concluded a peace treaty with him.

The whole of Syria at this point came under the Ikhshīdis’ rule. Although Kāfūr had subdued Syria, he could not consolidate his power over the whole area, due to the trouble that Egypt faced internally. Kāfūr had to move his army back to Egypt to crush a revolt against him.
by a nobleman named Ghalbūn in 350/961. Kāfar died in
357/967 and was succeeded by Āhmad ibn ʿAlī al-Ikhshīdī,
who was eleven years old. His father’s cousin, al-Ḥasan
bin Ṭanj, ruled the country in his name for one year.
The situation deteriorated internally and externally.
The Ikhshīdīs lost Syria to the Qarāmites; internally,
the army mutinied for lack of money and provisions. They
did not receive their pay and so they took to the
streets. Ibn Ṭanj blamed his vizier, Jaʿfar ibn al-
Furāt, for the mutiny and imprisoned him, which did not
solve the problem but offered the right time for the
Fatimids to move in.

Such was the political situation in Egypt on the eve
of the Fatimid invasion. Some of the members of the
Ikhshīdī army that revolted wrote to al-Muʿizz and asked
him to send in his forces to take over Egypt. The
Ikhshīdīs discovered the plot, gathered what was left of
their army, and marched into battle against the Fatimids,
who won an easy victory; the Egyptians surrendered in
358/968.

8 Jamāl al-Dīn Abīʾl-Maḥāsin Yūsuf ibn Taghibirdī,
Al-Nujūm al-zāhīrah fi mulūk Miṣr waʾl-Qāhirah (Miṣr: Dār
Egypt offered fertile ground for the Fatimids, who thought of it as their first step east, for their long-range plans were to take over the dying Abbasid empire and to make Baghdad the seat of the Fatimid caliphate, a plan perhaps they never took the trouble to execute, nor would they have been able to muster. More important was their feeling that Egypt would be a place from which they could spread their Ismāʿīlī faith. The Fatimids had many Ismāʿīlī dāʿīs in Egypt during the Ikhshīdī period and had felt that the dāʿīs, if successful, would help them conquer Egypt. The truth was that the dāʿīs' activities did not prepare the ground for a successful takeover by the Fatimids because they were very secretive about their work, a policy they practiced even during Fatimid rule in Egypt. The Fatimids encouraged a secretive approach to proselytization in Egypt in order not to antagonize the majority of the population, which was either Sunni Muslim or Coptic Christian in faith.

9 The name of the Fatimid caliph was pronounced in the khuṭbah of the mosques of Baghdad for one year during the reign of al-ʿAzīz. See al-Maqrīzī, Ittiḥāẓ, I, 274.

10 For an account of the Christians of Egypt and their wealth and numbers, see Abū Ẓāliḥ al-Armanī, Tārīkh (continued...)
The Fatimids' victory was the achievement of Jawhar al-Šiqilli, the first person to lay the cornerstone of Fatimid rule in Egypt. Commander-in-chief of the Fatimid army, he was born a Christian, possibly Byzantine Orthodox, and converted to Islam. He became a kātib (scribe) at the Fatimid court in the Maghrib. Being intelligent and dependable, he was named by al-Mu'izz as army commander at the age of fifty. Jawhar was endowed with foresight and wisdom, both of which were evident in his policy from the start. Upon entering Egypt, he

10(...continued)

11 'Alī Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, Tārīkh Jawhar al-Šiqilli (Cairo: Maṭba‘at Majāzī, 1933), p. 21, where he argues that Jawhar was born a Muslim because Sicily was conquered by the Arabs in A.H. 212, an argument based on sheer speculation, as Jawhar was called al-Rūmī, no doubt in reference to his Christian religious background.

12 Jawhar al-Šiqilli was born ca. 300/912 and was named commander-in-chief of the army in 351/962. He entered Egypt in 358/968.
promised the Egyptians that no-one would be harmed. He sent his own messenger into the streets to assure the inhabitants of clemency. This was a very important act, for it meant that the marketplaces would open and business would go back to normal shortly after the takeover. The transition from the Ikhshidis to the Fatimids thus became easy for the average Egyptian, who evinced loyalty and support because he was treated better than he expected. Al-SiqillI endeared the peasantry to him by having the government take up the task of maintaining the irrigation canals. It was al-SiqillI’s personality, his firmness, and his sympathy which enticed the Egyptians to follow him.

Upon entering Egypt, al-SiqillI instituted changes in the rituals and formulas of the Muslim daily prayers to make them conform to Isma’ili rather than to Sunni.


He made this change with such firmness that no-one challenged it. As a convert to Iṣmā‘īlī Islam, he possessed the zeal of a new convert. His accomplishments were due to his strong-mindedness and to his commitment to establish a strong administration for the Fatimid caliph in Egypt and Syria.

As for Ya‘qūb ibn Killis (formally, vizier from 368-380/978-990), his strength lay in his determination to do all he could to reach the top and to be in control of all offices of the caliphate short of antagonizing the caliph himself. He was a strong-minded individual of great intellectual capacity. He organized the administration into diwāns where he had full control over all


instruments of government. A complete discussion of his career is found in Chapter Two.

Al-Šiqillī’s first achievement, as mentioned earlier, was the building of Cairo, capital of the Fatimid caliphate. A new site was chosen for the capital so that government personnel and army officers coming from the Maghrib with al-Mu‘izz would not antagonize the indigenous population of neighboring Fustāt. This choice was one way to ensure that the assimilation process would not carry with it side-effects such as rivalry among two ethnically different groups, which could have led to insurrections and revolts. Moreover, al-Šiqillī employed Sunnis and Copts in different government jobs - at the beginning - and avoided any clash he could between Egyptians and Maghribīs.¹⁷ This tactic enabled the Fatimids to pursue their tolerant policy towards the non-Ismā‘īlī majority in Egypt. Al-Šiqillī realized from the beginning that the Fatimids could not impose their religious beliefs on the Egyptians, and that the best they could hope for was the conversion of many of them.

¹⁷ Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī ibn Muyassār, Akhbār Miṣr (Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie orientale, 1919), II, 45.
through Fatimid good treatment. Historians of later periods recognized that fact: though Fatimid rule lasted for two centuries, when it ended there were hardly any Ismā'īlīs in Egypt.  

Al-Ṣiqillī’s second major achievement was the doubling of the kharāj tax from three and one-half percent to seven percent, which helped pump money into the treasury; the money in turn was used to build or repair bridges and roads. The network of roads made the provinces and areas on the periphery more readily accessible and prevented the population from thinking of rebellion. Tax collection was also made easier because of better communications.

Al-Ṣiqillī’s brilliance as an administrator was shown in the building and lay-out of the new city of Cairo. He divided the city into quarters or hārāk (as are all Islamic cities) according to the ethnic and

socio-economic backgrounds of the would-be residents.\(^{19}\) This division was important in order to rule the populace. Al-Šiqilli believed that the administration of such ḥārāt provided fewer problems than if the population were integrated. In case of any disturbance or insurrection from within the new city, it was easier to put that disturbance down and to keep an eye on that sector so that no further upheavals would take place. Moreover, the social and economic discrepancies between classes were less keenly felt that way, for the poor were physically remote, not in close contact with inhabitants of the rich ḥārāt. The segregation of the population was so fixed in al-Šiqilli’s mind that he did not permit the Maghribīs to live within the walls of the new city. Their settlements were outside the city proper. To insure that they did not spend the night within the walls of Cairo, he had a special crew of callers (munādīs) who went through the streets calling, "No Maghribī is allowed

\(^{19}\) The word ḥārāt is synonymous with quarters or independent entities with their own mosques, madrasahs, süqs, and baths, rather than roads or alleys. For a full discussion of the ḥārāt, see Ibn Taghibirdī, Al-Nujūm al-zāhirah, IV, 42-54.
to sleep in the city." Divide and rule was his policy to control the newly acquired territory.

Commander-in-chief of the army, ruler of Egypt from 359-361/971, a builder and organizer of a new city, al-Ṣiqillī was also a lover of knowledge and a promoter of learning. He is credited with the building of the Azhar mosque, which became the symbol of the Ismāʿīlī faith, although other schools of law were given permission to teach in it. During his era, al-Ṣiqillī ordered the imām in the Miṣr mosque to change the basmallah and to add the names of ‘Alī and his family to the prayers. He also imposed Ismāʿīlī rather than Sunni inheritance laws.

On the political front, he tried in every way to right the wrongs committed against the indigenous population during the Ikhshīdī period. These were the achievements of Jawhar al-Ṣiqillī. He laid the cornerstone of the administration which his successor, Ibn Killis, brought to completion.

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20 Ibn Muyassar, Akhbār Miṣr, II, 45.
21 Anonymous, Majmūʿah, British Library, MS 5928, fol 265r.
22 Ibn Zulaq ‘Alī, Tārīkh Miṣr wa faḍāʿīluhā, fol 47v.
Ibn Killis was unable to run affairs of state alone. He knew that the Fatimids, because they were a minority, needed a strong centralized administration in order to control their people. Furthermore, for maximum benefit to the Egyptians, Ibn Killis felt that the Fatimids had to have a sound fiscal policy in order to keep the ra'iyyah content. They promised to have an equitable society and they set out to do it through a fair system of taxation.

The vastness of the Fatimid empire made it necessary for the caliph, with the help of his vizier, to reorganize the network of existing diwāns and to create new ones. In order for the Fatimids to perfect the system, they had to introduce new administrative and personnel policies. Their aim was centralization and they did their best, although not always successfully, to ensure that their system functioned as they conceived it.

With the reorganization of the existing diwāns and the creation of new ones, hiring new personnel became possible. Fatimid hiring policies reflected an increase in the number of their co-religionists in government positions. They gradually introduced Maghribīs into the system; thus the newcomers, who lack know-how, shared
their posts with Coptic or Sunni kuttāb who were not, however, phased out of their jobs.\textsuperscript{23} The Fatimids, out of their tolerance, but more accurately out of expediency, were aware that without the know-how of the indigenous Egyptian class of kuttāb, they would never have been able to build their administration. Be that as it may, the Fatimids embarked on building their system by first dividing Egypt into four wilāyat or administrative units: Qaws, the East, the West, and Alexandria. Syria and the Maghrib were also administrative units. The governors or wālis of these provinces were directly responsible to the vizier or to the caliph.

At the same time that these administrative divisions were created the dīwāns were also reorganized and new ones appeared. Many of these bureaus duplicated each other's efforts. Such duplications were necessary as a system of checks and balances. One dīwān could confirm the figures of the other or it could show discrepancies between its figures and those of the other, thus leading to an investigation of the dīwān and the correction of the problem. In case of corruption, the vizier could

\textsuperscript{23} Al-Maqrīzī, Itti‘āz, I, 119.
then fire all personnel connected with that specific bureau. In such cases the government would have been brought to a halt had there not been duplication of effort, particularly in diwan al-jaysh, diwan al-rawātib, and diwan al-kura. In diwan al-jaysh and in diwan al-kura the number of horses given to the army was recorded by both diwāns and the salaries of the army personnel were inscribed in both diwan al-jaysh and diwan al-rawātib; while diwan al-kura also tabulated the salaries of the personnel in order to divide horses and mules among those who received them according to rank and seniority.24

The Fatimid bureaucracy was staffed from the special class of scribes. These scribes or kuttāb were a select group of administrators who had studied the art of calligraphy and composition at the hands of masters in both fields. Highly regarded for their breadth of knowledge and education, this elite group were mainly composed of either Copts or Melkite Christians who had been trained to become scribes by their fathers and

grandfathers and who had served in such positions since the Arab conquests. As good mathematicians, the Copts were very valuable in keeping the books and accounts for all the diwāns. As trained bureaucrats, they knew the art of administration, making it logical for them to attain even the highest position in government, the vizierate. Many of the early Fatimid viziers were from this select group of administrators, referred to as arbāb al-aqlām. The majority of them were at one point in their careers either poets or scribes in the bureaus.

The administration employed a large number of officials due to its extensive branches. Apart from employment in the diwāns, the Fatimids had a great number of gādīs and individuals working for the treasury (bayt al-māl) and the mint; both institutions will be discussed later in this chapter.


26 Hasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, Tārīkh al-dawlah al-Fātimiyah, p. 293.

27 Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-ʾaʾshā, III, 485.
The number of diwāns increased during the Fatimid caliphate. The Fatimids inherited an administrative system which was far from elaborate. Their predecessors left behind the following bureaus: diwān al-jaysh, diwān al-kiswa wa’l-ṭirāz, diwān al-aḥbāṣ, and diwān al-rawātib. This limited number of bureaus does not mean that the Ikhshīdīs did not have a system for collecting taxes or for running their state; nor does it mean that empires which preceded the Fatimids lacked such an apparatus. Far from it; what they lacked were bureaucracies which consisted of several bureaus or administrative units with clearly defined functions, fully staffed by individuals trained in the art of government, calligraphy, and composition. These scribes, as Ibn Māmātī described them, were expected to be "honest literary men, [preferably] jurisprudents..., [and] patient..., [who] treat people fairly and do not hesitate to admit their errors and to correct them."  

A typical bureau employed around seventeen persons, each of whom had his own title and designated work. Among these seventeen officials were: the nāẓir, or

28 As‘ad ibn Māmātī, Kitāb qawānīn al-dawāwīn (Cairo: Maṭba‘at Miṣr, 1943), p. 66.
supervisor, who oversaw the work of the rest of the employees and who alone could initiate policy; mutawalli al-dīwān, or executor, who was responsible for all transactions that took place in his bureau; and the mustawfī, or collection agent, a scribe whose duty was to keep tabs over the time spent by the employees doing their work and who alerted employees as to when taxes should be paid or collected. The muʿīn, or helper, was a scribe who assisted the mustawfī. The nāṣikh copied incoming and outgoing mail in order for the dīwān to keep track of all its correspondence. The mushārif, or overseer’s job, did not differ much from that of the nāẓir. Such duplication, as mentioned before, was a form of double-check. A bookkeeper, ʿāmil, calculated expenditures and went over all calculations made by his superiors; he saw to it that the books all balanced. A kātib, or scribe, substituted for the ʿāmil if the ʿāmil were absent. Another scribe, the jahbād, collected dues. An eyewitness, shāhid, attested to the correctness of all bookkeeping. A nāʿib, or substitute, was used by all branches of bureaus when necessity dictated it. An amīn, or confidant, functioned like the substitute. The māsiḥ, or surveyor, accompanied the cadastral survey and
registered its findings for the purpose of his dīwān. The dālīl, or guide, was a scribe who took information gathered in the surveyor’s records as to names of landholders and amounts of land they held in a given area. The ḥāvīz controlled the use of the narcotic leaf, gāt, and its production. The khāzin received foodstuffs, stored them, and kept records of them. Al-ḥāshīr was the "squeezer" who supervised the compliance of dhimmīs with Islamic and specifically Fatimid regulations of dress and behavior.

These seventeen employees did not include the raʿīs al-dīwān, or head of the bureau. He was answerable in turn to raʿīs al-zuʿasāʾ (chief of all the bureaus), who ranked after the caliph and the vizier. His task was to coordinate the findings of all dīwāns and to take them to the vizier and caliph for their approval. The chief of the bureaus also had the ultimate say regarding appointments or terminations of heads of dīwāns. In his hands lay the ultimate authority for dispensing funds; he received requests for increases in the budgets of dīwāns as well. According to Ibn Ṭaywīr, whom al-Qalqashandī

29 Ibid., pp. 297-306 for a complete description of all the employees of the dīwān.
quotes, "There were no Christians in this position all through the Fatimid caliphate except for one al-Aḥram." 30

As mentioned previously, the Fatimids did not inherit an elaborate system of government from the Ikhshidīs; all they found were the remnants of disintegrated bureaus, such as dīwān al-jaysh, al-kiswa wa’l-ṭirāz, al-ahbās, and al-rawātib. 31 To this group, Ibn Killis, with the help of al-Ṣiqilli, added sixteen bureaus, thus creating the elaborate administration of which both men had dreamed. All of these bureaus may be divided into several groups for the purpose of this discussion, although the Fatimids obviously did not make such a division. These groups of dīwāns were the scribal, military, regional, internal Egyptian, and specialized.

The scribal bureaus consisted of dīwān al-inshā’ and dīwān al-barīd, the bureaus of formulation of documents and of correspondence. The head of dīwān al-inshā’ had to be a fluent and eloquent author and calligrapher. He received all incoming correspondence for the caliph,

30 Al-Qalqashandī, Subh al-ḥṣāh, III, 489.
31 Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, Tārīkh al-dawlah al- Fāṭimiyah, p. 292.
discussed its contents with him, then answered the correspondence and sealed it with the caliphal seal. Within his bureau there were two other important officials. The first was a confidential secretary, al-tawqī' bi'l-qalam al-dagīq fi'l-maṣālim, who sat with the caliph when he was alone to repeat the Qurʾān with him, to relate tales of the prophets, and to help him in his calligraphy. Another duty, which in fact was the most important, was to be present as a confidential secretary to the vizier when the latter judged legal cases. The second important official was a recorder, or al-tawqī' bi'l-qalam al-jalīl, whose main function was to record cases and to present them to the confidential secretary, who in turn signed them and gave them to the vizier and the caliph. Then, after all the essential signatures were collected, the documents would be inscribed in the dīwān. 32

Finally, the other scribal bureau was that of the mail, dīwān al-baṣīd. This bureau was of great importance to the caliph; it made sure that correspondence reached its destination. This bureau used

32 Al-Qalqashandī, Šubḥ al-aʾshā, III, 487.
carrier pigeons; it also served as an intelligence bureau for the caliph.33

The military group of bureaus consisted of the bureau of the army, diwan al-jaysh; bureau of fiefs, diwan al-iqtā'; bureau of supplies, diwan khazā'in al-kiswah and bureau of clothing, diwan al-ṭīrāz.

The bureau of the army took care of the different military elements, such as the Turks, Kurds, Maghribis, Sudanese (the blacks), the Ghuzz, and the Daylamites. Each of these groups had its own leader who reported to the head of the bureau concerning the affairs of his own group. The bureau also took care of military equipment, ammunition, and supplies. The army general received lists of all provisions from the head of this diwan. This bureau also took care of building ships for the navy; needless to say, it was one of the biggest in the administration. The military formed the backbone of the country and also drew the largest sum of money from the treasury. The head of this bureau had to be a Muslim.

His position was very sensitive, particularly because he provided the army with all money, equipment, and ammunition. He also made sure that army personnel had enough horses and mules to transport their arms, ammunition, and goods. The bureau had several individuals whose jobs were to keep track of soldiers who died or who went on vacation, as well as those who reported for duty. The latter officials were called nuqabā' al-umārā'.

Dīwān al-iqṭā', or the bureau of fief allocation, kept records of fiefs given to army members. It had a complete account of all the names of those to whom land was given in return for service in the army. The fiefdoms were registered in this dīwān along with the names of their holders.

The last two dīwāns in this group were not separated at the beginning of the Fatimid era but became so under the vizierate of Ibn Killis. Dīwān al-kiswah and dīwān al-ṭirāz respectively dealt with food and clothing provisions for the army and for some administrative

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35 Al-Qalqashandī, Subḥ al-a‘shā, III, 489.
personnel. Their division into two bureaus was probably engineered in order to keep a close watch on their expenditures. Such were the bureaus associated with the military.\footnote{Ibid., III, 490.}

The third group of bureaus had to do with regional affairs. It consisted of two diwāns, diwān al-Shām and diwān al-Ḥijāz. Although al-Shām was a province by itself, a special bureau was created to handle complaints coming from it. The Ḥijāz diwān regulated the routes for the pilgrimage or ḥajj and provided safe conduct and places of rest for travellers.\footnote{Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, Tārīkh al-dawlah al-Fāṭimidyyah, pp. 292, 294; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, Dhayl tārīkh Dimashq, ed. H.F. Amedroz (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1908), p. 49.}

As for the internal bureaus, they were created to handle the affairs of the Egyptian provinces, such as coordinating tax collection and paying salaried personnel in the provinces. They also dealt with the complaints of farmers in particular, who were concerned with the central government’s maintenance of irrigation canals. The Fatimids dug the canals so that more land could be irrigated and more crops grown. Irrigation was probably
the single most important issue which the Fatimids had to deal with, because in the event of crop failure, their political stability would be threatened; this issue was most critical during the reign of al-Mustansir. Ibn Killis instituted these diwāns in order to have direct access to them rather than wait for reports sent to him by the wālis or governors.

There were three diwāns that dealt with provincial affairs: diwān al-Ṣa'īd, diwān Asfāl al-Ard, and diwān al-Thughūr. Diwān al-Ṣa'īd was responsible for both the Upper and Lower Ṣa'īd regions. In addition to what was discussed above, this bureau handled the accounts and arrears owed to the central government. Diwān Asfāl al-Ard was concerned with the towns and cities facing the Mediterranean Sea, excluding the seaports. The ports were handled separately by a special diwān called diwān al-Thughūr. The functions of these three bureaus were the same, the only difference between them being that they handled different geographical areas.39

38 Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-a'shā, III, 491.
39 Ibid., III, 491.
Although the Fatimids inherited such bureaus as diwān al-rawātib and diwān al-ahbās, they created several new and specialized bureaus to supervise all technical aspects of the administration. One of the most important bureaus was diwān al-rawātib, which was concerned with salaries and wages. Others were diwān al-kharāj, or bureau of taxation; diwān al-kura', or the bureau of transportation; diwān al-jihād, construction bureau; diwān al-ahbās, prisons bureau; diwān al-jawālī wa'l-mawārīth, personal status affairs; and diwān al-shurtah, or bureau of internal security. Lastly were diwān al-majlis and diwān al-taḥqīq, both of which will be described below.

The bureau of salaries and wages, or diwān al-rawātib, contained lists of all the scales of wages or salaries, starting with that of the vizier down to the most menial official. The diwān also had lists of all the names of mercenaries in government service and the name of every slave (male and female). Its scribes, under the direction of a chief scribe or kātīb al-kuttāb, had several duties: to collect information on how many persons were employed in the government or in the army; on the number of deceased officials and whether their
positions were filled or vacant; and on the amount of money, food supplies, and livestock to be divided among those who received such non-monetary compensation. The bureau provided tentative lists of names with proposed salaries to the vizier and to the caliph for acceptance. The caliph had to sign the proposed list and send it back to the bureau in order for it to be acted upon. Meanwhile, the caliph had the right to change, modify, raise, or lower the salaries of any individual of his choice, even though recommendations were proposed by the bureau. Depending on who the caliph was, his word or that of the vizier was the ultimate word on the subject. Power as such rested with the central figure of the central government in the person of the vizier ("government by deputy") or the caliph.  

The bureau of taxation was one of the most important, for government revenues known as kharāj came through it to the treasury. The kharāj existed prior to the Fatimid takeover of Egypt. Historically it was created by the Arab invaders in the seventh or early eight centuries; but Ya'qūb ibn Killis, with the help of

'Aslūj ibn al-Ḥasan, reorganized the kharāj and created a bureau to deal with all aspects of taxation. They enacted a new system of tax collection and land survey which gave the central government greater income. Prior to this change, Egypt had had several centers for tax collection. There was no central bureau of taxation, a situation which created much unrest among the population, who were overtaxed by their collectors; the latter pocketed the difference and never reported any of their gains to the government. The new diwān had a strict policy in tax collection which made the average person content with Fatimid rule for nearly a century. Tax collectors became salaried personnel rather than tax farmers who took a share of the taxes for themselves. Moreover, the bureau had scribes who took care of the complaints of those who were taxed unfairly. The vizier would then look into these cases and mete out punishment. Another very important contribution which this new bureau made was to list the expenses of all the diwāns of

41 Abū-Qāsim 'Alī ibn Munjib ibn al-Ṣayrāfī, Al-İshārah ilā man nāla al-wizārah (Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie orientale, 1924), p. 102; al-Qalqashandī, Şubh al-a’shā, III, 492.
government. From this bureau, then, money was allocated for the rest of the bureaus according to their needs and expenses. Money which remained after the expenses of the diwāns were paid was transferred to the treasury. The new reorganization of the bureau of taxation made the government aware of the sources of taxation, which areas yielded most of the kharāj, and which areas were richest in agricultural production. Moreover it gave the government a notion of which diwāns spent the most and on what. This method allowed the government direct control of these diwāns and a say in how and where money should be spent. According to al-Maqrizī, diwān al-kharāj supervised three sub-diwāns: diwān al-rabbā’, diwān al-mukūs, and diwān al-ṣinā‘ah. The first collected money from hospitals, personal waqfs, and monasteries. The second dealt with taxation on iqtā’ land and on entertainment areas. The last collected taxes on manufactured goods.42

Dīwān al-kūrā’, or bureau of livestock, handled the stables of mules, horses, donkeys, camels, and beasts of

burden used for construction and for the use of the diwāns, along with all equipment and fodder for both animals in stables and wild animals such as giraffes and elephants. This bureau also handled the salaries of personnel who worked in the stables. Three individuals worked in diwān al-kura': a scribe, an undersecretary, and a helper.43

The Fatimids had several other diwāns which were highly specialized, such as diwān al-jihād, also called diwān al-‘amā’ir, the bureau of construction, which supervised manufacturing in Egypt. It also built ships for the fleet. This bureau concerned itself with cutting wood from lower Egypt for construction and heating. It took care of the extras that were spent on admirals and navy personnel, as well as the compensation of its own personnel. But when the diwān was unable to cover salaries, the head of the diwān could draw the extra needed directly from the treasury via petition to the vizier.44

43 Al-Qalqashandi, Subh al-a’shā, III, 492.
44 Ibid., III, 492.
Dīwān al-āḥbās was another specialized bureau. It had a very special place in the administration, for its personnel had to be Muslims only, and from the scribal class. Not only were they Muslim scribes; they were also sworn witnesses. This bureau also had several salaried directors, two scribes, and two helpers. Part of the taxes collected from the north and the sea coast went directly to Dīwān al-āḥbās. This bureau handled all legal procedures involving prisoners and the prisons to which they were sent.

