THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO

BOOKS I. AND II.
Οὐ γὰρ ἀόριστον τὸ δίκαιον.

Ἀσχίνες.

Καλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον.

Θεογνις.
REPUBLIC
OF
PLATO
BOOKS I. AND II.
WITH
AN INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND THE ARGUMENT OF THE DIALOGUE
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Ad Patrem
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The present text is that of C. F. Hermann, with the exception of Stallbaum's conjecture, ἐμποιήσας for ἐμποιήσαι, p. 333 E.
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. 'The finest of human intellects, exercising boundless control over the finest of human language.' If these words, in which Plato's genius has been described, are to be taken, not as the language of misguided enthusiasm, but as the verdict of competent criticism, we may well pause, in approaching the Republic, in order to attempt to grasp the situation, philosophical and political, that produced the masterpiece of Greek literary effort which lies before us.

After the storm comes the calm. The Peloponnesian War was over; Athens had passed through the oligarchical revolution of the Four Hundred, and through the tyranny of the Thirty; Socrates and Plato, amongst their fellow-citizens of Athens, had looked upon the destruction of their city's walls, the walls which had made Athens what she was; public irritation and private resentment had cut short Socrates' few remaining years of life—he was more than seventy years of age at the time of his impeachment—when Plato relinquished that promiscuous intercourse with all classes of citizens, which he had practised as Socrates' companion, for the private study of philosophy. He made the Academeia, a gymnasium lying on the north-east side of Athens, his
home; whence, without passing through the city,\(^1\) he could reach the Lyceum, another gymnasium on the north-west, which had been Socrates’ favourite haunt (τὰς ἐν Λυκείω διατριβάς, Euthyphro, init.); and in the Academeia he delivered the results of his philosophical inquiries to all those who came to hear him.

In the intervals of his systematic studies, his mind, continually reverting to the friend and master whom he had made the companion of his life, he poured forth a continuous series of biographical sketches, in which he treated all those ethical questions which engaged attention at the time, in relation to Socrates’ life and Socrates’ opinions with regard to them. It was a labour of love, demanding systematic work and careful elaboration, and could never have been carried out without an absorbing interest in the character of the man who is the hero of these Dialogues.

In the Republic of Plato, the completest and most elaborate of all his Dialogues, we find ourselves at a new point of departure in Greek philosophical thought.

The first philosophers were the Ionian physicists, such as Thales and Anaximenes, with whose systems Socrates had little or no sympathy. Next came Pythagoras, who thought that number was the essence of all things, a belief which must have swayed Plato’s dictum in Republic, Book VI., page 546 C, viz. that disregard of a certain ‘perfect number’ (ἀριθμὸς τέλειος) is fatal to the existence of a good city. Reference to Pythagoras’ teaching is also found on pages 600 B and 530 D.

But although this philosopher exerted no small influence over Plato’s fancies, we must pass to the Eleatic

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\(^1\) See Lysis, init. ἐπορευόμην μὲν ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας εὐθὺ Λυκείου τὴν έξω τεῖχους ὑπ’ αὐτὸ τὸ τεῖχος.
school to trace the origin both of Socrates' method and of Plato's philosophical system.

Socrates' method was that of the Eleatic Zeno, who is styled by Aristotle the father and founder of dialectic; it was principally a negative method, i.e. it tended towards the destruction of error and the testing of facts. This method Socrates shared with the Sophists, a number of men professing to teach ethic, some of whom had applied this Eleatic method of criticism to all relations of life with a corrupting and subversive effect that had roused the indignation of orthodox and constitutional Athenians.

Passing on from the method to the system, we find that the Eleatic school held the belief that the world of sense, that is, tangible objects, did not really exist. This is in direct agreement with the system of philosophy which Plato constructs in Books VI. and VII. of the Republic\(^1\); where objects of sight and touch (φανόμενα) are stated to be three times removed from their Real Originals, of which they are emanations.

Independently of this negative, or Eleatic belief, Plato's philosophy also had its positive side; it recognised as the origin of all being certain forms (εἴδη) cognisable only by pure reason (Nous). Λόγος τελευτής εἰς εἴδη, page 511 C. In this belief we see the influence of Anaxagoras, a philosopher who was driven from Athens, B.C. 432, who spoke of νοῦς, or Intelligence, as the designing and arranging principle of the universe.\(^2\) Since the expulsion of Anaxagoras, positive philosophy had held no place in Athens. As a substitute for it the lectures of Sophists had engaged public attention and

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1 See abstract of the Dialogue, libb. citt.
2 See Aristotle, Metaph. i. 3.
had fostered private inquiry. The Sophists’ lectures, like their method, were rather critical than positive: the Sophists did not contribute to general knowledge; they proved the fallacy of this question or that, and those of them who were inclined to rhetoric, taught the art of persuasion. But Plato, following upon hints dropped by Socrates, and not merely reproducing the words of his teacher, struck out again into the path of constructive philosophy. Whilst he shows us in his Dialogues that no one appreciated the Socratic and Sophistic method, or ἐλεγχός, better than himself, it is in the Republic, beyond the other Dialogues, that he demands, under the characters of the sons of Ariston, a positive and coherent account of Justice, of Being, and of God. Whilst therefore sharing in the general tendency of Eleatic thought, Plato must be regarded as having developed and elaborated the main tenet of Anaxagoras’ philosophy.

With this brief account of the conditions which furnished the occasion and the speculative direction of the Republic, we proceed to inquire into what divisions the Dialogue naturally falls.

§ 2. Setting aside the division into books, at once arbitrary, and, as in the case of Books II. and III., incorrect, we find that, speaking very generally, there are three main divisions of the Dialogue.

I. There is the preface, or, as Socrates calls it (page 357 C), the προειμον, which lasts from the beginning of the work to the end of the first book, and is carried on to page 367 E, that is, rather less than half Book II. This first part is occupied with a refutation of popular and Sophistical definitions of, and opinions concerning, justice, and with an elaborate statement of
the advantages of injustice, given as a challenge to Socrates by the two sons of Ariston.

II. In the second division of the Dialogue we have a defence of Justice given at length by Socrates, who finds it necessary to put the growth of an imaginary city before the minds of his hearers (εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασάμεθα λόγῳ, page 369 Α), in order to discover the growth of Justice in that city, and to transfer it analogically to the mind of individual man. The description of the origin, the life, the requirements of this State, and the education of its members, together with sundry ἀπορίαι, i.e. difficulties, put forward and discussed, occupy the remainder of Book II. and the whole of Books III.—V. inclusive. But in Book V. the Dialogue is beginning to assume a more analytical and esoteric phase. Socrates has already thrown out a hint of this: he has already admitted that his State and his Justice hitherto described are accommodated to popular comprehension: καὶ εὐ γ’ ἵσθι, ὁ Γλαύκων, ὡς ἦ ἐμὴ δόξα, ἀκριβῶς μὲν τόθε ἐκ τοιούτων μεθόδων, οἷος νῦν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις χρώμεθα, οὐ μητε λάβωμεν ἄλλη γὰρ μακροτέρα καὶ πλέον ὄδος ἦ ἐπὶ τούτο ἀγούσα: page 435 D.

III. Now, however, as the last ἀπορία, viz. ‘The ruler of the State must be a philosopher,’ is proposed, and to some extent settled, Socrates suggests that the thorough and complete solution of the whole of this point would be quite sufficient to set the main inquiry at rest, without entering upon other points connected with it: ἔμοι γ’ οὖν ἐτα δοκεῖ ἂν βελτιώνως φανήναι, εἰ περὶ τούτου μόνου ἐδει ὑπῆρχαι καὶ μη τολλὰ τὰ λοιπά διελθεῖν μέλλοντι κατάψευσθαι τί διαφέρει βίος δίκαιος δῶικος (Book VI. ἑκ., Book VI. ἑκ., Book VI. ἑκ., Book VI. ἑκ.). And this, on the whole, is the purport of the rest of the Dialogue, i.e. Book VI. to X. fin. This part starts with a study of the philosophic nature, gives the education
necessary for its development, propounds and accommodates to the philosophic nature the theory of Ἰδέας, and with a digression upon the various degenerated forms of the perfect State, comes to an end in an account of the rewards that follow upon a life lived according to philosophy and justice.

To sum up, then, there are three parts into which the Republic may be divided. First, the prelude; secondly, the discovery of Justice through the creation of an Ideal State; thirdly, the elaboration and idealization of this State through a carefully worked out system of philosophy.

This division has been called a rough one; we proceed to give a more detailed view of the structure of the work.

I. The first part, or preface, may conveniently be kept, viz. Book I. init.—Book II. page 367 E.

II. Next we have the creation of a State, and the nature of Justice as found in it, pages 367 E—435 A.

III. Transference of Political Justice to man by analogy, pages 435 A—449 B.

IV. Three ἀπορέα, or τρυκυμία, arising out of the question, 'How is the State to be managed?' pages 449 B—505 A.

V. Philosophical system of Ἰδέας, or Real Existence, pages 505 A—541 B.

VI. Different forms of degeneration from the Ideal State, and the types of man corresponding to them, pages 543 B—579 C.

VII. Comparison between the just and unjust man; and their respective rewards, 579 C—fin.
§ 3. Following upon the first division of the Dialogue, the question demands attention—How far is the Republic a constructive dialogue? With a few exceptions, such as the Apology, and perhaps the Cratylus, which Professor Jowett looks upon as of a neutral stamp, Plato’s Dialogues may be divided into two kinds: positive and constructive, and negative and destructive; i.e. those which try to prove, and those which try to disprove, some position or positions. Of the former the Phaedo, Crito, Symposium, and Phaedrus may be taken as examples; of the latter the Lysis, Charmides, Laches, Protagoras, and Meno. The Dialogue before us is compound, i.e. it partakes of both kinds. In the first division of the book, viz. init.—367 E, Socrates is avowedly trying to disprove, and not to prove. He first destroys that definition of justice which is attributed to Simonides or Homer, or some other wise man; see 335 E, Μακούμεθα ἀρα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, κοινὴ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ, εὰν τις αὐτῷ (sc. this definition of justice) φη ἢ Σιμωνίδην ἢ Βιάντα ἢ Πιττακὸν εἰρηκέναι. He next combats at length a definition given by the inferior Sophist of the day, and shows that it is incorrect, see 352, seqq.; and, when he has twice shown the falsity of existing opinions on the question, ‘What is Justice?’ he openly confesses that he himself knows nothing at all of its true nature; see 354 B: πρὶν δ’ τὸ πρῶτον ἐσκοπούμεν εὑρεῖν, τὸ δίκαιον ὃ τι ποτ’ ἐστὶν, ἀφέμενος ἐκείνου δρμήσαι ἐπὶ τὸ σκέψασθαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ εἶτε κακία ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμαθία, εἶτε σοφία καὶ ἀρετή . . . . οὕτω μοι νῦν γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ διάλογον μηδὲν εἰδέναι.

So far in the Dialogue we have nothing of constructive import, with the exception of a few points by means of which Socrates overcomes Thrasymachus’ position, which will be noticed in the text. And in the beginning of
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Book II. we merely encounter a re-statement of Thrasymachus' position and an elaboration of his arguments; with which re-statement the first part of the Republic is held to conclude.

The earnest challenge of the sons of Ariston, πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς πεῖσαι ὧτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἄμεινόν ἐστι δίκαιον εἶναι ἡ ἁδικόν (Book II. init.), has roused Socrates to an unusual effort, which he veils, as always, under the pretence of incapacity. He begins, not to tell them what Justice is, but to ask them to try with him if they cannot find a larger organism than the human soul wherein Justice dwells, and so to overcome the difficulty. 'Let us,' he says, 'construct a State, and find where Justice dwells in the State' (page 369 A). The word γνωμέανυ here shows that we now have something to look for from Socrates himself,—that he has for the time renounced the destruction of error, and is entering upon the construction of a truth.

This constructive character the Dialogue maintains to its end. For the construction of a State is found to involve the construction of a complete system of education for all classes, and out of this system, again, there arises the necessity for constructing another and a more esoteric system of education for the upper class, and this involves the complete elaboration of a philosophical system. And besides these two systems of education and this system of philosophy which are contained in the Republic, we have a great deal of information and suggestion upon various other subjects conveyed to us by the way; for the Dialogue, although it has its unity, is far-reaching and discursive.

It must therefore be apparent to any one at all
familiar with the negative character of Platonic writing, what a valuable link in the chain of Greek thought lies before us in the *Republic*. Two complete systems of education and one of philosophy, a treatise upon the interdependence of classes in a State, trade, medicine, poetry, political economy, religion, the position of woman, death, slavery, the relation between mind and body, music, courage, temperance, science, immortality, all different systems of government, love, war, the stage, revolution, such, and many more questions of minor interest, do we find treated, in many cases with great care and elaboration, in this unique and universal Dialogue.

§ 4. We next come to inquire if it is possible from internal evidence to discover the motives that induced Plato to compose this Dialogue?

There can be little doubt that, amongst other motives, Plato approached the composition of the *Republic* with the intention of vindicating Socrates’ life and opinions. It is an *Apologia pro vita ejus*. It may be replied to this that nearly all Plato’s Dialogues partake, more or less, of this intention; and the reply would be true. Plato, we can see, had an unbounded veneration for the protagonist of his Dialogues as a man, as a philosopher, and as a dialectician. He must have experienced the bitterest grief at Socrates’ death, and must have devoted a great part of his life to storing up, in these vivid dialectical portraits, reminiscences of his guide, philosopher, and friend. Now the Dialogue before us is at once the longest, with the exception of the *Laws*, and by far the most wide-reaching in the subjects of which it treats. (These subjects have been briefly summarized above.) It is, in fact, Plato’s greatest effort. We expect, then, in
Plato’s greatest effort to find the completest and the best account of Socrates’ life and opinions. Those who look in Plato for anecdotes about Socrates will be disappointed, and must turn to the Memorabilia of Xenophon. Plato does not deal in anecdotes. He never fell into what the author of Vivian Grey would call his anecdotage. He is too much of an artist to endeavour to depict a man solely by what he did; he gives us the true account of his character by showing what he would have said and done under certain circumstances.

If we view Plato and Xenophon in their respective ways of treating the character of Socrates, we find that Plato’s manner is romantic or poetic, whilst Xenophon’s is matter-of-fact; that there is, in fact, the same distinction between them which Aristotle draws between poetry and history. He says, ‘There is this difference between the historian and the poet: the former tells us what has happened, the latter what would happen. For poetry is concerned with the general, and history with the particular.’  

Plato has clearly laid down for us the general lines of Socrates’ character, as well as Xenophon; but he has done so by means of giving us a broad and a coherent account of the principles which formed his character.

Plato himself would have been loth to hear himself termed a poet; he condemns most poets and their poetry, and drives them from his Ideal State; he even deprecates Homer, although his endless quotations show

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1 See Poetic, ix. 1451 b, τοῦτο διαφέρει τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τὸν δὲ οἶνα ἄν γένοιτο. οἶκι καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ στουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστοριάς ἐστίν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἢ δ’ ἱστορία τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν λέγει.

2 See p. 398.

3 See Book X. init. 602, C.
how he read and admired him; but he was a poet in this, the real, sense, of which Aristotle speaks. He tells us what were and also what would have been Socrates' opinions.

Plato, then, was a poet in this respect; but it does not follow, as a writer supposes in his preface to Xenophon's Memorabilia (Oxford Ed.), that Plato's portrait of Socrates given us in the Dialogues is an idealization. To us the otherwise marvellous consistency of the character renders this an impossibility, especially in regard of Socrates' religious professions, his method of dialectic, his humour, and, a point difficult of illustration, but of the greatest weight, his manner.

To place before his readers a complete account of Socrates, his beliefs, his method, and his character, is one of the objects of Plato's Republic. But there is another object which Plato had in view, bearing no direct reference to Socrates, viz. the presentation of an Ideal State; and this object is to be explained by the absorbing interest felt by every Greek in the politics of a free city, the love of a Republic and the hatred of a Despotism. Each citizen of a Greek city had his political opinions, and no doubt each citizen had his political hobby. Putting together this philo-political feeling, and a further one, viz., the love of one's own creations, upon which Plato himself insists, we may feel certain that the work grew under his hands, and that the gratification of watching his city's growth urged the maker of the city to further efforts than he at first intended.

1 oĩ de κτησάμενοι διπλῆ ἢ oĩ ἓλλοι ἄσπαζονται αὐτὰ. ὡσπερ γὰρ oĩ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ oĩ πάτερες τοὺς παιδέας ἀλαίφωσι... p. 330, C.
Again: Plato's *Republic* is evidently a work of art, the work of a mind bent on a complete and beautiful creation. The definition of such a work is laid down by Aristotle in his *Poetic* (1450 fin.) in these terms, τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν. And he also states that the magnitude of the work must be in proportion to its importance: μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν. If we allow that these principles of artistic construction are correct, and if we grant that Plato considered justice to be a subject demanding the most lengthy and detailed treatment, and the most elaborate development from popular to scientific definition, we may at the same time gather that he looked upon it as a theme specially susceptible of artistic treatment, from various points of beauty which distinguish the Dialogue. We do not here speak of such points of beauty as the simplicity of the style and the lucidity of the argument: they are natural to the writer, and inseparable from his style. We speak rather of conscious and exceptional efforts to adorn his work. Such an effort results in the elaborate sketching of character which presents to us the admirable portraits, among others, of the violent Thrasymachus and the sincere yet sceptical Glaucon. Another such effort relieves the monotony of constructive dialogue, whilst it illustrates the text of the speaker, by the introduction of short romances, fables, and allegories. Such are the story of Gyges and his ring in Book II., the allegories of the cave in Book VII.,

1 To the simplicity and lucidity of Plato's writing John Sterling bears witness. See Carlyle's *Life of John Sterling*, Library Edition, p. 139, 1870: 'For philosophic inquiry and truths of awful preciousness, I would select as my personages and interlocutors beings with whose language and “whereabouts” my readers would be familiar. Thus did Plato in his Dialogues.
and of the ship's captain in Book VI., and the narrative of Er concerning the after life in Book X.

Theognis wrote—

Κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λόγον δ' ἤγιαίνειν,
"Ηδίστοι δὲ τυχεῖν δὲν τις ἐκαστὸς ἐρᾶ,

where it is noticeable that Justice (the theme of the Republic) is placed first amongst human blessings, and described as 'the fairest'; and Plato in his Dialogue concerning Justice felt with Theognis that it was a subject which called for the decoration of the artist as well as the research of the philosopher.

Another and a more special motive makes itself apparent here and there in the Dialogue, viz., the desire to rebut specific charges against Socrates, and especially to answer those brought against him in the Clouds of Aristophanes ¹ and the indictment of Anytus. We know that the latter was expressed in the words: Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ οὖς μὲν ἢ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἣρα δὲ καὶ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νεόν διαφθείρων.

To take the latter charge first: we find a distinct statement as to the corruption of young men, in Book VI. 492 A. ἦ καὶ σὺ ἡγεῖ, ὁσπέρ οἱ πολλοὶ, διαφθειρομένους τινὰς εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν νέους, . . . ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας μεγίστον εἶναι σοφιστάς; Here he denies that corruption of a class can be effected by individuals, and asserts that society and its depraved

¹ In Rep. p. 583, B, we meet this expression, after two proofs have been given of the superiority of justice to injustice, ὅτι γε νικηκῶς δ' δίκαιος τὸν ἀδικοῦ. This expression cannot fail to recall at once the episode of the word-battle between the δίκαιος and ἀδικοῦ λόγος in the Clouds; and if we add the other points of coincidence between the two works, we shall not fail to conclude that Plato wrote with distinct reference to that comedy of Aristophanes.
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taste is the real corrupter. Thus he answers the latter count of Anytus' indictment and the whole plot of Aristophanes' play. Of the charge of impiety we must speak more in detail, because we have to gather, not from a single passage, but from many scattered up and down in the Dialogue, Plato's opinion as to this charge against Socrates. In the Clouds Socrates is represented as repudiating the existence of the gods—

Ποῖος Zeus; οὐ μὴ ληφήσεις οὐδ' ἔστι Ζεύς.

1. 367—

just as he is charged in Anytus' indictment; and he is also represented, καὶ ἡ δαμόνια εἰσφέρων (in Anytus' words), by Aristophanes in the same play.

ΣΤ. ὦ δ' ἀναγκάζων ἔστι τίς αὐτάς οὐχ ὦ Zeus, ὡστε φέρεσθαι;

ΣΩ. ἤκουστ' ἄλλ' αἴθερίος Δίνος.

ll. 379, 80.

How does Plato answer these charges? In the first place he represents the Socrates of the Republic as eminently orthodox in religious belief and religious observance. When Socrates comes to these subjects in the course of founding his city, he remarks that to Apollo of Delphi must be left the greatest, the best, and the first legislation, τῷ μέντοι Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς τά τε μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα καὶ πρώτα τῶν νομοθετήματον . . . ἱερῶν τε ἱδρύσεις καὶ θυσίαι καὶ ἄλλαι θεῶν τε καὶ δαμόνων καὶ ἥρων θεραπείαι, p. 427 B. This is the teacher who was accused of disregarding the gods of his country! For, be it noted, it is to Apollo, θεὸς πατρίφως of Attica, and not to Zeus, that Socrates refers questions of religion, a course that should satisfy the most fasti-

1 v. Euthydemos, 302, C fin. Ἀπόλλων πατρίφως διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἡμοῖν γένεσιν.
dious of Athenian ritualists. And this is not a solitary instance of his orthodoxy. We find on page 461 E, that the family regulations of the State are to depend upon a system of lots subject to the consent of the Pythia, ἢ Πυθία προσαναργή; 2

In the next place Socrates in the Republic is represented as removing from the gods all those charges of cruelty and lust which legend had attached to them; 3 thus on page 377 E seqq. ὅ εἰπὼν οὐ καλῶς ἐφεύσατο, ὡς Ὑφανός τε εἰργάσατο ἃ φησὶ δρᾶσαι αὐτῶν Ἡσίοδος, 3 τε αὖ Κρόνος ὡς ἐτιμωρήσατο αὐτόν. τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοεός, οὐδὲ ἄν εἰ ἦν ἄληθή, ψέμν δὲν ῥαδίως οὕτω λέγεσθαι. And in the same passage he states his disbelief in quarrels between the gods, the stories of Hera being bound by her son, 4 of Hephaestus being thrown out of heaven by his father, and so forth. 5

1 Xenophon bears strong and direct testimony to the falsity of the charge of heresy against Socrates in Mem. 1, 2, fin. Πῶς οὖν ἐνοχὸς ἂν εἰη τῇ γραφῇ; δὲ ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ μη νοεῖτεν τοὺς θεούς, ὡς εἰν τῇ γραφῇ γέγραπτο, φανερὸς ἢν θεραπεύων τοὺς θεούς μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων. And v. also on this point, chap. iii. 1–4, and iv. ad fin.

2 Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 3, init. τὰ μὲν τούτων πρὸς τοὺς θεούς φανερὸς ἢν καὶ ποιῶν καὶ λέγων, ἢπερ ἡ Πυθία ὑποκρίνεται τοῖς ἑρματῶι, τῶς δὲ ποιεῖν ἢ περὶ θυσίας ἢ περὶ προγόνοις θεραπεῖας ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τοιοῦτων. ἢ τε γὰρ Πυθία νόμῳ πόλεως ἀναγει ποιοῦντας εὐσεβῶς ἀν ποιεῖν, Σωκράτης τε οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς ἐποιεῖ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρήγηει.

3 The rejection of popular legend about the gods caused the cry to be raised that Socrates did not believe in the gods themselves.

4 A confirmation of this hypothesis, that Plato is writing with the express purpose of vindicating Socrates' teaching from accusations brought against it, is afforded by Xenophon in his Memoria-bilia, 1, 2, 49; where he expressly mentions that Socrates was accused of inciting youths to 'bind,' i.e. imprison their fathers, an accusation which this present passage of the Republic would answer: 'Ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης, ἐφη ὁ καθήγορος, τοὺς πάτερας προσπηλακίζειν εἴδιδακε ...Φάσκων κατὰ νόμον ἐξεῖναι παρανοίας ἐλύντι καὶ τῶν πάτερα δήσατα. 5

5 For an explanation of this inconsistency, viz. the belief in
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Thirdly, Socrates lays down in plain language the terms of his religious belief, his creed. The God in whom he believes is one, and eternal, and true¹; and knows the just from the unjust.²

God cannot harm any being, because he is good himself, and therefore cannot make anything bad: on the contrary, he is the author of all good to mankind, page 379 D. τῶν μὲν ἄγαθῶν οὐδένα ἄλλον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλ' ἀττα δεὶ ξητεὶν τὰ αἰτία, ἀλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν. All his works are for the best, page 530, A. νομεῖν μὲν, ὣς οἶνον τε κάλλιστα τε τουαίτα ἕργα συντήσασθαι, οὕτω ξυνεστάναι τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δημιούργῳ αὐτῶν τε καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ. And one more point in support of Socrates' orthodoxy may be added: that the occasion itself of this Dialogue arises on the return of Socrates from a religious observance, προσευξόμενος τῷ θεῷ, whither he had been, like any other good citizen.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that Socrates was an irreligious man or an atheist. On the contrary, and in accordance with what has been said above, Xenophon bears witness that Socrates' belief in divine supervision of earthly life amounted almost to superstition. His words are (Mem. 1, 3, 4), 'And if Socrates thought that he had any intimation from the gods, he would have been less likely to disobey it than to take a blind guide in a journey instead of one who could see. And he used to speak in severe terms of those who prefer the blind counsel of men

good and beneficent gods existing side by side with a number of immoral and revolting tales concerning them, see Sir G. W. Cox, Aryan Mythology, Book I. chap. vi. ed. 1870; also chap. iv. p. 66.

¹ 382, E.
² 612, E. θεός γε οὐ λανθάνει ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν οἶδος ἐστίν.
to warnings from the gods." With this religious feeling is associated the δαμόνιον, or actual supernatural check, which, so he devoutly believed, prevented him from entering upon a wrong course of action. ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει, προτρέπει δὲ οὐτοτε. And this belief no doubt partly accounted for that clause in the indictment of Anytus, καὶ νὰ δαμόνια εἰσφέρων. But we cannot help asking, if Socrates' religious teaching was as pure as it is represented by Plato, and it is hard to believe otherwise, how are we to account for the charge, οὐς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεῶς οὐ νομίζων, in the face of such testimony as we possess to Socrates' regular observance of religious forms? We can only say that the original worship of Zeus, the mighty king who dispenses justice to gods and men, had become totally corrupted, that legend had come to be regarded as the essence instead of the accidents or accretions of religion, and that belief in legend was jealously demanded by ultra-orthodox Athenians from any one who practised as a teacher.

At the same time it must be remembered that the anti-Socratic agitation took its rise in political animosity; the indictment, like the scorpion, bore the sting in its tail: διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους. Alcibiades and Critias were no doubt the νέοι, who had attracted the special attention of the accuser: they were more or less responsible for their country's ruin, and in their excesses we see the more immediate cause of Socrates' indictment. The first count, viz. that of heresy, arose from an

1 See also Socrates' remonstrances with Aristodemus the Little, a man who habitually disregarded sacrifice, consultation with oracles, and other religious duties.—Mem. 1, 4.

2 See however Xen. Mem. 4, 3, 12, where it is hinted that the δαμόνιον initiated action. εἶ γε μηδὲ ἐπερωτάμενοι (sc. θεοί) ὑπὸ σου προσημαίνουσι σοι ἀ τε χρῆ ποιεῖν ἀ τε μῆ.

3 For the δαμόνιον, v. Euthydemus, 272 E.
ignorance of facts, the second from a confusion of causes.

§ 5. Another interesting question meets us as we follow Socrates’ creation of his State, viz. How far Plato thought it possible to realize such a State and such a life? That this question had engaged Plato’s own attention we can be sure. Not once nor twice do the hearers interpose with the question, ‘But, Socrates, is such a state of things possible?’ See page 471 C. "Ἀλλὰ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐδεποτε μυνηθήσεσθαι ὃ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παρωσάμενος πάντα ταῦτα εἴρηκας, τὸ ὡς δύνατη αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία γενέσθαι καὶ τίνα τρόπον ποτὲ δύνατή: ἐτ ἴνσα Ἐ, τοῦτο αὖτο ἕδη πειράμεθα ἡμᾶς αὕτοις πείθειν, ὡς δύνατον καὶ ἕ δύνατον. Socrates’ reply to this challenge is characteristic. ‘You swoop down upon me and my argument just as I was coming to the most difficult part of it. Now we are inquiring what Justice and the just man are: very good: we are, in other words, trying to find the model, or pattern, or canon, to which we can apply individual cases, judge of their merits, and so build up our own definition of Justice. We never started with the idea of proving that such things can be. No! a painter may be able to paint a most beautiful figure, and yet it will not follow that such a figure has ever existed, or does, or will exist. But such a figure is none the less beautiful, it is none the less useful; for it serves as an ideal towards which painters may direct their efforts.’ In this answer Socrates parries the question: he has not sufficiently unfolded his scheme, nor sufficiently prepared the minds of his hearers to approach such a question.

But, in the third τρικυμία (473 D), that is, the statement that evil and trouble will never cease till kings
are philosophers and philosophers kings, Socrates has delivered his mind, and he adds, 'Until this is so, our State will never come to be a possibility (φύγε εἰς τὸ δύνατον) and see the light of the sun.' The further question at once arises, 'What does Socrates mean by kings being philosophers, and philosophers kings?' The answer to it is found in the conclusion of Book V. and in Book VI. Briefly, he means by philosophers those men who are gifted with a strong will, that can master the desires of the body (λογιστικὸς), and a clear head that can discriminate real from false (φιλοσοφίας ἐρωτικὸς). Even in this place he does not distinctly commit himself to the statement that such a city is actually to be realized; he only mentions here a necessary condition for its realization, which he repeats in slightly different terms in 499 B., οὐτε πόλις οὔτε πολιτεία οὐδὲ γ’ ἀνὴρ ὁμοίως μὴ ποτε γένηται τέλεος πρὶν ἄν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τούτοις τοῖς ὀλίγοις καὶ οὐ πονηροῖς ἀνάγκη τις ἐκ τύχης περιβάλλῃ τόλεως ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ τῇ πόλει κατήκουσι γενέσθαι, ἢ τῶν νῦν ἐν δύναστείαις ἢ βασιλείαις ὀντῶν νίεσθιν ἢ αὐτοῖς ἐκ τινος θείας ἐπινοείας ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινὸς ἔρως ἐμπέσῃ. 'Until philosophers are compelled to govern the State, or kings receive, through some divine afflatus, a real love of real philosophy, our city can never exist.' And he adds, as before, 'And whether either or both of these conditions can be realized, I maintain is a question wide of the mark.' But let us see what follows;—'Now if in some bygone age, or at the present time in some foreign country far from our ken, or in the future, it happens that men of a truly philosophic nature be are philosophers and philosophers kings, Socrates has delivered his mind, and he adds, 'Until this is so, our State will never come to be a possibility (φύγε εἰς τὸ δύνατον) and see the light of the sun.' The further question at once arises, 'What does Socrates mean by kings being philosophers, and philosophers kings?' The answer to it is found in the conclusion of Book V. and in Book VI. Briefly, he means by philosophers those men who are gifted with a strong will, that can master the desires of the body (λογιστικὸς), and a clear head that can discriminate real from false (φιλοσοφίας ἐρωτικὸς). Even in this place he does not distinctly commit himself to the statement that such a city is actually to be realized; he only mentions here a necessary condition for its realization, which he repeats in slightly different terms in 499 B., οὐτε πόλις οὔτε πολιτεία οὐδὲ γ’ ἀνὴρ ὁμοίως μὴ ποτε γένηται τέλεος πρὶν ἄν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τούτοις τοῖς ὀλίγοις καὶ οὐ πονηροῖς ἀνάγκη τις ἐκ τύχης περιβάλλῃ τόλεως ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ τῇ πόλει κατήκουσι γενέσθαι, ἢ τῶν νῦν ἐν δύναστείαις ἢ βασιλείαις ὀντῶν νίεσθιν ἢ αὐτοῖς ἐκ τινος θείας ἐπινοείας ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινὸς ἔρως ἐμπέσῃ. 'Until philosophers are compelled to govern the State, or kings receive, through some divine afflatus, a real love of real philosophy, our city can never exist.' And he adds, as before, 'And whether either or both of these conditions can be realized, I maintain is a question wide of the mark.' But let us see what follows;—'Now if in some bygone age, or at the present time in some foreign country far from our ken, or in the future, it happens that men of a truly philosophic nature be

1 A succinct definition of 'philosopher' is given in 484, B. φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ ἄληκτα ταὐτα ἀφαστως ἡχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι.
found managing the State, I am ready to maintain in argument that the city we speak of has been, or is, or will be realized. We confess the difficulty of the thing, but we deny that it is an impossibility. Χαλεπὰ τῷ ὄντι τὰ καλά.' Here then we have at least Plato's, and probably Socrates' opinion, clearly laid down, that the State he speaks of is not merely Utopian. By the side of this passage such a remark as 'I forgot that we were not in earnest' (page 536 C, ἐπελαθόμην ὅτι ἐπαιξόμεν 1) may be dismissed as not affecting the question, as being a façon de parler on the part of Socrates. And if further confirmation be needed, we may turn to the end of Book VI., where Socrates appeals to Glaucon to allow that his State is not all cloudland, μὴ παντάπασιν ἵμασ εὔχας εἴρηκέναι, that it is difficult to realize, but not impossible. Glaucon however is not convinced; on the contrary, he expresses farther on in the Dialogue (Book IX. fin. 592 B) his opinion that the State only exists in the Dialogue, and not in the world, πόλει τῇ ἐν λόγους κειμένη, ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἴμαι αὐτῆν εἶναι. To which Socrates repeats his original answer, 'Whether such a city exist or not, it matters little; but we have it in heaven as an ideal towards which we can strive.'

Such is the internal evidence of the Republic with regard to Plato's belief in the possibility of his State. This evidence we leave to the reader, first adding a few remarks upon the different conditions of political existence at the time this Dialogue was written, conditions which materially affect the question as to the possibility of the existence of such a State. These conditions may be gathered into two heads:—

First, the great pliability at that period of a mass

1 It is perfectly true that Socrates 'was in jest,' but he was also in earnest. 'Επαιξέν ἀμα σπουδάζων, v. infin.
of people or material from which the State was organized.

Secondly, the small extent of the material.

The second point may be dismissed in a few words. Aristotle in his *Ethics* (9, 10, 3) lays down that the limits of a State must be more than ten citizens and less than 100,000: οὐτε ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἄν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων. Plato, it is true, mentions four or five as the least possible number that could compose a State, but he is speaking only of its origin, not of its complete form: see page 369 E. Εἰδ' ἄν ἢ ἀναγκασθάτη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἀνδρῶν. According to Ctesicles, at a census of the population of Attica taken under Demetrius Phalareus, the number of free burghers was 20,000, 10,000 μέτοικοι, and 400,000 slaves. And the frequency with which whole communities migrated or were transplanted in Greek history will serve to show that Aristotle's 100,000 is an extreme limit towards which the average πόλις did not nearly approach. To take a few examples of this fact, and omitting mention of the numerous parties of κληρονόμου or colonists continually leaving Hellas, as being rather off-shoots than transplantations, we may call to mind the several movements of the Thereans under Battus, of which Herodotus speaks (see Book IV. 155, *seqq.*); or the exodus *en masse* of the Phocaenians, who are said to have sunk a stone in their harbour as a pledge of eternal exile; or the sudden transplantation of citizens from forty districts to the newly-founded town of Megalopolis in Arcadia by Epaminondas.¹ And this ease of manipulation could only be afforded by comparatively small numbers.

¹ Similar instances in ancient history are afforded by the removal of the Jewish nation to Babylon, and the deportation of the Cilician pirates to Soli by Pompey.
With regard to the former point, viz., the great pliability of these bodies of men, it must be remembered that the range of human thought at the period of the Athenian empire was much less extensive than at the present day, and that the general tone of a State was depreciated, in the case of democracies, by the admission of the mass of the lower classes to a share in the management of public business. Hence the whole πόλεως was easily influenced by a powerful, or ambitious, or unscrupulous mind. At Athens, Peisistratus, Pericles, and Cleon, men of very different stamp, all exercised at different times an undisputed empire over the Athenian mind; and, in the case of the two latter, the people followed their leader obediently, and ratified with constitutional voting whatever measures that leader might put forward. Even in matters requiring the gravest and the longest deliberation, a burst of rhetoric would carry a majority on the side of the speaker; as in the case of the condemnation of the Mytileneans, where the audacity of Cleon was sufficient to blind the whole Athenian assembly to the atrocious nature of his proposal. ‘The most violent man in the whole city, and at the same time the most influential.’  

(δικαίωσαι τὰ ἄλλα βιοτάτος τῶν πολιτῶν, τῷ τε δήμῳ παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανῶτατος, Thuc. III. 36.) Such is Thucydides’ description of Cleon, and although it is evidently pointed by oligarchical feeling, it is generally borne out by the story of Cleon’s career. And if the most violent man in a city is also the most influential, we can see that the mental and moral standard of the whole city must be low, and the city itself easily swayed. Cleon’s history is an example of the power

1 In Xen. Mem. 2, 6, 13, Pericles is said to have charmed the city into following him. ἐπάθων τῇ πόλει ἐποιεῖ αὐτῷν φιλεῖν αὐτὸν.
wielded by a violent or unscrupulous mind. When Pericles' influence was in the ascendant, the city followed his guidance to the bitter end, even to enduring the worst hardships of a siege and a blockade; thereby illustrating the truth of Plato's belief, that the people are usually traduced, and only need proper guidance to bring them up to better things. (See 499, E.) But Cleon's case is the reverse of Pericles', and his influence depreciated the public tone, whilst it also shows how blindly the average citizen was led by the man whom he believed, rightly or wrongly, to be working for his interest. Now, as such a man could lead the populace when champion (προστάτης, see 565 D, and also θαν θην ην αυτος τυράννος ἐκ προστατικῆς βίως καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοθεν), so he could impress them when he had constituted himself permanent despot, as Peisistratus (τυράννος); or when he availed himself of his influence only for a time, as Lycurgus and Solon and Pericles are said to have done (νομοθετής). Such men, in fact, stamped their individuality on the peoples with whom they had to deal.

Let us see how Plato himself bears out this fact. In page 502 B, Socrates states that one single man, supposing that he have the city in obedience to his will, can bring everything to pass that seems to his hearers so difficult of accomplishment. 'Αλλὰ μὴν, ἢν δὲ ἐγώ, εἰς ἱκανὸς γενόμενος, πόλιν ἔχων πειθομένην, πάντ' ἐπιτελέσαι τὰ νῦν ἀπιστοῦμενα. The constitution of the Spartan community is a striking instance of a whole people voluntarily submitting themselves to an irksome military régime (said to have been inaugurated by one man), lasting far on into middle life, against which they are known to have secretly, and in some cases openly,1

1 E.g. in the case of Pausanias and Lysander.
rebelf. To this opinion of Socrates, that a single man could impress himself upon an entire community, we must add one of his reasons already mentioned, viz., his above-mentioned belief that the common people were usually traduced, and really merited a much better reputation for capacity of improvement. See 499 E. ὃ μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἔγω, μη πάνυ οὖτω τῶν πολλῶν κατηγόρει ἄλλοιαν τοι δόξαν ἔξουσιν . . . κ.τ.λ.

Such are the considerations which help to explain Plato's belief in the possibility of his State—a possibility, however, not to be realised, as he thought, till the existing generation with their traditions and prejudices had given place to the next, on which the legislator might work. See page 415 D. ὡς μέντ' ἀν οἱ τούτων νικεῖ καὶ οἱ ἐπείτα οἱ τ' ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οἱ ὑστερον.

§ 6. The first step towards the constitution of a defending and protecting body in the State is education (Book II. page 376 E). And the first part of education is music, i.e. all learning which demands a direct effort of the mind, and is opposed to gymnastic. Again, the earliest step in musical education is fiction (ψευδεῖς λόγοι). But to the usual tales of fiction which relate to gods and heroes, Socrates takes great exception, because of their lightness, their impiety, and their immorality. A great deal is said in this Second Book, and a great deal more in Book III. upon the same subject, a subject which has been formulated in the expression, 'the conflict between religion and mythology.'

It is well known to all what cruel and immoral deeds are attributed to the members of the Greek theogony. Socrates mentions several of them in this Second Book
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of the Republic, e.g. the binding of Hera by her son Ares, the mutilation of Ouranos by Kronos, how Ouranos devoured his own offspring, and so forth. But it is not equally well known that by the side of this variety of legends there existed a clear and well-defined belief in the existence of one Supreme Power, almighty and just, from the earliest time of which we have records in Greek writing. The object of this belief was not well defined, nor can we expect it to have been so; there was no attempt to define in strict terms the nature of God.

But the co-existence of this belief and this mythology challenged criticism in the mind of the people, conscious or unconscious. Sometimes the criticism broke out in the writings of the poets in the form of a declaration of faith in the Supreme Being and his purity; sometimes it appeared as a direct protest against the wickedness of the celestials or the impiety of attributing wickedness to them. At another time both declarations of faith and protests were combined with an attempt to grasp with the mind that which must be by its nature transcendent.

The necessity under which the human mind lies of believing in God is put forward in the Odyssey in simple and beautiful language,

πάντες δὲ θεῶν χατέουσαν ἄνθρωποι.—Od. iii. 48.

'All men yearn after gods'; and the recurrence of the expression θεοποίησις in that poem points to a God who is to be feared by those who violate the laws of hospitality (see Od. vi. 121, where the expression is joined with φιλόξευνος), and who upholds justice (Od. xix. 109, in connection with εὐδικίας). Justice is also said by Hesiod to originate in its purest form from Zeus, ἱθείησι δίκαιος,
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αἱ τ' ἐκ Διῶς εἰσὶν ἄρισται: and the same poet bears witness to the omniscience of Zeus,

οὗτος οὖτε πη ἐστὶ Διῶς νόον ἐξαλέασθαι,

and speaks of the race of heroes who succeeded to the gold, silver, and bronze ages, as juster and nobler than their predecessors—

δικαιότερον καὶ ἄριστον,

ἀνδρῶν ἥρων θεῖον γένος.

Where it is noticeable that they seem to be termed θεῖον or godlike, inasmuch as they are just and noble. In the same way, and in the same poem, men who fail to honour parents in old age are described as οὐδὲ θεῶν ὅπως εἰδότες: and Αἰδώς (Reverence) and Νέμεσις (Just Anger) leave the earth and return to Olympus in the iron age of cruelty and strife. And the reward of prosperity is said distinctly to follow upon righteous dealing—

οἱ δὲ δίκαιοι ξείνουσι καὶ ἐνδήμουσι διδοῦσιν ἰδείας καὶ μὴ τι παρεκβαίνουσι δικαίοι,

tοιοὶ τέθηλε πόλις, λαοὶ δ' ἄνθεόυσι ἐν αὐτῇ,

εἰρήνη δ' ἀνὰ γῆν κουροτρόφος, οὐδὲ ποτ' αὐτοῖς ἀργαλέον πόλεμον τεκμαίρεται εὐρύσπα Ζεύς.

From these passages it will be seen that Hesiod believed the relation of God to man to be one of justice and active supervision:—

πάντα ίδὼν Διῶς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ πάντα νοήσας,

are his words later on in the same poem; and although he speaks of Zeus' hatred of particular individuals and the harsh punishment which mortals incur at his hands, his general and his final conception of the Deity is of a pure and monotheistic character.

Pindar's religious belief finds its expression in a
strong protest against the credibility of mythological tales; thus in Olymp. 1, 82,

ἐμοὶ δ’ ἀπορα γαστρίμαρ−

γον μακάρων τω’ εἰπεῖν’ ἀφίσταμαι.

And another of the early lyrists claims Virtue as the peculiar gift of Heaven—

οὕτι ἄνευ θεῶν ἀρέτην λάβεν

οὐ τόλις οὐ βροτός. Θεὸς ὁ παμμῆτις.

Whilst another says the same of what is noble—

ὅτι καλὸν φίλον ἐστὶ. τὸ δ’ οὗ καλὸν ου φίλον ἔστι.

tοῦτ’ ἐπος ἀθανάτων ἡλθε διὰ στομάτων;

and Sotades speaks of Temperance as their especial gift:—

ἀν δὲ σωφρονῆς, τοῦτο θεῶν δῶρον ὑπάρχει.

Empedocles (Fr. 437-9) expressly states that the same law of right (θέμις) is invariable for all—

οὐ πέλεται τοῖς μὲν θεμιτῶν τόδε τοῖς δ’ ἀθέμιστον

ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νομίσμων διὰ τ’ εὐρυμεδοντος

αἰθέρος ἤνεκέως τέταται, διὰ τ’ ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς.

Here the language is vague, and the principle of justice is not referred to one Being as its originator, but the principle itself is none the less distinctly laid down. And a similar thought occurs in Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus, line 863—

εἰ μοι ἔυνειθ φέροντι

μοῖρα τὰν εὐσεπτὸν ἀγνείαν λόγων

ἐργον τε πάντων, δὲν νόμοι προκευταί

ὕπειπόδες, οὐρανίαν

di’ αἰθέρα τεκνωθεῖντες, δὲν ὁλυμπόσ
Here, as Professor Campbell says, we have Olympus used to express 'a sort of unseen heaven,' a holy place. And all words and deeds are said to be fixed and defined by heavenly laws as pure or the reverse. A vagueness of expression pervades the poet's words, but there is no vagueness in the principle; just as in the same play (line 903 infr.), we have an invocation to Zeus, qualified by the condition 'if so thou art rightly called'—

\[ \text{\'alll\' ó kratýnωn, e\'περ ὅρθ\' ākoûeis,} \]
\[ \text{Zeî, πάντ' ānássowv,} \]

a sentiment to be closely paralleled by a similar expression in the Agamemnon of Æschylus, line 162, 'Zeus, whoe'er he be,'

\[ \text{Zeûs, õstis pot' ēstîn eί tóδ' aû—} \]
\[ \text{tô φιλον κεκλημένω,} \]
\[ \text{tòtò niv prosēnêpòw.} \]

Here the use of the indicative ēsti shows that there is no doubt in the mind of the supplicant as to Zeus' existence, which the context confirms; but there is the same confession of ignorance as to the form of his manifestation. And so in Choêphoroe 951, when speaking of Justice, the poet first speaks of her as Διώς κόρα, adding that her name among mortals is called by a happy chance Δίκα, implying that her divinity and her being are alike derived from Zeus:—

\[ \text{Διώς κόρα: Δίκαν δέ niv} \]
\[ \text{προσαγορεύουμεν} \]
\[ \text{βροτοί, τυχόντες καλώς.} \]
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These passages show that in the minds of the best thinkers there was no doubt as to the existence and the preeminence, and the justice and purity of Zeus and the gods. They may have believed to a small extent in mythological tales; they cannot have accepted them entirely; in Pindar’s opinion, in fact, they are to be unconditionally rejected—ἀφίσσεσθαι. And no doubt all those poets and thinkers who approached to Pindar’s intellectual standpoint thought with Pindar and with Socrates that tales of the sort should have no place in a man’s serious belief.¹

§ 7. We have now seen what the Republic is, how it is divided, why it was written, what kind of information or addition to philosophy it contains, and how far Plato believed in the possibility of his State. We have also seen that in the first two books of the Dialogue we must only expect critical and negative results with the beginning of the creation of a State. It remains to say a few words upon the light in which Socrates is brought before us in the first two books of the Republic, which form the proem or prosodus of the dialectical drama.

We have spoken above of Socrates’ religion, his belief in God, and the terms of that belief; we have

¹ In this apparent inconsistency, viz. the coexistence of a pure morality with a debased mythology, some have seen the traces of an old cult of personified natural forces, the growth of which cult is thus described by Buckle: ‘The aspects of nature when very threatening stimulate the imagination. . . . . Among an ignorant people there is a direct tendency to ascribe all serious dangers to supernatural intervention; and a strong religious sentiment being thus aroused, it constantly happens not only that the danger is submitted to, but that it is actually worshipped.’—History of Civilization, vol. i. page 113, 2nd Edition.
seen that, so far from being an atheist, Socrates was a man of lively belief in the gods of his country. We cannot speak here of his moral earnestness, his deep conviction of the seriousness of life, and the tenacity with which he applied himself to the preaching of that conviction. That, in spite of a superficial lightness and a gay humour, he was earnest and serious, the perusal of a single Dialogue of Plato will satisfy us. We have to speak rather of this gaiety and humour, characteristics which stand out in the brightest light in this prelude to the more serious business of the Dialogue.

"Επαυξεν ἀμα σπονδὰζων, 'he used to jest in earnest.' This epigram of Xenophon’s expresses in the happiest terms Socrates’ power of mingling the grave with the gay, the lively with the severe; it shows how he could joke and quibble apparently in the lightest strain, and yet bring out of his jokes and quibbles the solid grain of truth. And who shall quarrel with Socrates for this habit? The first principle of teaching, of preaching, of imparting knowledge of any kind, is not to instruct, but to interest. Μαρθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῆ ἢ ἀποδείξει are the words of Aristotle¹; and induction, the marshalling of facts in detail, must precede deduction, if we are to interest our hearers. This is Socrates’ manner of argument. He presents in their humblest guise the humblest facts, garnishes them with his humour, and links them effectively but not obtrusively into a more or less perfect chain of argument; until the hearer is struck with amazement and conviction to find what power and what knowledge the barest facts can yield if they are manipulated with a skilful hand.

Let us, then, see how this humour is employed with

¹ *Post. Analyt.* 1, 18, p. 81, a 40.
effect in the scenes of dialectic which the first two books of the *Republic* present. Socrates is quietly walking home from Piraeus; in reply to the jocular threat of forcible detention he suggests the possibility of gaining his release by persuasion; he falls with pleasure into a conversation with Cephalus, who is approaching the evening of life, and begins an apparently short discussion with Cephalus’ son and heir Polemarchus. Thus far Socrates has shown only in his quiet and speculative mood; but, as the discussion with Polemarchus advances, he begins to apply his ξέγχως critical method with such effect that it rouses the envy of Thrasymachus, a Sophist present among the audience, described by Socrates in the *Phaedrus*¹ as the mighty Chalcedonian, who trusts, as the sequel will show, rather to his lungs than his logic for dialectical success. It is to Socrates’ treatment of this braggart and to Socrates’ bearing under the infliction of his declamations that we invite attention; for by his treatment of others the best insight is gained into a man’s character.