Dīwān al-shurṭah, or the police bureau, had two headquarters: one in Fustāṭ, called al-shurṭah al-suflā, and the other in al-‘Askar, called al-shurṭah al-‘ulyā. Jawhar al-Ṣiqillī moved the latter from al-‘Askar to Cairo. The power of the shurṭah was stronger in Fustāṭ, for originally it was a bigger city than Cairo and its population was not Shi‘i. Moreover, Fustāṭ was not the seat of government like Cairo, where many army men and civil servants could interfere with the police; the shurṭah had stronger jurisdiction in Fustāṭ than in

46 Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, Tārīkh al-dawlah al- Faṭimiyah, p. 296.
Cairo. The head of this bureau, ṣāḥib al-shurṭah, had to be a Muslim well-versed in the law. His job was both religious and secular in character. His duties will be discussed in full under the judicial branch of government, although the ṣāḥib al-shurṭah was tied to the executive end of it also.

Diwan al-majlis used to be the original and only bureau. It received all the information from all the other diwāns and had several scribes and assistants. The head of this diwan was second in rank to ra'īs al-dawāwīn or ra'īs al-ru'asa' and third in rank to the vizier, as far as status and power were concerned. His title was istimārat daftar al-majlis. He was the spokesman of the central government in the provinces and handled all distributions of money and food, kept count of all government personnel, including those who died in the line of duty. The bureau was responsible for ceremonies held on religious holidays and all expenditures connected with them. Its personnel supervised all disbursements from stored grain and food, disbursed money to the sons and daughters of the caliph and all his blood relatives,

47 Ibid., p. 296.
and kept records of all incoming and outgoing gifts from the caliph’s household including gifts to dignitaries of foreign governments. Finally, the bureau handled compensation of couriers and the costs of burial services for the caliph’s entourage. Such was the diversity of functions that diwān al-majlis handled that the Fatimids broke it down later into the other diwāns.

The last of the specialized bureaus, diwān al-taḥqīq, kept track of all the other diwāns. It investigated other bureaus, if need be, and it acted as a watchman over other diwāns so that no embezzlement of funds would take place. Its chief was the fourth most important person in the government.

These were the permanent bureaus of the Fatimids. Although many others were created, some were in existence for only a short time because they served specific, temporary purposes, such as diwān Umm al-khalīfah al-Mustanṣir, which was dissolved after her death.

50 For a complete discussion of all the diwāns, see al-Maqrízī, Ittiḥāẓ, III, 335-344.
dtwâns did not represent the whole administration: although the employees of the bureaus formed the majority of the bureaucratic cadre, the judicial system and the mint were run as separate operations.

The judicial system during the Fatimid era was based on Shiite law, which "did not differ much from the [Sunni] even in its application" at that time. This new system had replaced the Sunni one which had been in existence since the twenty-first year of the hijrah. But not all Egyptian judges were Ismâ'îlî Fatimids; the government appointed judges from all the schools of jurisprudence, all of whom had, however, to use the Shiite school for interpreting the law.

The Fatimids were the first to introduce the position of the supreme judge, or gâdi-l-qudât, into the judicial hierarchy outside Baghdad. The judge's seat was Cairo and his jurisdiction was the Fatimid domains, unlike his counterpart in the Abbasid caliphate who was only the chief gâdi of Baghdad. The title was given

first to one Abū al-Ṭāhir, a Sunni judge who had been invested by the Abbasids to take care of justice in Egypt and who, when Jawhar al-Ṣiqilli arrived, was given the title of supreme judge. 52 Officially the position of ḡāḍīʾ-l-qudāt did not become a part of Fatimid institutions of law until al-ʿAzīz’s time. 53 As a position it was possible to combine it with the office of dāʾī al-duʿāt or chief propagandist. 54 "The office of Supreme Judge derived its authority by way of delegation bestowed upon [the holder] by the Caliph himself." 55 This office was not a government position but was a delegated "ministry" over the community of believers. The individual nominated was supposed to be of the


54 Al-Maqrīzī, Ittiḥāẓ, III, 336.

highest religious integrity, well-read, and well-versed in Islamic jurisprudence.

From 525/1130, during al-Ḥāfiz's caliphate, the chief judgeship was shared by four quḍāt from four schools or madhhabs: Imāmī, Ismā'īlī, Shāfi'I, and Mālikī. Not only was the chief judgeship during the later Fatimid period shared; it also became theoretically part of the job of a wāzīr tafwīd. Many such viziers carried the title of qādī quḍāt al-Muslimīn (or chief judge of the Muslims) or kaffī quḍāt al-Muslimīn (or guarantor of the Muslim judges).

The chief judge was to see that justice was done all over Egypt. He nominated the jurisconsults and quḍāt of the different areas. He also set the niche for direction of prayers during the construction of new mosques. He saw to it that waqfs were administered honestly and that orphanages were up to the standards of the time. His duties also included the inspection of the bureau of the

56 For further information on the judges of Egypt during the Fatimid era, see Adel Allouche, "The Establishment of Four Chief Judgeships in Fatimid Egypt," JAOS, 105 (1985): 317-320.

57 Al-Maqrīzī, Ittiḥād, III, 337.
mint. In addition, he made sure that money was spent on mosques in accordance with their activities, which included the students, teachers, writers, and workers. One of his most important duties was to supervise the administration of the courts, or majālis al-ḥukum. The chief justice held court himself at the Miṣr Mosque in Cairo. He was one of the pillars of the judicial system, along with the muḥtasib (market inspector) and ṣāḥib al-shurtāh (prefect of police).

The muḥtasib, or inspector of markets, drew his authority from religious texts and laws. In Islamic jurisprudence, the norm, al-amr bi’l-ma‘rūf wa’l-nahy ‘an al-munkar, is incumbent upon all Muslims. The Qur‘ān, the ḥadīth, and the sharī‘ah gave religious sanction to the muḥtasib to enforce the laws so that justice would prevail. The muḥtasib’s job, therefore, was to see to it that there was no cheating or abuse of weights and measures in the market place. This part of the work of Fatimid muḥtasibs was no different than that of his Sunni predecessors. But where the difference occurred was in

the list of munkarāt or prohibitions which in Ismā'īlī Shiite tradition were more numerous than in the Sunni tradition. Justice here was based on an Ismā'īlī interpretation of religious morality: hence, for instance, no cheating in weights and measures, no beating of students in madrasahs in places where they could be maimed or harmed. All of the muhtasib's actions to forbid such acts were based on a new religious morality, Ismā'īlī Shiite Islam.

The job of the muhtasib included also the supervision of ahl al-dhimmah (protected non-Muslims) so that they would not deviate from what was expected of them in the customary dress codes, housing codes, etc. But, as mentioned before, their main function was control over the industrial and commercial parts of cities in order to punish cheats and robbers, and to protect the average inhabitant from abuse.


60 Nāṣir-i Khusraw, Safar Nāmah, trans. into Arabic by Yahyā al-Khashshāb (Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-jadīd, 1970), p. 108. Nāṣir reports that because of their muhtasibs, the Egyptians felt so safe that they left their shops unlocked, and no one would steal their goods.
Muhtasibs were chosen from those persons with a reputation for high integrity, knowledge of religious laws (especially the law of finance necessary for this moral and practical role), which accounted for the great importance attached to the position.

As for the prefect of police, sāhib al-shurtah, his judicial function was to inflict punishment or execute the sentence of a judge. In the absence of a judge, he could take the law into his own hands and pronounce and execute sentence. In many cases the prefect of police was called wālī and his prerogatives and duties did not differ much from that of the governor of Cairo or other governors in Egypt, who also took care of law and order. He was aided by a police corps entrusted with executing judges’ orders and making sure, even by use of force, that justice was done, even if the losing side in a legal case was bent on enforcing an illegal verdict.

62 Ibid., p. 57.
63 For further information, see Ibn Muyassar, Akhbār Miṣr, II, 45; and Ibn Duqmāq, Al-Intiṣār li-wāsīṭat ‘īqd al-amsār (Būlaq: al-Maṭba‘ah al-‘Amiriyyah, 1893), IV, 11.
The last major divisions of government to be considered here are the treasury and the mint. The treasury was independently staffed and not associated with any of the bureaus. It was the central repository of all money; from it, expenditures of the various bureaus were made, including salaries of government personnel. The treasury was a separate institution in that even the caliph-imam did not have access to it freely. It was not his private treasury from which he could draw funds; its function was to be a repository whence all money was distributed and wars financed. The income yielded to the treasury from the different taxes included the kharāj on the land, and the jawālī, taxes on ahl al-dhimmaḥ.64 The other income came from taxes imposed on imports and on manufactured goods; income from zakāt; income from inheritance taxes; income from the mint, the bureau of weights and measures, and prisons.65

The mint (dār al-darb), an independent institution under the strict supervision of the qādī‘l-qudāt and his

64 Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, Tārīkh al-dawlah al-Fāṭimiyah, p. 549.
nā'ib, was responsible for minting coins of equal weight and value. Weights were also made in dār al-ḍarb in order to avoid cheating in the market place. Some sources refer to this institution as dār al-ḍarb wa’l-
vivār. 66 Three kinds of metals were used in the minting of coins: gold, silver, and nubās (which was either copper or brass unless otherwise specified). Four minting houses existed during the Fatimid period: in Alexandria, Qaws, Tyre, and Askalon. 67 Although al-
Qalqashandī speaks of four minting houses, al-Maqritzī relates that the caliph al-Āmir (reigned 496-525/1102-
1130) built a mint in the carpenters’ quarter of Cairo (ḥayy al-kharrātīn). 68 Dinars minted in this new place were higher in gold content than any dinar of the same era. Apart from the regular dinars for daily use, the Fatimids struck special commemorative dinars which the caliphs distributed among the amīrs and the a’yan (the notables). 69 It is important to note that al-Baṭā‘iḥī, the vizier of al-Āmir, created also an exchange and

67 Al-Qalqashandī, Subḥ al-a‘shā, III, 365.
68 Al-Maqritzī, Ittā‘āz, III, 92.
69 Ibid., III, 92.
depository (dār wikālah) for merchants who came to Cairo from Iraq or Syria to facilitate their business. It was located near the mint. Finally, new dinars were struck when caliphs assumed power, which did not mean that at other times new coins could not be minted. When al-Yāzūrī became the vizier of al-Mustanṣir (reigned 428-487/1036-1094), he had his own name included on the coinage, a rather uncommon phenomenon.

Such were the administrative units of the Fatimid bureaucracy. Its intricacies and the way it functioned have fascinated many historians of medieval Islamic institutions, who have seen in the Fatimid hierarchical system an efficiency and an order which can be attributed to the system’s founders: the viziers.

70 Ibid., III, 92.

CHAPTER TWO

THE VIZIERATE IN THEORY

AND IN ISMA'ILI THEOLOGY

As the institution of the vizierate was less than
two centuries old, and the office of vizier not defined,
nor an elaborate support system in place to help him
actualize his position, the Fatimids took this
institution from the Abbasids and tried to make it one of
the pillars of their administration. The vizierate as an
institution was to become a permanent feature of the
Islamic state, so that even "the term vezir has come to
be internationally accepted in the sense of prime
minister with unrestricted powers in an oriental
government."¹ The Abbasid caliphs wanted to spread their
da'wah at the beginning of their caliphate but could not
handle all affairs of state themselves; therefore, they
delegated certain executive powers to their
representatives or wazīrs. The Fatimids followed this
Abbasid practice.

1 S.D. Goitein, "The Origin of the Vizierate and Its
True Character," Islamic Culture, 16 (1942): 255.

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Although the Fatimids' dream was to actualize "the perfect 'Alid theocratic state" through the absolute rule of the caliph, who was called the "substitute for God on earth" (qā'im magām Allāh), the caliph-imāms could not achieve such a theocracy without delegating some power to their viziers. In speaking about the authority of the imām, al-Kirmānī emphasizes his role as an absolute ruler who should avoid division of power:

The Imām constitutes the 'heart' of this Divine Politeia [of the caliphate], because in the same manner that the organs of the human body are subservient to the heart, the seat of inspiration and life, so also in politics should the affairs of man be commanded by an Imām, who is the light of God, having absolute authority and avoiding a division of power.́

Al-Kirmānī finds himself recommending that the imām be the all-encompassing ruler of the Muslim world and

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eventually of the universe, without having any division or delegation of power, a task which was not within the realm of possibility. Caught in this dilemma, al-Kirmānī goes on to say that "there are no delegated powers or offices in the state, only executive functions subordinated to the Imām’s absolute theocratic authority."⁴ For al-Kirmānī, there are four pillars of the polity: "Imām; the king; his Wāzīr, and agents of the minister; and the subjects."⁵ Thus, the vizier was conceded an important position in the political life of the Fatimid caliphate: he was made a pillar of the political administration. Fatimid political theory, as articulated by al-Kirmānī, gave the viziers limited power, yet some viziers had much more influence and authority than others. It would appear that everything depended on the personality of these individuals and that of their respective caliphs. Fatimid practices, therefore, did not fit Fatimid theory. For example, how was the Fatimid vizierate different from the Abbasid model and from al-Kirmānī’s model? Did the Fatimid

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⁵ Ibid., p. 408, citing al-Kirmānī, p. 214.
签证 fit into al-Kirmānī’s theory of the theocratic state?

Although al-Kirmānī’s theory of government was supposed to be the best model for the theocratic Fatimid state, the Fatimid caliphs and their advisors were very pragmatic and knew that such a plan could never work. Their first concern was to consolidate their power, subdue their enemies, and maintain their grip over Egypt and Syria. For them, proselytization and the spread of the Ismā‘īlī da‘wah were secondary to actual political hegemony over the land. Although "Fatimism as a political creed would never have succeeded without a religious creed,"⁶ the Fatimids were also aware of the Egyptians’ resistance to their rule as an alien house and a non-orthodox one; so to force them to convert or to fight would have caused a great many wars and upheavals which the Fatimids wanted to avoid. To Qādī al-Nu’mān, the "primary political objective is the removal of oppression and injustice by the overthrow of existing political authority."⁷ After all the Fatimids’ success

was based on the fact that they were liberators of their subjects from "political and social disorder, economic disequilibrium and moral misery."  

The Fatimids built their administration as a parallel institution to their da‘wah, a situation which al-Kirmānī found unacceptable. For him, politics had to "comply with the da‘wah for the establishment of proper order."  

This is no different than the concept of an Islamic government where "the caliphate represented the political and the religious leadership of the community of Muslims, individual believers and subjects belonged to a polity defined by religious allegiance."  

Furthermore political institutions and religious communities developed independently of each other and the 'Golden Age' of the ideal Muslim society was very short-lived. 

The frustration shown by al-Kirmānī because of the abandonment of the Muslim concept of the state is clearly shown in his work. He wanted to recreate the perfect


Islamic state which, in the fourth century hijra, became impossible. Although the ideal caliphate was supposed to be the best and highest form of government, and its laws were divine, the "historical caliphate" fell short of the ideal. The Fatimids realized that and consciously or unconsciously practiced a separation of state and religion, leaving the Ismā’īlī da’wah and the Fatimid administration separate but parallel institutions.

The Fatimid caliph was different from any other caliph because he was the imām and he partook of divine attributes. This explains why al-Kirmānī felt it necessary for the imām to be the absolute ruler with no delegation of powers. Von Grunebaum described the Fatimid caliph as having "no human contemporary who would be his equal - not merely in respect of rank but of substance. There is thus no power to whom he could possibly be beholden."¹¹ As such he was ḥujjat Allāh ʿalā al-arḍ (God’s proof on earth), the living testimony of the existence of God. Not only was the caliph the head of the sect but also of the state; so how could there be any separation of state and religion such a

case. One might argue that the Fatimid caliphs consciously saw to it that state and religion were separated. One might also speculate that they practiced such a separation because if they linked both together, in the event that the caliphate collapsed, their religion or da'wah would also disappear with it.

When the Fatimids took over Egypt, they were faced with the task of building a centralized administration capable of controlling the newly-acquired territories. One could assume that their hierarchical bureaucracy was modelled after their da'wah, which was highly stratified. The Fatimid da'wah was kept separate from the state because the da'wah predated the state and was meant to post-date it. As Samuel Stern put it, "The Ismā'īlī activity [inside] and outside the Fatimid state was the direct continuation of the missionary activity in the third century A.H. which resulted in the establishment of the state." As such the Fatimids did not want to contain the da'wah within the boundaries of their administrative apparatus but to let it run in accordance with its organization. The Fatimids did not offer to

12 Samuel Stern, "Cairo as the Center of the Ismā'īlī da'wa," Proceedings, p. 446.
incorporate the 'ulama into the administrative system. The dāʿīs were not a bureaucratic cadre, nor were they salaried personnel in the administration. The daʿwah remained independently run without having to be limited by the confines of a bureaucracy. What the Fatimids actually achieved was to keep the civil administrative system running parallel to their religious system or daʿwah, converging and meeting only at the level of the imām. In Bernard Lewis’s words, the imām "was an emperor and king of his vast domain, yet outside the boundaries of his empire he was a shepherd of the daʿwa and its chief proselytizer."13 The imām kept this "double apparatus both coordinate and apart, with the result that the 'party organization' long survived Fatimid rule on the Nile."14

In his article, "An Interpretation of Fatimid History," Bernard Lewis included "the mission" or daʿwa as a "third branch of government" alongside the two well-


known pillars of the state, the armed forces and the civil bureaucracy:

The Fatimids organized [the da'wah] into a third branch of government, with its own functions, structure, and hierarchy, under the direction of the Chief Missionary and the ultimate authority of the Caliph in his capacity as Imām. The Fatimids thus created something previously unknown to Islam - an institutional Church. 15

According to Lewis, the Fatimids organized the da'wah and made it part and parcel of the government, a hypothesis which Stern and von Grunebaum among others cannot accept. Von Grunebaum argued that the state offered the sect (the Ismā'īlīs) the backing of a great power which made the da'wah more effective abroad; within the confines of Egypt it gave them the freedom to develop their organization. But, as he went on to say, "the sect structure did not coincide with that of the state [nor could] the missionaries and their hierarchy... be identified as functionaries of the Egyptian state," 16 as

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Bernard Lewis seemed to suggest. Stern, on the other hand, reaffirms von Grunebaum by stating that although "Egypt was the center of Ismāʿīlī propaganda the exact organization of this propaganda remains somewhat obscure." Furthermore, the evidence for the mission's relationship between the center and the provinces is sketchy, which makes for a rather uneven picture. Apart from occasional mentions by al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān of religious emissaries arriving at the Fatimid court in Africa, or al-Mustanṣīr's letters to the duʿāt of Yemen under the Ṣulayḥids, one would be at a loss to know how much communication there was between the center and the periphery of the daʿwah.

Thus to assume that the Fatimids organized the daʿwah after it had been already in existence for a century, and after it had facilitated the creation of the caliphate, is an overstatement of their mission. The Fatimids followed a conscious policy of keeping religious matters separate from administrative ones, at least once they arrived in Egypt. When Jawhar al-Ṣiqillī took over Egypt from Ikhshīdīs, his primary pre-occupation was to

17 Samuel Stern, "Cairo as the Center of the Ismaʿīlī Movement," Proceedings, p. 446.
establish for the Fatimids a lasting rule over the land. He was quick to recognize that the Fatimids could not and should not impose their religious beliefs on the Egyptians. All they could hope for was the conversion of many of the inhabitants to Ismāʿīlism, which treated the indigenous population tolerantly. Upon his arrival in Egypt, Jawhar saw that it was more expedient to leave the judicial authority in the hands of a Sunni judge, Abū al-Ṭāhir, who had been the chief judge of Egypt representing the Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad and who now continued as gāḍī’l-quḍāt.\footnote{Al-Maqrīzī, Khīṭāt, I, 137.} This decision seems to indicate that the Fatimids were conscious that if they imposed their religion by pursuing an active policy of Ismāʿīlisation, whether in the civil administration or otherwise, their rule over Egypt might prove impossible. Faced with the dilemma of imposing their religion on the indigenous population or actually looking after their political interests as rulers, the Fatimids opted for the latter. Their mission was to spread their daʿwah but not at the price of creating resistance to and rebellion against their rule. The Fatimid caliphs were known to come down
hard on extremists within their own community in order to consolidate their own power; a case in point is the ousting by the caliph al-Ḥākim of "the extremists who were responsible for the establishment of the Druze community." 19

The Fatimid civil administration was conceived by Yaʿqūb ibn Killis, who with the help of al-Ṣiqilli was able to create a form of government which was bent on recruiting its employees from the indigenous population, both Coptic Christian and Sunni Muslim. There was a conscious effort by the architects of the new administration to be non-sectarian and to leave the daʿwah in the hands of the duʿāt in order to avoid confrontation with the Egyptians. The Fatimids did not want to force their religious ideology on the Egyptians and were cautious to avoid resistance to their rule and to their efforts to consolidate their grip on the country. They followed literally the hadīth, Lā ikrāh fī al-dīn, "No compulsion in religion." This did not mean, however, that the caliph could not profess his Ismāʿīlīsm nor that the state was not a Fatimid one. But it did

mean that the da'wah remained secret and underground rather than an open activity.

Government positions were open to those who best served the state regardless of their religious affiliation. The Fatimids were known for their tolerance towards their subjects. The Iṣmā'īlī-leaning Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' expressed this tolerance eloquently: "It befits our brothers that they should not show hostility to any kind of knowledge or reject any book. Nor should they be fanatical in any doctrine, for our opinion and our doctrine embrace all doctrines and presume all knowledge."

If the Fatimids adopted even partially this idea, it would explain a great deal their ability to staff their government to the highest levels with non-Iṣmā'īlīs. If the da'wah and the state had been one, the bureaucracy would have been manned mainly by adherents of the Iṣmā'īlī faith. Qāḍī al-Nu'mān described the political objective of the Fatimid caliphate as "the removal of oppression and injustice by the overthrow of

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existing political authority." After all, Fatimid success was based on the fact that they were liberators of their subjects from "political and social disorder, economic disequilibrium and moral misery." Unlike Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī, al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān did not feel threatened by the separation of state and religion. Al-Kirmānī, writing during the time of the sixth Fatimid caliph, al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allah (reigned 996-1021), felt it necessary to emphasize the role of the imām as an absolute ruler who should avoid division of power. Al-Kirmānī did not believe in delegating power or office in the state. He felt that the power vested in the viziers and in the highest officials far exceeded the definition of the theocratic state. It is because al-Kirmānī observed the division between the civil administration and the daʿwah that he tried to reform the state and set it on its course as ideally conceived. For al-Kirmānī, as mentioned previously, politics had "to comply with the daʿwah for the establishment of proper order." But

the Fatimid caliphs and their advisers were pragmatic and knew that this would have never been possible. Their concern was to maintain their grip over Egypt and Syria. For them, proselytization and the spread of the da'wah were secondary to actual political hegemony over the land. Although "Fatimism as a political creed would never have succeeded without a religious creed," \textsuperscript{24} the Fatimids were willing to part company with the da'wah to keep the civil administration separate from the religious mission and to rule as both imāms and, in effect, emperors.

By way of comparison, the Sulayḥid Queen of Yemen followed the same policy as the Fatimids in separating the state and the da'wah towards the end of her rule, for she had seen that her power was dwindling and that for the da'wah to continue in the Yemen, she would have to opt for such a division. \textsuperscript{25}

The Fatimids were aware that the Isma'ili da'wah helped bring about their caliphate. They were also aware

\textsuperscript{24} P.J. Vatikiotis, "The Syncretic Origins," p. 488.

\textsuperscript{25} Ḥusayn ibn Fayḍ Allāh al-Ḥamdānī and Ḥusayn Sulaymān Maḥmūd, Al-Ṣulayḥiyūn waʾl-ḥarakah al-Fāṭimiyyah fīʾl-Yaman (Cairo: Maktabat Miṣr, 1305/1890), p. 180.
that the da‘wah should continue regardless of what happened to the caliphate. In recognizing that the da‘wah should not be tied down to one particular place or government, the Fatimids were able to separate the civil administration from the religious one. This kind of separation served as a sort of open policy in recruiting viziers. The personal convictions of viziers were generally of no concern to the caliphs, as long as these men were capable of handling the affairs of the caliphate.

The elite group of viziers studied here had a standard of ideal behavior set by the theoreticians of the era, such as al-Māwardī. They were expected to fulfill certain obligations and functions. They were also given privileges and prerogatives of men in the highest administrative offices of the caliphate. The viziers were supposed to be men of the highest integrity. They were commanded to be just, to be charitable, and to know God. They were to live by and practice justice in their ways, speech, and conduct, even with their enemies. They were to be calm, composed, and not be angered by the

slightest provocation. They were to be straightforward, know when to joke and when to be serious, where and in the presence of whom. Seriousness was an asset and a necessary quality for a vizier to rule his people. Honesty, frankness, and straight-forwardness were equally important characteristics.

The functions of the vizier were many, but his most important duty was to be the caliph’s own man. The caliph placed all trust in him. The latter knew the intricate turnings of Dār al-Khilāfah. He guarded its secrets with his life. As to the degree of administrative and political power that the vizier enjoyed, they depended entirely on the kind of vizierate bestowed upon him by the caliph. There were two kinds of vizierate. As we shall see in the sources cited below, the first was called wizārat al-tanfīdh, in which the vizier only executed the wishes of the caliph rather than initiate any moves of his own. This kind of vizierate existed mainly in the early days of the Fatimid caliphate. It was distinguished from wizārat al-tafwiḍ, in which the vizier was given the power to initiate, if he deemed it necessary, any reforms to insure the smooth functioning of the state, from levying taxes to going to
war. This latter is the same as wizārat al-sayf wa’l-galam, a vizierate of "the sword and the pen." Such a vizierate also gave the holder full control over the treasury (the bayt al-māl) and the mint.

Al-Māwardī summarizes the duties and prerogatives of wizārat al-tanfīdī as follows. First,

[the vizier should be] the mediator between the king and his subjects, because the king is glorified and set aside from the eyes of his people. He is also protected from the practice of direct correspondence or discourse [with his ra‘iyyah] and that is why he chooses to have a delegate or grand vizier [wazīr mu‘azzam]. 27

This kind of ministry entailed different levels of mediation, such as mediation between the king and his army; between the king and his agents [‘ummāl], which category included heads of bureaus and all the employees of the state; and, finally, between the king and his subjects. A ministry of this kind protected the rights of the king in matters of private wealth and the collection of taxes, etc. The vizier was given the task of choosing the employees and supervising their work.

27 Ibid., p. 37.
Second, according to al-Māwardī, the vizier should give the king his sound opinion, advice, and counsel, for the king although endowed with unerring judgement and clear deliberation is secluded [because of his lofty position] from pursuing these matters [i.e., mundane affairs]. Knowledge by experience is concealed from him. That is why the king needs a well-rounded and respected man with knowledge and experience to deliberate for him. 28

In this respect the duties of the vizier are many: he should provide counsel, help the king formulate his opinion, and, if the king is wrong, protect him from erring and from oppressing the ra‘iyyah. The opinion of the "chosen man" (the vizier) should be devoid of personal favoritism.

Third, al-Māwardī says that the vizier should be the king’s wandering eye and his listening ear. He should describe what he sees in detail and without any distortion. He should also tell all the truth with no exception, for he is an equal in kingship and power with the king. He is chosen to be especially close, and he is appointed to the highest administrative office. In return he

is expected to take care of the affairs of his king. 29

He should discuss with the king matters pertaining to policy, keep him informed about what takes place, be in a position to distinguish among the important issues, and to take care of more pressing problems promptly, while not shelving the less important ones and dealing with them in due time. 30

Fourth, the vizier should "offer up his comfort and ease for his king. He should protect him by defending his name against those who put him down. He is never absent even if allowed to be, and he does not despair if he is made to repeat [a task]." 31

As for wizārat al-tafwīd, which combines the power of the pen and the sword, al-Māwardī described it as a vizierate in which [the vizier] takes hold of management, planning, economy, military, organization and direction [of affairs of the kingdom]. He is the one who write contracts and breaks them. He is the one who appoints and who dismisses those

29 Ibid., p. 41.
30 Ibid., p. 41.
31 Ibid., p. 42.
in power.\textsuperscript{32}

The conditions or the duties of \textit{wazir al-tafwil} are four. First, he should implement the orders of the king whereby if the vizier thinks the order should be modified, he should act to ensure its modification; if it is adequate, it should be implemented immediately. He should then carry out his plans in order to run the kingdom effectively, informing the king of every plan he has. He should also see to it that his agents execute the tasks assigned them. In all he does, he should keep in mind the wishes of the people (\textit{al-za'iyah}). Second, he should attend to the defense of the kingdom by defending the king from his relatives, friends, supporters, and foes; and by defending the kingdom against the enemy. Then he should attend to his personal defense; and finally he should defend the populace from being abused by their king. Third, fearlessness, enterprise, initiative, and courage in politics are the job’s most important conditions. Fourth, cautiousness (\textit{al-hadar}), alertness, and circumspection are prerequisites in this position. In order for the vizier to run the affairs of

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 10.
the kingdom smoothly, he should be careful and cautious, but not to the point of becoming weak and spiritless. 33

After having discussed the duties and prerogatives of both kinds of vizierates, al-Mawardī summarizes the differences between them as follows:

1. The king gives power to wazīr al-tafwīd to safeguard his rights and the rights of his raʿīyāh while the wazīr al-tanfīdh is given direct orders from the king. 2. There is no contract for wazīr al-tafwīd, while for the tanfīdh there is a specific contract by which the vizier is made an official of the king.

3. The wazīr al-tafwīd is bound by his signature whereas wazīr al-tanfīdh is not responsible for any orders because they emanate from the king.

4. The wazīr al-tafwīd can be discharged from his office by simple utterance of the phrase [by the king], whereas the wazīr al-tanfīdh is discharged by a "truce" in which severance pay is given because he is the king’s employee [maʿmuṣ].

5. The wazīr al-tafwīd leaves office by resigning from his position and returning all tasks pertaining to the administration back to the king; whereas if the wazīr al-tanfīdh wishes to resign, he has no attachments and can do so of his own will.

6. The wizārat al-tafwīd is a combination of both

33 Ibid., pp. 10-21 passim.
military and administrative ministry [with all powers vested in both], while wizārat al-tanfīdh does not have any of these powers.\textsuperscript{34}

The theoretical vizierate was in several respects very different from the Fatimid experience. Many viziers exercised bad leadership, lacked knowledge of affairs of state, or indulged themselves with intrigues. Even worse, some viziers worked to promote themselves over the interests of the ra‘īyyah and the caliphate. Those who came close to al-Māwardī’s description, or to al-Kirmānī’s, were few and far between. Probably no human being could attain the degree of perfection that both theoreticians would have preferred. The rigid criteria by which al-Māwardī wanted to measure the viziers remained an ideal that few could realize. The next chapter will consider the salient characteristics of the sixty viziers who served the Fatimid caliphs and will study three of them in order to determine how closely Fatimid practice followed Fatimid theory.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p. 43.
CHAPTER THREE
THE VIZIERATE IN PRACTICE:
A CAREER-LINE ANALYSIS AND THREE CASE STUDIES

We have already seen the resemblances and differences between the Abbasid and Fatimid vizierate, but many questions remain concerning the latter. How, for example, did it fit into al-Kirmānī’s theory of the theocratic state? Did it help the Fatimids build an administration which was the most hierarchical of its time? Were the viziers as an elite group effective in mobilizing the ra‘īyyah as has been suggested? Did they form a cohesive unit - as far as their backgrounds, their administrative experience, social, political and religious - which gave the Fatimid caliphate a sense of continuity?

The method that will be pursued here in studying the vizierate and the role of the viziers in the Fatimid caliphate is prosopographical. As described by Lawrence Stone, "prosopography is the investigation of the common background characteristics of a group of actors in
history by means of a collective study of their lives."¹
This method constitutes a basis for answering questions
relating to "birth, death, marriage and family, social
origins and inherited economic position, place of
residence, education, amount and source of personal
wealth, occupation, religion, experience of office."²

Prospographical study, the data for which are
contained in Appendix Two, has yielded the following
results. Concerning duration of office, thirty-five
viziers were in office for a year or less, thirteen of
them served less than one month, twelve spent less than
one year, and ten one whole year in office. Seven
viziers spent two years in office; eight served three
years; and two viziers spent four years in office. Four
viziers served eight years, and four served more than
nine years in office.

As for geographic origins, the viziers came from
lands even outside the caliphate: fourteen Iraqis, nine
Egyptians, seven Armenians, six Maghribīs, six Shāmīs,
two Arabs (bedouins?), two Kurds, two Palestinians, two

¹ Lawrence Stone, "Prosopography," Daedalus, 100

² Ibid., p. 46.
Persians, one Libyan, one Sicilian, one Rûmî (Anatolian?), and seven unknown.

In religious background there were fewer Ismāʿīlī viziers than all other religious groups combined: twenty-nine non-Ismāʿīlī to twenty-three Ismāʿīlī viziers. Among the non-Ismāʿīlīs, there were seven Christians, three Jews, eleven Sunnis, six Shiʿis, one "Unitarian" (lawḥīdī, perhaps Druze?), one Muslim without a madhhab, and eight unknown.

Professionally or occupationally, the majority of viziers, forty of them, came from administrative positions such as ruʿasāʾ al-dawāwīn or kutṭāb class. Five were gadīs, two from the military, two merchants, one "literary man" (adīb), one tribal leader, one court guard, one spy, and one laborer. Six viziers were of unknown professional or occupational background.

The viziers’ socio-economic backgrounds fall into the following categories: fifteen were very wealthy, influential, and well-known in society; another fifteen were wealthy but not as well known or as influential; seven aristocrats (amīrs and tribal shaykhs); three religious men of whom two were from very well-known and wealthy families; six from what one would today term the
middle class; three freed slaves; two slaves; one eunuch; one peasant; one sayyid; and six unknown. The criteria by which the contemporary sources chose to designate the viziers depended on their families' social standing and their wealth, measured by how much money they had, their ownership of beasts of burden, of slaves, and of concubines, their ownership of farms, and the extended families' prestige and holdings. For some of the viziers, chroniclers such as Ibn Muyassar in Akhbar Miṣr and Ibn al-Ṣayrafi in Al-ʾIshāra ilā man nāla al-wizāraḥ, furnish such information. If one were to superimpose a twentieth-century categorization on the viziers' class backgrounds, one would find that twenty-five belonged to the upper class; twenty-one belonged to the middle class (including fifteen from the upper-middle and six from the middle-middle classes); and seven belonged to the lower

3 For example, Ibn al-Ṣayrafi, in his biography of Yaḥyā ibn al-Mudabbār, the vizier of al-Muṭṣanṣir, introduces him as follows: "This vizier was of a famous family in the Abbasid state; historical works have included information about his ancestors." In describing Abu Shujāʾ Muḥammad ibn al-ʾAshraf, Ibn al-Ṣayrafi has this to say: "He was generous and well to do, as is mentioned in the histories." Al-ʾIshāraḥ, pp. 41, 53.
classes. Despite the Fatimids' efforts to recruit qualified viziers regardless of background, those who attained the office tended to come from the better-educated and more affluent classes. Violence was the norm by which the viziers departed from this world, twenty-eight of them falling victim to conspiracies, jealousies, rivalries, etc. Nineteen died natural deaths. As for the rest, thirteen in all, no cause of death is recorded.

Although heirs to different political traditions, the Fatimid viziers served their caliphs within the framework of the new administration created by their masters and tailored for their own purposes of government. With few exceptions (such as al-Afḍal, the vizier of the caliph al-Āmir), they worked within the confines of the bureaucracy. Because the majority came from the scribal class, they were well versed in the art of government and capable of becoming pillars of the administration. In speaking of the Fatimid system in these words: "Given the perfection of [its] centralized administrative machine that would continue in large measure to work with fair effectiveness regardless of the
directing hand," 4 Von Grunebaum seems to suggest that the Fatimid system was somehow immune to disintegration if the viziers were not competent, a partially true statement. The Fatimid administrative apparatus was structured to take into account the differences between one vizier and another and still be effective; yet no system functions to its full capacity if the management is defective.

Social and geographical mobility were welcomed by the Fatimids. Freed slaves or noblemen were treated alike by the caliphs, who gave them equally honorific titles. When Abū Najīm Badr al-Jamālī al-Mustanṣirī, a slave of the caliphate (min mamālik al-dawlah), worked his way up the ladder and became the vizier of al-Mustanṣir, he was given the title of al-sayyīd al-a‘all, amīr al-juyūsh, sayf al-Islām, nāṣir al-imām. The title given by the same caliph to one of the most celebrated Fatimid viziers, Sa‘īd ibn Mas‘ūd, was ‘amīd al-mulk zayn al-kufāt, much less honorific than that given to a slave. The Fatimids were after competence and know-how. They wanted trustworthy individuals with insight and

experience in bureaucracy to insure a smooth-running government. The Fatimids’ lack of rigidity, in other terms their policy of non-discrimination towards religious minorities, non-natives, and lower classes, encouraged those seeking the second-highest office of state to prove themselves as excellent administrators and to be rewarded by selection to the vizierate.

Some would argue that this policy towards aliens, non-Ismāʿīlīs, and those of humble background, was due to the Fatimids’ conviction that those men would serve the state with all honesty, integrity, and with no intention of creating problems for the caliph. This conviction might have been partially true, but the Fatimids solemnly believed that they were in power to relieve Muslims of the intolerance of other dynasties, to wipe out famine, and to remedy the ills that had afflicted the ummah.

As previously discussed, the Fatimids had the majority of their viziers as "alien residents" (‘ābir ẓarīq or gharīb), which could have been considered a liability, especially if the viziers’ allegiance was to their place of birth. In many instances, that birthplace would have been either under the rule of the Abbasid caliphs, the Seljuk sultans, or some other dynasty in the
eastern Mediterranean. Many of the "alien resident" viziers were descendants of bureaucrats who had served those dynasties. This background, instead of being a liability, was a ticket for them to become administrators and eventually to become viziers in the Fatimid caliphate.

On the whole, Fatimid viziers had a great say in running affairs of state, with the exceptions of the majority of the viziers of the caliph al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh (reigned 386–411 /996–1021). The majority of viziers were wuzarā' tawīl, rather than wuzarā' tanfīdīh, and they ran the government single-handedly. Al-Suyūṭī suggests a different viewpoint in Ḥusn al-muhādarah: that this situation in part was due to a lack of ability on the caliphs' part from al-Mustanṣir on to maintain total control. Much of the power was in the hands of the viziers, as had been the case with the later Abbasids. 5

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5 Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Suyūṭī, Ḥusn al-muhādarah fī akhābār Mīgr waʿl-Qāhirah, London, British Library, MS 23,332, fol 113r. ʿAbd Allāh al-Sharqāwī, Tuhfat al-nāẓirīn fī-man wulliya Mīgr min al-wulāt waʿl-salāṭīn (Mīr: n.p., 1864), p. 47. If the Fatimids were unable to control their realms, nor able to govern, how can (continued...)
Many of the caliphs did not abdicate all their responsibilities in administering their realm in favor of their viziers. Had they done that (as the Abbasids had before them) the caliphs would not have been able to fire their viziers at will or even to dispose of them in a harsher manner. Moreover, dynastic succession of viziers did not occur. The caliphs from al-Mustanṣir onward were willing to give viziers more power, because in many instances the caliphs themselves were not charismatic characters or able persons who could have dictated their terms to the ra’iyyah. Moreover, many of the later caliphs were far too young (not having attained their majority) to be able to handle government business. Therefore, many of the tafwīd viziers were given honorific titles indicative of their enhanced power.\(^5\)

\(^5\) (...continued) one explain al-Ḥāfiẓ’s dismissing his vizier and ruling as the only administrator? “Al-Ḥāfiẓ killed Riḍwān [his vizier] and did not appoint another after him; he directed affairs himself until he died.” See ‘Imād al-Dīn Abūʾl-Fidā’i, Al-Mukhtasar fī tārīkh al-bashar (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifah, 1972), III, 12.

\(^6\) As an example of titles given to tafwīd viziers, one could choose Badr al-Jamālī (466-488/1073-1095) and his (continued...)
Many other viziers with such titles, however, had little influence on the bureaucracy or with the people. But, on the whole, one could attribute the government’s functioning, or lack of it, to this elite group, the tawfiq viziers. They pulled the levers, although the last word in many cases rested with the caliph, who more often than not took their recommendations and acted on them without any modification or amendment.

6(...continued)
son. Badr’s titles were: al-sayyid al-ajall, amin al-
juuyush, sayf al-Islam, nasir al-imam. Badr’s son al-Afdal’s titles (487-515/1094-1121) were: shahinsah al-sayyid al-
ajall, al-afdal, sayf al-Islam, jallal al-Islam, sharaf al-
anam, nasir al-din, khalil amir al-muminun. These two viziers were in office for twenty years each.

7 As for honorific titles given to viziers during the caliphate of al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah or of al-Mustansir, such viziers ruled for very short intervals and did not influence events or contribute to the running of the caliphate. To mention but a few as examples: the vizier of al-Mustansir, Abul Hasan Tahir ibn Wazir (458 A.H.) was entitled al-ajall, al-wajih, sayyid al-kufat, nafs al-dawlah, zahir amir al-
muminun. He was in power for a few days. So was his contemporary, Abul Abd Allah Muhammad ibn Abul Hamid, who spent one day as vizier and was given the title: al-qadir al-‘adil, shams al-umam, sayyid ru’as‘a’ al-sayf wa’l-qalam, taj al-‘ulam, amir al-hudat, sharaf al-din ghayath al-Islam wa’l-Muslimun, hamim amir al-muminun wa zahirun.
Although the Fatimids had a variety of viziers from different backgrounds, administrative experience, and social, political, and religious affiliations, they were to a certain extent a cohesive unit, as far as their ability to run the administration within the boundaries or set norms of Fatimid bureaucratic practice. That practice had been created by Ibn Killis with the help of Jawhar al-Šiqillī and their entourages. As far as mobilization of the raʿiyyah to support the system, the Fatimid viziers were successful. Full-fledged insurrections against them were rare. An alien house, the Fatimids, with the majority of their raʿiyyah as non-Ismāʿīlīs, had no opposition to their rule. As Goitein put it, the Fatimids "knew how to make friends and how to influence public opinion." Moreover, the Fatimids allowed their raʿiyyah "freedom of speech and thought, because their political prestige was so great." 

The viziers on the whole helped to build the administration of the Fatimids as a unique experiment in bureaucratic organization because it was possible for

such men to experiment, to suggest, and to implement their ideas. The liberal spirit of the Fatimid period promoted talent and encouraged a spirit of innovation. Concerning the viziers themselves, then, it is clear that Fatimid practice did not fit al-Kirmānī’s theory of the theocratic state.

To demonstrate this divergence between theory and practice, the careers of three prominent viziers from three different periods of the Fatimid caliphate will be discussed. (Data on the fifty-seven other viziers may be found in Appendix One). The three viziers are: Yaʿqūb ibn Killis, Bahrām al-Armānī, and Badr al-Jamālī. These men represented the Fatimid administration at its best. They all contributed to its uniqueness and effectiveness. And they built the bureaucracy and helped it develop into a model to be followed by other Islamic empires.

By far the most important figure to hold the vizierate was Yaʿqūb ibn Killis, the architect of Fatimid administration. Ibn Killis was an Iraqi Jew of distinguished lineage. It is noteworthy that all the

10 S.D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, I, 34.

11 Ibn Killis traced his ancestry to Aaron. The (continued...)
information we have concerning him comes from Arab historians; the Jewish sources of his time are silent. As Fischel points out, "the shortage of Hebrew sources may be responsible for this, and possibly his conversion to Islam, as the result of which Jewish sources might prefer to ignore him."  

12 Whatever the case, Ibn Killis still maintained his close relationships with the Jewish communities in both the Maghrib and Egypt. Ibn Khallikān notes that Ibn Killis died a Jew (māta 'alā dīnīh); in the same breath Ibn Khallikān disregards his own remark and says: "He professed Islam, and it was true that he converted to it, and that his Islam was a true one."  

13 Whether or not Ibn Killis was truly a Muslim is

11(...continued)


13 Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-a'yan, VII, 34.
a matter for debate, for he helped many Jews attain positions in the Fatimid bureaucracy. Whether this was a matter of their being most qualified or whether he was playing favorites cannot be proven.

As a young man, Yaʿqūb studied the art of writing and mathematics in Baghdad. After spending the first, formative part of his life there, he moved with his merchant father to Syria, where he set up his own business. His stay in Syria did not last very long and he then moved to Egypt in 331/942. There he worked as a currency exchange broker. Ibn al-Ṣayrāfī describes him as an honest man who was loved by his co-workers and his clients alike. At that time the Fatimids’ immediate predecessors, the Ikhshīdīs, were the rulers of Egypt. Kāfūr al-Ikhshīdī, impressed by Yaʿqūb’s honesty and intelligence, invited him to join his court. At the court Yaʿqūb worked very hard to win Kāfūr’s trust, which he soon attained. He thus became sole organizer of the court’s expenditures. Kāfūr became more and more dependent on Ibn Killis and thought of giving him full authority over the realm as a vizier. But Kāfūr was

14 Ibn al-Ṣayrāfī, Al-Iṣārah, p. 91.
unable to make this appointment because Ibn Killis was not a Muslim. Upon learning that, Ibn Killis decided to convert. He became a Muslim on Monday, 18 Sha‘bān, 356/966. He then took up the study of the Qur’ān and of Arabic grammar, in which he became very well versed. He served in Kāfūr’s court until the latter died. Because of Ibn Killis’s preferred status at Kāfūr’s court, Ibn al-Furāt, who was the number one man during the Ikhshīdī era up until the rise of Ibn Killis, made it impossible for the latter to stay at court. He even imprisoned him, but Ibn Killis bought his freedom and travelled to the Maghrib, where he joined the Jewish community. There is no evidence that he apostatized from Islam, a capital offense in Islamic jurisprudence.

15 A non-Muslim was not allowed to become a vizier because one of the vizier’s duties was to stand at the minbar during Friday prayers, a practice which a non-Muslim could not carry out. This was an important duty, for every Friday the oath of allegiance to the state was taken by the ra‘iyyah.

16 Ibn Khallikan, Wafayāt al-a‘yān, VII, 28; Ibn al-Ṣayrafi, Al-Ishārah, p. 92, provides the date.

17 Sibt ibn al-Jawzī, Mir‘āt al-zaman, Volume IV (358-400 A.H.), Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 5866, fol 127r.
While in the Maḡrib, he joined the administration of the Fatimid caliph al-Muʿizz in 363/973. With al-Muʿizz he moved to Egypt, where he was entrusted, along with ʿAslūj ibn al-Ḥasan, with the kharāj and the collection of all other taxes: al-hisbah, al-mawārīth, al-ḥāṣ, al-shurṭatayn, al-sawāḥil, and al-jawālī. This was the time when he introduced his equitable taxation method. He also handled the budget and the salaries of all state personnel.

In his new capacity as a tax collector, Ibn Killis and his colleague introduced a new Egyptian currency which made any payment with the previously used Raḍī dinar equivalent to seventy-five per cent of the newly-coined dinar, called al-Muʿizzī. In making tax

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18 Al-Maqrīzī, Ittiʿāz, I, 144-145. It has been said that whenever Ibn Killis went to a village in Egypt, he knew by glancing at it how many people lived in it, how much their income was, and how much tax they paid. He actually ran a census of all the villages and instituted a reassessment of the kharāj so that no-one would suffer unduly. Cf. Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn Muyassar, Akhbār Miṣr, ed. Henri Massé (Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie, 1919), II, 45.

19 Al-Maqrīzī, Ittiʿāz, I, 146: "Yaʿqūb and ʿAslūj (continued...)
payments, people lost on the exchange, which was tantamount to a devaluation, while officials thereby replenished the coffers of the depleted bayt al-māl. The government collected taxes without accepting any delays or barter or ḥawālah (letter of credit). Cash on the spot was the way Ibn Killis ran the affairs of the new regime in Egypt. It is related by al-Maqrīzī and by Ibn Zulāq that in one day Ibn Killis collected 220,000 dinars in kharāj money from Damietta, TinnĪs, and Ashmonīn, only to be superseded by 'Alī ibn 'Amr al-'Addās during the caliphate of al-'Azīz.