The first result of the dialectical collision between the mighty Chalcedonian and Socrates is that the former is made ridiculous (see page 338 C); the next that he becomes furious; and this again is naturally followed by his discomfiture in the argument. But all these results are attained by Socrates without the slightest violation of those rules of good feeling and good breeding to which Thrasymachus is an entire stranger. In his account of the discussion Socrates compares Thrasymachus to a wild beast and a bath-man, and very well are the similes deserved; but in the actual

¹ 267 D.
conversation his politeness stands out in marked contrast to Thrasymachus' overbearing conduct. We know that there is nothing so provocative of anger to a violent person as a calm and cool demeanour under his attacks. Of this demeanour Socrates was a perfect example. His humour led him also to take a positive relish in exasperating men who showed any violent intentions—we see traces of this in his treatment of Thrasymachus, and we have another case of it in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, which deserves, for the illustration it affords of Socrates' manner in this respect, to be quoted in extenso.

'Critias and Charicles (two of the Thirty) called Socrates and showed him the law which forbad him to converse with the young . . . . Then he said, "I desire to obey the law; but I wish to know if you think dialectic is on the side of that which is spoken rightly, or against it, that you bid me discontinue it. For if it belongs to the former class, it is the same thing as if you ordered me not to speak rightly, and if it belong to the latter, it is evident that we should try to learn to speak rightly." At this Charicles was angry, and said, "As you cannot understand us, Socrates, we tell you clearly not to converse with the young at all." Socrates replied, "To prevent any misunderstanding, will you define what you mean by the young?" And Charicles answered, "All those below thirty years of age." "But supposing that I am making a purchase," said Socrates, "and the seller is under thirty years of age, may I not ask him what he charges?" "Of course," replied Charicles; "but you are always asking questions with a purpose: these questions you must not ask." "Nor answer, I suppose," replied Socrates, "if
INTRODUCTION.

a youth were to ask me, for instance, 'Where does Charicles live?' or, 'Where is Critias?'" "Such questions as those you might answer," said Charicles. And Critias said, "But your cobblers, and your carpenters and your coppersmiths, those illustrations that you are always dinning into our ears and working to death, you must have done with." "Then," said Socrates, "I must also have done with all my inductions from those illustrations, about justice and piety and the rest?" "By Zeus, you must!" said Charicles.'

In this interesting and characteristic scene, we have Socrates treating in his humorous way a command that must have been of the greatest seriousness to him. ἐπαιζεν ἀμα στονδάζων. He is trying to show his enemies the mistake into which they are falling, by exhibiting their command in a ridiculous light. But Critias and his companions were not men who could be influenced by words; and it is only when Socrates has fair play accorded to him that his reductio ad absurdum is of avail. Then, however, it is of the highest efficiency; and nowhere is it employed with greater effect than in the First Book of the Republic. And if it be asked, 'Why is it that Socrates was so given up to his humour that we find it glancing on every page of these biographical sketches?' we must answer that its very value and force lay in the fact that it was spontaneous, redeeming Socrates' teaching from the charge of dulness, and investing it with an interest for all. So far was Socrates even from lying under the imputation of flippancy that the Athenians who condemned him must have felt that in him they had to deal with one who

1 Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 33, seqq.
exerted a real power and a real influence over the citizens. Earnest he was in every action, inasmuch as he did nothing without a definite object; and so far was he from wasting his energies in mere logomachy that his teaching may be fairly summed up in Plato's noble words, 'Αθληταὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγώνος, 'Men are athletes in the greatest of all contests—the arena of life.'
THE

ARGUMENT OF THE REPUBLIC.
I went down to Piraeus yesterday with Glaucon, Ariston's son, to see the festival of Artemis; and, as we were coming back, Polemarchus, son of Cephalus, overtook us, with Adeimantus, Glaucon's brother, and others with them. And Polemarchus constrained us to go home with him; where we found amongst others Thrasyvmachus of Chalcedon, and the old man Cephalus, just finishing a sacrificial rite. He gently upbraided me for not coming oftener to see him, adding that at his time of life the pleasure of conversation with friends was very great. I replied that nothing gave me also greater pleasure than communing with those who have gone before on the road of life; for they could describe whether it were hard or easy, rough or smooth. 'Why,' he said, 'many of my friends, Socrates, when they come to see me, are always lamenting their old age and longing after the pleasures of youth; whilst I tell them that to be quit of the desires of youth is to be freed not from one but from a host of hard and savage masters.' 'Yes,' I said, 'but you must recollect your easy circumstances, Cephalus.' 'No doubt,' he
replied, 'my circumstances make life easier; but though I might be discontented if I were poor, I am sure some of those friends of mine would never be contented, even if they were rich; as Themistocles said to the Seriphian. And I have worked hard to repair my grandfather's fortune, which my father left me in a dilapidated state. But when you come to my age, Socrates, you begin to think over your past life, of the good you have done, and then you are comforted: and of the evil, and the more it be, the unhappier a man is. 'And what is this "doing good" or justice?' I said. 'Oh!' he said, 'I must bequeath the disquisition to Polemarchus.' 'Who is your heir?' I said. At this he smiled, and then left us. 'Come now, Polemarchus,' I said, 'with your legacy of argument, what is that definition of justice "Tell the truth and pay your debts," given by Simonides, which you support? You don't say that you ought to give back to a friend everything that you have borrowed? You might, at that rate, have to give a sword to a madman.' 'I suppose Simonides meant,' he said, 'that we ought to give that which befits each to each.' 'In other words,' I said, 'to do good to your friends and harm to your enemies; as a good steersman is capable of carrying his friends safely and drowning his foes. But in what circumstances is justice useful to our friends?' 'To help our friends,' he answered, 'when they need help, and give back money when they lend it us.' 'So that,' I said, 'if they have no attacks made upon them and never lend money, there is no place for this justice of ours. And on the principle that a good keeper makes a good poacher, our just man will be good at thieving, if he is good at keeping. So that Simonides' and Homer's definition of justice has assumed a strange aspect. And
again, often those who are apparently our enemies are really our friends; so that from our definition it would in some cases, turn out that doing harm to friends is justice—the very reverse of Simonides‘ meaning. ‘Let us change the definition then,’ he said, ‘and substitute “our real friends” for “our friends.”’ ‘But,’ I said, ‘the function of justice is to make men just and good, as the function of each art and trade is to make the objects of their work better in respect of that art or trade. How then can it be the function of justice to harm any one, that is, to depreciate his powers? For all harm is depreciation. We must therefore remove that part of the definition.’ ‘We must,’ he said.

Now Thrasymachus before this had tried to interrupt the conversation a good many times, but the rest prevented him; so that when we stopped he gathered himself together like a wild beast and hurled himself upon us. ‘You fools!’ he said, ‘why, if you really want to know what justice is, do you exhibit all these pretty tricks of dialectic? Now answer me in a straightforward manner, what you really think it to be. And don‘t say that it is the beneficial or the advantageous or the profitable or that which is to a man’s interest.’ ‘Nay! pity us, Thrasymachus,’ I said, ‘and give us your help, for we do not profess to know what it is.’ ‘Ah!’ said he, ‘Socrates’ usual self-depreciation! ‘By no means,’ said I; ‘but if you ask a man to define twelve, and say, you must not answer twice six, or three times four, or four times three, what is he to say?’ ‘Nonsense!’ he said; ‘but supposing I tell you what justice is, what will you say?’ ‘I shall receive the information and be thankful for it,’ I said.

\[^{1} \text{epo\~v\~e\~a.}\]
'Well, pay your money,' he said. 'I have none,' I replied. 'We will all contribute for Socrates,' said Glaucon. So Thrasymachus, after beating about the bush for a time, and pretending that he was not anxious to be the speaker himself, defined justice as the Interest of the Stronger. 'Do you mean,' said I, 'that if it is to the interest of Polydamas, who is stronger than we, to eat beef, that we ought to eat beef too, and that that would be justice?' 'You are a brute, Socrates,' he said. 'You know that, in every city, whether the government be tyranny, oligarchy, or democracy, the laws are always made by those in power in their own interest; and justice is acting according to law, therefore justice is the Interest of the Stronger, or the Governing Portion.' 'But stay, Thrasymachus,' I said, 'you told me not to use interest in my definition, and you have done so yourself. But, passing over that objection, I ask you if the Governing Portion does not sometimes make laws which turn out badly for themselves; and if so, whether justice, i.e. acting according to law, may not therefore sometimes turn out in the exactly opposite way, viz. against the Interest of the Stronger?'

'I did not mean that at all,' said Thrasymachus, 'I do not call the man who makes a mistake in legislation the Stronger, when he makes his mistake. For a man is not a scribe, a doctor, or a calculator, when he makes a mistake in transcribing, doctoring, or calculating.' 'Well, that may be,' I said; 'but all the arts have some definite object, as arts (I do not mean as remunerative, because in that respect they are all phases of the art of money-making); and these arts need no external assistance as long as they are correctly and wholly practised, but are free from defect and mistake,
as arts. And these arts are superior to and command those subjects on whom they practise. And their object is merely and solely the interest of the subject, which is inferior to and weaker than themselves; and in the case of the arts, therefore, the interest of the weaker is their object and not the interest of the stronger. And in a ship the steersman governs the ship, and directs all his efforts to the safety of the crew, who are his inferiors in steering. And in every kind of government, in short, you will find that it is the interest of the weaker that is sought after by the stronger, and not that of himself.

At this point Thrasymachus suddenly asked me: 'Have you a nurse, Socrates?' 'Why do you ask foolish questions,' I said, 'instead of going on with the argument?' 'Because you drivel,' he said, 'and don't understand the difference between sheep and shepherd. For the shepherd takes care of the sheep, just as your steersman or captain takes care of his crew, but it is for his own ultimate profit and interest. You can prove it by what you know of public office. When a strong, unscrupulous man takes a public position, he farms it, he uses it to help his friends and spite his foes, he comes out of it with full hands, even if he went in with empty ones; but a just and upright man lets his own household go to rack and ruin, whilst he is transacting the public business of such a post, and offends his friends, and spends much of his private fortune, and comes out of his position much poorer than he was when he accepted it. And in a contract between a bad man and a good one, which do you suppose will come off the better? And I do not speak of thieves, and sacrilegious persons, kidnappers, and so forth. but of those specious rogues who compass the
ideal of injustice, and are highly respectable members of the State.'

After this burst of rhetoric Thrasymachus would have made off, but the others detained him, and compelled him to stay and defend his words. 'Well,' said I, 'in plain words, I do not believe all that. For you will not keep to your strict definition with which you began, when you said that the ruler, or the Stronger, never erred as a ruler; but now when you say that the shepherd takes care of the sheep only for his own ultimate interest, I answer that, respecting his own ultimate interest, he is a money-maker and not a shepherd. Therefore, as shepherd he has regard for the interest of the weaker.' And this is proved, Thrasymachus, by the attachment of salaries and honours to official posts, to induce men to come forward, or even fines, if they will not offer themselves; because it is not for their own interest that men hold office, but for the interest of those whom they govern. And therefore in a perfectly fair and prosperous community there would be exactly the same struggle to avoid office as there is now to enjoy it. On these grounds, among others, I repudiate Thrasymachus' definition of justice. But I consider that a much graver position which he upholds, viz. that an unjust life is better and more profitable than a just one. Come, Thrasymachus, let us enter on this question. You call injustice profitable, so I suppose you call justice vice.'

1 This refutation of Thrasymachus is substantially a reply to Adeimantus also, in Book IV. *init.*, when he maintains that Socrates has not made the rulers of the State, the φύλακες, comfortable; for the answer there is, although not distinctly expressed, the same as this, viz. that the rulers are for the people and not the people for the rulers, and that this principle is evident, consistent, and universal, at any rate in a free State.
'No,' he said, 'but great folly.' 'You grant,' I said, 'that the just man does not try to overreach the just, but the unjust?' 'He might try,' he said, 'but he would not succeed.' 'Whilst the unjust,' I continued, 'tries to overreach both.' 'Yes,' he said, 'and the ideally unjust man succeeds completely.' 'But,' I continued, 'in any art whatsoever, it is the unskilful and ignorant man who tries to take advantage both of the ignorant and the skilful; whilst the skilful man would take advantage not of the skilful, but of the unskilful only. So that according to the analogy of all the arts, if we call the skilful man wise and good, and the ignorant useless and bad, your unjust man resembles the latter, and your just man the former.'

Thrasymachus was obliged to confess the justice of my proof, but he fought hard against it, and got very hot (for it was a summer day) and actually blushed, for the first time, I should say, in his life. 'Well,' I said, 'with this conclusion, that other position of yours is turned, viz. that injustice is strong and justice weak. For which city is more likely to hold her own amongst other cities, the skilful or the unskilful, i.e. the just or the unjust? You must remember that, where there is injustice, there is sedition, and the house divided against itself. So that the more injustice there is in a State the less efficient it will be. And your unjust man will incur Heaven's hatred, for he is opposed to the just, and I suppose you call the gods just; whilst the just man will be the friend of the gods. And hence we may conclude that, when we see an unjust man prospering, or a number of unjust men carrying out a project to a successful issue, that, in so far as they succeed, they are not entirely unjust, but have a certain consistency and
coherence, by virtue of which they succeed, whereas if they were perfectly unjust they would fail altogether. And if you grant that we live in virtue of our souls, and that the soul has a function, or mode of action, as the eyes' function is seeing, and the ears' function is hearing; and if you further grant that these functions have an excellence proper to each, viz. their highest state of efficiency; we must conclude that the excellence of the soul is justice; for by it the soul best performs its part of originating right action. And so the just man will live a good life, and the unjust man a bad one. It is by your consideration, Thrasymachus, that we have arrived at this happy conclusion: since you began to take a calm view of the question. But for all this I know no more of what justice really is than when we began; for we have been considering whether it is wisdom or folly, virtue or vice, profitable or unprofitable, before we have even obtained its definition.'

1 κομιδὴ ὑντες ἁδικοί.
BOOK II.

When we had one so far in our discourse I thought that there was an end of it, but as it turned out, this was merely the preface. For Glaucon would not accept the conclusion, but said, 'Are you content to suppose that you have set the question at rest in our minds by this mode of arriving at a conclusion, or will you thoroughly prove the truth of the position that justice is better than injustice? Is justice one of those things that we pursue for its own sake, or for the sake of its results, or for the sake of both?' 'Of both,' I answered. 'Well,' he said, 'I should like to have it satisfactorily proved. Thrasy machus gave up long before he ought to have done (for I will revive his argument), and did not bring half the objections against the just life which he might have brought. And all the apologists of justice, whom I have ever heard speak, confine themselves to the advantages which follow from a virtuous life, and do not support justice for its own intrinsic worth. So I am going to bring various counts against justice with all my powers. First, then, in its origin justice is described as a compromise, effected by the weaker, who find themselves habitually ill-treated, and make an arrangement that there shall be no ill-doing by themselves or against themselves. It is a compromise between the height of success, viz., doing evil with
impunity, and the depth of misfortune, which is being ill-treated without hope of redress.

There is no principle in doing good and being just. If a just man had a ring like that of Gyges the Lydian he would be as bad as the unjust. For Gyges' ring had the power of making its wearer invisible, and he committed adultery with the king's wife, and by her help slew the king, and reigned in his stead. Now strip off from the unjust man all things that make him unlovely to the world's eyes, and let him stand forth completely and efficiently equipped with his injustice. If he ever fail, imagine him as one capable of restoring his fortunes; let him be considered a just man; let him be master of persuasion, and, if need be, of force. On the other side place the perfectly just man, and, to complete the antithesis, subtract from him even his appearance of justice, for otherwise he will be rewarded according to his appearance, and let him go on unaltered until he die, so that he may be consistently and continuously just. How then will these two fare? The good man will be scourged, fined, tortured, imprisoned, and deserted by every one, will end his days in solitude and misery; whilst the unjust man will be called to rule over his fellow citizens, receive crowns and rewards, will attain to the summit of earthly prosperity, and will have all the means of helping on his poorer friends and of paying duteous sacrifice to the gods. This is the completest indictment against the just life that I know.

I was about to begin a reply to Glaucon, when his brother Adeimantus chimed in: 'He has not said half enough, Socrates. The apologists of justice tell us that in the after life the good enjoy different sensual pleasures, e.g. a never-ending intoxication, and that the evil are sentenced to pour water for ever through a sieve; such
are the rewards and punishments by which the minds of the young are incited to virtue. The poets again are hopelessly at sea on the question of justice and morality, for they sing of the beauty of holiness, but they tell us that spells and sacrifices and prayers of all kinds can easily sway the judgments of heaven. And when young men see how injustice prevails, and learn from professors of rhetoric and persuasion how to move the hearts of men, what wonder is it if they turn altogether away from justice, saying to themselves that they can always get rid of their sins by a few sacrifices, when they are coming towards their end. And all this is due to that custom of praising justice for its rewards, and dissuading people from injustice because of its penalties. In your apology, then, for justice, remove the reputation and the accessories that attach to each. Bring both bare before us, and prove to those who will hear you with eager ears that justice is right and good, and injustice wicked and bad.'

I had always felt a regard for Glaucon and Adeimantus, but on this occasion I was especially struck with them, so cleverly had they stated their case, and so earnest were they in their desire to have the question settled. I replied that I feared I was unable to make such a defence of justice as would satisfy them, but I was ready to try. To discover justice in the human soul, let us see if we cannot find justice first in some larger organism, just as if we were unable to read something written in small letters, and were to seek for the same thing written large in another place. Justice perhaps may be 'writ large' in a State, and could then be transferred by analogical argument to the Soul of man. Let us then picture to ourselves the actual birth and growth of a State.
Now the origin of a State lies, I take it, in the insufficiency of a man's resources. For man needs much, but cannot always satisfy his needs by himself. Therefore this man joins that man to himself in a society to profit by his powers, and an interchange of benefits is made between them. What, then, is man's first need? Food. And the next is that of lodging, and the third that of clothing. We shall require for our city, then, a tiller of the soil, a house-builder, and a weaver, and perhaps, too, a cobbler. Hence four or five at least is the original number of our citizens. The next question is this: Is the husbandman to produce enough corn for himself and no more, or is he to supply the others with corn on the condition that they supply him with the produce of their labour? Is he to make his own clothes and build his own house, besides raising food enough for his consumption? No; we must lay down this principle at once, that each man must share the results of his toil amongst all the citizens, because every man has one art and only one, generally speaking, in which he excels; therefore let him confine himself to this art, and not waste his time and his art by attempting other arts. So there must be a smith to make the husbandman his plough, and a carpenter, and various other mechanicians. And we cannot help feeling the necessity of importing commodities from other places; for each place, like each man, is not self-sufficient, but needs supplementing from the resources of other places. And so we shall have merchants in our State. And, seeing that a seller cannot sit down and waste his time till a buyer may happen to come by who wants his commodity, we must have middle-men, i.e. tradesmen, to form a convenient link between the producer and the consumer. Those of our citizens whose body is more efficient
than their mind will become hired servants, and so the different inhabitants of our city will grow and multiply.

'This is our city. Now comes the question,' What manner of life will they live? They will till the ground, build them houses, make them garments; in summer working lightly clad, in winter well protected; they will make them fine loaves and cakes of the wheat and barley which they grow; they will lie on leaf-couches and will live pleasantly, drinking their wine and praising their gods, training their children carefully to avoid poverty and contention. And, if you please, we will give them a relish, olives, cheese, figs, and nuts. And living moderately they will spend a long life, and bequeath the same happy existence to their children.'

'Tis a city of swine, Socrates, and nothing more nor less,' said Glaucon. 'You must give them the usual amenities of life, tables and chairs, and a few delicacies.'

'Ah!' I said, 'you want me to create a luxurious city, with all its accompaniment of cooks, sweetmeats, sauces, dancing girls, and doctors. And to keep all this mob of accessory populace we shall want to cut off a little piece of our neighbours' land, and they will feel the same necessity regarding ours, so that at once war is generated, with its horses, and soldiers, and weapons. And if war is an art or trade (and I do not see how it can fail to be so) we must confine our soldiers to their trade of war, and keep a standing army. Nay, of all other trades in the city, it will be the most important, because the duty of the warriors will be to keep intact the whole Body Politic. Hence the most time and the greatest care must be spent on our warriors or guardians as we may call them. They must be keen, quick, strong, courageous, and gentle; so that their great
strength and spirit may not be turned against their own fellow citizens; like dogs of a noble nature—very savage when they see a stranger, who may have done them no harm, but gentle to any one whom they know, although he may never have done them any kindness. In other words they must be philosophic, i.e. quick to apprehend what is to the interest of their fellow countrymen and what is against it. How then are we to produce such a type of man?

'Education is divided into music and gymnastics. In the music the first step is fiction.' 'I do not understand you,' he said. 'I mean,' said I, 'that as we teach our children by telling them stories, so we must begin the education of our guardians, but with this difference: the tales that our children hear, told by Homer and Hesiod, contain a great deal of noxious fiction, which must be expunged with the greatest care from our system of education. The foul and ridiculous stories about many of the gods are not true, to begin with, and, if they were true, I would not have children's ears defiled with them. What, then, are we to use in their place? you say. And I reply that we are no poets; but in our city there will be poets, and we shall instruct them as to the poetry they are to write, we shall lay down the lines on which they are to work, and if they transgress them, we shall punish the irregularity. God is good, and he must always be represented so: he cannot be the author of evil to any living being; he cannot lie or deceive; he cannot even change, for if he were to change it would be for the better or for the worse. Now he cannot change for the better, because he is the Best; and he would not desire to change for

1 i.e. every subject which has an intellectual element, e.g. music, poetry, ethics.
the worse. Therefore he is true and unchangeable. We will, then, strive with all our might and main against those writers who attempt to traduce the nature of God, and drive them from our city. And we shall have great fault to find with Homer and Æschylus, and many other poets who have failed to give a consistent account of the goodness of the gods.'
BOOK III.

Our poets must be careful when they speak of the after life, not to malign it; and when they are singing of gods and heroes they must not attribute anything unseemly to them, either in grief or in joy, for example, excessive laughter. And the rulers of the State are to be the only persons who have control over the songs and myths of the State.

Again, sobriety and temperance are necessary for our young men; and therefore all things intemperate, either in word or in action, must be struck out of our poetry, especially in mentioning gods and heroes. The matter of our poetry having been considered, and rules for its guidance having been laid down, we come next to speak of its manner, or style.¹

All poetry is either imitative, or narrative, or compounded of both. For instance, the poet of the Iliad begins with invoking the Muse: and then he narrates to us how Chryses came, and besought all the Greeks to give him back his daughter; and then the poet speaks as if he were Chryses himself. And in this latter mode of speaking I call a poet imitative. For he might have gone on with his narrative style, and told us about Chryses' invocation himself, instead of making Chryses speak, as he does. The epic then is of the

¹ λέξις.
compound order; whilst tragedy leaves out, "and he replied," or "so the goddess spoke," and gives the dialogue as it actually comes from the speakers. This kind is purely imitative. Whilst in dithyrambs it is the poet speaking all the time; and in them we have the narrative pure.

'Now one man is seldom or never a good imitator in more than one subject. A writer of tragedy does not succeed in comedy, nor vice versa. Man's nature is of so small a capacity that, as in craftsmanship, so in art, we must be specialists if we wish to succeed. And the manner of imitation must correspond to the matter. We shall not allow our artists to give us presentations of anything foul or dishonourable. For as a good man will never lose control over his actions, so he should never imitate in word or action those who have lost control of themselves. As he will not imitate everything he sees indiscriminately, but only those things which are worthy of imitation, so he will not even read such imitations from the poets, or allow them to give such imitations. In fact, our citizens must be men of single, not double or multiple mind; and in their words, actions, and writings, they will follow the ideal of the upright and single-hearted man.

'Next, the music of the poetry. This must be adapted as far as possible to the poetry itself; and if we observe this rule we shall not go wrong. Remove at once then those melodies of a pitiful and wailing character like the mixolydian and syntonolydian; the soft, effeminate,

1 In the Laelius of Cicero, the single-minded man is held up for our admiration as a friend. 'Simplicem præterea et communem et consentientem, qui rebus isdem moveatur, eligi par est; quæ omnia pertinent ad fidilitatem. Neque enim fidum potest esse multiplex ingenium et tortuosum.'—Ch. xviii. sec. 65.
and revelling strains.’ ‘At this rate,’ he said, ‘you will leave none but the Dorian and Phrygian.’ ‘I dare say not,’ said I, ‘for the first-named have many strings and many chords, and are altogether of too complex a nature for our simple and unaffected songs. And then the rhythm, or flow of the verses, must be fixed; for instance; dactylic, epic, iambic, or trochaic. But we will consult Damon on this point; for it is a difficult one. Only we may be sure of this, that, if we have a good style to begin with, our metre and rhythm will more easily flow well with it; and the whole composition will ultimately depend for its style and music and rhythm on the character of the composer. If we take pains with our teaching of temperance, courage, and magnanimity, we shall find our music and poetry falling naturally into a good groove; and thus we shall avoid all intemperance and vulgarity.

‘Now we come to the gymnastic training of our youths. And let me remind you that men are athletes in the greatest arena, that of life.¹ Their bodily training must be of the highest efficiency; excluding Syracusan luxuries, Sicilian cookery, Attic sweetmeats, Corinthian courtesans; for by the presence of luxury in the State the door is opened to intemperance and a whole horde of diseases, which will come trooping in; and our city will be full of doctors, cooperating up wrecked constitutions. Nay, our men will have no leisure to be ill; but if a man is unsound we will have none of him, for it is neither to his own interest nor to that of his fellow citizens that he live in our State or anywhere else.’ ‘But,’ said Glaucon, ‘the best doctor is he who has had most experience of bad constitutions and bad illnesses, even perhaps in his own body.’ ‘That may be,’ I said,

¹ ἀθληταὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγώνος.
but you might as well say that the best judge, and the most honourable man, is he who has had most experience of crime. Whereas, on the contrary, the fact is that the fresher the mind and the purer, which approaches the administration of justice, the better able is it to discern between good and evil. For a wicked man would be always suspecting others to be as bad as himself, and would attribute the worst motives to every man. And no doubt the good man, on the contrary, would now and then lay himself open to the charge of too great a simplicity. But it is a fault on the right side.¹

³And we must take care in gymnastic that we do not forget its real object; which is, not to bring the body to its highest development, but to increase the efficiency of the mind.² In this way. Men who spend all their time in gymnastic become subject to roughness and harshness of manner, whilst those who neglect it entirely grow too soft, and milder than is fitting. But a due admixture of the gymnastic element will strengthen the mind for its intellectual labour, and is of the same importance as music, because without it we cannot attain to that intermediate condition between the excess of roughness and the excess of mildness which is the proper frame of mind for our citizens to possess.'

³And who are to be the guardians and rulers?' ‘The

¹ Socrates does not really answer Glaucon's objection by this analogy. It is quite true, as Glaucon maintains, that in such a State a physician would not have the opportunity or the experience to perfect himself in his art. The true answer would be that in Socrates' state there is no requirement and no place for a skilled physician; but Socrates does not state this clearly, he leaves it to be inferred, and breaks away into the moral sphere with an illustration which is not sufficiently parallel to be to the point.

² See Book vi. 498 B. τῶν τε σωμάτων ἐν ἡ βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνδροῦται, εὗ μάλα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφία κτῶμενος.
elder of course, and the best of the elders. And the best of the elders I should define as those who can best withstand the temptation and the bewitchment of pleasure and fear, who can keep their mental and moral balance and live a harmonious and consistent life.

'To keep our youth firmly imbued with their responsibility and their duty, I would invent a fiction of this sort; that all those citizens who are found worthy to rule are golden in their nature, and the defenders are silver, and the common people iron: and that there is a prophecy that, when a silver or an iron nature shall be found at the head of the state, then it shall fall and come to nought.' 'Well,' said he, 'you might imbue a second generation with this fable perhaps, but not the present.'

'And so our community will live, well governed by its guardians, and well defended by its protectors, who will not turn against the sheep they defend like wolves; and all will live in common, not calling this mine and that yours," but, like a great army will be happy and powerful in the loyalty of each individual to the colours. Gold and silver, except the gold and silver of their own natures, they will never touch; for it is avarice that breeds disunion in a city, and it is disunion which is political ruin.

1 Sir Thomas More following this principle of Plato in his *Utopia*, finds one result of proprietorship and inequality of possessions in the great number of laws required to regulate conflicting rights. Thus: '. . . where euerye man calleth that he hathe gotten his owne private and proper goodes, where so many newe lawes daylye made be not sufficiente for euerye man to enjoye, defende, and knowe from another man's that whych he calleth his owne.' A few pages further on we have his description of the Utopian life in common: 'Whoso will may go in (to the houses), for there is nothing within the houses that is private or anye man's owne.'—Pp. 67 and 73, ed. Arber, London, 1869.
BOOK IV.

'But supposing some one objected to all this, Socrates,' said Adeimantus, 'that you have made your State and appointed your guardians, and that they turn out to be by no means the happiest and most comfortable people in it, what would you say?' 'I should answer,' I said, 'that the people are not for the guardians, but the guardians for the people, or rather "each man for himself and God for us all." In other words, we do not make the happiness of a particular class our object, but the general welfare. It would be absurd, would it not, to dress up our farmers and potters and shoemakers in fine clothes, and tell them to do as much work as they pleased, and how they pleased? Every man then must do his quantum of due labour, and thus we shall avoid the two extremes of riches and poverty, which are the mainsprings of discontent and sedition.'

'But are we to have no resources, no wealth, Socrates?' 'Certainly not; for if we have no wealth we shall have no enemy coming to despoil us, and like a trained athlete, who can encounter any number of rich fat burghers, provided that he take them one or two at a time, so shall we be. For our soldiers and guardians will be able to fight twice their number of opponents; and other nations will prefer to fight with us, the strong and hard-bitten dogs, against the fat and helpless sheep. And us they will leave alone.
'Each of us then having our proper duty and performing it, we shall allow our State to grow and extend so far as is consistent with its unity. And our guardians will attend to many points of detail, such as of preserving the orthodox rules of music and gymnastic, of enforcing proper respect towards elders; but many more must be left to the good sense of our people, and the correct development of our principles of education. And our religious observances of all kinds will of course be settled by the word of the Delphian God.

'Our city is now grown, and furnished with all its appliances, and is a living organism. Where, now, are we to look for justice? Let us approach the problem as a mathematical equation in which there are one or more unknown quantities. Every city that is rightly and justly managed, in other words, a good city, must be wise, courageous, temperate, and just. In our equation then, these four are the unknown quantities; and if we can ascertain the first three and eliminate them, the remaining one, justice, will be clear.

'First then our city must be wise. And wherein? In the smallest and yet the most important section of itself, viz. in the body of guardians. For if these be truly wise, seeing that on them depends the weal or woe of the State, the rest of the people will be wise also, in so far as they can attain to wisdom. Again, what part of the State must without fail be brave?' 'The part which defends the rest,' he said. 'So,' said I, 'it is of the greatest importance that our guardians and defenders be the bravest men in the State.

'Shall we take temperance next,' I said, 'or do you prefer to leave it out, and go straight on to find justice?' 'We had better keep to your method,' he said, 'and go on to consider temperance.' 'Well,'
said I, 'when all the citizens are in agreement as to who should be the rulers, and when they all live in harmony, then I should call them temperate. Just as in the soul of a man there is a better impulse and a worse, and sometimes the better has complete control of the worse; so that concord throughout the State is the temperance of the State. And now, Glaucon, for justice. Follow close behind me, and breathe a prayer for success, and peep warily through this dark and tangled thicket. But courage! we must go forward.' 'We must,' said he. And I,—'Holloa, holloa, Glaucon, what fools we are! Here is the very thing we have been gaping about for, tumbling at our feet.' 'Why, what do you mean?' he said. 'I mean that when we said every man was to do his own business in the State, and not to be a busybody or a Jack-of-all-trades, that was justice; and that is the unknown quantity, as I was calling it, which we have been speaking of all along. And to meddle with other people's business is injustice.

'Now let us transfer this to the individual. In the mind of man there is a three-fold division which corresponds to the division above, of the three virtues necessary to a good guardian. There is the faculty of acquiring knowledge, of feeling spirited with the second, and of feeling sensual desire with the third. And let

1 It will be seen that in the application of the justice of the State to the human soul, this description of σωφροσύνη is very nearly identical with that of δικαιοσύνη there. Only the different parts of the human soul, here described as βέλτιον and χείρον (431 B.), are there further elaborated into three, viz. λογιστικόν, θυμοειδές, and ἐπιθυμητικόν. Aristotle's division in the Politics, Book i. chap. v. ad med. is similar to the present one,—ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ (sc. ψυχῇ) ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ μὲν ἄρχον, τὸ δὲ ἄρχομενον, ὥστε ἐτέραν φαμέν εἶναι ἄρετῆν. οἷον τοῦ λόγου ἐχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἄλογου.
me premise that a thing can neither do nor be the contrary of itself, in the same part of it, and with regard to the same thing. We have thirst and we have thirst of a particular kind, but we have also sometimes, and together with the thirst, another feeling which holds us back from satisfying that thirst. This other feeling is the contrary of the first and cannot therefore be a manifestation of the same faculty. The faculty which often opposes itself to the sensual desire is the rational or intellectual; and we shall find upon inspection that the spirited or third kind of faculty either ranges itself upon the side of the intellectual or is quenched by the sensual. Then if our individual is to be just, the intellectual faculty must always predominate and govern the other two inferior faculties. For the sensual occupies the greatest extent of the soul and is of an insatiable nature; and the three must be in accord and harmony. It was then a shadow of the real justice which made us lay it down that a mechanic should work at that art with the whole and the best of his powers, and at that art alone for which he is fitted. So a man, generally, must see that each of his three faculties are working according to their proper nature and to their proper end, and if he adjust them harmoniously and combine them into one efficient whole, he will be a just man, and will be practising justice.

' We have now to fix what is injustice—not a difficult task. It is the predominance of the wrong faculty in man's soul, which cannot fail to bring with it disturbance and sedition and trouble. And it follows naturally upon this that justice is profitable and injustice unprofitable.'
BOOK V.

I was then going on to speak of the degenerate forms of the Body Politic, when Polemarchus and Adeimantus interrupted me. They refused to allow me to go on until I had set their minds at rest on the troublesome question of the wives and the children of our guardians. 'Well, then,' I said, 'I cannot help believing that we ought to go on the same principle with respect to our women as we did in the case of our men, in other words, that the women should undergo exactly the same training mental and physical, however much you may laugh at the idea of the wrinkled old women in the gymasia. And I maintain this because there is in my opinion\(^1\) no intrinsic difference between the two natures; only one is weaker than the other, implying a difference of quantity, not of kind. So we must select, as before, those with a prudent mind for our guardian-women, and their chastity\(^2\) will be a protection for those who have to

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\(^1\) Aristotle's opinion was less liberal than Plato's upon this point. He thought, with the general mind of Greece, that the woman and the slave were naturally and originally inferior to man, and did not contemplate the possibility of their having been gradually deteriorated. See Pol. 1, 2. \(\varepsilon \tau i \, \delta \, \tau o \, \dot{\alpha} \rho \rho \varepsilon \tau \, \tau \, \theta \varepsilon \lambda \nu \, \phi \upsilon \sigma \varepsilon \, \tau \, \mu \varepsilon \, \kappa \rho \varepsilon \iota \tau \tau \omicron \tau \, \delta \, \chi e \iota \omicron \nu \, \kappa \alpha \, \tau \, \mu \varepsilon \, \acute{\alpha} \rho \chi \omicron \nu \tau \omicron \nu \, \tau \, \delta \, \dot{\alpha} \rho \chi \omicron \nu \mu \omicron \epsilon \upsilon \nu \omicron \nu \). \(E l \, i \nu \varepsilon \tau \alpha \), \(\sigma \omicron \tau o i \, \mu \varepsilon \, \epsilon \iota \omicron \, \phi \upsilon \sigma \varepsilon i \, \delta \omicron \upsilon \omicron \lambda o i \). And again of women, chap. v. \(i \nu i i \). \(\tau o \, \tau e \, \gamma \dot{a} \rho \, \dot{\alpha} \rho \rho \varepsilon \tau \, \tau o \, \theta \varepsilon \lambda \omicron \sigma \, \eta \gamma e \mu \omicron \omicron \nu \kappa \omega \tau \omicron \nu \)."

\(^2\) \(\varepsilon \pi \epsilon \iota \pi \epsilon \pi \, \dot{\alpha} \rho \varepsilon \, \tau \omicron \, \iota \mu a \iota \iota \omb \, \acute{\alpha} \mu \phi \iota \acute{\iota} \omicron \sigma \omicron \tau a \). Tennyson has the same thought in his Lady Godiva, 'Then she rode forth, clothed on with chastity.'
mingle with the men in daily life. This is the first of those great difficulties which stand in the way of my theory, and made me hesitate to expound it. And the next is a more serious one, viz., that all the wives and all the children should be common, and none should say, "This is my wife," "These are my children." My reason is one which should appeal to you, Glaucon, who are a bird fancier, and take great pains in the selection of your brood-birds and their pairing: you choose, of course, the staunchest and best-conditioned in your yard. Ought not therefore man, who is the noblest animal, to have the greatest care taken of his sexual relations? And the manner in which I should wish it to be managed would be as follows. At certain periods of the year solemn rites and sacrifices should be performed, and marriages should be effected then and there between the finest and strongest men and women. The festival should be looked upon as most holy, and any one disobeying the injunctions of the directing priest should be subject to the severest penalties. And for the ages between which marriages should be effected I place twenty to forty for the women, and thirty to fifty-five for the men. And no illegitimate offspring, or children born at a wrong time, should be brought up, so that all irregularity may be avoided in the matter. These children must be considered as the children of all the fathers, they must call all men who were married before they were born, father, and in the same manner they will speak of all the women as mother, and the children as brother and sister. And I wish to see this community of relationship, because, in such a state of things, each individual will feel, and enjoy or resent, everything that affects the state for good or for ill; just as in a man's body, which is healthy and sound, there is a perfect
sympathy and harmony of all feelings. Minor disputes, too, will be prevented by the fear and regard which relationship inspires in a well educated mind. Such a view of relationship dissipates, I think, your former objections about the hard life we were giving our guardians. For this view shows that a man’s proper part in life is to be first well regulated, and afterwards comfortable; and the latter will follow upon the former.

‘Now these children, so born, and brought up in large State nurseries, will be trained to war from their youth, besides their other studies, and ought by all analogy to go to view battles at an early age, mounted upon swift and docile horses to bring them out of possible harm. And in the battles the warrior who acquits himself best shall receive all the usual rewards of a victor, and shall receive the best wife, whomsoever he chooses, so that he may beget others like himself.

‘In war our soldiers must recollect that they are not barbarians nor brutes; and in fighting against a Greek city they should treat their opponents as belonging to the same family as themselves, and not destroy houses nor burn fruit-trees, but only ravage the crop of the year; whilst against barbarians they will proceed as Greeks now, unhappily, treat Greeks.’

‘You are avoiding all this time, Socrates,’ said Glaucon, ‘the real pith of the matter, viz., the question, Can such a condition of relationship exist in reality?’ ‘Well,’ I said, ‘I was avoiding it, I confess, and I answer, since you press me to a conclusion, Does the unattainability of anything make the representation of it any the worse, if it is the best representation that human skill can effect?’ ‘No,’ he said, ‘certainly not.’ ‘Well, then,’ I replied, ‘I do not say that such a thing has, or can, or will be brought about, but I do say that if we
can, as we have done, picture it to ourselves, we may place it before the eyes of our mind, and work up towards our ideal in hope and faith.

'A third difficulty I have to put before you, and the greatest of all. Until kings are philosophers, and philosophers kings, there is no end to the troubles of a state.¹ Stand by me, Glaucon, or I shall never weather this storm-wave.' 'That will I,' he answered. 'Do you know, then,' said I, 'what it is to be devoted to one subject, such as wine, when a man has a word to say about, and in favour of, all kinds of wine? Or to be very emulous, e.g. when a man will be sub-lieutenant if he cannot be general, rather than not be a commander of some sort; the opposite of the character 'aut Cæsar, aut nullus.' I mean, then, by philosopher, the man who is devoted to the acquisition of knowledge, real knowledge, and not merely inquisitive. The more our citizens approach this temperament, the better the state will be. True knowledge in its perfection and entirety, man cannot attain. But he can attain to a kind of knowledge of realities, if he has any knowledge at all, because he cannot know nonentities. Hence his knowledge is half way between real knowledge and ignorance, and we must call it opinion.² When, then, his opinion about a thing is correct; as far as it goes he is a philosopher and a useful and valuable member of our State.

¹ Sir Thomas More proposes a middle course which he judges would be of more value. 'For where as your Plato judgeth that weale publipes shall by thys meanes atteyne perfect felicitie, eyther if philosophers be kynges, or elles yf kynges geue themselues to the studie of Philosophie, how farre I praye you shall commen wealthes then be frome thys felicitie, yf Philosophers wyll vouche-saufe to enstruct kinges with their good counsell?'

² Compare the definition of courage in Book IV. 429 B. : δύναμις τιμιότητι, ἡ διὰ πάντος σώσει τὴν περὶ τῶν δεινῶν δήξαν.
BOOK VI.

'Ve must next spend some time, not as much as I should wish, upon a study of the philosophic nature. I call a philosopher one who can grasp the continuity and coherent existence of things. So in our selection and education of philosophic natures, we must first be sure that they desire to know things which have a real and continuous existence, not those which are subject to flux and decay. Next, their nature must be truth-loving, lie-abhorrning. Again, they would be devoted to the pleasures of the mind, and have little taste for sensual pleasures; from which it follows that they will not be ardent seekers of money: for they will despise the pleasures which money buys. They must also be magnanimous, with a disregard of death, gentle and just, fond of learning, with good memories.'

'I can say nothing against the method of your conclusion, Socrates,' said Adeimantus; 'but like a good chess-player you lead your man away little by little until these little diversions mount up to an overwhelming total. In this game of words I cannot beat you; but what I have to say is this, that those men whom we see round us studying philosophy continuously, so far from being the best citizens, turn out the most

1 'The eternal and unchangeable.'—Jowett.
inferior, I will not say the worst. How then can these things be which you maintain?'

'I will try and explain myself in a parable, Adeimantus,' I said. 'Picture to yourself a ship, steered by a helmsman, who in size and strength is vastly superior to the rest of the crew, but short-sighted and deaf and not well acquainted with navigation. And suppose that his crew are always struggling and fighting amongst themselves, and trying to get the helm of the ship into their own hands, either by force or fraud. And that they try to drug the helmsman, and gauge the characters of their fellow-sailors entirely by the consideration, whether they are quick at getting the helm out of the helmsman’s hands, or not. Such a position I imagine does the philosopher occupy in an ordinary state as the helmsman in such a ship as I describe. And the persons you describe as utterly worthless, who nevertheless affect philosophy, are like those sailors who without any knowledge or practice of navigation try to gain possession of the helm.

'You recollect the different excellences requisite for a nature which is to become truly philosophic: these requisites are very rarely combined in the same person. And we must further inquire into the depreciation and degeneration of these natures. For the principle, corruptio optimi pessima, is unfortunately too true, and the more abilities a man has the worse he will be without training and principle.'

'It is not individual sophists who first corrupt noble

1 We find the same sentiment insisted upon in the Euthydemus, page 281, D, through a number of instances:—'Εν κεφαλαίῳ δ’, ἣπν, ὡ Κλεινία, κινδυνεῖ σύμπαντα, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐφαμεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι . . . ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῶν ἡγήται ἀμάθα, μείκω κακὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων, ὅσο δυνατώτερα ὑπηρετεῖν ἡγουμένῳ κυκῷ ὑμῖν.
natures, but the applause and the noise and the struggling of the world. In fact, if any young mind were to resist all these influences by its own strength we should be inclined to call it a miracle. For these paid professors are like men who might study the passions and desires of some great brute and know how to humour him, and were to call this study wisdom; having no regard for real wisdom and virtue, but judging everything by the likes and dislikes of the monster. In the same way do these sophists study the tastes and opinions of the vulgar and the many, who from their nature, are incapable of ever knowing realities and unities. So that a young man is sorely let and hindered if he have any tastes for philosophy by the tyrannical action of the world and the sophists; seeing that even if he persist in his natural bent, they will be up in arms against him, straining every nerve to keep out the truth. The result is that those of a noble and philosophic nature are prevented from studying philosophy, whilst inferior and vulgar minds leave their workshops and their trades and go philosophizing; just as if a little baldheaded journeyman were to come into a fortune, get washed and dressed up in fine clothes, and marry his master's daughter. What kind of offspring could be expected from such a union but bastards? and what sort of philosophy can be expected from those vulgar minds we speak of but inferior sophistry and false systems? So those men who would be philosophers, if they could stand against the overwhelming attacks of the world, give up the contest, and content themselves with looking calmly at the worry and bustle, taking care to do their own duty, like a man who stoops down under a wall to let a storm of dust and hail pass over him.

"Now in what sort of a state can a philosopher
have fair play? Not in any that we know of. But we must have a training and an atmosphere for our youths the very reverse of that at present existing. Boys approach philosophy in its most difficult aspect in the intervals of other studies, and soon throw it aside for the rest of their lives; with the exception of a few who continue it quite by the way, and think a good deal of themselves for continuing it at all. But we should have the rudiments of philosophy taught at an earlier age, and we should amplify the training of the mind whilst it is approaching its greatest development. And when bodily strength begins to fail, our citizens should devote all their mental activity to philosophy, treating everything else as of secondary importance. And whether our plan succeed or not, is not the question, as long as we are persuaded that our principle is good; in fact, I do not look for very great opposition from the majority, who, I believe, are usually traduced, and after all are only misled by ranters and pseudo-philosophers. This then is the way towards realising our perfect state; and we must try to make it clear to the majority that men must be philosophic, and the philosophers must rule in the State. Nor will it be impossible for even a single man to bring a whole city into a condition of obedience to this maxim.

'Now we said that the philosopher must be fond of learning and of a keen nature withal, that he must be physically as well as intellectually able; two requisites hard to find united in the same person. What then is he to make his study and his object? The Ideal Good; which is above and greater than even Justice itself. Most men are ignorant as to what is really good: they pursue that which appears to them to be

1 παρεργον.
good. Let us try to seek out the nature of this Ideal Good. The sense of seeing requires a medium through which the object of sight is seen, I mean light. And light is generated from the sun. The sight is not the sun, nor is the sun sight, but the one exists by means of the other, and beholds it. Conceive then the Ideal Good as standing in the same relation to the mind and the objects of thought, as the sun stands to the sight and the objects of sight. And as the shining of the sun enables our eyes to see things clearly before us, so that which brings truth and reality illumines the mind and gives rise to actual thought, and perception of the Truth and Reality themselves. They are not the Ideal Good, but partake of its form and its nature. And as the sun is the author of life and growth, although not itself life and growth, so the Ideal Good is the author of real knowledge and real existence, yet superior even to existence itself.

'And to make quite clear the relation between the different grades of knowledge and reality, imagine a line divided into two parts, and again another line divided into two parts, in the same ratio as the other. Let the first line represent the mental sphere, and the second line the sensual. The first section of the first line represents pure thought and its objects, viz. real existences; and the second part represents thought which does not contemplate real existences, but copies of them as nearly as possible like the originals. Take, for instance, those squares and circles and triangles about which mathematicians reason, which are not

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1 Cf. 'He was not that light, but was sent to bear witness of that light.'—St. John i., where this same illustration of light is carried out at length.

2 idéai.
really exact squares and circles, but copies of the real, and useful for practical purposes. The whole line thus divided represents the sphere of thought and knowledge. The first division of the second line, that is of the visible and sensual sphere, is occupied by that faculty which apprehends objects as presented to us in this world of ours. And that faculty is belief.\(^1\) The second represents the sphere of the unreal, the class of copies of the real, like shadows, reflections on the water and so forth. And these are the four grades, in descending order from the really existent.'\(^2\)

\(^1\) πίστις.

\(^2\) Plato’s geometrical arrangement may be given thus:—

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
A & C & B \\
\hline
\hline
\end{array}
\]

\[
AB = Ενιστήμη, \text{ and its objects, νοητá.}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{which includes} \\
&\begin{cases}
AC = Νούς, & \text{real existences (ιδέαι).} \\
CB = Διάνοια & \text{conceptions (ειδη).}
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
DE = Δύξα, & \text{and its objects, things perceptible (αισθητά).}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{which includes} \\
&\begin{cases}
DF = Πίστις, & \text{natural objects.} \\
FE = Εικασία, & \text{copies and shadows.}
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]
BOOK VII.

'Now picture to yourself,' I said, 'an underground cavern with a long exit to the upper air; and imagine that you see a number of people who ever since they were born have been chained neck and foot, so that they have always sat in the same position with their faces towards the inner wall of the cavern. Behind them, a long way off and above, a large bright fire is kindled, and between the fire and the prisoners runs a road, along which pass continually men carrying different objects; and between the road and the prisoners is a low wall, over which the fire casts their shadows on to the wall of the cavern facing which the prisoners sit. Will not these prisoners, if they can talk to each other, give names to the objects they see in the reflection on the wall? And will they not attribute the voices, if the men speak, to the different shadows?' 'Certainly,' he said. 'So that,' I continued, 'these shadows and echoes of the realities will be taken by the prisoners for realities themselves.

'Next suppose that one of these prisoners is released from his chains and dragged up to the light of day by a rough and difficult path. Surely he will find everything hard to perceive, and will believe the shadows, with which he is better acquainted, to be the realities, and will be blinded by the light, and will hate the man
who dragged him up into it; and, if he is gradually educated and taught to understand and behold realities, he will first and most easily behold images in the water, reflections, and other things not far removed in their nature from his shadows: he will see better by night than by day.

'If he ever become completely enlightened he will think himself fortunate in having escaped his dungeon, and he will pity his former fellow-prisoners, and will despise any good things he may have enjoyed there as worth nothing in comparison with what he now enjoys. Again, were he to revisit the cave, he would find his eyes unaccustomed to its darkness, and would be looked upon as good for nothing, even if, before, he had been the quickest and the cleverest at perceiving the various shadows. Nay, if he tried to persuade the captives to come up and be enlightened, they would ill-treat him and perhaps kill him.

'Transferring all this image to the actual world, I liken men who have gone into the upper air and contemplated the realities, of which the captives only see the shadows, I liken them to men who have made an approach to the Ideal Good. Thus, following out the parable, when such men are called back to the world from that contemplation, it is small wonder if they fail, and are jeered, and worsted, in the pettifogging affairs of ordinary life. A wise man, then, will recollect that there are two ways of making a mistake; as we might say according to our parable, either from having too much light in the eye or too little. And, in accordance with this view of thought and life, I do not agree with those who talk about "putting" knowledge into people; as if it were not there already, and only needed a proper training and a
proper atmosphere to draw it out. Other powers of the
soul may have been acquired and may seem to have
their nature akin to the bodily powers, but the power
of comprehension seems to have something of a divine
and original nature which it never loses, however much
it may be dulled.