Ibn Killis's strict policy of tax collection provided the Fatimids with a full treasury which was much needed in building a solid administration and in consolidating their rule over the newly-acquired territories. Al-Maqrīzī relates that al-'Azīz, when he was ready to fight Haftakīn, a general in Buyid service—this reference is to Haftakīn al-Turkī al-A'war, the slave of Mu'izz al-Dawlah ibn Buwayh al-Daylamī, who

19(...)continued) refused to accept the kharāj except in Mu'izzī dinars; thus the Rādī dinar was devalued and in exchange transactions it lost one-fourth of its actual value. People lost on their liquid assets."
ruled al-Shām during the early part of al-'Azīz's caliphate\textsuperscript{20} - his princes collected a tremendous amount of money to absorb the cost of the war. When al-'Azīz wanted to return the money to its donors because it exceeded by far the projected cost, Ibn Killis protested by saying that the treasury needed to be full for the future so that the caliph would not have to count on donations from his loyal followers; rather, he could wage war with no strings attached, as it would be financed by his own treasury.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, al-'Azīz had to back down from returning the gifts and instead channeled them into the bayt al-māl.

Ibn Killis became ra'īs al-dawāwīn or head of the bureaus at a point in his career when he was already running the caliph al-Mu'izz's affairs from the latter's palace. A few years afterward, in Ramaḍān 368/978, he was given the title of al-wazīr al-ajALL, the glorious vizier.\textsuperscript{22} Ibn Killis outlived his master and was among


\textsuperscript{21} Al-Maqrīzī, Itti'āz, I, 248.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibn al-Ṣayrafl, Al-Ishārah, p. 92.
the few who were privileged to know that his sovereign had passed away before the news was officially announced by the caliph’s son; in fact, the vizier was present at the death bed. He was then reappointed vizier by al-
'Azīz in the same year (368/978). 23 He thus became the first vizier of the Fatimids in Egypt. According to Abū-Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī, Ibn Killis’s vizierate was "a substitute for a caliphate." 24 He was a vizier from arbāb al-aqlām, and his power as unlimited as al-Māwardī’s wāzīr al-tafwīd.

Ibn Killis was a learned man whose court was the meeting place of lawyers, judges, linguists, and learned men of the day. In fact, a historian and contemporary, Ibn Zulāq ‘Alī, referred to Ibn Killis as al-qādī al-wāzīr. 25 He must have had an education at the hands of the ‘ulamā‘ who frequented the court, thus entitling him to be called qādī. He was also a faqīh of the Ismā‘īlī

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24 Quoted in Ibn al-Ṣayrafi, Al-Ishārah, p. 91: wizāratuh niyābatan ‘an khilāfah.
25 Ibn Zulāq, Tarīkh Miqr wa faḍā’il iluhā, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 1817, fol 41v.
rite and wrote several books, of which his *Al-Risālah al-wizāriyyah* was particularly widely read and was considered by the Fatimid propagandists (*dā'īs*) to be the best book for the interested layman.\(^\text{26}\) Although a convert to Islam, he did much to help promote the Ismā'īlī cause. For example, it was to his credit that an Ismā'īlī mosque outside Bāb al-Futūḥ in Cairo was finished.

Ibn Killis was a man whose insight and brilliance made it possible for him to build a centralized government for the Fatimids. "In Egypt the Fatimids started their rule by setting up the most centralized and hierarchical administration ever known in Islam [up until then], [and] the architect of this elaborate plan was Ya'qūb b. Killis."\(^\text{27}\) His most important contribution was

\(^{26}\) *Al-Maqrīzī, Ittiʿāz, II*, 175. Ibn Killis’s work, which has not survived, is referred to by Ibn al-Ṣayraffī, *Al-Ishārah*, p. 91.

tax reform, especially of the kharāj. He went about his reforms by personally visiting every village and by calculating how much potentially each village could contribute to the coffers of the central government and by matching his figures with what the government was actually getting. Where the population had increased, he increased taxes, and where it had decreased, he lowered taxes, thus relieving hardships for peasants, allowing them to improve their lot and to become more productive. His skill as financier helped replenish the treasury after it had been drained by wars. He was not an extravagant man; he spent wisely, thus allowing for accumulation of capital, which was channelled to defense purposes if need be. Ibn Killis also had control over the expenditures of the army, and over recruitment and numbers.

Ibn Killis’s power as a vizier was unlimited because of his personal ties as trusted advisor and friend of al-ʿAzīz. In many instances his word overruled that of the caliph himself. Many critics of the Fatimids during

28 "It is said that the wālī of Ṭīmān, Bakjūr, during al-ʿAzīz’s caliphate, asked al-ʿAzīz to grant him the (continued...)}
the time of al-`Azīz did not hesitate to make their feelings known as to who ran the state. A poet who lived in Egypt, and who was a contemporary of al-`Azīz, Ibn Killis, and the army commander, Faḍl, articulated the dismay of many Egyptians at the power which Ibn Killis enjoyed:

Become a Christian, for Christianity is the true religion,
For all the signs of our times point in this direction.
So pronounce the Three in reverence and humility,
And drop those not in their company, for they are unacceptable.
For Ya'qūb the vizier is the father, while al-`Azīz is the son, and the holy spirit is Faḍl.29

28(...continued)
wilāyah of Damascus. Al-`Azīz responded by installing him. But, when he went to inform the wāli of Ba`albak about his fortune, the latter refused him the office because of a letter that Ya'qūb ibn Killis had written to him, telling him to refuse Bakjūr for the position. Bakjūr was unable to assume his new office until Ibn Killis gave his blessing." Al-Maqrīzī, Itti`āz, I, 259.

29 Although the poem infuriated Ibn Killis, al-`Azīz pardoned the poet; but Ibn Killis, exercising his power as wazīr tafwīd, had him decapitated. Al-Maqrīzī, Itti`āz, I, 298. The poem reads:

(continued...
The power of Ibn Killis was such that many persons though that it was he who was actually the ruler, and not the caliph. Al-Kirmānī’s emphasis on and concern for the possibility that the caliph-imām not lose his authority as the man in command, as the one who should exercise absolute authority over his realm, with all of his assistants subordinate to him. Ibn Killis had become at least an equal to the caliph, if he did not exceed him in power. His creation and organization of many new bureaus merited him the title of architect of the Fatimid bureaucracy. His position was so strong that he was allowed to run the dīwāns from his own home rather than from the traditionally-accepted place for them, the caliph’s palace. The employees of these administrative bureaus worked in his own home and under his supervision. He oversaw the day-to-day work mechanics of the bureaus and made sure that salaries paid were not wasted. Only

29(...continued)
Tanaṣṣar fā al-tanāṣṣur dīnu ḥaqqin.
ʿAlayhi zamānuna hādha yadullu.
Wa qul bi-thalāthatīn ʿizzu wa jallu
Wa ʿaṭṭīl mā siwāhum fa huwa ʿiṭlu.
Fa Yaʿqūbu al-wazīru abun, wa hādhā
Al-ʿAzīzu ibnun, wa rūḥu al-qudsī Faṭlu.
once, in 373/983, when Ibn Killis was thrown in prison for an alleged conspiracy which cost the life of a friend of the caliph, did al-'Azīz order the removal of the bureaus from Ibn Killis's home. They were then housed for a two-month period in the caliphal palace, their usual site, until Ibn Killis was reinstated.\footnote{Ibn Killis was proven not guilty and was reinstated as vizier; the bureaus were returned to his own home.} Ibn Killis was also the first vizier to have his name appear with that of the caliph on the ṭarrāz or royal cloth which was spun for the use of the nobility by the official cloth-maker of the state.\footnote{Al-Maqrizī, Ittiḥād, I, 262.} No doubt his was a wizārat ṭafwīd, for he had the initiative in all affairs of government.\footnote{Ḥamza ibn al-Qalānisī, Dhayl tāribh Dimashq (Beirut: al-Maṭba‘ah al-Yasū‘iyyah, 1908), p. 32.} It is interesting to note that Ibn Killis, because of his ability as an administrator, was also given, for the first time, the honor of having his own letterhead, which read: "From Ya‘qūb ibn Killis, vizier of amīr al-mu‘minīn to so and so."\footnote{Ibn Ţāfir, Akhbār al-duwal al-munqatī‘ah, p. 39.} A letterhead
might not be novel in this day and age, but it was surely an innovation during Ibn Killis's time. One might also argue that if Ya'qūb ibn Killis held court for all the dīwāns, he should have had his own letterhead, which, however, would have been unprecedented in a caliph's court. Although many of his contemporaries begrudged Ibn Killis his power and success, many historians who called him a hypocrite did not fail to say that the affairs of al-'Azīz's empire ran smoothly and correctly.34

Ibn Killis remained as vizier until his death in the year 380/990. Even on his death-bed, he still had time to advise his master, al-'Azīz: "O Commander of the Faithful, keep peace with Byzantium, when they keep peace with you; and keep the Hamdanids satisfied by constant contact."35 With the death of Ibn Killis, the Fatimids lost a mastermind and a creator of an administrative

34 Ibid., p. 39.
system which was to outlive the Fatimid caliphate itself. Ibn Killis did not fit into al-Kirmānī’s definition of a vizier in a theocratic state. In fact, it was viziers like him who had preceded al-Kirmānī who prompted the latter to write his treatise. As a devout Ismā‘Ilī theologian, he did not, for obvious reasons, want to see the power of the imām being delegated. Ibn Killis’s vizierate was “a substitute for a caliphate.” The caliph not only delegated power but also gave him the authority to make major decisions, from waging war to changing the tax system. If al-Kirmānī’s model had existed at the time of al-‘Azīz and if it had been rigidly pursued and absolutely binding, Ibn Killis would not have had all this power, nor would he have been able to run the affairs of the caliphate without being checked by the caliph himself. He would not have been able to initiate any fiscal reforms, nor would he have been able to assume the responsibility for creating new dīwāns and for reorganizing the caliphate into new administrative

36 Al-‘Aynī, Tārīkh dawlat banī’l-‘Abbās, Paris MS arabe 5761, fol 173r.
37 Ibn al-Ṣayraḥī, Al-Ishārah, p. 91.
units. Any such reforms would have had to emanate from the caliph himself. The power to go to war if necessity dictated it, according to al-Kirmānī’s theory, should only be vested in the caliph-imam, not the vizier, who in the case of Ibn Killis continued to be considered a Jew by the people, and not an Ismāʿīlī.

Although al-ʿAzīz was a strong caliph, he chose to delegate power to Ibn Killis. He gave him a delegated ministry over the Fatimid realms, wizarat tawfiq, because the Fatimids, upon moving their capital to Cairo, decided that it would be impossible for them to rule such a vast empire without sharing or delegating power to an administrator of their choice, which in practice diverged from al-Kirmānī’s theory. In the case of Ibn Killis, the Fatimid caliph al-Muʿizz and his son al-ʿAzīz chose the right man for the job.

The reorganization of the administration was due to Ibn Killis’s efforts. He alone deserves the name he was given as architect of the Fatimid bureaucracy. The chain of command the responsibility for caliphal policies rested in his hands. In turn he was responsible to the caliph and took orders only from him. He issued commands to the bureau chiefs and they in turn handed the orders
to the kuttāb and from the kuttāb to the hujjāb and to the lowest-ranking officials. This pyramid-like concept of administration made it the most hierarchical administration in the Muslim world then. In his capacity as gādī and vizier, Ibn Killis was in touch with the ṭariyyah, its aspirations and complaints, which were heard by him and by his bureau chiefs. The vizier in this respect was able to sway the masses of the populace, especially in rallying around the caliph and in defending the realm.

Ibn Killis was the man for his time, as was our second example, Badr al-Jamālī, whose vizierate occurred at a time when the future of the caliphate was in doubt. Abū Najm Badr al-Jamālī al-Mustanṣirī al-Īsmā‘īlī (d. 488/1095; vizier, 466-488/1073-1095) was born a slave to Jamāl al-Dawlah ibn 'Ammār. An Armenian by origin, Badr al-Jamālī was an ambitious young man who reached the highest office of state.38 As a freed slave, he entered the service of the caliph in the army. He distinguished himself as a career officer and worked his way up until he was named commander-in-chief of the army. In this

38 Ibn al-Ṣayraffi, Al-Ishārah, p. 58.
position he introduced a new element into the army, the Armenian contingent, which owed him its loyalty because of his ethnic background. At its zenith, this contingent numbered over 20,000 men. The new ethnic group was the key element in Badr al-Jamālī’s ability to control the situation and re-establish peace and order in the realms of the caliphate after 466/1073.

Although Badr al-Jamālī’s Armenian contingent was the reason for his success in re-establishing the peace, the addition of one more ethnic group to the army created problems for the Fatimids later on. Their army was composed of Turks, Sudanese, Maghrībīs, and mercenaries.39 Introducing the Armenians posed the risk

39 Al-Maqrīzī, Ittiḥād, II, 311; Jere L. Bacharach, "African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East," IJMES, 13 (1981): 486: "The most important change [introduced by Badr al-Jamālī] was the use of large numbers of Armenians for infantrymen." For further discussion of the composition of the army during Badr al-Jamālī’s time, see M. Canard, "Notes sur les arméniens en Égypte à l’époque fatimide," Annales de l’Institut d’études orientales, 13 (1955): 144; and Muḥammad Ḥamdī al-Manāwī, Al-Wizārah wa’l-wuzāra’ fī’l-‘asr al-Fātimī (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1970), p. 179: "After Badr got rid of the bad elements in al-Mustanṣir’s army, the only contingent that was left was the (continued...
of adding the potential for internecine conflict among the military contingents, which became a reality later in the history of the Fatimid state.

Badr al-Jamālī’s distinguished career as a commander of the army was matched by his administrative one. He was the governor of Damascus in 454/1062. His governorship of that area did not last more than two years, due to a revolt against his strict application of the law. This episode did not by any means end his career. He was shortly afterwards (458/1065) renamed governor of "Greater Syria," from which he fled in 460/1067 because of a military insurrection which ultimately led to a general revolt in the whole area.

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39(...continued)
Armenian one, which originally came with Badr from al-Shām and were known as al-Juyūshiyyah, in reference to amīr al-jaysh Badr, and he gave them al-Ḥusayniyyah quarter, which used to be for the blacks [lis-sūd]."

40 Al-Maqrīzī, Ittiṣāz, II, 268.

41 Ibid., II, 277, contains the reference to Greater Syria or bilād al-Shām; Ibn al-Ṣayrāfī, Al-Ishārah, p. 58; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, Dhayl, p. 93. For a complete biography of Badr al-Jamālī as governor of Damascus and of al-Shām, see Khalīl ibn Aybak al-Ṣafādī, Tuḥfat dhawī al-albāb fī man ḥakam bi-Dināshq min al-khulafā’ wa’l-mulūk wa’l-nuwwāb, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 5827, ff 131r-131v.
These two administrative positions, although short-lived, helped to prepare him to become a vizier of the type described previously as "vizier of the sword and the pen," a combination of military and administrative career. He was called by al-Mustanṣir to assume the vizierate in 466/1073.

Badr al-Jamālī became vizier at the insistence of the caliph, whose reign had been plagued by internal strife and by struggles within the armed forces, mainly between the black contingents and the Turkish ones. Al-Mustanṣir’s reign was dominated by his mother, who was a black woman. Under her influence, al-Mustanṣir installed her nominee as vizier. She was able through her man to run the affairs of the caliphate in the name of her under-age son. In her capacity as Umm Al-Mustanṣir, she was able to increase the number of blacks.

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42 Al-Sayyidah Raṣd, the mother of al-Mustanṣir, was born a Sudanese slave and was owned by a Jewish merchant in Egypt named Abū Saʿīd ibn Hārūn al-Tustarī. She was given to the caliph al-Ẓāhir upon the latter’s request for his enjoyment. During her husband’s lifetime she showed no favor to Abū Saʿīd and played no political role until her son al-Mustanṣir became caliph. See Ibn Muyassar, Akhbār Miṣr, II, 1; Jacob Mann, The Jews in Egypt and in Palestine under the Fatimid Caliphs (New York: Ktav, 1970), p. 77.
(Sudanese) in the army and in her own personal contingent: "By purchasing black slaves as her special contingent..., she favored them in government and she was extremely generous to them." She was hostile toward the Turkish contingents, which created many problems for al-Mustanṣir. This led to increased tensions between the Turks and the newcomers, particularly the fact that the Turkish contingent looked down on the latter as slaves. Eventually a rift arose in the Fatimid armed forces. The Turks led the fight against the "slaves" (ʿabīd), a common name for black Africans. The country ultimately was paralyzed for twelve years as al-Mustanṣir witnessed the disintegration of his realm. The war between both groups started in 454/1062 and lasted into 466/1073, when Badr became al-Mustanṣir’s vizier. That year marked the beginning of the end of the caliphate’s problems; at least with internal strife over for a while, the caliphate would last another century.

The period of unrest in Fatimid history from 454-466/1062-1073 had been marked by the short-lived vizierates of sixteen men, which made any policy-making...

43 Al-Maqrīzī, Ittiḥāṣ, II, 273.
or continuity impossible. All through this period the army was able to dictate to al-Mustanṣir its own candidates for the second-most important position in the caliphate, the vizierate. Because of the Turks’ stature in the army, their numbers, and influence, and because of al-Mustanṣir’s weaknesses and the economic weakness of the time, the Turks were able to demand a raise in pay to meet the inflationary situation. The growing numbers of blacks in the army alarmed the Turkish contingent. According to al-Maqrīzī, the black contingents numbered about 50,000 men in 459/1066.44 When finally the Turks and the blacks fought, the Turks won and pursued the blacks all the way to the Ṣa‘īd, deep into upper Egypt. Because they were victorious, the Turks insisted that they get their pay raises. But the treasury was already depleted, so al-Mustanṣir had to beg them to defer the pay raises; but they insisted. So he sold arms and ammunition in order to pay the Turks, even paying them with weapons instead of cash. With the Turks setting a precedent for other state employees to ask for increases, the caliph had to sell everything he owned to raise the

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money. The situation kept deteriorating until, in 461/1068, food prices soared as food became scarce, the customs houses did not report income, and people were so desperate that they ate the bodies of their fellow men. War, famine, and disease made the death toll soar. The infighting made it impossible for the ordinary peasant to plow the land and plant crops. As al-Maqrizi put it, the Nile flooded on time but there were no men to build the bridges or till the land. There were entire villages whose population died as a result of war or famine.

Al-Mustansir, in a desperate move to save his caliphate, called upon Badr al-Jamali, who was then in Acre, to come and save him. He "promised him control over the country (al-bilad)." Before accepting the invitation, Badr had his own conditions for going to Egypt: first, that he would come with his own army; second, that he would completely wipe out the existing

45 Ibn Zafir, Akhbar al-duwal al-mungati‘ah, p. 75, speaks of the famine and plague that hit Egypt as the "years of Joseph," the seven lean years.

46 Al-Maqrizi, Itti‘az, II, 311; IbrahIm ibn Duqmaq, Kitab al-jawhar al-thamInah fi sTar al-khulafa‘ wa‘l- salatin, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 5762, fol 50r.
Egyptian army; and third, that he would hunt down and execute former viziers whom he accused of contributing to the malaise of the state. It is interesting to note that, though Badr al-Jamālī did not include Egypt’s princes on his list, when he reached Egypt he did not spare them either. Al-Mustanṣir accepted the conditions set by Badr. The latter, travelling by sea from Syria to Egypt, was taking a risk (it was winter), but was on his way.

Al-Mustanṣir in desperation had thus given up his authority, which was vested in him by Allāh, as imām, to guide his own people. In fact, according to al-Kirmānī’s theory, he had abdicated his responsibility as a caliph.

Badr al-Jamālī arrived in Egypt with 10,000 of his own men. Landing at Damietta, he embarked on his scheme to set the country back on its feet. The first thing he did was to ask the merchants for a fixed tribute. While en route to Cairo, he was given provisions for his army by a rich man from Buḥayra. Arriving at the outskirts of Cairo, he sent a secret messenger to inform the caliph of his arrival and to ask him to dismiss the Turkish general.

47 Al-Maqrīzī, Ittiḥāẓ, II, 311.
Yaldikūsh. Al-Mustanṣir dismissed Yaldikūsh and Badr entered Cairo alone; his men followed him one by one so as not to give the impression of being conquerors but rather friends. Next, Badr began to keep the company of the princes of Egypt. He then arranged to have them all to a dinner party; when they left he sent his own escorts with them. On the way home, each one of these princes was killed. He then confiscated their properties, with which he replenished the coffers of his master. Badr then turned to the army and destroyed those whom he suspected of misconduct in regard to the caliph and the raʿiyah. Previous viziers and a fair number of qādis were next on his list. This action was an attempt on his part to set the caliphal house in order. Internally, he tried to enforce the laws so that Egyptians would have an incentive to go back to the villages and to start replanting the land. He offered them a three-year tax-

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48 Ibid., II, 291. Those princes, along with the upper echelons of the army, had been responsible for stripping the caliph of his gold, silver, arms, ammunition, personal belongings, and treasures of Dār al-Khilāfah. Thus, Badr al-Jamālī was only trying to reclaim part of what was stolen from the caliph's home. Badr himself was also a recipient of some of the stolen goods.
free income from the land if they cultivated it. Furthermore, as a vote of confidence in those who moved to devastated areas, he provided them with plenty of food, which was carried free of charge from faraway places. He thus repopulated these areas without the use of force. The tax incentive gave Egypt plenty of crops. Badr was a firm believer in the idea that after he subdued his enemies in the Aswan area and the Ṣaʿīd, he would be able to rule Egypt. He used his enemy’s strategy: "If you get lower Egypt, the seashore, and all the rural area, you can own Miṣr." Having accomplished his goals of setting the caliphal house in order, he turned to the enemies of his master in bilād al-Shām and reinstated the khutbah for al-Mustansir in Mecca and Jerusalem. Badr’s final step was to reorganize the bureaus and to control them through his own men as bureau chiefs. This gave him direct access to the bureaus and complete control over all branches of government.

49 Aḥmad ibn Yūsūf al-Dimashqī, Akhbār al-duwal wa ṣāḥibāt al-uwal, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 4923, fol 118r.

Badr al-Jamālī’s vizierate was wizārat tafwīd. If Ibn Killis’s vizierate was called a "substitute for a caliphate," Badr al-Jamālī’s was even more so. Badr’s powers exceeded those of Ibn Killis. The latter’s powers had been bestowed upon him by a powerful caliph who did not feel threatened nor afraid to be undermined. In many ways Ibn Killis complemented al-ʿAzīz. Badr was delegated power by the weak al-Mustanṣir, who at that point in his career had nothing to delegate. He had lost everything he owned to his army, to his viziers, and to his bureau chiefs. He was unable to maintain his own haram: his mother, wife (or perhaps wives), and daughters had to leave Egypt and live with friends in Baghdad.51 The height of degradation in an Islamic context occurs when a man cannot provide for or defend his own women.

Badr could have usurped the power that al-Mustanṣir bestowed on him because al-Mustanṣir had no power to delegate. It was all stripped from him. For all practical purposes, Badr ruled Egypt unchecked. The

51 Ibn Ẓāfir, Akhbār al-duwal al-munqaṭī’ah, p. 75: "In 462 A.H., the daughters of al-Mustanṣir and his mother arrived in Baghdad fleeing from the famine [which afflicted Egypt]."
caliph was at his mercy and not he at the mercy of the caliph. There is no comparison, then, between Ibn Killis's position and that of Badr. Al-‘Aziz held the reins of state in his hands and no-one could have dictated any policy to him without his consent. Al-Mustanṣir, on the other hand, was a puppet in the hands of his vizier, Badr. He owed his temporal power to the man. He even owed him the continuation of Fatimid rule over Egypt and Syria. There is no parallel for this scenario in Fatimid history.

After he re-established order and brought the country back to normal functions, Badr became the master of the Fatimid lands. He remained in office until his death at the age of eighty. He fell victim perhaps to a stroke which robbed him of his speech for the last year of his life. In all, he was in office for twenty-one years. His military valor and his reputation as a ruthless commander made it possible for him to reorganize the government and fire those who were accomplices to the crime committed against the people of Egypt and the state. The Fatimid administration started to function normally again. Badr was able to set the administration and the caliphate back to normal because he had his own
army of ten thousand men who obeyed his commands and defended his interests and those of the caliphate. Badr's fiscal and tax policy promoted productivity and the return to a normal way of life in Egypt. His policy of return to the land, mentioned earlier, yielded crops which were badly needed to feed the Egyptians. He was also able to change the taxes to reflect new demographic realities: many villages were completely empty because the inhabitants had either been killed in wars between the Turks and the blacks or had died of famine and epidemic diseases.