"Therefore our education must make our chosen citizens
move towards the contemplation of the Ideal Good and
the Really Existent; and,\textsuperscript{1} remembering that they are
for the people and not the people for them, they must
be content to go amongst them and lead them towards
that light and knowledge which they themselves have
acquired.

"And for this education, or drawing round of the mind
towards light and knowledge, our former methods of
gymnastic and music will not suffice. Let us take some
general science, such as arithmetic or calculation, and
see if they must be experts in it. First let me premise
that all objects of perception and thought are either
excitative or non-excitative, \textit{i.e.} either they suggest
something else, or they do not. For instance, finger.
That does not suggest any other fact. But first finger,
or long finger, suggest respectively second finger, short
finger, and so on. The perception therefore of length,
or priority, is the same as that of shortness, or duality;
and is, as we might say, a double sense. But the
actual vision only sees one object, and may therefore be
called a single sense. Now the science of number is
essentially excitative: we are continually seeing objects
which the sight takes in as one and the same, whilst
the mind teaches us to look upon them as one and

\textsuperscript{1} v. 8. Book IV. \textit{ivii.} οὐ μὴν πρὸς τὸ ὄρος βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν
οὐκ ἔχομεν, ὡσπερ ἐν τι ἡμῖν ἔθνος ἔσται διαφερόντως εἴθαιμον, ἀλλ
ὡσ παν τι μάλιστα ὅλη ἢ πόλις.
as many at the same time. Therefore the science of number, being excitative of thought, appears to be necessary for our further developed education. And they will not treat the science in a trafficking way, but will investigate the properties of pure number.

"Our citizens will find this science of great use also in warfare; geometry too will be good for the same purpose, which they must study, if we find that it also conduces to the knowledge of the Ideal Good and real existence. Now the objection that geometry is only useful when applied practically is absurd; for then it is knowledge applied to things that come and go, that are made and perish. Whilst our study of geometry will be primarily directed to the knowledge of that which is eternal and not perishable. Therefore let us teach our citizens geometry. After geometry shall we take astronomy, i.e. solids in motion? Or ought we not rather to pass to solids first, i.e. bodies of cubic content? The fact is that the science of three dimensions is so little understood and practised that we must say we will have it taught if our city will; and so we pass on to astronomy. By astronomy I do not mean lying on your back and staring upwards to the heavens, or lying on your face and staring downwards. I understand that science which teaches us about real existence in the study of the heavenly bodies, and draws the intelligence upwards in an intellectual, not a physical, sense. The student of philosophy will study the motions of stars, sun, and moon, the flight of seasons and years, as they point to a unity and a coherent design of a perfect Creator.

"Should we not seek for some science which stands to our hearing in the same relation as astronomy to seeing? I mean the science of harmony; not the practice of
worrying and torturing musical instruments, twisting the head on one side, dragging unwilling notes from more unwilling strings, and disputing about demi-semi-
tones. But that there is a science of harmony worth studying for our citizens I am sure.

‘All these sciences form but the preface and prelude to the business of life for our citizens. And this is a law, viz. that they shall be able to comprehend an account, and give an account of all that they ought to know. And Dialectic is the master science which effects this, and gives the mind the power to free itself from everything sensual, and move straight on through argument to the actual nature of things and to the Ideal Good. All the other studies and arts we have mentioned before merely correspond to the process of accustoming the released prisoner’s eyes to the sight of shadows and reflections. Even those sciences we have just now mentioned as indispensable to the education of our citizens have been treated in an inadequate manner, and not so as to conduce towards the knowledge of real existence. For men have been unable to give a rational account of them and have ignored their first principles. Dialectic, on the contrary, moves upwards towards first principles of science, directing the eye of the soul to the source of true knowledge; and uses these arts, which we have called sciences in deference to custom, as props and helps in its progress. It is in fact the coping stone and perfection of all studies.

‘Now we must be very careful in the choice of those who are to enter upon this highest course of study. We must be sure that they have a congenial nature and will take pains and pleasure in the subject. For intellectual labour which is found only compulsory, and brings no pleasure to the student, is worth nothing.
They must begin from boyhood to study arithmetic and geometry, but compulsion must be avoided; rather let each mind develop itself in its congenial channel; for in this way we can best judge in what direction we are to employ them. And the quickest in work of all kinds and on critical occasions are to be selected for the higher education; when the gymnastic period, of two or three years, is over. And then we shall distinguish these above their fellows, and begin to teach them the general connection between the different lines of study, and their general bearing upon real knowledge and real existence. At thirty years of age we shall again make a selection from these students, and advance the best to further honours. But we must beware of the free-thinking which dialectic brings with it, and try to prevent the former landmarks from being swept away. Put the case in a parable thus: A child is brought up from his infancy with parents whom he is taught to love and respect, as being his own, when they are not really so; and he is also surrounded with flatterers. If he discover his true relationship, or rather non-relationship, he will lose his respect and love for his supposed parents and pay more attention to his flatterers. So are we brought up to believe this and that honourable and just, until the age of scepticism, i.e. inquiry, comes and asks "What is the just?" "What is honourable?" And then, with the exception of strong and noble minds, men fall back upon the pleasures which have played the part of the flatterer, and fail in their allegiance to justice and honour. To prevent this from being the case in our city, the study of dialectic and the inquiry into the real nature of things will be consummated only late in life; in fact the youths will not be allowed to approach it at all,
except by the study of the preliminary sciences. Let there therefore place five years, or about twice the number of those given up to gymnastic, as the proper time to be allotted for the study of dialectic. After this period they must return to the cave and take their place as instructors in war and other business for, say, fifteen years.

'And when they have earned their discharge from the duty of assisting their fellow-citizens in the routine of life, they may at last be admitted to the end and aim of their training, the contemplation of absolute existence, and the pure study of actual knowledge; allowing a short time, turn by turn, for the performance of political duties. And when they die they will go to the islands of the Blest, and will leave an honourable memory of their life and services in the city. All this is not impossible, but it is hard to compass; and our means of facing the difficulty will be to ignore the present generation, and apply ourselves to those who are young enough to receive new ethical impressions.
BOOK VIII.

'We have now composed our State, and its different grades of citizens have been discussed, and we have agreed that everything in it which relates to men applies equally to women. But we have been diverging from the original question in these last discussions.' 'Yes,' said Glaucon, 'you were going to speak of the different modes in which the actual city of the present day is a degeneration from our ideal city. And you said that there were four kinds. What are these?' 'First,' I said, 'there is the Cretan or Laconian, which has the highest reputation, then oligarchy, a state full of evils, next democracy, and lastly that fine régime they call a despotism.¹ Let us then, with these five kinds of States before us, investigate the characters which severally correspond to them.

'We can omit the just and noble man, who corresponds to our Ideal State, for he has been fully discussed already. Next to him comes the ambitious and emulous man, corresponding to the Cretan State. And then we might pass in review the other characters, corresponding to the other three States, so that when we have studied injustice in its fullest development we may compare it with justice, and make up our minds whether to believe Thrasymachus or not. And following our former method

¹ τύπαντος.
we had better first study the several States which correspond to these men, so gaining a clearer understanding of the men themselves.

'Change in a State arises from dissension in the governing part: where the governing part is unanimous no disturbance is possible. But the origin of the disturbance will lie in a disregard of the proper season of reproduction. This season should properly depend upon a fixed number calculated to an exact result; and if this number be calculated wrongly there will be irregularity in the birth of our children. And this irregularity will show itself as the children grow up and are appointed by selection to posts of difficulty and danger. For they will fail to retain the proper opinion about musical study, about crises, and about moderation, and, according to our fiction, the gold will have become alloyed with silver, bronze, and iron. The inferior part will draw their minds to base gain, while the superior continues to draw them upward towards the proper object of life. Hence they will begin to strive with each other, to appropriate land and houses to their private use, and to enslave those whom they ought to protect against slavery. And such a State lies midway between aristocracy and oligarchy. But there will still be respect for government, the defending portion will

1 Aristotle, Pol. v. 10, objects to this statement, on the ground that time changes all things. He also objects that this disregard of proper seasons is not peculiar to the dissolution of the 'Aριστη πολιτεία. And thirdly, he states that the progress of degeneration does not pass regularly through these five stages, but that often a monarchy will change at once to a democracy, or an oligarchy to a despotism. And another objection is that Plato does not tell us what happens after the despotism. And lastly, that although the forms of oligarchy and democracy are diverse, Socrates treats them as one.
still abstain from other business, and there will be meals
in common. Yet there will be a reluctance to appoint
the cleverest to govern, because the clever will now
have become unprincipled, and men will lean towards
the spirited and pugnacious to be their leaders. Greed
of gain and of private fortune will spring up, conceal-
ment, and eluding of the law, and greater honour will
be paid to gymnastic than to music. Next, the man
who corresponds to such a state as this.' 'He will be
something like Glaucon,' said Adeimantus, 'if he is
emulous.' 'Perhaps he will,' I said; 'he will also sink
a little below the intellectual standard, but will be fond
of study, obedient, no orator, rough to slaves, gentle to
his peers, and very fond of rule, of praise, of gymnastic,
and of hunting; and as he grew up a love of money
would develop in him. Such is our timocratic youth.
And such men as he is arise in the following way: when
a man, nobly born, retires into private life disgusted
with the bad state of politics, and pays no attention to
the pomps and vanities of the world. Then his wife,
finding that she is nobody, as her husband holds no
public office, and pays little attention to her for good or
for ill, grows discontented. And the servants say to
the sons of the family, "When you grow up you can
pay off this man, or you can do all that your father
neglects to do." Such a youth, and one born of such a
father, will find himself dragged in different direc-
tions by the two inclinations—the philosophical, inherited
from his father, prompting him to peace and retirement,
and the concupiscent, on the other hand, and the spirited,
leading him into politics and a life of action; from
which conflicting motives he will finally become am-
bitious, emulous, and high-minded.

'Next after the timocratic or ambitious city will come
the oligarchy. The cause of degeneration here is the "auri sacra fames" in the citizens and their wives. For riches and virtue are like the opposite pans of a balance: as one goes up the other goes down. So our citizens, instead of being praise-loving or virtue-loving, will become money-loving. The rich will monopolise all government and honours, of whatever character they themselves may be, poor men will be ill-treated, and there will be two cities in one, a sure sign of dissolution. In war, for instance, this disunion will appear in the reluctance of the rich to put arms in the hands of the poor, for fear the poor should turn upon them. And tradesmen and farmers will sell their plant, which others will acquire who have no business with it, and thus a useless rabble will be turned loose upon the city, with nothing to do except raise sedition. If you see drones in a hive, you know that there are some bees with stings as well as those without; and in the same way in a city where you see beggars, there are sure to be thieves and cut-purses, sacrilegious and abandoned people. Now in an oligarchical city the beggars are numberless, and by analogy we should expect to find thieves and robbers there also. Next, to speak of the man corresponding to this State. His father has met with the worst misfortune of all kinds in public life; he has been general in a war, has failed, been impeached, fined, imprisoned, banished, or what not. And these misfortunes have quite driven all love of honour and all spirit out of the son's head, who applies himself sedulously to scrape money together. In his soul the concupiscent and covetous element is the honoured and unquestioned lord. He will satisfy those desires which we call necessary, but will not spend his money on the others, for them he will keep in subjection. He has no
culture, and therefore all those drone-like vices are incipient in him, even if repressed; he would defraud a ward, for instance, and take any other opportunity of doing evil with impunity. He would have two natures, therefore, within him, and on the whole the better powers would be masters of the inferior, although not through any virtuous principle, but merely because such a man shuns indulgence as expensive.

'After this comes Democracy. And the change from Oligarchy arises through an excess of present advantage, I mean the accumulation of wealth in a few hands. For we have those stinged creatures, the men burdened with debts, and smarting under disgrace and political disabilities, ready to fall upon the rich class, and anxious for revolution. And the rich money-making, money-lending class increase the liabilities of their victims, stinging with their usury and filling the city with drones, i.e. beggars. There is no check on this malady, no law to prevent a man from converting his goods and his means into ready money; whilst the rulers make all they can out of the ruled, and bring up their own families in luxury. When these two classes meet, on the road, in war, at public games, on board ship, the poor man learns that it is not an unmixed advantage after all to be rich; he sees the rich man fat and unwieldy, whilst he himself is wiry and agile; and he consequently despises him as good for nothing. And a very slight occasion will serve to bring these two opposing elements into actual war. Then the poor conquer, and make a re-distribution of property, and a democracy is formed. How, then, will such a State fare? First there will be free license for every man to acquire what he likes and to live as he likes; and the State will be a wonderfully variegated production, such as some
people, women and children, for instance, especially admire. It is the city of all men, for every one can suit his own taste if he come here; a man can do just what he pleases. If you wish to go to war, your neighbour is not bound to agree with you; if you are prevented from this or that by law, you can set the law aside. Democracy, in fact, means anarchy.

The democratic man is the son of the oligarchic man, whom we have already described as money-making. The son will follow his father in keeping down those desires which are not imperative. By imperative or necessary desires I mean those of which we cannot be rid, which benefit us by being satisfied, such as the desire of eating, whilst those which do us no good and can be repressed by means of training I call unnecessary, of which we may mention a fondness of delicate food for an example. The change from the oligarchic to the democratic nature is as follows: the son was brought up in a frugal manner on the honey which the father accumulated, and afterwards makes the acquaintance of 

gay and brilliant sparks who have carried the science of pleasure to a wonderful perfection. Then there arises in him a sedition, between the careful oligarchic temper and the pleasure-seeking and prodigal; and sometimes the former is in the ascendant, sometimes the latter. And if certain desires are driven out their place is soon filled up by others, perhaps worse, because in such a man there is nothing, such as intellectual tastes, to fill the void. So the citadel of his soul is won by base pleasures and wrong opinions. These base pursuits drive away honour, and temperance, and propriety, and flaunt anarchy, incontinency, and pride, in their stead. And the man who has thus lost the right opinion treats

\(^1\) αἰθωσι ἀσολ ὁκ δεινοὶ, carrying on the metaphor.
all pleasures alike, and indulges them indiscriminately. First he spends his time in drinking and playing, then he veers round and drinks nothing but water; sometimes he practises gymnastics and next does nothing at all; again he becomes a politician and jumps up to say the first thing that comes into his head; he is

'Everything by starts, and nothing long.'

If he sees another engaged in making money, he will make money; if another is going to the war, he will go too. In short his life and his tastes are universal.

The finest State of all and the finest man now remain, I mean the despotism and the despot. As excess of wealth turned oligarchy into democracy, so excess of liberty turns democracy into despotism. For men, such as we have described in a democratic city, intimidate the rulers and make them do as they wish, and not follow the law strictly: they uphold servile rulers and decry just ones. All relations are disturbed and reversed, sons usurp their father's prerogatives, and fathers are afraid of their sons. Strangers usurp the place of the citizens, masters fawn upon their pupils, and pupils have no regard for their masters. Elders throw aside their grave and serious bearing, and ape the lightness and flippancy of youth, and slaves are as free as their purchasers: whilst the very animals are imbued with this spirit of ultra-freedom and strut about pushing people off the pathways. So free must every one be that they disregard all law, and will call no one master.

On the principle, then, of reaction, this ultra-freedom

1 Cf. Ar. Nub. 1331, 1332:—

ΣΤ. τὸν πάτερα τύπτεις;
ΦΕ. κάποιον ὡς νῦν θανάτου ὡς ἐν δίκη σ' ἐστυπτον.
will result in an ultra-slavery, somewhat in the same way that we establish the principle *corruptio optimi pessima*; although it must be remembered that this surfeit of freedom is not "the best," for it is possible to have too much of a good thing.\footnote{Cf. *Euthydemus*, xxv. where the sophist is trying to make Ctesippus advance the contrary proposition; ἐπείδη γὰρ ὁμολόγεις ἄγαθον εἶναι φάρμακον, ὅταν δὲν, πίνειν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἄλλο τι τούτο τὸ ἄγαθον ὡς πλεῖστον δεῖ πίνειν, et seqq.} The change will begin in the persons of those men whom we likened to the drones of the hives, some of them having stings and others stingless, in the oligarchic State; but in the democratic this class will be much stronger. So the strongest of these drones will do all the speaking and working in politics, and the inferior drones will buzz about the tribune and prevent any one from being heard in opposition, except a very few. Then there are the rich on which the drones subsist, and a third class, viz. the mechanics and journeymen, who are always ready to combine if they see an opportunity of plunder. And if the rich try to defend themselves they are called bad citizens and oligarchical, a false accusation which makes them really become so. And the people set up a champion in opposition to them, who is the germ of the despot. And such a man is like to him who once tastes human blood, as in the story of Zeus Lyceus in Arcadia, and must become a wolf. For if he once become involved in prosecutions and judicial murder, he will go on from bad to worse, banishing, killing, proclaiming abolition of debt and redistribution of land. Then he is perhaps expelled and re-installed by force, and his hand is against all who helped to drive him out. The next step is that he is obliged to ask the people to give him a body-guard, and when he has obtained this,
the despotism stands forth complete. And the people do not say of their champion, "How are the mighty fallen!" but the champion is now a full-blown despot.

'At first he is mild and gentle, and his measures are all in the direction of lightening the people's burdens, but as he goes on he finds it necessary to stir up war so that he may keep up his character of champion, and impoverish the people by war-taxes to prevent their rising against him. And if any of his friends speak out his mind against these practices he will have to remove him, and so he will become the enemy of any magnanimous, prudent, or wealthy man. And as physicians remove all the evils of the body and encourage the development of what is good, the tyrant will remove all the good and leave the evil. He will defend himself with foreign mercenaries and with freed men. Hence we may see the mistake of Euripides and of poets in general who commend despotisms and democracies, and encourage people towards them, although they naturally are well rewarded for their encomiums by those whom they panegyrise. The despot will plunder sacred treasure, confiscate the property of those whom he has exiled, and spend his own inheritance in riotous living with male and female companions. And the people that has begotten the despot will have to keep him, and it will be of no use to them to say that it is not right for a child when he grows up to be a burden to his father, and that they did not help him forward as their champion that he might collect a pack of idle knaves about him, who devour the citizen's substance. Nay, he will strike his father and treat him as a son should not; and the people trying to escape out of the frying-pan of slavery will fall into the fire
of despotism, which is after all the worst kind of slavery. This, then, is the change from democracy to tyranny.\footnote{With this simile of the son illtreating the father, may be compared a considerable part of the \textit{Clouds} of Aristophanes, v. II. 1321, \textit{seqq.} In Xenophon, \textit{Mem}. 1, 2, 49, the charge is noticed against Socrates, as in the passage referred to in the \textit{Clouds}, that he encouraged the very vices which he condemns here and in Book II. page 378 B.}
BOOK IX.

'We now come to speak of the despot himself and how he arises. But first I should wish to define more exactly the differences of pleasure. Some of those pleasures which I called unnecessary appear to be distinctly criminal: the desire of them arises very frequently in sleep, when the rational faculty is dormant, and we imagine ourselves doing the worst actions without compunction. Now the more temperate a man's actions are when waking, the more rational will be his dreams. The democratic man, if you remember, was he who had deserted the parsimony of his oligarchic father, and on making acquaintance with dissipated men, and lived a life midway between luxury and miserliness. The son of this democratic man will be brought up between two opposing forces; viz. the advice of his father and of a part of the household, to live a moderate life, and the incitements of others of the household who draw him on to all kinds of pleasures and expenses. If these triumph in the city of his soul, they are like the drone's sting, they kill any honourable and temperate inclinations that may yet survive, and they fill the soul with madness and license. Thence come feastings, revellings, and dissipations of all sorts, which drain his income; and to supply funds for their continuance there
must be loans and embezzlement, and defrauding of his family, perhaps with violence, and his old and dear parents will perhaps be thrown aside and ill treated and disregarded, in the interest of some acquaintance of an hour. And from such crimes it is but a short step to robbery and sacrilege. If there are but a few of such men in a city, they commit crimes of various gravity, and perhaps they become informers; and take and give bribes; but they are a mere trifle compared with the régime of a despot. For he is generated by an excessive number of such men in a city; who put forward the most despotically-minded of them all, and he grinds down his father-city, or, as the Cretan phrase goes, his mother-city under, and by means of his young companions. Such a man is never on terms of friendship and equality with any one, he either flatters and fawns, or else he bullies: he has no honour or magnanimity, he is full of injustice, he is unreliable, and the longer he lives the worse he becomes. So the despot will become a most unhappy man, and will be exactly opposed to the monarch, and the monarchical state will be the best. Therefore let us glance also at the rest of the despotical State, to gain a clear and true notion of the whole growth of a despotism, and specially at the inner and unvarnished life of the despot himself.

To speak of the State first: all that is best in it will lie in the most abject slavery, and similarly in the man's soul, his noblest nature will be in slavery to his worst. And as the despot is a spendthrift and a lustful man, the soul of the despotical man will be continually poverty-stricken and continually craving. Is he not then the most wretched of all men? No. It is the despot himself, the despotical man who comes forward
and lives a public life, who is the most wretched.\(^1\) Let us consider the life of those private individuals who have the greatest external resemblance to the tyrant, viz. those who possess many slaves. Now of these slaves they have no fear, why? Because the whole city is full of free men like themselves, and the union of them all is strength. But imagine a single free man with his whole family and household suddenly transported to a desert place,—where would his safety be? Would he not be obliged to fawn upon his slaves, to free them, to give them all they asked for? Or put a case of this sort. Imagine a man surrounded on all sides by neighbours who would not brook the slightest injury to any of their number, but would inflict the greatest penalties on him if he attempted to harm them. Such a life does the despotical man lead, and in such intimidation does he live, fearing even to show himself outside his house, and living more like a woman than a free man. But his worst lot is to come forward in public, for then he is like a man with an unsound body which is compelled to fight and strive with other bodies, although most unfit for the task. The despot will be of all men most hateful, wicked, odious, friendless, impious, and will make others as bad as himself. And the different kinds of men will follow in this order of descent, beginning from the monarchical; the timocratic, oligarchic, the democratic and despotical.

'Let us try and gain the same result by a different method; and let us recollect the triple division of the

\(^1\) Socrates is careful to insist upon the difference between the despot and the despotical man. Glaucon is deceived by Socrates' proposal in 557 B. κελεύομεν ἐξαγγέλλειν, τῶς ἔχει εὔδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὁ τυράννος. But, to discover the condition of the τυράννος, Socrates will pass first through a description of the condition of the τυραννικός ἴδιότης.
soul, into rational, spirited and concupiscent. The last may be renamed and called the money-loving element, because money is the means by which the sensual pleasures are gratified, and the second we may call the praise-loving or strife-loving element, and the first the knowledge-loving. Now each man in whom one of these elements predominates will praise the pleasures proper to that element, and despise those of the other two. Which then are we to believe? Surely the man who has the most experience, good sense, and logic. And the knowledge-loving man will have more experience than the other two, for he has, or may have, tried the pleasures which they commend, and found them wanting, before he went on to the pleasure of studying truth and real existence. He will also be a more sensible man, and have greater command of logic, for logic is the science of gaining knowledge. On all points, then, the knowledge-loving man is the best judge of what pleasure really is: next, he who loves praise, and lastly he who loves money.

'The just man has thus thrown the unjust man twice.' Let us try a third method. You know that people when they are in pain look back upon their past condition of painlessness with a feeling that it was pleasure compared with their present condition of pain. And when, after pleasure, there comes a cessation from pleasure, people imagine the absence of pleasure to be pain. In fact there is a middle state, neither pleasure nor pain, and the pleasure or pain of this middle state is only apparent,

1 See again, Ar. Clouds, II. 889, seqq. where the Just and Unjust cause contend, the latter being victorious.

2 Imitated by Sir Thomas More, Utopia, p. 114, ed. Arber. 'For thys (viz. the quiete and upryghte state of the body), yf it be not letted nor assaulted with no greif, is delectable of itself, though it be mowed with no externall or outwarde pleasure.'
not real. But there are real pleasures, which arise out of no cessation from pain, e.g. the pleasures of smell, which leave no feeling of pain upon their removal. Real pleasure and real pain are not the absence of pain and pleasure respectively, which form most of those states called bodily pleasures, pleasures of anticipation, and so forth. We may parallel this fact by picturing to ourselves something below and something above a fixed point midway between the two. The mid-point seems to be the upper point to the lowest, and the lower point to the upper: whereas it is really midway. And if you put gray beside white it looks black, or if you put it beside black it looks white. Now hunger, thirst, and feelings of this sort, are a sort of emptiness of the body, which their satisfaction fills up, and if you grant that the satisfaction of a void in knowledge and right opinion is more true and real than the satisfaction of a void in man's stomach (inasmuch as knowledge and right opinion partake more of the nature of real existence than the life of the body) it will follow that the pleasure experienced in the satisfaction or filling up of ignorance with knowledge will be a more real thing than that experienced in gratifying bodily desires and emptinesses. Those men, therefore, who know neither virtue nor good sense, wander all their lives about this middle or colourless region, experiencing no true pleasure, and they live the life of brutes, in endless gorging, indulgence, and strife. And their loves, and hates, and wars will all be concerned with shadows, as Stesichorus sings of the image of Helen, about which the Greeks fought at Troy.

'Passing on to analyse the praise-loving or ambitious nature can we not account for it on the same principle? Is there not a void in the soul which is filled and
satisfied, according to the man’s nature, by honours and victory and the exercise of spirit? Now in so far as any of the money-loving or praise-loving desires follow science and reason, they obtain true pleasure: what then shall we say of the knowledge-loving part, which makes science and reason its only pursuits? Therefore in man’s soul, as long as each part pursues its own pleasures, and as long as the proper relation is preserved between the three parts, and we do not have one interfering with another, the man’s life will be harmonious and happy. So the despot, since the worst and most unreal form of pleasure is master within his soul, will live most unhappily, and the kingly man, who gives the pursuit of true pleasure the first place, will live the happiest life possible. Let us try to estimate the gulf between them. The despot is three times removed from the oligarchical man, and the oligarchic man also three times from the kingly man. Hence the despot is thrice three times removed from the kingly or aristocratic man, and from true pleasure and happiness. So, to put it arithmetically, and taking six powers of three, we find that the kingly man is seven hundred and twenty-nine times as happy as the despot.

‘Let me ask you now to exercise your imagination once more, thus: A being is composed of three parts, the first, of a sort of hydra, having the heads of all kinds of beasts, wild and tame; the second, a lion; the third, a man. All these different parts are grown together, so that they make one creature. But around them all and including them all there is the external appearance of a man. Now suppose that this man allows the brutal and bestial natures within him to have the upper hand of the human nature, and to quarrel, and to do exactly as the passing mood bids them, whilst the
human part is starved and reduced. Surely one who praises injustice would say that such would be the proper life for this creature to lead: whilst a man who loves justice would advise that the tame parts of the hydra be developed and the wild ones suppressed; that the leonine nature be won over to ally itself with the human, and harmony be attained in the whole body of the creature. In such an image as this we might express the history of man’s composite nature. When a man commits a crime for the sake of money or does any evil act voluntarily, he is letting loose the bestial nature within him, and when he is cruel and desperate he gives the leonine part of his soul undue prominence. Or again, when he turns fawner and flatterer, he is trying to turn the noble lion within him to an ape. Therefore rule is salutary—the rule of the better; for the better rules for the good of the whole polity. That is the reason of our governing children, and not permitting them to think for themselves, till they by careful training come to years of discretion, because they do not when young understand the superiority of the rational or the inferiority of the sensual. He then that forgets not to keep his inferior nature in subordination to his superior, will gain temperance and justice and sense: he will give honour to study as the means of acquiring this temperament, he will not even make good health and strength his object, if it be incompatible with temperance; nor honours, unless he think that he will be the better for them. ‘’Tis an ideal,’ said Glaucon. ‘Ah!’ I said, ‘it is an ideal, but one to which he would be always looking.’

1 v.s. 472 and 473, e.g. ἐὰν οἷοι τε γενώμεθα εὔοεΐν ὡς ἀν ἐγγ’ τατα τῶν εἰρημένων πόλεις οἰκίσσειν, φάναι ἡμᾶς ἐξευρηκέναι ὡς δυνάτα ταῦτα γενέσθαι, & σὺ ἐπιτάττεσ.
I should wish to say a few more words on the subject of poetry and imitation,—in short, to reject that poetry which partakes of the imitative. When a man makes a bed, or a table, he makes it with regard to a pattern or example. He does not make the pattern, he uses the pattern to guide him. And any man can, in a sense, make everything; for instance if you reflect anything in a mirror, you make it, so to speak, and a painter, when he paints, makes objects in another sense. Now in the case of a bed the pattern is really the original and most really existent bed; for that which the carpenter makes is only this bed or that, and not the universal bed. Hence there are three beds; first, the pattern and original of all, second, the physical specimen, made by the craftsman, thirdly, the copy of this latter, made by the painter. And notice that God, who is the maker of the original, has made it one and universal, whilst the others are indefinite in number.

It is just so with poetry and poetry writers; they are imitators three times removed from the original maker. And consider the question thus also. When you look at a bed from different points, it seems different, but it is really the same. Now painting, and imitative art generally, represent things as they appear, not as they

1 ἴδεα.
are. Now the question arises, are we justified in giving Homer the reputation he enjoys at present in our State, the reputation of knowing all those things about which he sings? for if he and the other poets do not, they are deceivers of those whom they instruct. Surely, if they were well acquainted with those works and objects about which they sing, they would apply their energies to those works themselves and to those objects themselves, in order to leave behind them a substantial and enduring record of their labours.¹ So when the poet speaks about medicine we shall inquire if he ever healed any sick persons, or else ask what right he has to speak on the subject. Has he made any laws, as Lycurgus, given any city a constitution, as Solon, invented anything, as Thales and Anacharsis? No! Then perhaps he was useful during his lifetime in private life; laid down ethical rules, as Pythagoras did, which have formed the law of a sect. Not even this! Both Homer and Hesiod then could hardly have been able to teach men how to be virtuous, or they would never have been allowed to travel about singing their songs with a scanty remuneration. They would have been treated, on the contrary, like Protagoras of Abdera² and Prodicus of Ceos, who gained such a hold over those whom they taught, that their pupils never thought of doing the smallest thing without consulting them. Homer therefore, and all the poets, are the imitators not of virtue but of the shadows of virtue. And the painters are the same; for they do

¹ It is curious that Plato should have been so carried away by the favourite antithesis of λόγοι and ἔργα, as not to recognise in writings a more enduring work than the results of physical labour; especially with the writings of Homer and their influence before his eyes.

² For these two sophists v. the dialogue which bears Protagoras' name, 310 A.—316.
not consult with the maker of the things which they imitate, as they ought to do, if they wish to gain a good idea of it, before putting it on the canvas. Now it is granted that this sort of imitation is concerned with things three times removed from reality: things like shadows and reflections which seem different from what they really are, and are perceived by the most superficial of the senses; whilst the rational faculty discovers the true nature of things. Imitation then in painting is far removed from truth and reason, and consequently can be the originator of nothing sound and useful in us.

‘Next the imitation of poetry. Poetry represents action, intentional or unintentional, and the consequences of action: it represents men under the influence of complex and distracting thought. Now we know that when a man gives way to violent excitement, he does so under the influence of his sensual nature; \(^1\) when he resists it, he is moved by the law of reason. \(^2\) And the more a man resists the effects of excitement the more temperate and the better he becomes. What good and temperate man then will care to imitate, especially in the publicity of a theatre, the abandonment of self-restraint, as expressed in the writings of the poets? Will not any wise man think that it is hard enough to keep a check upon his own passions without imitating other people’s passions as well, and thereby bringing the mind into a relaxed and excitable condition? \(^3\)

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1 Πάθος.
2 Λόγος καὶ νόμος.
3 With this view of theatrical and poetical works should be compared Aristotle’s view in *Poetics* 5, 20. He justifies the exciting properties of tragedy as being a purgative: δὴ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.
Notably in the case of pity and fear the wise man will refrain from exciting himself by studying or representing the excitement of others. And he will shun excessive indulgence in laughter for fear of becoming flippant; and generally avoid the fiercer lusts of the flesh. Homer then as a hymn-writer and panegyrist shall be welcome in our State, but otherwise we will have nothing to say to him, although we may allow him to be the best poet and the first tragedian. And before any poet can be admitted he must make a defence of poetry in prose, to prove that it is selutary.

‘After all we have not yet spoken of all the rewards of virtue. It would be an endless task,’ he said. ‘And why should not our task be endless,’ I said, ‘in the case of an immortal being?’ ‘What do you mean?’ he said. ‘I mean,’ said I, ‘that our soul is immortal, and I will try to prove it. Every existing thing is liable to corruption, the body has its sicknesses and diseases, plants have their blight, metals rust, and all things go from better to worse. It is some evil which destroys, not a good, nor even a neutral; whilst the good preserves each thing of which it is a good. Injustice, ignorance, intemperance are the corrupters of the soul, just as disease corrupts the body. Bad food and poison do not directly destroy the body; but they produce in it a corruption, which corruption directly destroys it. According to this analogy, then, unless the corruption of the body implant a corruption of soul in the soul, we can never imagine that the soul is destroyed by a foreign evil without any evil of its own. But it does not appear that a bad condition of body can exert any influence of the sort upon the soul. A man is not the more wicked because he dies of a malignant fever. Nor does a life of wickedness make a man mentally
incapable; but rather sharpens his wits. Hence the soul is not destroyed by its own corruption, as the body is; neither is it, of course, destroyed by the corruption of other existences. Therefore it exists for ever, or is immortal. Neither can it grow less if nothing of it is destroyed; nor greater, for that would imply the addition of something mortal. To look at the soul as it exists in the world and human life, is to look at it with all its accretions and disfigurements, like the representations of the sea-god Glauocos, beaten, and bruised, and broken by the waves, with shells, and seaweed, and stones, sticking to his body; and more like a beast than a god. Such is the soul, beset with its thousand ills. We should, on the contrary, try to look to the philosophical history of the soul, its real, its immortal, and its divine nature, raising it out of this sea of troubles and removing all the accretions of the world, and the forms and feelings of human life which cloud and dim its clearness.

'We have not yet spoken of the advantages and rewards of justice. I beg you to give me back the loan you received from me on that point, I mean, my admission, for the sake of the better stating of your case,\(^1\) that a just man may be, and often is, considered to be unjust, and vice versa. Now I think it has been shown that in the first place the gods have no doubt about the just and the unjust. And if so, the gods must give him good fortune whom they know to be just, however much it may appear to be the reverse at the moment. And, in regard of his fellow-man, although the unjust may for the time appear to be carrying everything before him, like those who in a race rush off with the lead, yet, as those runners often run them-

\(^1\) v. s. Book II. init.—367 E.
selves out and come in far behind at the end, so the unjust will be found wanting at the end of his career, and the truth of the proverb 'Honesty is the best policy,' will be established. One point yet remains to be settled. What are the rewards of justice and injustice after death? I will try and tell you briefly; no long story of Alcinous, but of a man named Er, a Pamphylian. This man died on the field of battle, and was taken up on the twelfth day to be burnt on the pyre, when he suddenly revived, and told how he had gone in company with many other souls, to a strange place, where there were two rifts in the earth, close together, and other two over against them in the heaven. Between these sat judges, who bade the just take the right-hand path upwards, and the unjust the left-hand and downward path. But him they told to observe carefully; for he was to return to earth, and tell men what things he had seen done there. So he saw the souls departing as I have said through these two rifts, one in earth and the other in heaven; and he saw them rising from the other rift in the earth covered with dirt and dust, and coming down from the rift in the heaven pure and clean. Here in a meadow there was a great meeting;—those from the earthly rift told how they had been wandering for a thousand years in pain, whilst those from the heavenly rift spoke of the transcendent pleasure they had enjoyed. In short, for each offence the penalty was tenfold, and for each good work a tenfold reward likewise. And greater penalties even than these for impiety and murder, and greater rewards in proportion for piety. He heard a question asked about Ardistes, despot of a Pamphylian city, who had committed foul crimes during his rule. And a soul answered that when Ardistes, together with other despots and certain private men,
who had committed great crimes, arrived at the entrance of the upper rift, after their thousand years’ suffering, there was a bellowing noise from the entrance, signifying that they were still too guilty to be received, and certain savage-looking, fiery-hot figures advanced, seized and bound them, flayed them, and carded them with thorns, proclaiming to all the crimes which had merited such punishment. But those for whom the entrance had no noise, went on in peace and joy, and, after staying for seven days in the meadow, on the eighth they went on their way; and on the fourth day after this they came to a pillar of light, stretching straight along earth and heaven, like a rainbow, very bright and very clear. This they reached after a day's journey; and there they saw the ends of it lashed with cords, forming as it were an undergirder to the circuit of the heaven. At these ends was the spindle of Necessity, the centre of all revolutions, whose shafts and hook are of adamant, and its whorl of composite construction. For it was as if hollow and of great size, with a smaller and similar one fitting in it, and another within this, making eight in all. Their rims are of different breadths, and their lights of different intensity and colour, and their revolutions of different speed. On each of them sits a siren singing in monotone, and the eight sounds produce a harmony. And the three daughters of Necessity sit singing to the music of the sirens; Lachesis sings what has been, Clotho what is, and Atropos what is to come. And they turn the spindle one after the other. Now these souls were obliged to proceed towards Lachesis; and a certain one took different lives and lots from Lachesis’ lap and stood up and proclaimed aloud, “Thus says Lachesis, daughter of Necessity—choose ye what life ye will; ye are responsible; God is free.” Then he
threw all the lots down and they chose, with the exception of Er, who was not allowed to choose. And there were lives of all kinds of men and animals. This then was the crisis, this was the difficult moment; and herein was the man fortunate who had studied the philosophy of life, and knew how to refuse the evil and choose the good; avoiding excess in both directions. And all, even the last, if he chose with discretion, might secure a happy and a peaceful life. Now the very first who chose, through his own folly and greed, selected the life of a great despot; and when he discovered what sort of a life he had chosen, he beat his breast, and bewailed not his own folly but the cruelty of fortune and of fate; whereas if he had gone about his choice in a quiet and philosophic spirit, he might not only have lived his earthly life in happiness, but afterwards have gone through the heavenly journey with comfort and pleasure. It was pitiful and sometimes ludicrous to see how the different choices were made, generally in some regard to the former life of each chooser. Orpheus, for instance, would be a swan, not wishing to be born of woman; Thamyrs, a nightingale; Telamonic Ajax, a lion; Agamemnon an eagle; Epeios, son of Panopeus, a workwoman; Thersites, a monkey. And last of all there came the soul of Odysseus; and he, for his toils and wanderings that he had undergone, chose rather to live the life of an obscure and humble man than any other. Many souls of animals, too, passed into men, and interchanged with each other. Then they were all led before Lachesis, and a spirit took each of them, and led them to drink of the water of Lethe, after Clotho had assigned their future to each, and Atropos had rendered it inevitable. And the wise drank less than the foolish, who forgot everything. Then they lay down to rest.
and at midnight there were thunderings and an earthquake, and they were all shot up different ways to their birth, like shooting stars. But Er was prevented from drinking, and remembered nothing more, till he revived.

'Such, Glaucon, is the story, which if we believe we shall do well, practise justice, believing the soul to be immortal, and at last arrive at that happy road which leads up to heaven, and spend our thousand years of wandering in happiness.'
PlatwvnoS Politeia.

Ta ToY Dialogov Prooopa

Sophatrcs, PlAtKov, P0leMarKov, OpaSTMaKov, ADeiMantoS, KeFaloS.

Cap. I.

KaTreBiv xhes eis Peiraiw metà GlauKovnoS tov 327
Arìstovnos, proseuqömenos te tê thef kai áma tìn

Ch. I.—Socrates, walking home
from Pirceus, is induced to
tarry at Polemarchus' house.

tê thef, sc. the Thracian
Artemis, known as Bendis. So
we have this festival termed tâ
Benvidieia: v. infra 354 A. Tàvta
dê sou, ò Sókrates, eístidrôv èn
tois Benvideiwos. The temple of
this goddess stood on the pro-
montory Munychia. See Xen.
Hell. 2, 4, 11, where Thrasyl-
bulus is described as posting
himself on Munychia. From
this passage it appears that
there were two temples, one of
the Munychian Artemis and one
of Bendis. Ópèita ékáronv kata
tìn eis tòn Peiraià èmæx'tòn
anaférουsan. ói dê èpò òulhò...
sonvsepeirábhsan èpì tìn Mouv-

xian. oì dê èk tòv òustèwos eis
tìn òppodamieivn ágoràn eldôntes
pròton mèn svneiqexanto, òptè
emplèthai tìn òdòn èf fèrein pròs
tè tò ieròv tòs Mouvuxias 'Apte-
midòs kai tò Benvideiow. The
question suggests itself, Why
do we find a Thracian goddess
located in the heart of Athens' seaport? Traces of a connec-
tion between Athens and Thrace
appear in an alliance with
Sitalces, king of the Odrysian
Thracians, made in the time of
Pericles, B.C. 431; the strength
of which may be gauged by the
fact that a Lacedæmonian em-
bassage who tried to separate
Sitalces from Athens were de-
levered up to the Athenians by
him. Sitalces' son Sadocus also
became at that time an Athenian
The object of the dependent sentence is here drawn back from its proper grammatical position, because it is the most prominent thought in the mind of the speaker. So Ar. Nub. 1148:

καὶ μοι τὸν υἱὸν, εἰ μεμάθηκε τὸν λόγον ἐκείνων εἴφ', ὅν ἀρτίως εἰσῆγαγες.

et infra ibid. 1186—

οὗ γὰρ, οἷμαι, τὸν νόμον ἱσασιν ὅρθως, ὧ τι νοεῖ,

where the subject of the dependent sentence is treated similarly. The idiom is a very frequent one. See below, ὃς ὁμοίως ὑμᾶς, ὑποὶ ἐσμέν; and Chap. X. εἰδέναι τὸ δίκαιον, ὧ τι ἐστὶν.

For the sudden transition from the past narrative tense to the simple future we may compare Herod. 2, 121, 9, ὅσ, ἐκείνων προσεών, ὅκας βίον ἀφθονον ἔχωσι, τεχνάσατο... Also see Xen. Anab. 7, 1, 2, ἐκ τούτου δὲ Φαρνάβαδος φοβοῦμεν τὸ στράτευμα μὴ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀρχὴν στρατεύσαται,...ἐδείτο — where the primary tense στρατεύονται accompanies the narrative tense ἐδείτο. This example, it may be noticed, also illustrates the use of the subject drawn back from the dependent sentence. Again, Xen. Anab. 7, 1, 4, ἐφὶ οὖν ταῦτα ποιήσειν, εἰ ἐνθά 33, ἐς τε δ᾽ ἂν μόλωσιν, εἰς ἀφθονίαν παρέξειν ἐφῆ καὶ οἰκίᾳ καὶ ποτᾷ.

πομπῆ, the technical term for a religious ceremony involving a procession. See Ar. Acharnians 247.

καὶ μὴν καλὸν γ᾽ ἐστ᾽, ὃ Δίωνυσε δἐσποτα,

κεχαρισμένος σοι τὴνδε τὴν πομπὴν ἐμὲ

πεμψάντα καὶ θύσαντα...

where the verb πέμπω is joined as here with πομπῆ.

ἀπῆμεν πρὸς, 'we were going towards'... so below, οἰκίας, homewards. It is to be noticed here that Socrates goes through the religious service and festival like any other orthodox citizen, v. Introd.
μον...λαβ...ιμ., 'taking hold of me by the robe from behind,' -ιμισ is added afterwards, defining more exactly the word μον. Verbs, such as λαμβάνομαι, ἀπτομαί, ἀρπάζω, ἔχομαι, σαῦο, take genitive of the thing caught hold of, or of the part of the thing. Thus Eur. Cycl. 322—
tένοντος ἀρπάζασα ἀκροῦ ποδός, et 390, ἦντρ.—
κόψω λαβοίμην τοῦ τυφλούντος ἄματα
δαλόν, and Herod. 2, 121, 11, ἔργον ἔχεσθαι. So ἀντιλαμβάνομαι, ἦντρ. Ch. ι.ι.ι., Ἡρασύμαχος
. . ἄρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου.
μετεστράφην ... ἤρόμην, distinguish these tenses.
Πολέμαρχος, said by Muretus to have been brother of Lysias the orator. ν. ἦντρ. Ch. Η. ἦντρ. 
Νικήρατος. Muretus states that this Niceratus was a general in the Peloponnesian war; but Thucydides, to whom he refers, is silent upon the question.

...ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς, in the same way above ἀτε νυν πρὸτον ἄγοντες. These particles, joined with a participle, introduce a circumstance which defines more fully, or explains, the principal statement. See below 329 Α, ἄγανακτοῦσιν, ὡς μεγάλων τινῶν ἀπεστερημένω. It must be distinguished from ὡς in the next sentence, which introduces a supposition, not a fact.

... ὡς ἔγορ... Fully expressed, the answer would be, 'You guess rightly, for (γάρ) we are going homewards.' See Soph. Ο. Τ. 432-3—
ΤΕ. οὖν ἤκοψεν ἔγωγ' ἄν, εἰ σὺ ημ' ἱκαίεις.
ΟΙ. οὖν ἄγαρ τί στ' ἢδη μῶρα φωνήσαιντ'.
i.e. 'It was not my fault that I called you, for I knew not,' &c.

οὐκοῦν, &c. Socrates is ready at once with a characteristic reply to Polemarchus' dilemma. 'There is another alternative yet, if we can persuade you to let us go.' Polemarchus' threat
is of force, Socrates suggests persuasion.

μη ἄκ., ‘if we refused to listen.’ The participle here, as often, is equivalent to a conditional sentence. See infr. Ch. V. init. ὅ τιως οὖν ἂν πολ- λοὺς πείσαμι λέγον, i.e. ‘if I were to mention it.’ Also Ch. VI. med τὸ πινὸς παρακαταθεμένον τι δτάφαν μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτούμεν ἐποδιδόνα, i.e. ‘if he were to ask for it when he was out of his mind.’

οὐδ’ ὅστε. οὐδὲ indicates surprise. ‘Then you do not really (ἀρα) know?’ This particle ἀρα, although differently accentuated and used at the beginning of the sentence, contains the same implication as ἀρα, ‘after all,’ or ‘then’; for which see Eur. Med. 1029—

Ἀλλος ἄρ’ ὑμᾶς, ὅ τέκν’, ἐξε- θρεψάμην,
et ibid. 1262—

μᾶς τὸν ἄρα γένος φίλων ἔστεκες. λαμπάς, ὄγλη λαμπαδήφορα, a contest in which two or more sets of competitors handed on a torch from man to man, the object being to bring the torch first to the goal alight. See Aesch. Ag. 281 seqq.; where the beacon-signals that brought the news of the capture of Troy are compared in an elaborate simile to the λαμπάς, ll. 312–4—

τοιοῦτοι τοι μοι λαμπαδηφόρων νόμων,

Ἀλλος παρ’ ἄλλον διαδοχάς πληροῦμενοί
νικα δ’ ὁ πρῶτος καὶ τελευταίος δραμόν.

The simpler form of the game was for individuals to run the whole course with the torch. Muretus tells us that Prometheus, Hephaestus, and Pallas were the first recipients of this sacred celebration; and suggests that it was paid to Artemis under her character of Selene, quoting the epithet ‘noctiluca’ from Horace, Od. 4, 6, 38, and accounting for the introduction of horses by a reference to Ovid’s line, ‘Altaque rorantes Luna regebat equos.’ He also refers most aptly to Plato’s own use of this custom in simile. Laws 776 B. ἐκτρέφοντας παι- δᾶς, καθάπερ λαμπάδα τόν βλον παραδίδοντας ἄλλοις ἐξ ἄλλων.

πρὸς ἐστέρας, sub noctem, towards night-fall.
Theaσόμεθα καὶ ξυνεσόμεθα τε πολλοίς τῶν νέων αὐτοτιθα καὶ διάλεξομεθα. Ἀλλὰ μένετε καὶ μὴ ἄλλως Β ποιείτε. καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων, "Εσοικεν, ἕφη, μενετέον εἴναι. Ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, ὡς δ' ἔγω, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν.

**CAP. II.**

Ημεν οὖν οἴκαδε εἰς τοῦ Πολεμαρχοῦ, καὶ Λυσίαν τε αὐτόθι κατελάβομεν καὶ Εὐθύδημον, τοὺς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου ἀδελφούς, καὶ δὴ καὶ Ὁρασύμαχον τον πολλοῖς τῶν νέων... Added by Polemarchus as an inducement to Socrates, whose conversations with the young were so notorious that he was distinctly forbidden to engage in them. Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 33, tois νέοις ἀπειπήτην μὴ διαλέγεσθαι.

Ἀλλά μένετε, ἀλλὰ is the favourite particle employed with an urgent imperative, and may be seen from the following passages to have the force, as it were, of anticipating a possible refusal. See above, 328, ἀλλὰ περιμένετε. Αρ. Ach. 408. ΔΙ. ἀλλ' ἐκκυκλήθην. ΕΤ. ἀλλ' ἄδυνατον. ΔΙ. ἀλλ' ὅμως. Eur. Med. 942—σὺ δ' ἀλλὰ σὴν κέλευσον αἴτεισθαι πατρὸς γυναίκα παῖδας τὴνδε μὴ φεύγειν χθόνα.

Ch. II.—Where they find Cephalus, Polemarchus' father, with whom Socrates engages in conversation.

καὶ δὴ καί, ἵτιμ. et denique: this collocation of particles marks the final and principal point in a series, the particular case to which the others have been the prelude. See Enthyphro βίω. καὶ τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον γραφῆς ἀπαλλάξουμαι..., καὶ οὐκέτι ὅτ' ἁγνοίᾳ αὐτοσχεδίαζω, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βιον ἀμείνον βιωσόμην. See also Rep. Book Π. ἀιτ. Γλαύκων ἀεὶ ἀνδρειότατος ὑπνυχάναι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε, ἰ.ε. 'always hitherto, but especially on that occasion': an exact illustration of this force. See also Ch. ΙΙΙ. Б. καὶ ἄλλως, καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς. Other cases of the phrase, with slightly varied meaning, will be noticed below, 343 Β, 361 Ε. δὴ itself is usually final or conclusive: see Soph. Antigone, 895, where Antigone, after enumerating the others of her family who have perished by violent deaths, speaks thus of herself—

ἐν λοισθία γὰρ καὶ κάκιστα δὴ μάκρῳ κάτειμι. See also Rep. Ch. ΧΙΙ. βίω, and Ch. ΧΙV. τοιοῦτον οὖν δὴ σοι καὶ ἐμὲ ὑπόλαβε νῦν δὴ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, the concluding statement and summing up of Thrasymachus' case.