As mentioned before, al-Kirmānī would have been shocked by the power that was vested in Badr al-Jamālī. Not only was he made a vizier but he was given the title "prince of the realm," the title "supreme judge" (qāḍī‘ī l-qudāṭ), the "sword of Islam," and the "shield of the imām." The theocratic state which al-Kirmānī had envisioned could not be created; the caliphs recognized that fact. Rather than lose full control over their realm, they opted to delegate power to one trustworthy individual who could run their internal and external affairs.
Badr al-Jamālī helped to create a workable administrative hierarchy by firing or killing those who took bribes or dipped into the Fatimid treasury or whose corruption was the cause of the populace’s misery. Thus the vizier, with his "iron hand" policy, was able to bring about the administrative changes which eventually were responsible for the recovery of the caliphate from bankruptcy and corruption. The ra‘iyvah were behind him because the famine which had befallen them in the period 459-464/1066-1071 was due to the mismanagement of the caliphate by those who were in power.

Although Badr al-Jamālī was a freed slave, his administrative experience and his determination made him uncompromising as far as reforms were concerned. No-one was exempt, even his own son who rebelled against him in Alexandria. He too was brought to his knees. Badr’s integrity was a driving force behind his reforms. In all these respects he was the equal of Ibn Killis.

In contrast to Ibn Killis and to Badr al-Jamālī, Bahrām al-Armanī (529-532/1134-1137) was a newcomer to the Fatimid capital, Cairo. An Armenian Christian whose background was unknown to the Fatimids, Bahrām succeeded in attaining the position of vizier without real effort.
Not much is actually known about his birth or what he did prior to becoming the vizier. Two theories existed concerning his socio-economic and political background. One theory stated that he was a prince who ruled for a very short period over the Armenians of Tell Bashîr, northeast of Aleppo and was ousted because of a revolt. As a result he left Tell Bashîr and moved to Egypt where he worked his way into the caliph al-Ḫâfiẓ’s court. The second theory described him as a khâdim or servant, a eunuch who climbed the military ladder and became the head either of the Jayshiyyah or the Yanîsiyyah army corps. Both groups were formed by Armenians, Badr al-Jamâlî and Abû’l-Fatḥ Yanîs, respectively. The majority of both corps were Armenians. Ibn Muyassar subscribed to the latter theory, while al-Maqrîzî felt that Bahrâm was of noble birth. Ibn Taghribirdî refers to Bahrâm as al-amîr without any hesitation. M. Canard suggests that Prince Bahrâm, after leaving Tell Bashîr, must have

started his career as an officer in one of the two Armenian contingents before becoming the head of all the Armenians. He is also of the belief that Bahrām was no eunuch but a descendant of a rather well-known and well-to-do family whose fortunes had changed over time. Furthermore, his two brothers lived in Egypt: Vassak was a governor and Gregory was the Armenian Catholics of Egypt.\footnote{Ibn Muyassar, Akhbār Miṣr, p. 79; al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Itti‘āz}, III, 155-157; Yūsuf ibn Taghibirdī, \textit{Al-Nuṣūm al-zāhirah}, V, 242; M. Canard, "Un vizir chrétien à l'époque fatimite," p. 111: "Ainsi finit ce vizir arménien, resté chrétien, frère d’un Catholico arménien, peut-être de grande famille arménienne, forcé par les malheurs de la nouvelle patrie que les arméniens s’étaient créé dans la région du Taurus et de l’Euphrate, à venir chercher fortune en Égypte. Son renom ne s’est pas borné à l’Égypte, car il était connu chez les francs en Palestine et chez les normands en Sicile."} Be that as it may, Bahrām was forced on al-Ḥāfiẓ as a vizier by the army (al-ainād).\footnote{Ibn Żāfir, Akhbār al-duwal al-munqati‘ah, p. 97; and al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Itti‘āz}, III, 156.} He was no choice of al-Ḥāfiẓ, but he came at a time when the caliph or no say in affairs of state, so he was forced to accept the choice of the army. Although Bahrām was not chosen by the caliph, the latter bestowed on him
two honorific titles: "the sword of Islam" and "the crown of the caliphate." For a non-Muslim and an alien of sorts to be given such titles was indicative of al-Ḥāfiz’s desperation over his state of affairs. He was ready to abdicate his imāmate in favor of saving his temporal power. 55

The circumstances that surrounded Bahram’s rise to the vizierate are as unclear as his background. Historians such as Ibn Taghrībirdī suggested that as head of the Armenian corps (mugaddam al-Arman), he was asked by the caliph’s son, Ḥasan, to help him force his father to name him as his heir and to cede power to him while al-Ḥāfiz was still alive. Al-Maqrīzī’s version of the story was as follows. Ḥasan was a vengeful character who alienated the princes and tribal shaykhs. His bloody career as heir apparent led to a mass movement against him supported by large numbers of army contingents. The caliphal palace was surrounded and al-Ḥāfiz, with his son

55 Concerning the titles, see Ibn Taghrībirdī, Al-Nujum, V, 242; and al-Maqrīzī, Ittiḥād, III, 156. The caliph’s contemplation of abdication is alluded to by Gustav von Grunebaum, "The Nature of the Fatimid Achievement," Proceedings, p. 208.
Hasan, became prisoners. The besiegers demanded Hasan’s head; al-Ḥāfiẓ had to comply or else lose his own life and the lives of those who lived in the palace. He arranged for Hasan to be poisoned by one his private physicians. With the news of his death, the Sudan contingent of the army, supporters of Hasan, mutinied and forced the army (al-ainād) to flee. To avoid disintegration of the army, al-Ḥāfiẓ called on Bahrām to use his Armenian contingent and to subdue both sides. When Bahrām arrived at the gates of the palace, the main army (al-ainād) hailed him as savior and carried him to the caliph to bestow on him the vizierate. Bahrām was no choice of the caliph; he was imposed on him.56

Bahrām was the second Armenian vizier to enjoy the title of wazīr al-sayf or wazīr al-tafwīd.57 He was a military man who by becoming vizier combined two jobs which gave him great power. Because al-Ḥāfiẓ had accepted his as vizier, he had to listen to the complaints of personal friends and disenchanted amīrs.

56 For a complete account of Bahrām’s rise to power, see al-Maqrīzī, Ittiḥād, III, 155-156.

The criticism voiced against the caliph was well-known to many historians of the Muslim world: how could a non-Muslim stand at the minbar with the imam and caliph during the religious holidays? Al-Ḫāfiẓ got around that problem by appointing the qāḍī al-qudāt as a substitute for Bahrām on such occasions. 58 Although Bahrām was "an intelligent man, an organizer, and a good politician," 59 he nevertheless was unwanted by the amīrs whose powers were immense at that point in the history of the Fatimid caliphate. Bahrām came to power thirty-five years before the Fatimid era ended. The mood that swept the caliphate was paranoia; anyone who was not a Muslim or from the established Egyptian aristocracy was suspect, especially if that person attained a high position, let alone the vizierate. At such a late date in the history of the dynasty, the caliph had but nominal powers; the true power rested in the hands of the vizier.

Bahrām’s Christianity, according to al-Maqrīzī, made him the target of the ra‘īyyah’s hatred. As a


59 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti‘āq, III, 156.
politician, Bahrām had full control over the realm and subdued every revolt against the state. He spent a large fortune on the army to reorganize it. In this respect he could not be criticized. Although Maqrīzī argues that Bahrām’s Christianity was his Achilles heel, I am inclined to believe that the Egyptian military aristocracy was responsible for creating obstacles for Bahrām because they wanted al-Ḥāfiẓ to bestow the vizierate on their candidate, the amīr Riḍwān ibn Walakhshī, a well-known scribe. The army unfortunately sabotaged their efforts and had their own man, Bahrām, named as vizier.

The downfall of Bahrām nevertheless ultimately came at the hands of Ibn Walakhshī, who with the support of the amīrs of Egypt again demanded the vizierate for himself. One possible explanation for this stubborn opposition is that the historians al-Maqrīzī, Ibn Taghrībirdī, and Ibn Muyassar all claim that Bahrām invited around 30,000 Armenians, including his own brothers and relatives, to come and settle in Egypt. Furthermore, the influx of such large numbers of Armenians at a time when Egyptians were finding it increasingly difficult to maintain their standard of
living (due in large part of loss of territory and revenue to the Crusaders) made Bahrām and his people targets for the Egyptians’ anger. Moreover, being rich Christians, the Armenians built a great number of churches and monasteries. They also practiced their religion outwardly, which led Muslims to become afraid of a Christian takeover which would take Egypt away from them, as was happening in Syria under the Crusaders.  

This led many of the a’yān to put pressure on the caliph to let Bahrām go. Al-Ḥāfiẓ wanted to appease the army, so he did not take heed; so the a’yān turned to Riqwān ibn Walakhshī, who called a jihād in the name of God to fight Bahrām and his Armenian followers. Bahrām, the Armenians, and the Fatimid army met Ibn Walakhshī, the contender for the vizierate, with all his supporters. When the two armies met, Ibn Walakhshī’s forces raised the Qur’ān as a battle standard, and all the Muslims in the Fatimid army left Bahrām and joined Riqwān. Bahrām, with his Armenian contingents, fled to the Ṣaʿīd, where they took refuge in a monastery. There Bahrām remained until his death. Riqwān ibn Walakhshī marched victorious

60 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti‘āz, III, 159.
into Cairo, where al-Ḥāfiẓ named him as vizier. Bahrām’s headquarters (dār al-wizārah) and the Armenian quarter of the city were completely ransacked by Riḍwān’s followers. This was the first time in the history of the vizierate that dār al-wizārah had been sacked.\(^{61}\)

Of the three viziers considered here, Bahrām fits least into al-Kirmānī’s scheme. Al-Ḥāfiẓ had named Bahrām his vizier and had given him absolute power by wizārat tafwīd and the honorific titles of sayf al-Islām and tāj al-khilāfah. The title, sayf al-Islām, was equally extraordinary, for here was a non-Muslim being called the "sword of Islam." Al-Ḥāfiẓ had become a puppet manipulated by different interest groups vying for power, such as the Turks, the Armenians, the Sudanese (blacks) in the army, and the princes who lived under the auspices of the caliph.

In his model of the theocratic state, al-Kirmānī insisted that at no time should the power of the vizier be equal to that of the caliph. According to him, the vizier should be the man to execute the wishes of the caliph and not the man to initiate the policy of the

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\(^{61}\) Ibid., III, 160.
caliphate. Al-Kirmānī’s model vizier would be an Ismā‘īlī who adhered to the da‘wah, not a dhimmī such as Bahrām.

Even though the circumstances surrounding Bahrām’s nomination were not ideal, Bahrām nonetheless tried to reorganize the army in order to recapture the lost lands of the caliphate. His efforts at reforming the administration were sabotaged by princes (here, the land-owning elite with private armies) seeking power for themselves. The power struggle among the elites was uncontrollable. Within the army, the split was too deeply entrenched for Bahrām to eradicate it completely. Add to all this al-Ḥāfiẓ’s unhappiness with Bahrām’s appointment, hence his non-supportive attitude towards his vizier. Al-Ḥāfiẓ himself was in turn a very weak individual and was incapable of ruling.

As mentioned before, Bahrām also suffered from the lack of sympathy or support from the general population, who saw in his Armenian background a liability and in his Christianity the danger, perhaps unfounded, that Egypt would be lost to Dār al-Islām, as had happened to those parts of Syria which had fallen to the Crusaders. During Bahrām’s vizierate there was little hope that the
The caliphate could sustain any attack by the Crusaders nor withstand any more internal rifts. Bahram's time offered little hope for anyone — regardless of background or capacity — to salvage the dying empire.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE FATIMID ADMINISTRATION AND VIZIERATE:

A COMPARISON AND A CONCLUSION

In light of what was presented in Chapters One and Two concerning the hierarchical and centralized nature of the Fatimid administration, it might be useful to compare it to both the Abbasid and Seljuk systems. The latter flourished at the same time as the Fatimids, the Abbasids from 133-657/750-1258, the Seljuks from 447-591/1055-1194, and the Fatimids from 297-568/909-1172. In order for a comparison to be meaningful, it will be necessary to describe the two systems briefly, following now standard analyses.

The Abbasid administration as a system was put to the service of the empire as an experiment. Neither the Abbasids nor their predecessors, the Umayyads, found in either the Qur’ān or the Sharī’ah a prescription as to how to administer the ummah. They had to resort to their own innovations in government:

The Sharī’a..., by virtue of its character as the expression of God’s Will, and by the common acceptance of its prescriptions and their

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implications on the part of all Muslims, supplies the authority, sanctions, and moral basis for the unity and constitution of the Umma as a political entity. But neither in the Qur’ān nor in the Sunna of the Prophet are there to be found precise instructions as to the forms and institutions by which the unity of the Umma as a political organization should be expressed and maintained.¹

The Abbasids thus were pioneers in trying to form a bureaucracy whose main function was to coordinate all the institutions of the empire and to create new ones to cope with the ever-growing, ever-changing Muslim community. As pioneers in this experiment, the Abbasids created a system which was neither highly developed nor specialized. Limited by their inheritance of statecraft and administrative procedures from the Umayyads, they were slow to create their own institutions and were empirical in the methods and applications of their own procedures.² Equally inhibiting to the Abbasids were the

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² Al-Rashīd, when announcing his plans for the succession, included a major restructuring of the (continued...
bureaucrats whom they had retained as hold-overs from the
Umayyad period and who were from the Umayyad-trained
bureaucratic cadre.

The Abbasids had an administration which for all
practical purposes was limited in scope and operation.
Although a number of diwāns were created, the majority of
them specialized in the collection of taxes from
different parts of the empire, such as diwān al-kharāj,
which was the most important bureau. 3 The collection of

2 (...continued)
administration of the empire. He was to divide the empire
between his two sons, al-Amīn and al-Ma’mūn. "A most
important stipulation was that the revenues and forces of
each domain... be used only for the benefit of its
respective region. Ma’mūn would have complete autonomy and
the final say on fiscal matters in his area. However, he
was required to help his brother with military forces if the
need arose." M.A. Sha’bān, Islamic History, Volume II

3 The diwān al-kharāj was called simply "the diwān,"
which was also synonymous with diwān al-sawād, as the Sawād
was the richest area of the Abbasid Empire and yielded a
great percentage of its income. For further information,
see Dominique Sourdel, Le Vizirat abbasi de 747 à 936
(Damascus: Institut français de Damas, 1960), II, 590.
Hilal al-ṣābi’ considered diwan kharaj al-Sawād, diwan
(continued...)
the kharāj was divided among several bureaus concerned with the different provinces of the empire, such as dīwān kharāj al-Shām, dīwān kharāj al-‘Iraqayn, dīwān kharāj al-Mashriq, dīwān kharāj Miṣr wa Ifrīqiyya wa’l-Mawṣil wa Arminya wa Azarbāvajān wa’l-Madīna wa Makkah wa’l-Yaman. One gathers from the prominence of these bureaus that the Abbasid administration’s most important function was the collection of taxes imposed on agricultural land, especially since the absolute majority of the inhabitants lived on such lands. Thus land was the backbone of the economy and the main source of income for the caliphate.

The other kind of income came from ‘ushr land, i.e., the land that gave ten per cent of its share of income to the state. ‘Ushr land fell under the jurisdiction of a special bureau that collected its taxes, the dīwān al-ṣiyāb or the bureau of ‘ushr land. Its function was very similar to that of dīwān al-kharāj. Both bureaus were controlled by the central administration and had problems because the money that was collected went straight from

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3(...continued)
these bureaus to the coffers of the caliph, the bayt al-
māl or the public treasury, to which the great majority of collected funds were channelled. It is from this center that expenses in general and those of the army in particular were disbursed. Thus the revenues collected were not used immediately to pay the expenses of running the diwāns but were sent to the main treasury. As a result the whole financial operation of the administration fell into the hands of the caliph, who according to his discretion saw to it that the money was allocated to the different bureaus, a situation which had the potential of crippling the administration if the caliph acted whimsically.

Some bureaus, as in the case of the Seljuk administration, appeared and disappeared according to necessity, a phenomenon not so different from the ministries of our day and age. Other bureaus were constant features of the Abbasid administration. These were: diwān al-jaysh, or the bureau that took care of the

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4 "C'était le Bayt al-Māl, Trésor publique où était versée la plus grande partie de ces diverses contributions, qui alimentait à son tour les services des Dépenses et de l'armée." Sourdrel, Le vizirat abbaside, II, 594-595.
affairs of the army; dīwān al-nafāqāt, the bureau of expenses, wherefrom the small employees of the court and administration received their pay; dīwān al-rasā‘il, from which official decisions were announced and whence correspondence with other sovereigns originated; dīwān al-tawgī‘ or dīwān al-khatam (the privy seal), and dīwān al-fadd received letters and affixed the insignia of the caliph before letters were sent out or firmāns announced. Other less important dīwāns included dīwān al-muṣādarīn or the bureau which disciplined those who absented themselves intentionally or unintentionally from their employment or responsibilities; dīwān al-mawārith, which dealt with settling inheritance issues; dīwān dur al-darb or the bureau of the mint; dīwān al-birr or dīwān al-ṣadaqāt, the bureau for distributing the zakāt or waqf money; and dīwān al-mukhālifīn, or the bureau which dealt with the confiscation of property of rebels. Many of these latter bureaus appeared and disappeared from the

5 "Sous al-Ma‘mun nous savons cependant qu’Aḥmad b. Yūsuf perçevait la sadaqa d’al-Baṣra et qu’une partie des sommes ainsi prélevées lui était laissée en bénéfice." Ibid., II, 593.
reign of one caliph to another. Such were the bureaus of the central administration.

As for the provinces or the periphery of the empire, they were governed mainly by military personnel who administered land as fief holders in exchange for payment of salaries and in many instances as recognition for defending the lands of the empire from attack, chiefly from Byzantium. In this respect the Abbasids added to the fragmentation and the parcelling out of their own land to individuals, who were for the most part exempt from tax payments, as a way of compensating them for services rendered. The Abbasid caliphs, as Jacob Lassner points out, had a dilemma which "was the possibility of a challenge to the central authorities from an important regional sinecure.... The quintessential problem was how to ensure strong local rule while safeguarding the interests of the central regime." To ensure and to safeguard against fragmentation of the empire, the central administration tried to rotate governors (wālīs) of provinces frequently and to assign to those posts

persons loyal to the caliph or "close kinsmen." This policy, as the Abbasids discovered, was not successful, for even members of the caliphal family declared their independence from the central government if they felt that they had been unsuccessful in attaining their demands. As such the policy concerning the provinces was not immune to failure.

The staff of the administration came mainly from the scribal class, or kuttāb, who were educated either in the Byzantine tradition or the Persian one, depending on which phase of the caliphate one examines. The kuttāb were excellent calligraphers and possessed the skill which was a prime requirement for the profession.

The bureaus or diwāns included in their operations a majlis, or staff meeting, in which individuals responsible for running the affairs of the bureaus debated the validity of their decisions. 8 Side by side

7 Ibid., p. 58. As an example of trustworthy men being given iqṭā‘, al-Muqtadir bi‘llāh gave land that was under the supervision (muwakkalah) of Zaydān to him as fiefs. "Zaydān’s share were villages near Kaskūr and some land which yielded crops or profit in Baṣra." Hilāl al-Ṣābi’, Kitāb al-wuzarah’, p. 37.

8 Dominique Sourdel, Le vizirat abbaside, II, 600.
with the majālis there existed "an [internal] organism of control" called the zimām, or the section of the bureau which dealt with accountability. This feature, Sourdel argues, did not exist except in the theoretical work of Qudāma ibn Ja'far. While a separate, autonomous dīwān al-zimām was a reality, there is no evidence of this type of control within each bureau.⁹ The fact remains that in actual practice the Abbasids used three dīwāns to run the empire: the dīwān al-inshāʾ or chancellery, the dīwān al-zimām, and the dīwān al-khatam.¹⁰

As Goitein has pointed out, the Abbasids were the first to delegate power to one individual from the scribal class whose trust won him the position of an associate: the vizier.¹¹ This post was created by the

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⁹ Ibid. While Sourdel argues that dīwān al-zimām was a separate dīwān, Hilāl al-Ṣābiʾ spoke of it in the plural as dawāwīn al-azimmah, thus allowing the possibility of the existence of more than one dīwān, but as separate entities. Cf. Hilāl al-Ṣābiʾ, Kitāb al-wuzaraʾ, p. 89.

¹⁰ Dominique Sourdel, Le vizirat abbاسide, II, 601.

¹¹ Although a few viziers were not from the scribal class, the tendency remained during the whole Abbasid era to choose them from that class. Cf. Tawfīq Sulṭān al-Yūzbakī, Al-Wizārah: nash'atuha wa taṣawwuruha fī al-dawlah al-'Abbāsiyyah (Baghdad: Maṭbaʿat al-Īrshād, 1970), p. 124.
Abbasids but not clearly defined by them. The prerogatives and duties of the vizier varied greatly. Some viziers were administrators under the direct authority of the caliph, while others were dynastic sultans without caliphal authority. One should not forget that as pioneers in the field the Abbasids experimented and thus varied in the actual way they did their work, but finally the idea was so successful that it became an integral part of all the administrations that followed.

The Abbasid vizier was chosen to head the bureaucracy and was directly responsible to the caliph. With the latter’s blessing, he was able to run the affairs of the empire. One of the tasks incumbent upon the vizier was the responsibility for running all the bureaus without being in charge of any one in particular.\(^\text{12}\) He supervised the acts of the secretaries of the government offices \([\text{diwâns}]\), since they are in a fiduciary position towards Moslems in respect of what they receive and disburse from their property; they should therefore be kept strictly to rule, all

irregularities in their receipts or expenditures restrained, and all excesses punished.\textsuperscript{13}

He was supposed to give a detailed outline of events, to register the orders of the sovereign, and to see to it that orders were transmitted to the appropriate administrative units through the intermediary of 
\textit{diwān al-qaṣr}, or bureau of caliphal affairs.\textsuperscript{14}

Whereas the vizier was responsible for originating or transmitting the nominations of individuals for positions in the administration through the chanceller, he sent direct orders for allocation of money to the public treasury. Other instructions involving money matters were sent to the bureaus of \textit{kharāj} and \textit{diwā'}. The vizier also had the prerogative to send orders to \textit{diwān al-jaysh} and to \textit{diwān al-nafqāt} for the payment of administrative personnel.\textsuperscript{15} The vizier was also responsible for \textit{diwān al-khatam}, where his name appeared in many cases alongside the caliph’s, thus taking full responsibility for much of what was done in the empire.

\textsuperscript{13} H.F. Amedroz, "The Maṣālim Jurisdiction in the \textit{Aḥkām Sulṭāniyya} of MawardĪ," JRAS, (July 1911): 639.
\textsuperscript{14} Dominique Sourdel, \textit{Le vizirat abbaside}, II, 605.
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, II, 605.
In essence the vizier was an equal of the caliph and in a sense shared the domain of the caliphate with him. The Abbasid vizier was able to groom his sons or grandsons for the position.

It was Hārūn al-Rashīd’s (173-194/789-809) policy towards the Barmakī family that set the precedent for the vizierate to become hereditary, a tradition which had both a negative and a positive impact on Abbasid rule. Hārūn al-Rashīd’s involvement in the wars against the Byzantines during his father’s reign and then during his own, where he found himself in dangerous situations vis-a-vis the enemy, decided on freeing himself from all administrative responsibilities and [taking] personal charge of the army. For the administration of the whole empire, he fell back on his mentor and longtime associate Yaḥyā b. Khālid b. Barmak, a man whose loyalty, and that of his family, to the Abbasids was absolutely beyond any shade of doubt.16

16 M.A. Sha'ban, Islamic History, Volume II, p. 28. Al-Rashīd called Yaḥyā al-Barmakī "father" because the latter’s wife was al-Rashīd’s wet-nurse. "[Al-Rashīd] told him [Yaḥyā]: Oh father, you have been my mentor and you have advised me wisely. I [now] invest in you the authority over my people and I have placed this burden on you. Judge [the (continued...)]
Yaḥyā al-Barmakī trained his sons to run the Abbasid administration and one after another they took sole responsibility, with full executive powers, to accomplish their task. That the Barmakids were qualified men could not be doubted. They were well-trained administrators and well-respected individuals. They were loyal to the Abbasids and they had the interest of the caliph at heart. Such qualities were shared among them all.  

The hereditary vizierate provided continuity in policies and it encouraged the vizierial families to invest their energies in creating and maintaining an administrative apparatus which would outlive them and from which their own children would benefit by grooming.

16(...continued) ummah] as you see fit. Employ whomsoever you want, dismiss whom you please, and impose whom you see fit.... I am not going to hold you accountable in any way." Quoted without citation of source by Muḥammad Aḥmad Barāniq, Al-Wuzarā' al-'Abbāṣiyūn (Miṣr: al-Maṭba'ah al-Namūdhajiyyah, n.d.), p. 62; Yūzbakī, Al-Wizārah, p. 58, reproduces this speech and cites Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-rusul wal'-mulūk (Būlāq: Būlāq Press, n.d.), x, 50, and later sources.

them for the vizierate. This dynastic tradition had its negative aspects too. It strengthened the vizierial families by allowing them to accumulate wealth and to abuse their power by creating nuclei of acquaintances and friends in sensitive positions. In so doing they were able to control the caliph. They had him at their mercy and the roles were reversed: instead of his being the chief executive and they his delegates, they became the executives and he the executor of their wishes.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, the Abbasid vizierate became an inherited position with extraordinary privileges and wealth, so much so that when the Abbasid caliph’s power and prestige dwindled, the vizierial dynasties had ample support among the ra’iyyah and the jaysh and had the techniques or expertise to run the empire, plus the power to command, which helped them create their own sultanates. These dynasties had all it took to become independent entities, except for the legitimacy of being the rulers commanded by God to run the affairs of the kingdom.

As mentioned before, the Abbasids followed a policy of recruiting viziers generally from the kuttāb class.

\textsuperscript{18} M.A. Barāniq, \textit{Al-Wuzarā’}, pp. 66-67.
They refused to choose their viziers from among the 'ulamā'.\textsuperscript{19} The 'ulamā', in contrast to the bureaucrats, were not government employees. They lived on the ǧadāqāt or zakāt of pious Muslims. They often belonged to one mosque school or another where they studied the Qur'ān and had a set interpretation of it. "As judges, notaries and administrators of public or trust properties, the school members acquired positions of social as well as religious leadership."\textsuperscript{20} They were the true voice of the people and stood as spokesmen of the ra‘īyyah at the caliph’s court. In their eyes, as Ibn Ḥanbal argued, the 'ulamā' had the power to lead the ummah (and not the Abbasid caliph). "It was the duty of the 'ulema to revive and preserve the law, and the duty of all Muslims 'to command the good and forbid the evil,' that is, to uphold the law, whether or not the caliphate would properly do so."\textsuperscript{21}

Thus the Abbasid administration was directed by the vizier and his family, a situation which created a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Al-Yūzbakī, Al-Wizārah, p. 124.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Ira Lapidus, "Separation of State and Religion in Early Islamic Society," JIMES, 6 (1975): 369.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 383.
\end{itemize}
dynastic system replacing the caliph for all practical purposes and leading to the disintegration of the caliphate into several kingdoms.

As for the Seljuk administration, it was based on the Samanid and Ghaznavid models, the offspring of ancient Persian administrative models:

The Seljuks were primarily a military state geared for war and expansion which superimposed a foreign ruling element upon the indigenous population whose elite were called upon to manage the affairs and organization of government and administration.\textsuperscript{22}

In this respect they were continuing the tradition of the two above-mentioned empires. As a Sunni dynasty, the Seljuks tried to build an administration which was "compatible with the basic tenets of the Islamic ideology."\textsuperscript{23} Their theory of state was thus based on both the Islamic and the old Persian one.\textsuperscript{24} It was Niẓām


\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 5.

al-Mulk, the vizier of the Seljuk sultan Malik Shāh (1072-1092), who was responsible for reconciling both theories of state. According to him, temporal stability was guaranteed by the protection of religion.... "The foundation of kinship (dawlat) and the basis of dominion consist in the observation of the laws of God, glory and exaltation be to Him, and in giving precedence to the raising of the banners of religion and the revival of the signs and practices of the Shari'ah and in respecting and honoring the sayyids and 'ulamā' who are the heirs of the Prophet." 25

On the other hand, Niẓām al-Mulk went on to say that "God chooses someone from among the people in every age and adorns him with kingly virtues and relegates to him the affairs of the world and the peace of His servants." 26

The power of the sultan was absolute and required no authorization. In him the administration was centralized. 27

The Seljuks tried to establish the

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importance of the sultan as the absolute ruler, "head of the political institution," by making him the "shadow of God upon earth," a concept well-entrenched in the Persian idea of kingship. The hordes of Turkmen did not share this concept, especially the "princes, [who considered the sultan] merely as Primus inter pares," and were not pleased by the newly acquired image of their leader. The theory behind their action was to legitimize the sultan as the head of the ummah as well as the political head of the state:

The power of the Sultan was in theory delegated by the Caliph, but when the latter ceased to be effective and immediate source of this power, as was the case by the fifth century A.H., the tendency arose to ignore the historic imamate and to regard the Sultan as the shadow of God upon earth, appointed by Him and directly responsible to Him without intermediary in the person of the Caliph.

The Seljuks early on kept the Abbasid caliph as head of the empire solely to lend legitimacy to the sultan as spiritual leader of the Muslim community. The caliph gave them the unprecedented honor of becoming his lieutenants all over Dār al-Islām. Thus the power of the Seljuks, unlike that of the Buyids, rested upon the Sharī'ah. In attempting to live by the laws of orthodox Islam, the Seljuks were capable of preserving the religious life of the community and of giving a sense of continuity in the Muslim lands. Having attained the blessing of the caliphs at the onset of their sultanate, the Seljuks soon realized that they did not actually need the caliph to give them legitimacy and concentrated their efforts on drawing the religious class to back them. It was the 'ulamā' trained by the Seljuks in the numerous madrasahs who ultimately gave them legitimacy as the leaders and rulers of the Muslim community.

The Seljuks had hoped to create an administration which was an improvement on the previous ones, especially

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by avoiding the mistakes of their predecessors. Every
dynasty that came to rule the areas claimed to be an
improvement on what preceded it. In this the Seljuks
were no exception. They hoped still to achieve such an
aim, as Carla Klausner argues, "by renewing the
association of government and the religious institution,
and [by] controlling the new education system, and [by]
establishing the primacy of civil administration, which
had disintegrated under the last Buyid rulers." The
Seljuks’ dream was to bring about a relationship between
the sultan or the government and the religious authority
in the hope of creating an administration whose
principles were Sunni and whose values were deeply
entrenched in orthodox Islam. They hoped to have such an
administration by creating madrasahs that would graduate
religious men and administrative elites. Thus,
administrative positions were to be filled from religious
school graduates. Niẓām al-Mulk, the famous vizier, in
creating the Niẓāmiyyah schools, had hoped to inculcate
the perfect practices of the Sunni intelligentsia in
administration. In many ways such an administration was

33 Carla Klausner, The Seljuk Vezirate, p. 5.
envisioned as being able to attract the support of the average Muslim and thus give the Seljuks the sense of being accepted as legitimate rulers. The use of 'ulamā' or religious class in government was a ploy to give "juridical acceptance of the sultan as the agent of political and military administration alongside the caliph as head of the religious institution only...."34 A.K. Lambton, on the other hand, argues that Niẓām al-Mulk's purposes in initiating such a movement were presumably to provide government officials trained in the tenets of orthodoxy who would replace the former secretarial class and implement his political policies; and secondly, by using the 'ulamā' educated in the madrasahs, he hoped to control the masses and combat the spread of the Ismā'īlī sect, which had begun to threaten the existence of the state.35

The Seljuks' introduction of the madrasah-trained 'ulamā' into the administrative cadre and the support that the government got from incorporating them led to the compromising of this elite group, which normally was

34 Ibid., p. 6.

out of the reach of government. The Seljuk administration co-opted the 'ulamā', paid them salaries, and created a diwān to take care of their affairs. The gādīs, as part of the religious elite, were entrusted by the Seljuks "to watch over the religious institution on behalf of the sultan, and this perhaps marks a further stage in the subordination of the religious institution to the political institution." The gādī headed the

36 A.K.S. Lambton, "Quis Custodiet Custodes," pt. 1, p. 135; Carl Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples, trans. Joel Carmichael and M. Perllmann (New York: Capricorn Books, 1960), p. 177. As Carla Klausner notes: "despite the bitter warnings and better judgement of some of their members, the 'ulamā' were effectively incorporated within the framework of Seljuk government, and religious affairs were placed under the general supervision of the Vezir. To some extent the 'ulamā' continued to protect the interests of the people; but insofar as there was a tendency for them either to associate with and join the bureaucracy or to acquire extensive estates and become assimilated to the land-owning class, their function as spokesmen of the people was undermined and weakened." Klausner, The Seljuk Vezirate, p. 25. As is well known, al-Ghazālī himself also saw that the position of the 'ulamā' would continue to be compromised if they kept on lending their services to the temporal authorities.

diwan al-awqaf or pious endowments where he saw to it that the income, especially that from rental property, was spent on the support of the new madrasahs, although some of it went to the support of mosques, hospitals, hostels, etc.

Thus, the Seljuks’ use of the religious elite in the civil administration set the precedent for their use by the Ottomans and even found its way into the Arab regimes of today. The hope of the Seljuks was to strengthen their administration by the use of the ulama in the bureaucracy and thus to counteract the strength of the military establishment and to lessen the chance of decentralization, which was inherent in the Turkish model of state. Different members of the Seljuk family and tribe shared rule of the empire, thus parcelling out the land among themselves. They also shared the administration of their realms with the military elite, to whom igtâ' land was originally given as compensation for their efforts. The ulama, who were supposed to be a stabilizing influence and a centralizing factor, were also beneficiaries of the igtâ' system.

As the ulama scholars became increasingly dependent on the waqf endowments, they found

themselves in a position largely independent but complementary to the amīra, as the chief alternative beneficiaries of the land revenues and to that degree they were prepared to sanction the system as a whole.\textsuperscript{39}

The iqtā' system created problems for the Seljuks which eventually led to the disintegration of their sultanate. Not the least of these problems was decentralization brought about by the distribution of land or land revenues to civil and military officers, the majority of whom were entrusted with the civil administration of their iqtā'. The iqtā' system emerged during the tenth century because of economic needs. It was "in response to the state's dominant need to finance its operations and to pay its civil and military officers...."\textsuperscript{40} During the Seljuk era, it was apparently difficult to make clear distinctions between "military" and "administrative" iqtā's and to distinguish even between the different forms of iqtā'. What is known is the fact that once a military leader was assigned an iqtā' and the right to collect the taxes of an area, it became easy for him to

\begin{itemize}
\item[39] Ibid., II, 51-52.
\item[40] A.K.S. Lambton, "The Internal Structure of the Saljuq Empire," p. 231.
\end{itemize}
establish his independence. Thus, the military officers became responsible for the civil administration of their iqtā', which eventually spelled decentralization of the government and secession from the empire at the leisure of the iqtā' holder when he found it expedient to do so. Payment by iqtā' was even given to the highest civil officials of the state, such as the viziers. \(^{41}\) In this respect, when the land was parcelled out, the central government had no device by which to maintain control over the "administrative" iqtā' except – in case of injustice or rebellion – the threat of superior force. \(^{42}\) Thus, during the time of strong sultans, such as Malik Shāh or Tughrul Beg, the authority of the central government was evident. Decentralization and political disintegration caused by rebellion of iqtā' holders or their secession came about under the rule of weak sultans.

The Seljuks created a bureaucracy or civil administration with five major dīwāns: dīwān al-a’lā, or the vizierate; dīwān al-iftā', or the bureau which

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41 Ibid., p. 238.
42 Ibid., pp. 237-238.
dealt with finances and with keeping of accounts; diwan al-tughra, which included in it diwan al-inshā' (the chancellery of the empire and the home of the official dispatches and correspondence of state); diwan al-ishrāf, which took care of the supervision of the collection of taxes and revenues and their distribution; diwan al-lard, which was responsible for paying the standing army and "recording the grant of iqṭā's to the military class." 43

These Seljuk bureaus were staffed by graduates of the Niẓāmiyyah school and other madrasahs. Alongside the bureaus, the Seljuks had a provincial administration which was in several respects independent of the central bureaucracy. The central bureaucracy was unable to dictate its policies in many instances to the provinces. They were "only able to maintain the balance of power between the military and civil authorities," 44 because side by side with the civil administrator or governor of the province there was a military governor who, more


often than not, was responsible for the civil administration too. In exchange—as mentioned above—for a salary in many instances he got the civil administration of a province, thus giving him the power to levy taxes and entitling him "to all the revenue of the land, and the civil officers became his direct administrative subordinates." 45

The Seljuks attempted to form a centralized system of administration but, on the other hand, were keen on keeping the Turkish system of parcelling out the land among the extended members of the ruling family, and by giving out military iqṭā'īs to their deserving officers. The two systems of centralized bureaucracy and the parcelling out of the land, which spelled decentralization, were parallel yet contradictory. A bureaucratically ideal system was compromised by political tradition. Thus, one system in essence negated the other.

The Seljuk administration was innovative in many respects, yet such new ideas in government were tested and sometimes caused grave consequences for the state.

One example was the creation of the diwan for qadi, which made the latter salaried personnel and thus compromised their ability to be honest arbitrators for the ra'iyyah as a whole. Being co-opted into the system lessened their respectability and their effectiveness with the masses whose interests they were supposed to safeguard. Although the Seljuk sultans intended to create a system that would be guided by Islamicate principles and would be the best suited for the era, their system had inherent weaknesses which will be discussed below, when a comparison will be drawn between their administration and that of their nominal overlords, the Abbasids, and that of their contemporaries, the Fatimids.

The political and administrative organization under the Fatimids had its strength in operating from a single center, the capital at Cairo, which "was designed to be strictly the administrative and military capital of the regime." While that was the case with the Fatimids, the Seljuks, on the other hand, had an inherent weakness in the structure of their government, namely a tendency

46 M.A. Sha'ban, Islamic History, Volume II, p. 198.
towards decentralization and division. This tendency is mainly seen "in the Turkish conception of leadership as vested in the entire family."\textsuperscript{47} The Turkish conception of leadership was quite different from the Persian idea of the absolute monarch. "The Turkish leaders continued to think of the empire as the property of the whole family."\textsuperscript{48} To them, all members of the extended family and tribe shared in running the sultanate. The administration of provinces was assigned to members of the extended family, which eventually led to the breakdown of the empire into separate dynasties, such as those of Rûm, Syria, etc. The Fatimids, however, believed that only the caliph, with the help of the vizier who was the caliph’s choice, was vested with the authority to run the imamate. By definition, the imāmate could not be shared because it was not an office but an authority designated by God to one man as the chosen person to lead the ummah; thus, one could argue that there was no division of power in the Fatimid caliphate. The members of the caliphal family did not participate in

\textsuperscript{47} Klausner, \textit{The Seljuk Vezirate}, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 9.
any administrative capacity and incidents where power struggles occurred were very few. A struggle did arise between the sons of the Caliph-Imām al-Mustanṣir at his death in 487/1094 in which his eldest son sought to take over the imāmate from his brother, who had been named by al-Mustanṣir as al-Musta’lī bi’llāh, the new imām.49

The Abbasid administration, in contrast, had as its ultimate aim the centralization of power. But because in many ways the Abbasids were pioneers in creating new administrative units and because they were also heirs to the administrative legacies of the Byzantines and Persians, they were unable to manage completely the

49 The sons of al-Mustanṣir were Nizār, ‘Abd Allāh, Ismā‘īl, and Aḥmad, his youngest, who became al-Musta’lī bi’llāh. It was Nizār who showed anger against his brother and refused to give him allegiance (bay‘ah) and went to Alexandria, where he staged a rebellion. He protested by saying: "Even if I am cut into pieces I refuse to give him allegiance." Nizār lost his life in 488/1095 at the hands of al-Afḍal ibn Badr al-Jamālī. This also started the schism in Isma‘īlism between the Nizāriyyah and the mainstream. See al-Maqrīzī, Itti‘āz, III, 11-14. See also Ibn Muyassar, Akhbār Misr, p. 35.
situation as they wished. Moreover they were forever experimenting with new ways of administering their realms. The caliph, although vested with the power to be the sole and absolute ruler, was unable to hold on to his prerogatives and rights because he delegated authority to families whose actual power equalled and paralleled his own, such as the Barmakids and the Fūrāts, not to mention the Buyids and Seljuks. Thus the Abbasids’ weakness in attaining a centralized system of government stemmed from their policy of non-commitment to the newly-created bureaus or administrative units. As Sourdélap explains, bureaus appeared and disappeared, sometimes for no apparent reason.

Unlike the Seljuks and the Abbasids, the Fatimids did not believe in the military fief system. They did not depend on this type of system nor any other type of indirect administration. For land tax collection, they

50 "Si la qualité de kitab était régulièrement requise du vizir, c’est qu’il avait pour première tache de diriger les nombreux services administratifs qui régissaient l’empire abbaside et qui hérèt en partie de l’époque umayyade, continuaient de tendre vers une centralisation et un efficacité qui ne furent jamais pleinement réalisées." Dominique Sourdélap, Le vizirat abbaside, II, 580.
used the gabālah system, in which a given district paid a fix sum of money by contracting it out. The original system, which was devised by the Abbasid caliph al-Ma‘mūn, was greatly modified by the Fatimids. They auctioned the contracts to the highest bidder, and the contractors did not have to belong to the community concerned. Moreover, the contractors did not have to fix the canals and dikes in their tax-farming areas. Tax-farming was not a hereditary position, yet some tax collectors were able to ensure their sons such employment. In many ways, the modifications were an improvement, but not in others, especially the question of not fixing irrigation canals, which meant that the yield of the land was reduced and, in turn, that taxes paid into the treasury were reduced. Al-Maqrīzī laments this situation in his Ighāthat al-ummah fī kashf al-ghummah.

Again, auctioning the position of tax collector avoided the hereditary tendency, but at the expense of the ra‘īyyah, who during the reigns of weak imāms were taxed unmercifully; while under normal circumstances, a

51 M.A. Sha‘bān, Islamic History, Volume II, p. 201.
system of checks and balances devised by the central administration and frequent surveys and censuses by the Fatimids ensured a fair system of taxation. The periodic cadastral survey (rawk) produced an equitable form of taxation assessed on the land and from merchants and ports. The Abbasids and Seljuks, on the other hand, had their taxes collected by fief holders (tax farmers) who, at their own discretion, sent the money to the central government. Cases of extortion from the populace were many. If the tax farmer found it expedient to gain extra money from the masses of peasants, he did not hesitate to increase their taxes in order to pocket the difference before sending the sums of money owed to the government. In the case of the Abbasids, the money collected went straight to the treasury, from where the caliph drew his personal and court expenditures. This meant that the leftover money was divided among the bureaus.

The Fatimid system was just the opposite of the Abbasid. Taxes collected went straight to the bureaus for payment of salaries and for the purpose of ensuring
that the bureaus' expenditures were met. The leftover money was sent to the treasury from where the Caliph-Imām drew his palace expenditures. Although the public treasury was by no means his personal property, he had access to it if necessary. It was during times of crisis such as famines, floods, and disasters that the caliph drew money out of the treasury to relieve the human suffering of his people.

As far as the army officers were concerned, the Fatimids rewarded them by granting them monetary awards rather than by giving them ḫāṭā' and depending on them for running the provinces or the remote areas of the caliphate. ḫāṭā', however, was not completely


54 A description of the pay of the Turkish contingent of al-Mustanṣir's army during the worst days of the Fatimid (continued...)
nonexistent in Egypt. But, even when it existed, it was not in the form that was commonly known as iqtā' jayshī. It was Claude Cahen who in "L'Administration financière de l'armée fatimide d'après al-Makhzūmī" brought to my attention a paragraph from al-Maqrīzī’s Khīṭat which confirms this point. He translated it as follows:

Sache que ni sous les Fatimides d’Égypte ni sous les émirs qui les avaient précédés il n’y avait pour les armées du pays d’iqtā’ à la manière de ce qui se pratique aujourd’hui pour les soldats de l’État "turc" [= mamlūk]. Mais le pays était affermé moyennant des qabālāt déterminées à quiconque le voulait des émirs, des soldats, des notables arabes et coptes du district etc.⁵⁵

⁵⁴(...continued)
caliphate, when the treasury was empty, is in al-Maqrīzī, Ittīḥāz, III, 275-76, 281. Many government offices dealt in promissory notes instead of cash when they were unable to meet all the pay of their employees until positive cash flow was achieved. Goitein draws the conclusion that "the society of the Fatimid period to a certain extent was based on a paper economy," either credit extended or payment made by promissory notes. S.D. Goitein, "Bankers’ Accounts from the Eleventh Century A.D.," JESHO, 9 (1966): 28.

The Fatimids used *iqṭā' iʿtidsād*, in which the land was leased out on the basis of a fixed period of time with a fixed amount of money based on cadastral surveys, thus the *ʿibrah* method of payment. The *ʿibrah* "was based on the average revenue as arrived at by taking the revenue of the best and worst years, adding them and dividing by two, after allowing for changes in prices and occasional events such as wars and plagues."

Because the army personnel were kept as salaried individuals, the Fatimids avoided parcelling out their kingdom and thus causing the disintegration of the caliphate into small sultanates. The policy of the Fatimids vis-à-vis land ownership was built on the theory of the imamate. All land belonged to God, the imām was God’s representative on earth and owned all the lands that he ruled over; as such he was free to grant pieces of land to whomever he pleased. "The rest of the


57 "Les souverains fatimides étaient propriétaires de la terre d’Égypte à la façon des souverains pharaoniques." (continued...)
people who had been in possession of the land lost their titles to their properties but were allowed to continue to cultivate them. No one was forced off his land and it was passed from father to son. . . .” 58 Thus, these previous freeholders became renters of the land as the tax they paid was kirā’, or rent tax. 59

As many historians concede, the Fatimid system of taxation and control over the land differed from that of the regimes which preceded the Fatimids or those which followed them. Both the Abbasids and Seljuks created bureaus or administrative units to divide the work of government among specialized entities so that tasks were done more efficiently. Yet both were imprecise in the definition of what the bureaus were supposed to do. While such was the case with the Abbasids and the Seljuks, the Fatimids increased the number of dīwāns from

57(...continued)


the four they had inherited to twenty. Thus the intricate fabric of the administration. Many of the diwāns created by the Fatimids duplicated each others’ work on purpose in order to impose checks and balances, so that no offenses could be committed by one without their being caught by the other diwāns.

The Fatimids also differed in their recruitment policies and in their staffing of administrative units. Their aim was competence, and they pursued it even if it meant that their kuttāb were for the most part Coptic Christians. The Fatimids had no interest in injecting their religion into the political arena, whereas this was not true of the Seljuks or the Abbasids. The latter, although they inherited a scribal class which was mainly Christian, made an effort to staff their bureaus as time passed with Muslims who were supporters of the Abbasid

60 See Chapter One for detailed information on the diwāns.

61 Abū Ṣāliḥ al-Armanī, Tārīkh fī nawāḥī Miṣr wa aqtā‘iha, ed. B.T.A. Evetts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), p. 47/fol 34b. On ff 28b and 29a, the author speaks of Muḥammad as saying to his people to treat the Copts in Egypt well, for "they will be you help and support." The author cites an isnād on the authority of `Amr ibn al-`Āṣ.
da'wah. Ultimately they had a majority of non-Arab, highly-educated Muslims in the bureaucracy. The Seljuks, on the other hand, groomed Sunni 'ulamā' and their students from the madrasah system to become administrators. The Niẓāmiyyah schools were created precisely for the education of the new scribal class in a religiously-oriented manner, thus making Islam part and parcel of the sultanate’s ideology. The Fatimids practiced the separation of state and religion in that they did not offer to incorporate the 'ulamā' into the administrative system. The Fatimid dā'īs were not a bureaucratic cadre, nor were they salaried personnel in the administration. As we have seen, the Fatimid da'wah in many ways was underground in Egypt. "The Fatimid Caliph was an Emperor and a king of his vast domain, yet outside the boundaries of his Empire, he was shepherd of the 'da'wa' and its chief proselytizer."


sought to keep their da'wah and their religious system completely separate from their civil administrative system so that one ran parallel to the other, converging and meeting only at the level of the caliph-imām. Thus, the Fatimids tried to prevent the corruption of the religious system.

The Abbasid and Seljuk qādīs were salaried individuals. They were nominated practically for life, as was the case with all government officials. Their pay was high so that they would not be tempted by bribes. Al-Qalqashandī relates that a certain qādī, Bakkār ibn Qutayba, was paid 1000 dinars per month. The Fatimids, on the other hand, even when their chief dā'ī was paid by the government, created a "divorce of the juridical from the executive authorities," thus a separation in which no crippling of the system took place. Although the system of justice was administered according to an Ismā'īlī Shi'i code, the qādīs were from many different


66 Ibid., p. 318. See also al-Qalqashandī, Subh al-a`shā, III, 526.

madhhab. This was possible because the difference between the Shi'i code and the Sunni one are not great. 68

Recruitment of the viziers was no different. The Abbasids and Seljuks named only Muslims to the position, while the Fatimids did not limit themselves to recruitment only from among the Ismā'īlīs, but were able to recruit the most qualified men regardless of their religious, social, economic, and educational backgrounds. Thus, the Fatimids had several viziers who were freed slaves and who were extremely capable men. Unlike the Abbasids or Seljuks, the Fatimids did not look for viziers from the scribal class; for although such a qualification was a plus, it was not the only criterion by which the Fatimids judged the merits of their candidates for the vizierate. Thus, their viziers on the whole were capable men who made it possible for the caliphate to have a sense of continuity.

The chain of command, the fashion in which the Fatimids passed on an order coming from the vizier or the caliph, was a pyramid-like structure, so that the second, third, and so on in the chain of command received instructions by order of their rank. In the Abbasid and Seljuk systems, in contrast, stratification was limited to three to four kinds of hierarchical positions. The Fatimids' "elaborate system of administration was organized with scientific precision," thus contributing to their success.69 They were able to create a strong administration by putting emphasis on justice and freedom of trade. Through a justly-administered dīwān al-maṣālim, the Fatimids were able to make propaganda for their dynasty and administration.70 In an atmosphere of safety, the average merchant could flourish and the coffers of the state be replenished.

Building on what they inherited, the Fatimids reformed and created new apparatuses to deal with their own bureaucracy. They built their administration on the model of their da’wah, whereby they had different

positions for different stages which a dā'ī could attain. The result was a pyramid-like structure with a chain of command and of orders working from top to bottom: from one man, the caliph or vizier, to the simple employee. Complaints worked their way up from those in the lower echelons to the top administrator, the vizier, and even sometimes to the caliph. Such was the system the Fatimids devised which had no parallel in other Islamic empires.
APPENDIX ONE

SUMMARY TABLE OF SIGNIFICANT DATA ON THE FATIMID VIZIERS

Prefatory Note:
The first column in the table contains names and titles, if any, for the viziers. The second column designates religion and place of birth or origin. Professional and economic backgrounds are summarized in the third column (for a fuller explanation and analysis of this data, see Chapter Three). The fourth column indicates the year of assumption of office, the fifth the year and cause of death, and the last the duration in office.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name &amp; Titles</th>
<th>Religion &amp; Place of Origin</th>
<th>Professional and Economic Background</th>
<th>Year Assumed Office</th>
<th>Year &amp; Cause of Death</th>
<th>Duration in Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ya'qub ibn Killis</td>
<td>Jewish, Isma'il; Iraq</td>
<td>Merchant; upper middle class</td>
<td>368/978</td>
<td>380/990</td>
<td>13 yrs. (natural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabr ibn al-Gasim</td>
<td>Isma'il; Maghrib</td>
<td>Scribe; upper class</td>
<td>373/983</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 mos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Abd al-'Asas</td>
<td>Batin; Muslim</td>
<td>Scribe;?</td>
<td>380/990</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Alid ibn 'Umar &amp; el-'Addas</td>
<td>Sunni; Iraq</td>
<td>Scribe, vizierial; upper class</td>
<td>382/992</td>
<td>391/1000</td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ja'far ibn al-Faqi</td>
<td>Sunni; Iraq</td>
<td>Scribe, vizierial; upper class</td>
<td>382/992</td>
<td>391/1000</td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REIGN OF AL-'AZIZ BILLAH (365-386/976-996)</td>
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<tr>
<td>'Isa ibn Nastur</td>
<td>Copt; Egyptian</td>
<td>Scribe,?</td>
<td>383/993</td>
<td>387/997</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amr al-Dawlah</td>
<td>Isma'il; Maghrib</td>
<td>Tribal shaykh; upper class</td>
<td>386/996</td>
<td>390/999</td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad al-Husayn</td>
<td>Isma'il; Maghrib</td>
<td>Eunuch; slave</td>
<td>387/997</td>
<td>390/999</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Husayn ibn Al-Qadi Jawhar</td>
<td>Isma'il; Maghrib</td>
<td>Military; upper class</td>
<td>390/999</td>
<td>401/1010</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--co-vizier with--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Abd al-'Ala' Fahd</td>
<td>Christian; Egypt</td>
<td>Scribe; upper middle class</td>
<td>390/999</td>
<td>393/1002</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zar'ah ibn Nastur</td>
<td>Christian; Egypt</td>
<td>Scribe (son of a vizier); upper class</td>
<td>401/1010</td>
<td>405/1012</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Husayn ibn Tahir al-Wazzan; (wasitah)</td>
<td>Iran (wasitah); Iran</td>
<td>Scribe; upper middle class</td>
<td>403/1012</td>
<td>405/1014</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Hassan ibn 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Abi Sufayd; (wasitah)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Scribe; upper middle class</td>
<td>405/1014</td>
<td>405/1014</td>
<td>62 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--co-vizier with--</td>
<td></td>
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REIGN OF AL-RA'AM BILLAH (386-411/996-1021)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name &amp; Titles</th>
<th>Religion &amp; Place of Origin</th>
<th>Professional and Economic Background</th>
<th>Year Assumed Office</th>
<th>Year &amp; Cause of Death</th>
<th>Duration in Office</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abūl-'Abbās al-Faḍl ibn al-Wazīr Abūl-Faḍl Ja'far ibn al-Faḍl Ābn al-Furāt (wassāh)</td>
<td>Sunni; Iraq</td>
<td>Scribal; son of a vizier; upper class</td>
<td>405/1014</td>
<td>405/1014 (killed)</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abūl-'Hasan 'Alī ibn al-Wazīr Abūl-Faḍl</td>
<td>Jewish; Ismā'īlī</td>
<td>Scribal; son of a vizier; upper class</td>
<td>406/1015</td>
<td>409/1018 (killed)</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa'ūd ibn 'Ishāq ibn al-Wazīr</td>
<td>Christian; Egypt</td>
<td>Scribal; brother &amp; son of a vizier; upper class</td>
<td>409/1018</td>
<td>409/1018 (killed)</td>
<td>5 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abūl-Faṭḥ Mas'ūd</td>
<td>Ismā'īlī; Iran</td>
<td>Scribal; son of a vizier; upper class</td>
<td>409/1018</td>
<td>410/1019 (natural)</td>
<td>2 years</td>
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</table>

**REIGN OF AL-ẒĀHIR LI'-IZĀZ DĪN ALLĀH (411-427/1021-1035)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name &amp; Titles</th>
<th>Religion &amp; Place of Origin</th>
<th>Professional and Economic Background</th>
<th>Year Assumed Office</th>
<th>Year &amp; Cause of Death</th>
<th>Duration in Office</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abūl-Husayn 'Amār ibn al-Wazīr Abūl-Futūḥ</td>
<td>Ismā'īlī</td>
<td>Scribal; upper middle class</td>
<td>411/1020</td>
<td>412/1012 (killed)</td>
<td>7 months &amp; a few days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mūsā ibn 'Alī</td>
<td>Ismā'īlī</td>
<td>Scribal; upper middle class</td>
<td>413/1022 (twice)</td>
<td>413/1022 (killed)</td>
<td>9 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abū al-Muqtedār al-Ẓāhir al-Ṭāhah</td>
<td>Ismā'īlī</td>
<td>Scribal; upper middle class</td>
<td>418/1027</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REIGN OF AL-MUSTAṆṢĪR BI-ALLĀH (427-487/1036-1094)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name &amp; Titles</th>
<th>Religion &amp; Place of Origin</th>
<th>Professional and Economic Background</th>
<th>Year Assumed Office</th>
<th>Year &amp; Cause of Death</th>
<th>Duration in Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abūl-Qāsim 'Alī</td>
<td>Ismā'īlī; Iraq</td>
<td>Scribal; middle class</td>
<td>418/1027</td>
<td>436/1044 (natural)</td>
<td>9 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abū-Mu'āṣir al-Ridā</td>
<td>Jewish; Iraq</td>
<td>Scribal; son of a vizier; upper class</td>
<td>436/1044</td>
<td>439/1047 (killed)</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name &amp; Titles</td>
<td>Religion &amp; Place of Origin</td>
<td>Professional and Economic Background</td>
<td>Year Assumed Office</td>
<td>Year &amp; Cause of Death</td>
<td>Duration in Office</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abūl-Barakāt Ḫusayn Ismāʿīlī; Iraq</td>
<td>Scribal; nephew &amp; son of viziers; upper class</td>
<td>440/1048</td>
<td>ca. 468/1075 (natural)</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Saʿīd ibn Masʿūd al-Dāfūdī</td>
<td>Scribal; upper class</td>
<td>441/1049</td>
<td>? (natural)</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abū Muhammad al-Hasan Sunnī; Palestine</td>
<td>Gāfit; lower middle class</td>
<td>442/1050</td>
<td>450/1058 (killed)</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abūl-Farağ Abul-Ḥan Ismāʾīlī; Iraq</td>
<td>Scribal;</td>
<td>450/1058 (twice)</td>
<td>454/1062</td>
<td>2 months, 14 days; 4 months, 10 days; 5 months; 11 months, 24 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abūl-Farağ Muhammad Ismāʾīlī; Maghrīb</td>
<td>Scribal (grandson of a vizier); upper class</td>
<td>450/1058</td>
<td>478/1085 (natural)</td>
<td>2 years, 2 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Abdullāh ibn Yaḥyā Sunnī; Iraq</td>
<td>Adīfī from a family of Abassid viziers; upper class</td>
<td>453/1061</td>
<td>455/1063 (natural)</td>
<td>several months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Abd al-Ḥakīm</td>
<td>Gāfit; middle class</td>
<td>453/1061</td>
<td>454/1062 (natural)</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name &amp; Titles</td>
<td>Place of Origin</td>
<td>Professional and Economic Background</td>
<td>Year Assumed Office</td>
<td>Year &amp; Cause of Death</td>
<td>Duration in Office</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu 'Ali Ahmad ibn Isma'il; Syria</td>
<td>Sribal; son of vizier above, first upper class</td>
<td>456/1062</td>
<td>(natural)</td>
<td>17 days</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>'Abd al-Hakim ibn Sa'd</td>
<td>Egypt; nephew of vizier upper class</td>
<td>455/1063</td>
<td>(natural)</td>
<td>45 days</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>al-Dawlah</td>
<td>upper class (twice)</td>
<td>456/1063</td>
<td>(natural)</td>
<td>2 months, 455/1063</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu 'Abd Allah ibn Sadid</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>454/1062</td>
<td>6 months; 478/1085</td>
<td>returned to Syria</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Qasim ibn Feid</td>
<td>upper class</td>
<td>456/1063</td>
<td>(killed)</td>
<td>34 days; 465/1072</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abu 'Ali bin Feid;</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>456/1063</td>
<td>(killed)</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ghasan ibn Isma'il; of Kufa;</td>
<td>upper class</td>
<td>456/1063</td>
<td>as (natural)</td>
<td>666/1073</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Husayn ibn Abu Liban</td>
<td></td>
<td>456/1063</td>
<td>(natural)</td>
<td>5 months; 3 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Mashhara</td>
<td>upper middle class</td>
<td>457/1064</td>
<td>(killed)</td>
<td>2 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu 'Ali al-</td>
<td>Jewish; Iraq</td>
<td>456/1063</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Badi' khair, amir al-muminin</td>
<td>Merchant; upper middle class</td>
<td>456/1063</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu 'Ali ibn Muhammad</td>
<td>Sura; Iraq</td>
<td>457/1064</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ra'is</td>
<td>Sribal;</td>
<td>457/1064</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Qasim ibn Hisham;</td>
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<td>457/1064</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 days;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Hasan ibn 'Abd</td>
<td></td>
<td>457/1064</td>
<td></td>
<td>less than</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Badi' khair, amir al-muminin</td>
<td>Sribal; middle class</td>
<td>457/1064</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name &amp; Titles</td>
<td>Religion &amp; Place of Origin</td>
<td>Professional and Economic Background</td>
<td>Year Assumed Office</td>
<td>Year &amp; Cause of Death</td>
<td>Duration in Office</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu-'Alī al-Yasen Shī'ī (Imām); ibn 457/1064</td>
<td>Sayyid; brother of a vizier; upper class</td>
<td>a few days</td>
<td>(natural)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dhūl-Kafālatayn al-mu'izz</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ṣayyid al-falaj al-'azam al-dīn sayyid al-sādiq</td>
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<td>Abu-Shujā' Sunnī; Iraq</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad ibn al-Ashraf al-sāliḥ al-mu'izz</td>
<td>Scribal, military</td>
<td>457/1064</td>
<td>466/1073</td>
<td>a few days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(son of Iraqi vizier); upper class</td>
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<tr>
<td>fakhr al-mulk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abu-'Alī Yasen Ishīr; ?; Syria</td>
<td>Scribal; ?</td>
<td>458/1066</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>a few days</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ibn Mazīr</td>
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<td>al-mu'izz al-mu'izz</td>
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<td>sāliḥ al-dawād</td>
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<td>zand al-ma'mīn al-mu'mīn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abu-'Abdullāh; ?; Egypt</td>
<td>Scribal, military; upper class</td>
<td>458/1066</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Muhammad ibn Abu-Hamid al-sādir al-adil</td>
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<td>shams al-tamam sayyid ru'usān al-sayf al-amīn al-Islām</td>
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<td>tāl al-yūsuf an-Nāf al-khulafā'</td>
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<td>sharaf al-dīn ghayr al-Isām</td>
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<td>wa-l-Musālima hamīn amīr al-mu'mīn</td>
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<td>wa l-Ṭabā'</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu-Sa'īd Manṣūr, Christian; known as Abu Zunbar</td>
<td>? (son of zajir al-rīf); ?</td>
<td>458/1066</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>a few days; fled office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>al-maktab al-sayyid al-ma'dal al-mu'mīn</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-ma'dal al-maktab al-sayyid</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>al-ma'mīn al-Islām al-dawād</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>mā ghul amīr al-mu'mīn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abu-'Alī 'Abd al-Mohammad ibn 'Abd al-Nūr al-Ṣāliḥ</td>
<td>Scribal; ?</td>
<td>458/1066</td>
<td>466/1073</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(killed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Ghānī; ibn Naṣr ibn Sa'd ibn 'Abd al-Qayy</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(al-Qayy) fāl-al-sāliḥ</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-ma'am al-maktab al-dawād</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>wa-l-Ṭabā'</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu-Najm Badr al-Janālī; Muslim; known as Abu</td>
<td>Ismā'īlī;</td>
<td>466/1073</td>
<td>488/1095</td>
<td>21 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustansirī</td>
<td>Military, mamlūk; slave</td>
<td></td>
<td>(natural)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-sayyid al-sāliḥ</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>al-ṣāliḥ al-ma'mīn</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu-'Alī Qāsim Ismā'īlī;</td>
<td>Military, scribal</td>
<td>487/1094</td>
<td>515/1121</td>
<td>28 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th dāwil Badr al-Janālī; father</td>
<td>(son of Badr al-Janālī); freed slave</td>
<td></td>
<td>(succeeded)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shī'ī</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamlūk</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Mustansirī</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-ma'am al-ma'mīn al-Isām al-ma'mīn</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-'Imām</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name &amp; Titles</td>
<td>Religion &amp; Place of Origin</td>
<td>Professional and Economic Background</td>
<td>Year Assumed Office</td>
<td>Year &amp; Cause of Death</td>
<td>Duration in Office</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abū-‘Abdallāh Muhammad ibn Abī Shuja‘ al-Amīrī</td>
<td>Ismā‘īlī; Egypt</td>
<td>Military, scribe; freed slave</td>
<td>515/1121</td>
<td>522/1128 (killed)</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NO VIZIERS DURING REIGN OF AL-ʿAMIR (519-524/1125-1130)**

**INTERREGNUM, 524-526/1129-1131**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name &amp; Titles</th>
<th>Religion &amp; Place of Origin</th>
<th>Professional and Economic Background</th>
<th>Year Assumed Office</th>
<th>Year &amp; Cause of Death</th>
<th>Duration in Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abū‘l-‘Alī Ahmād ibn al-Sayyid al-ʿAjāl</td>
<td>Ismā‘īlī; Armenian</td>
<td>Scribal (son and grandson of viziers); upper middle class</td>
<td>524/1129</td>
<td>526/1131 (killed)</td>
<td>1 year, 1 month, 13 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shīhibnāsh, Amīr al-Juyūsh (ʿazīz al-sayf wa-l-qalīm)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abū‘l-Fath Yāmīs</td>
<td>Christian; “pūnīm”</td>
<td>Military; slave</td>
<td>526/1131</td>
<td>526/1131 (killed)</td>
<td>9 months, a few days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amīr al-Juyūsh</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NO VIZIERS DURING PART OF AL-ḤĀFIZ LĪ-DĪN ALLĀH’S REIGN, 526-529/1131-1134**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name &amp; Titles</th>
<th>Religion &amp; Place of Origin</th>
<th>Professional and Economic Background</th>
<th>Year Assumed Office</th>
<th>Year &amp; Cause of Death</th>
<th>Duration in Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abū Muzaffar</td>
<td>Christian; Armenian</td>
<td>Military, scribe; prince, upper class</td>
<td>529/1134</td>
<td>535/1140 (natural)</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrīn al-ʿArabī</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ṣayf al-īlām tālī al-nuṣūḥ)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raqīṣ ibn al-Walakhshāt</td>
<td>Sunni; Egypt</td>
<td>Military, scribe; amīr</td>
<td>531/1136</td>
<td>533/1138 (killed)</td>
<td>2 years, 5 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NO VIZIERS DURING LAST PART OF AL-ḤĀFIZ’S REIGN, 553-544/1138-1149**

**CALIPHATE OF AL-ẒĀFIR BI-AMR ALLĀH (544-549/1149-1154)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name &amp; Titles</th>
<th>Religion &amp; Place of Origin</th>
<th>Professional and Economic Background</th>
<th>Year Assumed Office</th>
<th>Year &amp; Cause of Death</th>
<th>Duration in Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Najm al-Dīn Muhammad ibn Masāl</td>
<td>Ismā‘īlī; Maghrib</td>
<td>Military; scribe; amīr</td>
<td>544/1149</td>
<td>544/1149 (killed)</td>
<td>2 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-smayyid al-ajall al-muṣaqqal amīr al-Juyūsh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Alī ibn al-Sūlār al-amīr Muzaffar Abū‘l-Ḥasan</td>
<td>Sunni; Egypt</td>
<td>Military, scribe; amīr</td>
<td>544/1149</td>
<td>548/1153 (killed)</td>
<td>3 1/2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ʿazīz al-ʿAdl)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Abdūs ibn Yāḥyā ibn Badi‘</td>
<td>Sunni; Maghrib</td>
<td>Scribal (nephew of a vizier); amīr</td>
<td>548/1153</td>
<td>548/1153</td>
<td>1 year; fled office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name &amp; Titles</td>
<td>Religion &amp; Place of Origin</td>
<td>Professional and Economic Background</td>
<td>Year Assumed Office</td>
<td>Year &amp; Cause of Death</td>
<td>Duration in Office</td>
</tr>
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<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jālā‘ī ibn</td>
<td>Imām; Armenian</td>
<td>Military, scribe; upper class</td>
<td>549/1154</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>7 years, 4 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rozzāk</td>
<td>Imām;</td>
<td>Military, scribe; upper class</td>
<td>556/1160</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shākur ibn</td>
<td>Sunni; Arab (tribal)</td>
<td>Military; shaykh</td>
<td>558/1162</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>4 years, 8 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dirghām</td>
<td>Sunni; Yemen</td>
<td>Military; amīr</td>
<td>558/1162</td>
<td>559/1163</td>
<td>9 months (killed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asad al-Dīn</td>
<td>Sunni; Kurd</td>
<td>Military;</td>
<td>564/1168</td>
<td>564/1168</td>
<td>2 months (natural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şalāḥ al-Dīn</td>
<td>Sunni; Kurd</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>564/1168</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Şalāḥ al-Dīn al-Āyyūbī assumed power in his own right and became sultan, ending the Fatimid caliphate.
APPENDIX TWO

BRIEF BIOGRAPHIES OF

THE FATIMID VIZIERS
REIGN OF AL-'AZIZ BI'LLAH (365-386/976-996)

Ya'qūb ibn Killis (368-380/978-990)
(For a full account of his life and career, see Chapter Three).

Jabr ibn al-Qāsim (373-374/983-984)
A Maghribī from a very prominent sedentary (ḥadār) family, he served al-'Azīz in the capacity of his "heir" (khalīfah) when the latter was in Syria.¹ Al-'Azīz brought him as a vizier when Ibn Killis was imprisoned because of a misunderstanding between the latter and the caliph; but when Ibn Killis was released, Jabr returned to his previous position as head of the police of both Upper and Lower Egypt.

Abū’l-Hasan ‘Alī ibn Umar al-‘Addās (380-381/990-991)
He became vizier (dāmin, guarantor of affairs of state) when Ibn Killis died. It is important to note here that the caliph al-'Azīz had a hard time finding a vizier after Ibn Killis’s death. No-one could measure up to Ya'qūb, and the standard was very difficult to meet. Thus, al-'Azīz had a succession of viziers with limited prerogatives who occupied the office only for a year or less. Al-'Addās was no exception. Furthermore, he mismanaged collection of the kharāj and thus reduced the caliphate’s income. Accused of embezzlement, he was acquitted because he was not guilty of stealing but of

¹ Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, Al-Ishārah ilā man nāla al-wizārah, p. 90; also see Jamāl al-Dīn ibn Žāfīr, Akhbār al-duwal al-munqatì’ah, p. 38.
mismanagement. He spent fifty-seven days out of his one-year term in prison.

Abū’l-Faḍl Ja’far ibn al-Furāt (382-343/992-993)
He was the vizier of the Ikhshīdī ruler, Kāfūr, and continued as such even when Jawhar conquered Egypt. The latter "re-instated him in his position" during the early part of his rule over Egypt. Named by al-‘Aziz as his vizier, he seems to have been a competent servant, yet he did not last more than a year. He is said to have died in 391, but the biographers are not very sure even of the date. There is a consensus of the medieval historians concerning his lineage: he was the great-grandson of a vizier, many of his family having served as viziers of the Abbasids.

‘Īsā ibn Nastūrus (383-386/993-996)
This vizier of al-‘Azīz belonged to a Coptic family. A scribe and secretary of finance before becoming vizier, he was noted for having amassed large amounts of kharāj money through his strict collection policy. Ibn Nastūrus was accused by some contemporaries of hiring only Christians for positions in the diwāns and of firing

2 Al-Maqrīzī, Itti‘āz, III?, 119.
3 In his edition of Ibn al-Ṣayraff, Al-Ishārah, p. 87, ‘Abd Allāh Mukhliṣ quotes Yāqūt, Mu‘jam al-udabā’ and Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-a‘yān as giving two years for Ibn al-Furāt’s death; but Mukhliṣ feels that the former source is more accurate.
Muslims. Whether this favoritism was alleged by biased Muslim historians or whether the vizier actually discriminated in recruitment cannot be verified. However, one should remember that the staff of the bureaus in the early days of the caliphate in Egypt came from the Coptic class of professional scribes; one might then take the Muslim historians’ criticisms as sour grapes or envy. Regardless of whether the accusation was right, Ibn Nastūrus all the same lost his position as vizier and was killed by the caliph al-Ḥākim in 391/1000.

REIGN OF AL-ḤĀKIM BI-AMR ALLĀH (386-411/996-1021)


A nobleman from the Kutāmah tribe of north Africa, he was known to be an able diplomat who would negotiate a settlement rather than resort to war. He actually left office after an insurrection in the army between the Maghribīs and the Turks, which prompted him to retire to private life. He was in office for one year only and was the first vizier to receive an honorific title.⁵


⁵ ʻIzz al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, Al-Kāmil fī al-tārīkh (Beirut: Dār Șādir, 1966), IX, 118.
Barjawan [al-Ustād] (387-390/997-999)
A white eunuch, he ascended to the highest office of state. He was entrusted by al-ʿAzīz to take the oath (bayʿah) for al-Ḥākim. Barjawan was also al-ʿAzīz’s choice to be al-Ḥākim’s chief administrator until the latter came of age. Barjawan was nonetheless unable to exercise his prerogatives as mudabbir al-dawlah because Ibn ʿAmmār (the vizier described above) claimed the vizierate for himself. Barjawan remained very close to al-Ḥākim and eventually was able to seize the vizierate for himself.6 He was in power for three years, at the end of which he was murdered on orders from al-Ḥākim.
Although he was successful in his wars against the caliphate’s enemies, Barjawan’s unrestricted powers threatened al-Ḥākim and prompted the caliph to have him murdered.
Al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Qāʿid Jawhar [Qāʿid al-Quwwād] (390-393/999-1002)
He was named as vizier when Barjawan was murdered but he was not alone in this position. He had to share the vizierate with Abū l-ʿAlāʾ Fahd ibn Ibrāhīm (see below). Al-Ḥusayn was an army general who was very careful in his dealings with others lest he be accused of mismanagement by al-Ḥākim and thus lose his life, which occurred after he abandoned his post when his co-vizier was killed.

6 Ibid., IX, 119-120.
Abū l-'Alā' Fadh ibn Ibrāhīm [Al-Ra‘īs] (390-393/999-1002)
He shared the vizierate with al-Ḥusayn ibn Jawhar. He had been the head of the diwāns. After falling out of favor with the caliph al-Ḥākim, he was murdered like his predecessors.7

Zar'ah ibn Nastūrus [Al-Shāfī] (401-403/1010-1012)
His vizierate was spent in accumulating wealth for the Fatimids and in organizing affairs of state after an interruption in the vizierate and the murder by al-Ḥākim of many administrators. A son of 'Īsa ibn Nastūrus, Zar'ah died a natural death while in office.

Al-Ḥusayn ibn Ṭāhir al-Wazzān [Ammān al-Umanā'] (403-405/1012-1014)
Prior to his vizierate, he was the head of the treasury (bayt al-māl). He was obsessed with collection of taxes to the point that after the death of the vizier al-Ḥusayn ibn Jawhar, he sold all the latter’s properties and deposited the proceeds in the treasury. For no apparent reason, he was killed personally by al-Ḥākim when the two went out riding together. His was not a vizierate as such but a wasāṭah, a limited vizierate by definition. This vizier was an "intercessor" between the caliph and his subjects. This kind of vizierate was very common during al-Ḥākim’s reign, for the caliph did not believe in delegating power to anyone.8

7 Ibid., IX, 122.
8 Ibn al-Ṣayraḥī, Al-Īshārāt, p. 83.
Al-Ḥasan ibn Abī al-Sayyid (405/1014) and Ṭabd al-Rahmān ibn Abī al-Sayyid (405/1014)

These two brothers shared the position of wasātah. They were regarded as honest men and collected the government’s dues with strictness. For no apparent reason they fell out of favor and were murdered after only sixty-two days in office.

Abū’l-‘Abbās al-Faḍl (405/1014)

He was the son of the vizier Abū’l-Faḍl Jaʿfar ibn al-Faḍl ibn al-Furāt. A vizier by wasātah, he was in office for only five days before being murdered on orders of the caliph.


A prominent man from the Kutāmah tribe, he was a close friend of al-Ḥākim, and his family were close friends of the Fatimids. Al-Ḥākim was very generous with ʿAlī ibn Jaʿfar when he bestowed the vizierate on him: he gave him a large sum of money and a great number of beasts of burden. In addition, this vizier was given the governorships of Alexandria, Tannīs, and Ḍimyāt, the prefecture of police, and the hisbah. After all the power and money given to him, he nevertheless suffered the same fate as his predecessors: he was killed when riding home.
He was named vizier as was his brother before him; he did not last more than six months before being killed. Al-Ḥākim had given him a vizierate of the sword and the pen, for he was qāsim al-khilāfah or sharer of the caliphate.¹

Given a wasāṭah or limited vizierate, he conducted government business from his own home as had Ibn Killis. He was spared death at the hands of al-Ḥākim and was renamed vizier by the new caliph, al-Ẓāhir, when al-Jirjirāʾ took over as regent for al-Ẓāhir.

REIGN OF AL-ẒĀHIR LI-IʿZĀZ DĪN ALLĀH (411-427/1021-1035)
Abūʾl-Husayn ʿAmmār ibn Muhammad [al-ʾamīr al-khaṭīr raʾīs al-ruʾasāʾ] (411/1020)
A scribe and head of dīwān al-inshāʾ, he was a diplomat of sorts, for he mediated among the Turks, the Easterners (al-Mashāʾirīqah) and the ḥaḍarah (soldiers of sedentary, non-bedouin origin) in the army. He also took the oath for al-Imām al-Ẓāhir li-Iʿzāz Dīn Allāh after the disappearance of al-Ḥākim. He remained in office for seven months and a few days, then lost his life.²

¹ Ibid., p. 80.
Mūsā ibn al-Ḥasan [Yad al-dawlah abū‘l-futūh] (413/1022)
In the service of al-Ḥākim as prefect of police, he became governor al-Ṣa‘īd for al-Ẓāhir in 412/1021 and was also head of diwān al-inshā’. He became vizier by wasāṭah and lasted for nine months, after which he was imprisoned then killed.

Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan ibn Šāliḥ al-Rūzbārī [‘Āmid al-dawlah wa naṣīḥuhā] (418/1027)
An elderly man who was well-versed in the art of government, he was administrator of Ramlah during al-‘Azīz’s caliphate. He also became the governor of al-Šām, then the head of diwān al-jaysh, and finally vizier. According to Ibn al-Ṣayrafi, he was mistreated by al-Ẓāhir, who did not respect his age and seniority and threw him out of office, reinstated him, then dismissed him again.

An Iraqi by birth, he came with his brothers to Egypt and joined the Fatimid bureaucracy in the Ṣa‘īd during the reign of al-Ḥākim. So many complaints were voiced against him that al-Ḥākim punished him by cutting off his hands. Vizier of al-Ẓāhir from 418-427/107-1035, when al-Ẓāhir died, al-Jirjirā‘ī took the oath for al-Mustanṣir bi’llāh and remained in his service for nine years. He died a natural death. The mastermind of the
Fatimid recapture of north Africa, he also subdued revolts against Fatimid rule in Syria.

REIGN OF AL-MUSTANŞIR BI’LLAH (427-487/1036-1094)

Abū Mansūr Ṣadaqah ibn Yūsuf al-Falāḥī (al-wazīr al-ajall tāj al-rivāsah fakhr al-mulk muṣṭafā amīr al-mu’mīnīn) (436-439/1044-1047)

A convert to Islam from Judaism, he was a personal friend of and aide to al-Jirjirā’ī, who had asked al-Mustanṣir to name him as vizier after his death. He became the vizier as al-Jirjirā’ī wanted. Al-Falāḥī was not a strong man and had to share power and position with Abū Sa’d al-Tustarī, the personal director of al-Mustanṣir’s mother’s affairs. Al-Tustarī was the owner of al-Mustanṣir’s slave-mother and sold her to al-Ẓāhir. With the two dhimmīs in control of the caliphate, there was widespread anger at the power which these two men enjoyed. Al-Falāḥī was resentful of al-Tustarī’s power, however, and sought to phase him out. The latter was killed but his death did not mean that al-Falāḥī was free finally to run affairs for al-Mustanṣir. On the


11 Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Ḥusn al-muḥādarah fī akhbār Miṣr wa’l-Qāhirah, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 5871, fol 157r.
contrary, the mother of al-Mustanṣir saw to it that he was imprisoned and executed in 439/1047.12


A brother of al-Jirjirā’ī and an Iraqi by birth, he took over the vizierate after al-Falāḥī. He was known for confiscating properties, imprisoning people and exiling many more. The same fate befell him as had befallen his predecessor: he was imprisoned by al-Mustanṣir, only to be exiled to Syria in 441/1049.

Abū’l-Faḍl Sa‘īd ibn Mas‘ūd [‘amīd al-mulk zayn al-kufat] (441-442/1049-1050)

A senior scribe and a dīwān head, he was in charge of dīwān al-Shām until he was asked to become a wasīṭ, a lesser form of vizier.


Al-Yāzūrī was catapulted into office. A member of neither the scribal nor the military class, he was born in a small village called Yāzūr, located in the district of al-Ramlah in Palestine. Ibn al-Athīr describes him as

12 For a complete account of al-Falāḥī and al-Tustarī’s relationship, see al-Maqrīzī, Itti‘āz, II, 195-197.
a peasant who knew nothing but his trade. Al-Yāzūrī’s father was the village gādi. Al-Yāzūrī left Ramlah for Cairo where he became nāzir of dīwān al-sayyidah, al-Mustanṣir’s mother, after which he became Sunni gādi. Al-Mustanṣir made him his vizier and bestowed on him several honorific titles, not the least of which was dā‘ī al-du‘āt, in itself a contradiction, as al-Yāzūrī was a Sunni. Desperate as al-Mustanṣir was to have a vizier during this period of his caliphate, when famine, disease, and war threatened his rule, he was willing to make concessions to anyone who would relieve him of these pressures. Al-Yāzūrī got yet another concession from al-Mustaṣir, who allowed him to have his name included on newly-minted coins. This was the reward that the caliph gave him for subduing Banū Qurrah (the Arabs of al-Jazīrah in Egypt), who were opponents of the caliph. Al-Yāzūrī took care of may other enemies of the caliphate and wanted to go as far as acquiring Baghdad for his master. His expenditures on war at a time when famine and disease were widespread and when the Nile was low depleted the treasury, thus leading to more disasters. Moreover, al-Yāzūrī did away with fixed prices on staples, thus causing prices to soar and more persons to die because they could not pay for food. Having depleted

13 Ibn al-Athīr, Al-Kāmil fī al-tārīkh, IX, 566.
14 Text in al-Suyūṭī, Ḥusn al-muḥāqarah, fol 156v. See Chapter One, note 71.
the treasury, al-Yāzūrī was removed by al-Mustanṣir from the vizierate, placed under house arrest, and executed as a traitor.  


A scribe who was a well-known mathematician and prose writer, he was brought into al-Yāzūrī's court to help him. After al-Yāzūrī's death he was asked on three occasions by al-Mustanṣir to become vizier. These vizierates were for very short periods, none exceeding five months.  

Abū'l-Faraj Muḥammad ibn Ja'far al-Maghribī [al-wazīr al-ajall al-kāmil al-awḥad sāfī amīr al-mu'mīnīn wa khālīgatuh] (450-452/1058-1060)  

He had fled Egypt during al-Ḥākim's reign because his grandfather, father, and uncles were killed by that caliph. He subsequently came back from the Maghrib, where he had hidden, and joined the government of al-Yāzūrī. When al-Bābilī became vizier, he imprisoned Abū'l-Faraj as a suspect who had been a friend of al-Yāzūrī; but when al-Bābilī was dismissed, Abū'l-Faraj was named vizier by al-Mustanṣir. He remained in office for two years, after which he negotiated with the caliph to give him a position as head of a dīwān. He got his wish
and became head of dīwān al-inshā'. This was the first
time that a vizier was offered a "demotion" and
reinstated into the kuttāb cadre.17

'Abdallāh ibn Yahyā ibn Mudabbir [al-wazīr al-ajal al-
ţādil al-amīr sharaf al-wuzarā' sayyid al-ru'asā' tāj al-
aşfīvā' iizz al-dīn muqīth al-Muslimīn khalīl amīr al-
mu'mīnīn] (453, 455/1061, 1063)

Twice vizier, but for very short periods, he was an Iraqi
from a well-known family whose history is related by the
chroniclers. Ibn Mudabbir was a learned Sufi.
Unfortunately he died while in office and had little
influence on events.

'Abd al-Karīm ibn 'Abd al-Hakam [al-wazīr al-ajal fakhīr
al-wuzarā' amīd al-ru'asā' qādī'1-quḍāt wa dā'ī al-
du'āt majd al-ma'ālī kaffīl al-dīn yamīn amīr al-mu'mīnīn]
(453-454/1061-1062)

Born into a family of qādīs, he was the first in his
family to become a vizier. His father was qādī in
Tripoli (in Syria) but he moved to Egypt. 'Abd al-Karīm
died five months after he took office.

Abū 'Alī Ahmad ibn 'Abd al-Hakīm ibn Sa'id [al-wazīr al-
a'ajal qādī'1-quḍāt wa dā'ī al-du'āt thiqat al-Muslimīn
khalīl amīr al-mu'mīnīn] (454/1062)

He was vizier for only seventeen days, prior to which he
was a qādī. Nothing is known about him except for his
reputation for piety and religiosity.

17 Ibn al-Ṣayraffī, Al-īshārah, p. 65.
Abū 'Abdallāh al-Ḥusayn ibn Sadīd [al-wazīr al-sayyid al-
ajalī al-kāmil al-aḥwād] (454/1062)
A Damascene who was a well-known writer and scribe, he
was brought from Syria to become the vizier of al-
Mustanṣir for six months only, after which he returned to
his native land to become its governor.

Abū-Aḥmad Ahmad ibn 'Abd al-Karīm ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakīm [al-
wazīr al-ajall al-aḥwād sayyid al-wuzarā' ma'id al-aṣfiyā'
qāḍī'ī-qudāt wa dā'ī al-du'āt] (455/1063)
Twice vizier in the same year, but only in power for
three and a half months, he alternated being between
qāḍī'ī-qudāt and vizier. After his second vizierate, he
left for al-Shām.

Abū-Ghālib 'Abd al-Ẓāhir ibn Faḍl ibn al-'Ajamī [al-wazīr
al-ajall al-aḥwād al-as'ad tāj al-wuzarā' al-amīn al-
makīn sharaf al-kufāt dhū'l-mafākhir khalīl amīr al-
mu'mīnīn] (455, 456, 465/1063, 1064, 1072)
Three times vizier, but for very short periods, he was in
office the first time for three months, the second for
thirty-four days, and in the first days of his third
vizierate he was killed. His last vizierate came at a
point when the caliphate was on the point of collapse.
With famine and plague ravaging Egypt, and with the army
stealing the goods of the ra'iyyah, no vizier was able to
correct the situation.18 When human beings engaged in

18 Ibn Muyassar, Akhbār Miṣr, II, 20; Muḥammad ibn
Ahmad ibn Iyās, Kitāb tārīkh Miṣr: badā'ī al-zuhūr fī
cannibalism, there was no room for a son of a dāʿī and a pious man to become vizier.


Al-Ḥasan was five times vizier and six times qāḍī’l-qudāt in ten years. He was a tyrant who inflicted pain on innocent men. For lack of better men to assume the vizierate under al-Mustanṣir, al-Ḥasan was invested with executive powers. He was the vizier when Badr al-Jamālī arrived in Egypt and personally struck him down.


Abū’l-Makārim was twice vizier of al-Mustanṣir. His vizierates were for short periods, one for two months and the other for less than two months.


He was vizier for ten days only, then asked to be relieved of his duties. Prior to his vizierate, he was secretary of the treasury. His father had been director of the affairs of al-Mustanṣir’s mother. Ḥasan’s family was known in Cairo as wealthy merchants whose holdings are described by al-Maqṣīṭ (Ištīʿāz, volume II) and by Ibn Muyassar (Tārīkh Miṣr).

An alien resident in Egypt, he was employed in its government and attained the vizierate twice, each time for ten days.\(^\text{19}\)


In office for less than one month, as all the other viziers of this era, he was unable to change existing conditions in Egypt. He was a Shāmī by origin and was employed as deputy head of the chancellery in al-Shām.


He spent only a few days as vizier. Because of the lack of respect shown by government employees and because of the state of affairs of the caliphate, he left the vizierate for al-Shām, where he remained until conditions in Egypt changed. He returned to Egypt only to die.


A man of high integrity and tremendous wealth, he was the son of a vizier who had served the Buyid Sultan Bahā’ al-Dawlah. The chroniclers of the time mention the family’s

\(^{19}\) Al-Suyūṭī, Ḥusn al-muhādarah, fol 157r. Fatimid historians of the time have been unable to assign him a place in Egyptian society except in these terms: min al-ṭāri‘īn ‘alā Mīṣr.
wealth. Abū Shujā’ was vizier for only a few days. He left for Syria by sea but was intercepted by Badr al-Jamālī, the commander in chief of the Fatimid army, who killed him.


After a few days as vizier, he left for Tripoli, Syria, his birth place. Prior to his vizierate, he was a scribe in dīwān al-inshā’.


He was a vizier for one day, after which he was dismissed and killed by al-Mustanṣir. He came from a rich family from Tannūs.


Abū-Sa’īd was no different than his predecessors, the viziers who spent a few days or months in office. He was in the executive chair for only a few days, after which he fled because the army demanded their paychecks and he knew that the treasury was empty. He was a Christian in the service of the Fatimids, as was his father before him.

According to Ibn al-Ṣayrafi, Abūʾl-ʿAlāʾ was an employee of al-Yāṣūrī when the latter was vizier. He was given a wasāṭah vizierate with limited prerogatives until Badr al-Jamālī was called to save Egypt and become vizier. Ibn Muyassar, on the other hand, said that Abūʾl-ʿAlāʾ was only in office for a few days and that Ibn Abī Kudaynah (mentioned above) was the vizier when Badr arrived in Egypt.20 Al-Maqrīzī spoke of Ibn Abī Kudaynah too as having been the vizier for approximately one year.21 The history of the viziers between 4598 and 466 is quite confusing because many of them served such short periods of time that some names might not have reached us. Furthermore, many of the above-mentioned figures served several times as viziers.


A complete biography of Badr is found in Chapter Three.

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20 Ibn al-Ṣayrafi, Al-Ishārah, p. 54; Ibn Muyassar, Akhbār Miṣr, p. 22.

21 Al-Maqrīzī, Ittiʿāz, II, 311.
Reigns of Al-Musta'li Bi'llah (487-495/1094-1102)

And Al-Amir Bi-Ahkam Allah (495-524/1102-1130)


He became vizier when his father became ill and for a year before his father died. Abū’1-Qāsim took the oath for Al-Musta’li, the youngest son of Al-Mustanṣir, when the latter died in 487/1094). There was resistance to the acclamation of Al-Musta’li as caliph because he was young and because Nizār, who was the eldest, was bypassed by his father. Moreover, history has it that Nizār left the palace and went to Alexandria, where Al-Afdal followed him and was able to destroy him in battle and finally kill him. His death caused a split in the Ismā’īlī da’wah, whereby many believed that Nizār was the true imām.22 During Al-Musta’li’s caliphate, Al-Afdal sent several expeditions to Al-Shām and to the Holy Land by sea and by land to ward off the Crusaders. During his vizierate, Al-Musta’li died and Al-Afdal found himself again in the position of taking the oath for Al-Amir Bi-Ahkam Allah in 495/1102. He kept going to war against

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the Crusaders every year until he was killed by an unknown person in 515/1121.


Historians of the era praise him extensively as a generous man who was very just and kind to the ra'īyyah. A wise diplomat, he corrected the mistakes of some of his predecessors without much ado.23 Thus he was loved and respected by friend and foe, so much so that the caliph al-Āmir bestowed on him a vizierate without restrictions (wizārat tafwīq) and prayers were said on his behalf in every pulpit, as if he were a caliph. The man was a lover of knowledge and surrounded himself with the learned men of his time, according to the sources. One of his greatest achievements was the census of Egypt. This census, Ibn Muyassar says, was "the first census taken and recorded in special lists which were called awrāq al-tasqī." He created papers to travel inside and outside the country."24 He also had an intricate system of espionage, using women as spies in order to learn


24 ' Abdallāh Mukhliṣ, editor’s introduction to Ibn al-Ṣayraffī, Al-Ishārah, p. 11.
about dissatisfied members of society and to try to correct the situation where necessity dictated it. Interestingly enough, al-Baṭā’iḥī was the one who commissioned Ibn al-Ṣayraffī to write his history of the viziers, Al-Ishārah ilā ṭan nāla al-wizārah. He remained in office until al-Āmir decided to imprison him and his brothers and finally to crucify them all in 522/1128. No-one seems to have known why he fell out of favor with al-Āmir, although many chroniclers speculate on it. It perhaps was the love of the ra’iyah and the powers that al-Baṭā’iḥī enjoyed which made al-Āmir decide to get rid of him.

[Between 519-524/1125-1129, until the end of his reign, al-Āmir did not appoint any viziers]

REIGN OF AL-ḤĀFIẒ LI-DĪN ALLĀH (524-544/1130-1149)


The son and grandson of viziers, he was not of the same caliber as his father and grandfather. He enjoyed sports and the easy life and was killed on his way to play ball (al-laḥ bi’l-kurraẖ).

Abū’l-Fath Yanīs [amīr al-juyūsh] (526/1131)

In office for nine months, Abū’l-Fath was a Christian slave of al-Afdāl, and a strong personality who instilled fear in the army in order to keep it under control. Al-Ḥāfiẓ became afraid of him and thus saw to it that he was poisoned.
[Al-Ḥāfiẓ remained without viziers from 526 to 529/1131 to 1134, when he named his own son, Ḥasan, as vizier and also had him poisoned]

Abū-Muẓaffar Bahrām al-Armanī [gayf al-Islām, tāḥ al-mulūk] (529-531/1134-1136)

For a full biography of Bahrām, see Chapter Three.

Riqwān ibn al-Walakhshī [al-Afḍal] (531-533/1136-1138)

Prior to his vizierate, he was governor of Askalon. He came to Cairo just when Bahrām had been thrown out of the vizierate and he stepped into the position. Ibn al-Walakhshī was noted for his reorganization of the diwāns and for employing Muslims instead of Christians in the bureaucracy. Christians fled after Ibn al-Walakhshī killed many of their number. Al-Ḥāfiẓ softened the impact of these actions when he brought the ex-vizier, Bahrām, and his relatives to live in the palace with him. Then, fearful of Ibn al-Walakhshī’s power, he instigated the army against him. Ibn al-Walakhshī had to flee for his life.

[Al-Ḥāfiẓ remained without viziers until he was killed in 544/1149]

REIGN OF AL-ẒĀFIR BI-AMR ALLĀH

(544-549/1149-1154)


Najm al-Dīn was a well-known amīr who was quick to act on purging the army of elements which were bound on having a good time and pocketing their wages. His action prompted
Ibn al-Salār, governor of Alexandria, to take the vizierate by force from Ibn Masāl and to kill him.

ʿAlī ibn al-Salār [al-amīr al-muẓaffar Abūʾl-Ḥasan] (544-548/1149-1153)

Ibn al-Salār was a vizier for three and one-half years. During his vizierate, he organized a successful expedition against the Crusaders, who were defeated in Jaffa, Akka, Beirut, Sidon, and Tripoli. Had this campaign been a concerted effort with Nūr al-Dīn Zangī in Damascus, the Crusaders could well have lost all their holdings in the Holy Land. Ibn al-Salār lost his life and his vizierate to his nephew, ʿAbbās, who with Usāma ibn Munqidh (the famous memoir-writer of the period between the second and third crusades) had conspired against him.

ʿAbbās ibn Yahvā ibn Bādīs (548-549/1153-1154)

He served only a year as vizier. He had instigated his son to kill the caliph al-Ḥāfīẓ because the latter was his son’s lover. Thinking that he might survive such an act, Ibn Bādīs remained in office for a short while until he had to run for his life.
REIGN OF AL-FĀ’IZ BI-NAṢR ALLĀH
(549-555/1154-1160)
Ṭalāʿī ibn Razzīk [al-sayyid al-a‘jall al-malik al-ṣāliḥ]
(549-556/1154-1160)
His vizierate was a substitute for a caliphate.25 His
term in office was spent in wars against the Crusaders;
and his court was said to be the meeting place for
learned men.26 He was a man who spent most of his time
in office devising means to lessen the power of the army
and the amīrs in order that he might impose his will on
both parties.

REIGN OF AL-‘ĀDID BI’LLĀH (555-567/1160-1172)
Razzīk ibn Ṭalāʿī [al-‘ādil al-nāṣir] (556-558/1160-
1162)
He was a forgiving individual who exempted many persons
from paying taxes owed and who lowered fees on court
cases. He made a major effort to save the caliphate, but
to no avail.

Shāwar ibn Muḥīr al-Sa‘dī [amīr al-ḥujūr] (558, 559-
564/1162, 1163-1168)
His vizierate came at a time when the Fatimid caliphate
had effectively ended, even though the caliph al-‘Ādīd
was still ruling, in name, but without power. Shāwar’s
vizierate was spent contending with the amīrs and those

25  Abū-Muḥammad ‘Amārah al-Ḥakamī (al-Yamanī),
Kitāb fīh al-nukat al-‘agrīyyah fī akhńār al-wuzarā’ al-
Miṣrīyyah (Baghdad: al-Muthannā, 1962?), p. 34.

26  Ibid., pp. 47-48.
who had real power. He spent his second vizierate fighting the Crusaders, who had landed on the shores of Egypt; internally, he continued to fight with the amīrs to consolidate his power. Unable to control either, he called on Asad al-Dīn Shirkūh to come and help him repel the wave of infidels. The latter did come to the rescue and was given the vizierate of Egypt as a reward in 564/1168.

Dirghām ibn ʿĀmir ibn Suwār al-Lukhamī [shams al-khilāfah abūʾl-ashrāb] (558-559/1162-1163)
A Yemeni by birth, he became vizier by force when he and Shāwar (see above) killed Razzīk ibn Ṭalāʿī. He did not last for more than nine months as vizier. The Crusaders arrived in Egypt during his vizierate. Shāwar, an army general, believed that his friend Dirghām could not ward off the attackers, so he took over and became vizier for the second time.

Asad al-Dīn Shirkūh (564/1168)
He was vizier for two months when he called on Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, his nephew, to take over before he himself passed away. Shirkūh was called to Egypt, as mentioned above, to stop the Crusaders from taking over the country. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn arrived in Egypt and became the vizier of al-ʿĀqid until the latter’s death in 567/1172. With the end of the Fatimid caliphate, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn established his own dynasty.
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