Ὀρασύμαχον. The character of this person the Dialogue will unfold. He is mentioned as a rhetor in Phædrus 261 C, 269.
Χαλκηδόνιον καὶ Χαρμαντίδην τὸν Παιανεία καὶ Κλειστοφώντα τὸν 'Αριστοτέλην ἦν δ' ἐνδον καὶ ὁ πατήρ ὁ τοῦ Πολεμάρχου Κέφαλος. καὶ μάλα προσ-

βύτις μοι ἐδοξέζε ἦν τις ἀνόητος αὐτὸν. καθήσατο δὲ ἐστεφανωμένος ἐπὶ τινος προσ-

κεφαλαίου τε καὶ δίφρου τεθυκὼς γὰρ ἐτύχωσαν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ. ἐκαθεξέμεθα οὖν παρ’ αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ ἐγένετο γὰρ δίφροι τινὲς αὐτῶθι κύκλῳ. εὐθὺς οὖν με ὑδὼν ὁ Κέφαλος ἥσπαζε τα' καὶ εἶπεν ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ θαμίζεις ἥμιν καταβαίνων εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ: χρήν

E, and especially 271 A, whilst in 267 D he is termed 'the mighty Chalcedonian,' and specially commended for his able treatment of a pathetic theme; but we are tempted to think that Socrates is imposing upon Phaedrus in this latter point, from what we learn of Thrasy machus in the Republic.

dιὰ χρόνου, see Herod. vi. 118. ἀλλὰ μὲν δι᾽ ἐτέων εἶκος Ὑπη-

βαίοι ἐκομίσατο.

καθήσατο δὲ ἐστεφανωμένος. In the same way the Socrates of the Clouds of Aristophanes causes the neophyte Strepsiades to sit down and wear a crown in approaching the Cloud-deities. ll. 255, 6—

ΣΤ. ἵδου κάθημαι.

Σ. ουτοτι τοῖνυν λαβή τὸν ἀπέφαλον.

προσκεφαλαίου καὶ δίφρου. So Cicero, Ep. Fam. 9, 18, fin. 'Sella tibi erit in ludo : eam pulvinus sequetur.'

παρ’ αὐτὸν. We find a verb with the meaning of sitting used with accusative in Euthy-

demus 273 B, ὁ μὲν παρὰ τῷ μειράειν ἐκαθέζοτα, and 271 B, ὁ δὲ παρ’ ἐμὲ καθήμενος; and in Hom. Od. 4, 51—

ἐς ρά θρόνους ἐζοντο παρ’ Ἀτ-

ρείδην Μενελαοῦ.

The accusative implies that they 'went towards him and sat down.' So Hefod, 3, 64, ὁ Ἐμέρις ἵδομεν εἰς τὸν βασιλέαν θρόνον ψάυσε τῇ κεφάλῃ τοῦ ὑφανου.

ἐκείνῳ γὰρ... These seats were for those who shared in the sacrificial rites, and afterwards partook of the sacrificial banquet from small tables placed in front of them. The practice of combining a banquet with a sacrifice was most frequent; thus the one is spoken of as the usual accompaniment of the other in Xen. Mem. 2, 3, 11. εἶ τινα τῶν γνωρίμων βούλιου κατεργάσασθαι, ὅποτε θῶι, καλεὶν τῷ διπ τινος, τῇ διπ θηνος; also see Od. 1, 144,

οἱ μὲν ἐπετα ἐξεῖποι ἐζοντο κατὰ κλεῖσμον τοι θρόνοις τε. And so in 3, 389.

θαμίζεις, the general term expressing frequency combined with a participle which specialization the action; whilst φολταω (πυκνός ἰέναι), used below to express the same meaning as θαμίζεις καταβαίνων, has the further meaning of 'going,'

ὅμως δὲ τε πολλοὶ ὑπ’ αὐγὰς ἥξειοι φοιτῶσι.

χρῆν μέντοι, 'but you should.' It is always advisable to look for an adversative meaning in μέντοι; and this is its force in the great majority of cases: see Ch. 1. ἵππ. οὐ μέντοι ἤττον... But in others it is more emphatic than adversative: E.g. 331 D, καὶ μέντοι καὶ παραδίδωμι τὴν λόγον. 375 C, ἀλλὰ μέντοι τούτων ὑποτέρου ἀν στέρηται... See note ad Cap. XIII. ἵππ.

εἰ μὲν...νῦν δὲ. So in Od. 2, 76 and 79—

eἰ χ’ ὡμεὶς γε φάγοιτε, τάχ’ ἀν ποτε καὶ τίσις εἶ, νῦν δὲ μοι ἀπρήκτους ὀδύνας ἐμβάλλετε θυμῷ. Where εἰ κε, 'in that case,' is balanced by νῦν δὲ, 'but as matters stand' ; as here.

eἰ μὲν γάρ... If this statement represents an actual reminiscence, we must look upon it as of the greatest importance, bearing witness as it does to the goodwill and confidence of an old man in Socrates. Notice that Cephalus uses ἥμεις, and τοῦτο ὑπ’ αὐγὰς below, his family as well as himself.

κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἥδοναι... Aristotle states the fact which is here implied, Eth. 7, 11, 4, ἐμποδίων τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἥδοναι. Plato is careful to show (infra Book III.) that a good mind must exert a good influence over the body, and that the body must not be left to itself to work out its own efficiency. See 408 E, οὐ γὰρ σώματι σῶμα θεραπεύοντι, ἀλλὰ ψυχῇ σῶμα. and supra. 403 D, ψυχῇ ἀγαθῇ τῇ αὐτῆς ἀρετῇ σῶμα παρέχειν ὡς οἴον τε βελτίωσον. And so also Xenophon in the Memorabilia represents Socrates as asserting that bodily efficiency can only be attained by making the body subservient to the mind, Book II. 1, 28. εἰ δὲ καὶ σώματι βούλει δύνατον εἶναι, τῇ γυναῖκε ὑπηρετεῖν ἐν καὶ γυμναστέον σὺν σῶμα καὶ γυμναστέον σὺν πόνοις καὶ ἱδρώτις. Conversely, Tennyson in the Princess—

'Since to look on noble forms

Makes noble through the sensuous organism

That which is higher.'
πλατωνος

τε καὶ πάνιν οἰκείοις. Καὶ μὴν, ἂν δ' ἐγὼ, ὦ Κεφαλε, χαίρω γε διαλεγόμενος τοῖς σφόδρα πρεσβύταις· δοκεῖ

Εγὼ μόι χρὴναί παρ' αὐτῶν πυνθάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ τινὰ ὀδὸν προεληλυθότων, ἥν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἰσως δείσει πορεύ-

εσθαι, πολα τίς ἐστι, τραχεία καὶ χαλεπτή, ἣ ῥάδια καὶ εὐτόρος· καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ ἥδεως ἀν πυθοῖμην, ὦ

τί σοι φαίνεσαι τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη εἰ τῆς

ἡλικίας, ὃ δὲ ἐπὶ γῆρασως οὔδω φασίν εἰναι οἱ

cal μὴν. μὴν is like μέντοι, and generally implies opposition. But like μέντοι it sometimes has no adversative force.

e.g. ἐντάξει Ch. VII. καὶ μὴν ὅταν γε πλοίον, ὦ ναυπηγός. Here καὶ μὴν simply introduces another case similar to that mentioned immediately before, and is accumulative, not adversative.

We see this accumulative force again in Book II. 362 D, ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; εἴπον, 'Why what next?' or 'What besides?' For Adeimantus is going to supplement, and not oppose, his brother's case with a further statement. As a rule its function is to adduce an answer to an objection, or to state a further objection or a further instance that must be taken into account. See Book II. 370 E, καὶ μὴν κενὸς ἂν ὅδι διάκονος—κενὸς ἀπεισιω, and in Book VI. 485 E, καὶ μὴν ποῦ καὶ τὸ δεὶ σκο-

tepiω, and in Soph. Ant. 1053, 4—

κρ. οὐ βούλομαι τὸν μάτιν ἄντειπειν κακῶς.

ΤΕ. καὶ μὴν λέγεις, ψευδὴ με

θεσπίζειν λέγων.

i.e. 'Ah! but you do insult me.' Also ibid. supra, 221, καὶ μὴν ὁ χρησαγὸς γ' οὔτος, 'Well, if they do that at any rate is the penalty.'

χαίρω γε. Γε is here apolo-
getic or explanatory. 'I really do take pleasure.'

καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ, 'so that I would gladly hear in your case,' lit. 'learn from you.' Here σοῦ is distinguished by καὶ δὴ καὶ from other cases in general as the special instance which engages the speaker's interest. See above, Ch. II. init. and Herod. 3, 20, νόμοισι δὲ καὶ ἀλλοισι χρῆσθαι, καὶ δὴ κατὰ τὴν

βασιλικήν.

ἐνταῦθα τῆς ἡλικίας εἰ, 'you are so far advanced upon the road of life.' For this genitive of distance see Euthyphro 4 B. οὐ γὰρ ὃπαλ γε τοῦ ἐπιποτυχότος εἰναι ὀρθὼς αὐτὸ πράξαι, ἀλλὰ πόρρω ποῦ ἢδη σοφίας ἐλαίνοντος. Again Lysides 204 D, πόρρω ἢδη εἰ πορεύομενοι τοῦ ἐρωτοῦ. Euthydemus 294 E, οὕτω πόρρω σοφίας ἤκει. And Xen. Anab. 7, 8, 20, ὅπως δι' ἡματρατήν ἠλθον τῆς Δυδίας.

ἐπὶ γῆρασος οὐδω. II. 22, 60, Od. 15, 348, and Herod. 3, 14, 12, εἰ τις ἑκτὸ ποτέ τοι ἤγαμος ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ γῆρασος οὐδώ. The first of a long series of quotations from Homeric poems with which Plato has adorned his work, which make us ill-prepared for a condemnation of poets in general (Book II. 377 D, seqq.) and of Homer in particular.

(Book X. init.)
CAP. III.

Ἐγὼ σοι, ἐφη, νή τόν Δία ἐρῶ, ὦ Σωκράτης, οὗν γέ μοι φαίνεται. πολλάκις γὰρ συνερχόμεθα τινες εἰς ταύτῳ παραπλησίαν ἥλικιαν ἔχοντες, διασώζοντες τὴν παλαιὰν παροιμίαν. οἱ οὖν πλείστοι ἥμων ὀλοφύρονται ἄνωντες, τὰς ἐν τῇ νεότητι ἡδονὰς ποθοῦντες καὶ ἀμαμιμησκόμενοι περί τε τὰφροδίσια καὶ περὶ πότους καὶ εὐωχίας καὶ ἀλλ' ἀττα ἅ τῶν

δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι, σεγγ. Cicero has translated thus in his Cato Major de Senectute: 'Volumus sane, nisi molestum est, Cato, tanquam longam aliquam viam caneceris, quam nobis quoque ingrediendum sit, istuc quo pervenisti, videre, quale sit.' CL. II. fin. In the next chapter Cicero translates from Plato almost literally this account of the old men who deplore their old age. He then states, in the mouth of Laelius, Socrates' suggestion that perhaps Cephalus' circumstances may be the reason of his happiness which we find in 329 D, together with the tale of Themistocles and the Seriphan. Hesiod uses the metaphor of the road in his description of the good and bad life. Op. et Dies, 285—

τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακότητα καὶ ἱκανὸν ἐστὶν ἐλέεσθαι

ρηθέναις λειτ μὲν ὅδος μάλα δ' ἐγγύτει νάεις.

τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρώτα θεοὶ προ-πάροιδεσθι ἔθεκαν

ἀθάνατοι μακρός δὲ καὶ ὀρθὸς οἶμος ἐς αὐτήν,

καὶ τρῄκυς τὸ πρῶτον ἐπὶ

δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἴσηται

ῥηθέν δ' ἐπίετα πέλει, χαλεπὴ περ ἐνύσσα.

τοῦ βίου, dependent on τοῦτο, 'this part of your life': v. infr. 367 D. τοῦτο' οὖν αὐτῷ ἐπαίνεσον δικαιοσύνης δ' αὐτῆς δ' αὐτήν τὸν ἔχοντα δύνην. Euthyd. 304 A. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τοῦ πράγματος. And infr. here, 329 C fin. τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται. And somewhat similar is Virgil's expression, Αἰν. I.—

'Tu mihi quodunque hoc regni...Concilias.'

From these examples it is clear that we should gain a better idea of the idiom by translating 'your life at this time'; and 'justice in this respect,' 'the affair in this aspect,' in the examples respectively: τοῦτο being closely constructed with the substantive. Fortified by these instances, the above explanation may stand against Stallbaum's condemnation of it as 'valde contorta.'

CH. III.—Cephalus' Apologia Senectutis.

& τῶν τού. ἐχεται, 'which are connected with such things.'
toioûtwn ēketai, kai ἀγανακτοῦσιν ὡς μεγάλω
τιων ἀπεστηρημένοι καὶ τότε μὲν εἰ ᾽ζωντες, νῦν δὲ
Bουδέ ζωντες· εἰνοι δὲ καὶ τάς τῶν οἰκείων προπηλα-
κίσεις τοῦ γῆρως ὄδυρονται, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτω δὴ τὶ
γῆρας ὑμνοῦσιν ὡςων κακῶν σφίσιν αἴτιον. ἐμοὶ δὲ
dοκοῦσιν, ὥΣώκρατες, οὕτω ὅ τὸ αἴτιον αἰτιὰσθαι.
eἰ γὰρ ἦν τοῦτ’ αἴτιον, κἀν ἐγὼ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπε-
pόνθη ἐνεκά γε γήρως καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁσοὶ ἐν-
tαύθα ἤλθον ἡλικίας. νῦν δὲ ἐγὼγε ἦδη ἐντετύχηκα
οὐχ οὕτως ἔχουσι καὶ ἄλλοισ καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ
ποτὲ τῷ ποιητὴ Παρέγενόμην ἔρωτωμένῳ ὑπὸ τινος
C Πόσ, ἐφη, ὥΣοφόκλεις, ἔχεις πρὸς τάφροδισία; ἐτὶ
οἴοσ τε εἰ γυναικὶ συγγίγνεσθαι; καὶ ὅσ, Εὐφήμει,

Lit. 'hang on to,' or 'depend upon'; so, in a physical sense,
κιοῦσι ὑπὸ ἔχεται.
-τοῦ γῆρως, 'about old age.'
We find ὄδυρωμαι constructed with genitive alone in Od. 4,
104—
τῶν πάντων οὐ τόσον ὄδυρο-
μαι.
So Od. 2 iniit.—
τοῦ δ' ᾃ δακρυχέων ἀγορῆ-
σατο. ἐπὶ τοῦτο δή, 'it is on this
very point,' or 'for this very
reason'; viz. οἰκείων προπ. δὴ
here is more emphatic than con-
clusive—it's usual force; and
refers to what precedes. So in
Book II. 368 B, Socrates, after
congratulating the sons of Aris-
ston on their able defence of
injustice, remarks, δοκεῖτε δὴ
μοι ἃς ἀληθῶς οὐ πεπεισθαίν.
'You certainly appear to have
lacked real conviction.' So in
370 B, ἐκ δὴ τούτων.
ἐπεσοῦν, 'the very same
thing would have happened to
me.' πάσχω, 'thus used of
something happening to a man,
by force of circumstances apart
from his control, is common.
See 368 B, loc. supr. cit. πάν
γὰρ θείων πεπόνθητε, 'some
divine afflatus has come to yo1.
Aristoph. Clouds, 816, τὶ χρῆμα
πάσχεις, δ' πάτερ; 'what has
come to you?' See infr. Ch. XI.
τῇ ἄξιοις παθεῖν; 'What do you
think should be done-to you?'
The idiom lies in the use of the
subjective word instead of a
neutral or objective one.
νῦν δὲ, 'whereas the fact is...'
ν. supra not. Ch. II.
καὶ ἄλλοις, καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ,
'Sophocles especially besides
other.' For the idiom καὶ ἄλλ.
car, see Theset. iniit. ἐθάμασα
Σωκράτους ὡς μαντικῶς ἄλλα
τε δὴ ἔστε καὶ περὶ τοῦτον. For
car δὴ καὶ v.s. not. Ch. II.
Sophocles was born b.c. 495, and
died b.c. 405. Recollecting
that Socrates' death took place
399 b.c. at the age of about
seventy, we see that the philo-
sopher must have had many
opportunities of intercourse
with the poet.
μέντοι, 'nay, on the other hand.'

Ωςπερ λυττώντα, &c. See what was said above, Ch. II. D, of the opposition between sensual and intellectual enjoyment; and the passage quoted from Aristotle. Plato mentions this below, Book III. 403 A, as being most opposed of all to the intellectual exercises. Μείζω δὲ τινα καὶ δεξιτέραν ἑχειν εἰπεῖν ἠδονὴν τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια, &c., as Aristotle in the Ethics.

κατατείνουσαι. The physical notion of stretching (τελώνω) begets a large family of transferred yet kindred expressions, when the verb is compounded with different prepositions, e.g. διαστασάμενος, Book VI. 501 C, 'with might and main,' (Jowett); ξυντείνωνος, 'in earnest,' 499 A; ἐντεινάμενος, 'laying great stress upon,' 'seriously,' 536 C; and again πάντα τὰ αὐτὸν εἰς τοῦτο ξυντείνως, 'concentrating himself entirely upon this point,' 591 B; and τελώνω simple: ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τελούντας πάντας, 'all striving towards the same object,' 464 D.

μανωμένων. So in 403 A, loc. cit. οὐδὲ γε μανικώτεραν. (ηδονῆν sc.)

ἀπηλλάξθαι. In Eur. Med. 967, the simple verb ἀλλάζομαι means to 'get one thing in exchange for another':

τῶν δ' ἐμὸν παιδῶν φυγᾶς
ψυχῆς ἄν ἀλλαξάμεθα

whilst the active verb, ἀλλάζω, is used simply as 'to take instead of.' Thus Theognis, οὐδὲ τις ἀλλάξει κάκιον, τοῦ 'σθλοῦ παρενότος,— ἀπαλλάσσω means 'to rid'; thus Eur. Cycl. 371—

κώμον μὲν αὐτὸν τοῦδ' ἀπαλ-λάξατι.

But it has also an intransitive meaning 'to turn out,' or 'come out from'; Rep. 491 D: τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν...κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν τῆς φαϊλῆς. Similarly παραλλάττειν, 'to change,' 530 B, γλυφεσθαι τὸ ταύτα ἰδία ὁσ-άντως καὶ οὐδὲν παραλλάττειν. Hence we can understand the meaning of ἀπαλλάσσομαι, 'to get rid of,' or 'to free one's self from,' as here; it is found again in Book III. 406 D, τοµῇ χρησά-μενος ἀπηλλάξθαι (sc. νοσήματος) and 390 E, μη ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τῆς μήνιοι. Also 465 D, πάντων τε ὅτι τούτον ἀπαλλάξοντα. But καταλλάσσομαι, 'to make it up with,' τοῖς μὲν καταλλαγῇ, 565 E; and διαλλάσσομαι, in the same sense, 471 A, καὶ ὁ διαλ-λαγησόμενοι ἄρα διοίσονται;
Then they will dispute on the understanding that they are going to make it up again some day?" The sense of change is apparent throughout.

μετρίως, 'not very.' The word implies an absence of excess: see 372 ε, μετρίως ύποπλώντες; 396 ε, μέτριος ἀνήρ; and 399 ε, σωφρόνως τε καὶ μετρίως πράττοντα. The idea which it conveys is the keynote of a great part of Greek thought: How to avoid excess and steer a middle course. So Theognis—

Μηδεν ὄγαν ἀσχαλες ταρασσομένων πολιτέων
Κύριε, μέσην δ’ ἐρχει τῆν ὄδυν ὣσπερ ἔγω.

So in Xenophon's Memorabilia, 2, I, 11, Aristippus defends his life of self-indulgence by terming it a mean between command and slavery. εἶναι τίς μεν δοκεῖ μέση τούτων ὄδος, ἐν πειρῶμαι Βαδίζειν, οὔτε δὲ άρχεις, οὔτε διὰ δουλείας, ἀλλὰ δ’ ἐλευθερίας. For another example see Antigone 67—

τὸ γὰρ περισσά πράσσειν οὐκ ἔχει νοῦν ὀϋδένα.

It is interesting to trace how large a part the idea of excess and moderation plays in Greek legend and drama: prosperity in excess is a direct challenge to Nemesis; Polycrates must throw his ring away, but even that cannot save him; Edipus is dashed from the height of success to a bitterness worse than that of death; and Agamemnon, flushed with victory, falls a victim to the jealousy which Heaven ever bears towards the over-fortunate.

καὶ γῆρας καὶ νεότης... See Cic. de Sen., Ch. II. 'Quibus enim nihil est in ipsis opis ad bene beatque vivendum, iis omnis ætas gravis est.'

CH. IV.—Cephalus' Opinions about Age and Money.
Book VII. 518 C, fasl dé pou oýn énóthis én tý ψυχή ἐπιστήμης σφεὶς ἐντιθέναι. He believed that knowledge, or at least the capacity for knowledge, was in all men, and only needed κίνησις, or μαίευσις, to use his own metaphor, to bring it out. We shall see below, Ch. V. C, how Socrates tries to draw Cephalus into a discussion about justice by means of propounding a dilemma; how again in Chaps. VI. and VII. he encourages Polemarchus to try and solve the difficulties in Simonides' definition of justice by placing them before him; how he is careful to say, after the detection of the flaw in the definition, 'We, then, shall dispute it,' μαχούμεθα ἄρα κοινῇ, ἐγά τε καὶ σύ...; and, in fact, to impress the person with whom he is conversing that it is his duty to do all he can to help in the discussion. Therefore Xenophon's word for Socrates' teaching of virtue in the Memorabilia is προτρέπειν, not διδάσκειν. See I, 7, ἵνα ἐπισκευάσωμαι δὲ, εἰ καὶ ἀλαξονεῖας ἀποτρέπων τῶν ἕνοντας ἄρετῆς ἐπιμελείσθαι προτέρετεν. and again Book II. ἵνα ἐθοκεῖ δὲ μοι καὶ τοιαύτα λέγων προτρέ-
In the same manner Aristotle claims for the good man a portion of the world's goods if he is to be really happy; Eth. 1, 5, 6, ἐνδέχεσθαι ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν...κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τά μέγιστα: οὖν δὲ οὕτω ζωντα ὀνδέσ τῶν εὐδαιμονιεῖσθαι: and in 7, 13, 3 quoted above; and again προσδείται ὁ εὐδαιμόνων ἐν τῷ σώματι ἀγαθῶν.

Infr. 109. Also see Euthydemus 291 A. Ξβ. καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἤν ὁ τοιαῦτα εἰπὼν; KR. Ποίος Κτήσιππος;

πάππος τε καὶ ὁμώνυμος. The usual practice was for grandfather and grandson to bear the same name. Thus we hear of a young Sophocles, B.C. 401, a tragic poet, who was son of Iophon, and grandson of Sophocles. Sometimes, however, this nomenclature missed a generation: thus we have in Alcibiades' family—

Clinias

Alcibiades

Axiocbus

Clinias.

ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγαπῶ, not 'I love,' but 'I am content.' So in 435 D, οὐκοῦν ἀγαπητὸν; ἔφη. 'Can we not rest content with these instances?' and again, 472 B, ἢ ἀγαπήσωμεν, εἰ δὲ τι ἐγγύτατα αὐτῆς ἢ; 'Or shall we be satisfied if it be the nearest possible?' We find amo used similarly in Juv. 7, 9,
At si Pieria quadrans tibi
nullus in arca
Ostendetur, ames nomen vic-
tumque Machaera,`

'You would have to content
yourself with...’ The expres-
sion is an optimistic one, as
though anything that has to
be acquiesced in became not
merely tolerable, but pleasant.

do de kteps. diply...
Sir
Thomas More in his Utopia ex-
presses this fact thus, 'And
verily it is naturally given to
all men to esteme their own
inventions best.' Aristotle, Eth.
4, 1, 20, πάντες ἄγαπώσι μάλλον
tά αὐτών ἔργα, ὡσπερ οἱ γονεῖς
καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. Again 9, 7, 7,
ἐτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως γενόμενα
πάντες μάλλον στέργοντις, οἶον
καὶ τὰ χρῆματα οἵ κτησά-
μενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων. Also
sec. 4 gives the psychological
reason for it, according to Ari-
stotle’s system. 'Ἐνεργεῖα δὴ ὁ
ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ πῶς: στέρ-
γει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ
eἶναι. This passage seems to
be a reproduction of Plato’s
words. Lord Beaconsfield, in
his psychological romance of
Contarini Fleming, states the
same fact with regard to the
acquisition of knowledge:—
'The idea that is gained with
an effort affords far greater
satisfaction than that which is
acquired with dangerous facility.
We dwell with more fondness
on the perfume of the flower
which we ourselves have tended,
than on the odour of that which
we cull with carelessness and
cast away without remorse.'
Pt. II. Ch. I.

καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν, 'as well
as in regard of its use.' See
above, καὶ ἄλλως καὶ Ὁσοκλεῖ,
329 B, 'Sophocles in particular,
as well as others.' Aristotle, in
speaking of friendship, remarks
that the friendships of the old
are dictated by what is advan-
tageous, which so entirely ab-
sorbs their attention that they
are sometimes unpleasant. See
Eth. 8, 3, 4, οὕτω γὰρ τὸ ἡδόν
τῆλικοῦτοι διώκουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ
ἀϕέλμον...ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὕτῳ εἶπεν
ἡδεῖς as here χαλεποί. And again
Eth. 8, 6, 1, ἐν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς
καὶ πρεσβυτίκιοι ἦττον γίνεται η
φιλία, ὡσπ. δυσκολότεροι εἴπαι
καὶ ἦττον τοῖς ὀμιλίαις χαῖρο-
σιν.
Wealth is a good thing, but a good conscience is better.

_λέγων, v.s. _ιστ. _αδ μη _ἀκοῦοντας. Ch. I._

teleutήσεων, this word is at once elliptical (_τελευτάν βίον_) and euphemistic. ‘To finish life’ avoids the use of an unlucky word, and is inspired by the same feeling which prompts the use of _οἱ_ _κάτω_, or _πλυρεῖα_, to express the dead; see Antigone 75—

_ἐπεὶ πλείων χρόνος_ _δὲν_ _δὲν_ _μὴ_ _ἀρέσκειν_ _τοῖς_ _κάτω_ _τῶν_ _ἐνθάδε_,

and, again, substitutes _ἐκεῖ_ (see below) for Hades. Thus in B, _ἐπειτα ἐκείσε ἀπίεναι_: and so in Book VI. 498 C, _τὴν_ _ἐκεὶ_ _μοίραν_.

In Book III, we find a remarkable acknowledgment of the use of euphemism, in the case of the word _ἐνθέσεια_. 400 E, _ἐνθῆθεα_, _οὐχ_ _ὅτι_ _ἀνθίζων_ _οἴσιν_ _ὑποκοριζόμενοι_ _καλούμεν_ _ὡς_ _ἐνθήσειαν, ἀλλά_: A similar use of _ἐνθάλμων_ is found in 422 E, _ἐνθάλμων_ _εἰ_, _ὅτι_ _ἐγὼ, ὃτι_ _οἷει..._ ‘You are much to be envied,' if you suppose...’; cf. _χρηστός_, 531 B, _τοὺς_ _χρηστοὺς_ _λέγεις_ _τοὺς_ _ταῖς_ _χρονίας_ _πράγματα_ _παρέχοντας_, ‘those fine people.’ In this last instance, as also in Plato’s use of _χαίρεις_, _κομψός_, _γενναίος_, euphemism becomes sarcasm.

_kataγελάμενοι_ _τέως_ _μῦθοι_. We shall have more to say about the _μῦθοι_ farther on: at present let it be remarked that Cephalus takes it for granted that national legend and belief incur ridicule amongst all but the old. Reference should also be made to Book III. _init._, where Socrates asks the question—‘Can we expect a man to be brave and despise death who is afraid of Hades as of a place full of horrors?’ _τὰν “Αἰδοῦ ἡγούμενον_ _εἶναι_ _τε_ _καὶ_ _δεινα_ _εἶναι_ _οἱ_ _τινὰ_ _θανάτον_ _ἀδεί_ _ἐπεσθαί_ _καὶ_ _ἐν_ _ταῖς_ _μάχαις_ _αἱρήσεσθαι_ _πρὸ_ _ἡττης_ _τε_ _καὶ_ _δουλείας_ _θάνατον_; Socrates’ answer to the difficulty is, to compel all who speak or write of the after life to sing the praises of Hades as of a place full of enjoyment and reunion with friends.
Socrates quotes Pindar in Book II. 365 B, and refers to him in Book III. 408 C. Plato, as it has been mentioned, conceived, at any rate in Socrates’ person, a violent antipathy for poets; but their words are continually on his lips. In this dialogue alone he quotes Homer in more than twenty places, Hesiod in seven, Æschylus in six, Pindar in three, besides Orpheus, Museus, Archilochus, Euripides, Sophocles, Phocylides, and Simonides. And this antipathy is rather a result of rigidly working out the principles of specialization than an expression of Plato’s own feeling upon the subject. But poets are accused by him of traducing the gods and the after life; in the philosophical system of the later books they are found to be imitators, and are therefore condemned, as being removed from treating of realities; and in Book X. Plato works himself up to such a pitch of indignation against their presuming to write about any subjects of which they have not a technical knowledge that he arraigns Homer and Hesiod at his dialectical bar, and bids them answer for themselves if they wish to be barely tolerated.

γνωστός οἱ καρδίαν ἀναλλοίωσα γηροτρόφος συναρτήσει ἐλπίσις, ὡς καὶ ἀλλωστρωτοφός. Πόλυστροφος γνώσμαν κυβερνήτης. Ηδύναμος. 

πολύστροφος, ‘full of expedients.’ The mind of man is ever ready through hope to make fresh endeavours. This word is
in effect the same with that which is applied to Odysseus:  

'Andra μοι ἐννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολ-  

ύτροπον.

ἐπείτα, inserted between partici-  

ples and infinitive, shows that  

the action expressed by the  

infinitive must be preceded by  

that expressed by the participle:  

that they express, in fact, a com-  

 pound but indivisible thought.  

Thus, ‘For money contributes  

to a large extent in helping a  

man to depart to Hades without  

owing anything to heaven or his  

fellow-man.’ See Xen. Anab. 7,  

1, 4. ὁ δὲ Ἀναξίβιος ἐκέλευσεν  

αὐτὸν ἐνδιαβάντα ἐπείτα οὕτως  

ἀπαλαττεσθαι. (Where notice  

what precedes—‘Xenophon told  

Anaxibius that he wished to  

depart.’) ‘But Anaxibius com-  

manded him not to go away  

until he had crossed over,’ or  

‘without crossing over.’  

θαυμαστῶς ὃς. Similarly ἰνθα-  

350 C, μετὰ ἰδρωτος θαυμαστοῦ  

ὁσου. The participle δεδότα  

here is loosely constructed, and  

added rather as an afterthought.  

It should properly be qualified  

with a negative, and would fall  

thus into the sentence: ‘Money  

makes it possible for a man to  

depart to Hades without fear,  

as not owing,’ &c. In Greek  
it is very frequent to find that  

when once the sentence has  
taken a negative phase, as in  

the present case (μηδὲ ἐξαπα-  

τήσαι), very little care is taken  
to separate strictly the rest of it  

into its affirmative and negative  

parts. In this sentence the  

second μηδὲ belongs solely to  

the participle ὁφείλοντα, and  
has nothing to do with the  

main verb ἀπίέναι, whereas μηδὲ  
in the former clause qualifies  

ἐξαπατήσαι, the principal verb.  

τὴν δικαιοσύνην, Cephalus has  
said that a life lived well and  

justly is the best passport to the  

other world. Socrates insists  

upon this point, viz. the diffi-  
culty of living a life justly,  

and, as is usual with him,  
demands a definition.  

ἀποδιδόναι τι. This may seem  
too special a case to be included  
in a wide definition such as  

that of justice; but it is to be
remembered that deposits on trust with friends were of the most frequent occurrence and of the greatest necessity in ancient times, from the absence of public funds, scarcity of reliable banks (τραπέζαι), and the few opportunities of safe investment; and, in the case of Greece, from the precarious status of many commonwealths. We have many references in Greek and Roman literature to this practice. In Herodotus 6, 86, we have the tale of Glaucon of Sparta, which turns upon the religious obligation of good faith in deposits: τά ἡμέρας πάσης τῆς ὁυσίας ἐξαργυρώσαντα θέσαν παρά σε, εἶ δὲ ἐξεπισταμένῳ ὡς μοι κείμενα ἐσται παρά σου σῶα, ἔς. And the moral of the tale is thus expressed: οὕτω ἀγαθῶν, μηδὲ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ παραλήκης ἄλλο γε, ἡ ἀπατεώνων ἀποδίδων. See also Juv. xiii. 174—

Nullane perjuri capitis, fraudisque nefandae
Piena erit?...
Spartano cuidam respondit
Pythia vates;
Haud impunitum quondam fore, quod dubitaret
Depositum retinere.'

Thus Pompey is made the custodian of one of the copies of Ptolemy's will when the treasury could not find room for them: 'Quum propter publicas occupatioines (in serario) poni non potuissent, apud Pompeium sunt depositae.' Cæs. B. C. 3, 10, 8. In Quintilian, Inst. Or. an accused man, it is suggested, may explain the presence of an article seized in his house by asserting that it is 'deposita res'; 5, 13, 49: 'Cum res furtiva in domo deprenhensae sit, dicat necesse est reus, aut se ignoranti illatam, aut depositam apud se...'. And again ibid. 7, 2, 50, the distinction is drawn between 'crediti' and 'deposita,' from which the latter appear to have been the more important. 'Crediti et depositi due sunt questiones, sed nonnuncum junctae.' In Thuc. 2, 72, Archidamus the Spartan uses the word παρακαταθήκην to describe the way in which the Plataeans' city and property should be treated under the Spartans' care. ἐπειδὲ δὲ (πόλεμος) παρελθὺ, ἀποδόσωμεν υἱῶν & ἂν παραλαβῶμεν, μεχρὶ δὲ τούτῳ ἔζομεν παρακαταθήκην. And in Xen. Hellen. 6, 1, 2, we read of Polydamas, a Thessalian, whose reputation for probity was so great that he was entrusted with the acropolis and the revenue of the Pharsalians in time of a political struggle. οὕτως ἔδοκει καλὸς τὸ κάγαθος εἶναι ὡστε καὶ στασιάσαντες οἱ Φαρσαλίωι παρακατέθεντο αὐτῷ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, καὶ τὰς προσόδους ἐπέτρεψαν. See also the use of δυσζύμβολος in Xenophon, Mem. 2, 6, 3; and note ad ξυμβόλαια, infra Ch. VII.

εἶ τις λάβοι παρὰ φίλου ἀνδρὸς...
Cicero has translated this passage in De Officiis 3, 25, 95. 'Depositā non semper redenda; si gladium quis apud te sana mente deposuerit, repetat insaniens, reddere pecatum sit...'
ou'te χρή τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδιδόναι, ou'te δίκαιος ἢν εἰῃ ὁ ἀποδιδοῦσ, ou'd' αὖ πρὸς τὸν ou'tos ἔχοντα πάντα. 

De'élews τάληθι λέγειν. 'Oρθῶς, εἴη, λέγεις. Όυκ ἀρα οὗτος ὁρος ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν καὶ ὁ ἄν λάβῃ τις ἀποδιδόναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, εἴη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαβῶν ὁ Πολέμαρχος, εἴτε γέ τι χρή Σιμωνίδη πείθεσθαι. Καί μέντοι, εἴη ὁ Κέφαλος, καὶ παραδίδομι ὑμῖν τὸν λόγον: δεὶ γάρ με ἤδη τῶν

ou'te χρή is balanced by ou'te δίκαιος ἢν εἰῃ, whilst ou'd' αὖ, &c. is supplementary to ὁ ἀποδιδοῦσ; 'nor again one who made a point of (ἐθέλων) telling him everything.'

καὶ μέντοι. See above note ad Cap. I. In this place there does not appear to be any adversative sense in μέντοι. Rather some phrase such as ‘and now’ or ‘and really,’ would express the bearing of Cephalus’ remark. If we look below, 339 C, we find the question οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς άρχοντι δίκαιον φής εἶναι; ‘Do you not maintain justice to be, in fact, obedience to governors?’ In this passage the whole point of the question bears upon the obedience, which Thrasymachus calls justice; because the obedience of the ruled is found sometimes to be against the interest of the rulers. Hence the word πείθεσθαι is emphasized by καὶ (καὶ is often purely emphatic), and the whole sentence by μέντοι: and the latter is adversative only in so far as it qualifies the opening sentence of an argument. The word is also found subjoined to ἀλλά, which fact confirms this supposition, that it is not always purely adversative: ν. infr. 614 B, ἀλλ' οὖ μέντοι σοι, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, 'Αλκίνου γε ἀπόλογον ἔρω. And below here, Ch. vi. viii. ἀλλὰ μέντοι. For καὶ emphatic see Hom. Od. Π. 107, 8— ἀλλ' οὖ τετρατον ἠλθὲν ἐτὸς καὶ ἐπήλυθον ἡρα, καὶ τότε δή τις ἐξειπτ γυναῖκών, ἢ σάφοι ἤδη. 

ἐν infr. 244—5— ἀργαλέων δὲ ἀναράσι καὶ πλεύσεσι μαχησασθαι περὶ δαίτι. And see below here, Ch. X.—καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ διαλεγομένων ἡμῶν ... and note.

With Cephalus’ departure the first phase of the Dialogue comes to an end, which we may call the descriptive and uncritical. The lines of an argument have been indeed laid down, but Cephalus has declined to have anything to do with the argument: he is the representative of old Athens, orthodox in his religion and undisturbed by scepticism. He has to contemplate his own approaching dissolution, not a dissolution and reconstruction of social systems; and he leaves it to the younger men to justify beliefs by argument, while declining to enter upon the task himself.
ιερῶν ἐτιμηληθήναι. Ὅψον, ἐφην ἐγώ, ὁ Πολέμαρχος τῶν ἔργων, κληρονόμος; Πάνυ γε, ἢ δὲ ὦς γελάσας, καὶ ἀμα ἦν πρὸς τα ἱερὰ.

CAP. VI.

Δέγε δὴ, εἴπων ἐγώ, σὺ ὁ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος, τί Εφῆς τὸν Σιμωνίδην λέγοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ δικαιοσύνης; "Οτι, ἢ δ’ ὦς, τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδίδοναι δικαίων ἐστί, τούτῳ λέγων δοκεῖ ἐμοίγε καλῶς λέγειν. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδης οὐθεν

Ch. VI.—Simonides’ definition means that we ought to give every man his deserts.

τί φῆς τὸν Σιμ. The principal verb here is really λέγοντα. ‘What do you maintain that Simonides said, when you say that he gave a true account of justice?’ But through a desire to give a more lengthened and connected form to the sentence, the sense is, as it were, suspended in the participle λέγοντα, and only brought to a conclusion at λέγειν; whereas it should have stopped at λέγοντα, and ὀρθῶς λέγειν should have been cast into a fresh dependent clause. See Ch. VI. init. A similar construction, subordinating the principal verb into a participle, is found in 462 Α. τί ποτε τὸ μέγιστον ἀγάθον ἔχομεν, ὃ δεὶ στοχαζόμενον τὸν νομοθέτην τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους; where the sense is, ‘What is the best object at which our lawgiver ought to aim when he makes his laws?’ But the aiming, although the important word, is subordinated grammatically to the conclusive, yet really weaker word, τιθέναι, already implied in νομοθέτην. See also Xen. Mem. I, 2, 34. Πότερον την τῶν λόγων τέχνην σῶν τοῖς ὀρθῶς λεγομένοις εἶναι νομίζοντες, ἢ σὺν τοῖς μη ὀρθῶς, ἀπέχεσθαι κελεύετε αὐτῆς; i.e. ‘Do you think dialectic is on the side of that which is rightly, or wrongly spoken, that you did me renounce it?’ Again, Xen. Anab. 7, 7, 8. καὶ οὖν ὁποίον δῶρα δούς καὶ εὖ ποιήσας ἀνθ’ ὄν εὖ ἐπάθες δεξίος ἡμᾶς ἀποτείμασθαι, ἀλλ’ ἵπτε. ‘And so far from having the grace to make us presents and repay us for benefits received, when you send us away...’ Plat. Ethyd. 289 C. ἄρα ἐστιν αὐτῇ, ἢν ἔδει κεκτημένους ἡμᾶς εὐθαλάμοναι εἶναι; ‘Was this the art which we ought to have learnt, if we wanted to be happy?’ Eur. Cycl. 123, 4—δέ ἐκτεινέαν κύκλικα βουλοίμην μίαν, πάντων Κυκλάτων ἀντίδοους κατακήματα. i.e. ‘I would give all the Cyclops’ flocks, if I could drain a single cup.’ And similarly ibid. II. 431, 453, and Req.
rādioν ἀπιστεῖν· σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ· τοῦτο μέντοι ὁ τί ποτε λέγει, συ μέν, ὁ Πολέμαρχε, ἡσώς γεγινώσκεις, ἐγώ δὲ ἁγνοῦ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅπερ ἀρτὶ ἐλέγομεν, τὸ τινὸς παρακαταθεμέ-καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενον ποῦ ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὁ παρακατέθετο· ἦ γὰρ; Ναϊ. Ἀποδοτέον δὲ γε οὐδ’ ὀπωσποτούν τότε, ὅποτε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῖ; Ἀληθῆ, ἦ δ’ οὐ. 'Αλλο δὴ τι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγει Σιμωνίδης τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα δίκαιον εἶναι ἀπο-διδόναι. 'Αλλο μέντοι νὴ Δ', ἐφ’ τοῖς γὰρ φίλοις

471 C. δοκεῖς οὐδέποτε μνημή-σεσθαι ὅ ἐν τῷ πρόδεξαι παρο- σίμενος πάντα ταῦτα έφηκας. In the present passage Polemar- chuck's answer shows what is the real sense of the question, for he tells us what Simonides said.

όσφος γὰρ καὶ θεῖος. So Herodotus calls Solon a σοφιστής, 1, 29. Solon, like Simonides, embodied his wise saying in verse: Stalib. quotes Cicero de Nat. Deor. i, 22. 'Simonides non solum poeta suavis, sed etiam cetero quin doctus sapiens-que traditur.' θείος, 'partaking of the divine nature.' The soul of man was regarded by Plato as being in some degree divine. See Book III. fin. (416 E), εἶπεν αὐτοῖς ὅτι θείον παῦλ θείων ἀεὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχουσι; as Cicero says in De Offic. iii. 2, 44: 'Mentem suam, qua nihil homini dedit deus ipse divinius.' Plato again, in speaking of the temp- tations of youth, attributes all good resolutions and resistance of evil to the same element; see Book VI. 492 E. οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται ... ἀλλοίων ἡθος πρὸς ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν πεπαιδευμένον, ἀνθρώπειον, ὧν ἐστι τοῦτοι κατὰ τὴν παρομίαν ἐξαιρέως λόγου, ἐν θαρ χρῇ εἰδέναι, ὅ τι περ ἀν σωθῇ ... θεοῦ μοῖραι αὐτὸ σώσαι λέγον ὡς κακῶς ἔρειε. See also 500 D. θείω δή καὶ κοσμίῳ ὃ γε φιλόσοφος ὁμιλῶν κόσμωι τε καὶ θεῖος εἰς τὸ δύνατον ἀνθρώπω γίγνεται. In legend we have a gradually descending scale of divinity from Zeus, through the Olympian deities, the inferior gods of heaven such as the Hours, Hebe, Ganymede; then gods of the earth, Dryads, Naiads, and of the sea, Nereids; and so on to demi-gods as Heracles, and Sarpedon; whilst finally such personages as Aescu-lapius, though mortal, obtain a partial divinity from their asso- ciation with gods. Such a system Plato would explain by the pre- sence to a greater or a less degree of that which he calls τὸ θεῖον. For this question see also 518 E, 546 B, 589 D, 590 D, ἔχουσιν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον, where it is equivalent to that part of the soul called λογιστικόν.

δίκαιον εἶναι, 'that justice consists in...’
'Hwvîzato ảra, ÿv o' ëgv, ós ëovkev, o Συμωνίδης C
povetikôs tò dîkaion o eîn. Xievoeîto mèn yáp, ós

τà ðfeilîêmena. At present the
difficulty of justifying this de-
definition lies in the double mean-
ing of ðfeilô. ðfeilîêmenon
means 'that which is owed.'
Anything therefore which is
'owed' ought to be given back.
But the word has also a moral
signification, viz. 'that which
is due' to any one. Hence in
the present sentence τà ðfeilô-
îêmena is elevated to the meaning
'that which is due to a man,'
not merely 'that which is owed
him.'

toîs ðxòpôs. Notice here
Socrates' adroitness. By an
apparently unimportant sugges-
tion he starts the wide question,
'How should we act towards
enemies?' Upon this slight
suggestion hangs the greater
part of the rest of this book.
And Polemarchus is drawn
into the discussion irresistibly;
thinking, as he does, that he
has an answer ready for the
difficulty.

Ch. VII.—We find that justice
is doing good to friends and
harm to foes. But apparently
there are but few occasions on
which justice can be employed.

In this chapter Socrates draws
on Polemarchus to give a cer-
tain definition of justice, and
a further description of it;
and then proceeds to demolish
the definition and stultify the
description by cases which are
drawn from physical facts, i.e.
by analogy. These proofs are
in themselves insufficient and
unsatisfactory; it is not fair
to condemn an ethical system
because it does not fall in ana-
logically with the system of
doctoring, of cooking, and of
cobbling. But Socrates' friends
are too ignorant of the use of
words to doubt his proofs or impugn his method. And So-
crates, in his conclusion, viz. that the definition of justice is
unsound, is correct, although he arrives at the conclusion un-
fairly.

τίσιν οὖν τί... ‘What then does the art of healing give
which is due and right, and to whom, that it is called the art of
healing?’ Here, as above, Ch. VI. init., we have the prin-
cipal verb in the participle, and the unimportant word ‘called’
thrown into its place. The question is not ‘What is the art
of healing called?’ but, ‘What does it give, and to whom, to
describe the name?’

τί ἂν οἶει. ἂν stands at the beginning of the sentence to
intimate at once that it is hypo-
thesis; as in Antigone, 466—
ἀλλ᾽ ἂν, εἰ τὸν ἐξ ἐμῆς
μητρὸς θανόντι ἀδαπτὸν ἠν-
σχόμεν νέκυι,
κελνοὺς ἄν ἠγμαν.
and so in Book II. 378 A. τὰ
de ἂν τοῦ Κρόνου ἐργα καὶ πάθη,
ὅπι τοῦ υἱόν, οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἰ ἦν ἀληθή,
ἀμύν δεΐν ῥάδιον οὕτω λέγεσθαι;
and similarly in the expression
οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ἂν εἰ πεισαμι.

εἰ μὲν τί, δεὶ ἂν... These words betray a consciousness
that analogy may not be a suffi-
cient guide to true inference.
As τοῖς πρώθεν εἰρήμενοι stands
here, we have in other places
λόγος almost personified, as the
chain of argument, which must
be followed out implicitly un-
less bringing the reasoner to a
palpable absurdity. See Book
II. 365 C. ἀλλ᾽ ὄμως, εἰ μέλλο-
μεν εὐδαμονίσει ταῖτε ἱτεόν,
ὡς τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων φέρει.
Book III. 388 E, ὡς ἄρτι ὁ λόγος
ἐσήμαινεν ὁ πειστεῦν, ἔως ἂν τι
ἡμᾶς ἀλλὰ καλλίον πείση. ἱντρ.
394 D, ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος ἄνωση
πνεύμα φέρη ταῖτε ἱτεόν. 399
D, ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἱσταῖνε.
503 B, παρεξήγουσι καὶ παρακα-
λυπτομένου τοῦ λόγου, πεϕοβη-
μένου κινεῖν τὰ νῦν παρόν.
The first definition, ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν καὶ ἄν λάβῃ τις ἀποδίδοναι, having been found insufficient, a second is stated in these words.

τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἄρα... The fallacy is involved here of confusing a contract with an ethical question. The physician and pilot are men of business, and perform certain duties to the best of their abilities for money; whilst a just man is one whose actions, as being just, are at once an object and end in themselves. The objective benefit of just conduct lies more in the example and encouragement it affords to others.

ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν... Polemarchus falls into the trap prepared for him, and tries to find some ‘business’ which a just man practises, some profession of which he makes a study; thereby getting involved in the difficulty explained above.

Ἀρὰ καὶ τοῖς μὴ πολεμοῦσιν... This inference is perfectly logical if a just man be described in the terms of Polemarchus’ definition. For if we state that a just man is one who benefits his friends, and then limit the benefits to acting as a champion and ally (προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ξυμμαχεῖν); it follows that if there are no disputes going on, the just man’s province or profession does not enter into consideration at all.

χρήσιμων ἄρα καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ... Polemarchus, by agreeing to this, repudiates his former reading of his definition, ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ξυμμαχεῖν. He is thus forced to find some ‘produce’ of justice, because Socrates continues to insist upon the analogy of the arts and manufactures, whose function is to produce some thing or some condition of things. Socrates, or Plato, was well aware of what we call the relation of things. In Book IV. 438 B we find the words ὅσα γε ἔστι σωφροτά ὁμολογεῖ ταὐτά, ἐν αἷς εἶναι τού, ‘All those things of such a
nature as to have a relation to some thing.' These words are the introduction to a disquisition upon quality and relation. Now Socrates knew that justice is concerned not with things but with the relations between things; and from the passage in Book IV. it appears that he is using this form of "

nature as to have a relation to some thing.' These words are the introduction to a disquisition upon quality and relation. Now Socrates knew that justice is concerned not with things but with the relations between things; and from the passage in Book IV. it appears that he is using this form of έλεγχος or disproof here only because it suits the mind of his hearer and gets rid of the bad definition.

εξιμβόλαια. Here Polemarchus is nearer to the function of justice—the model and rule for covenants and transactions. For the word compare 456 C, ού κόσμου...έαθο, ὑπὲρ ἂν δυσεξάμβολος καὶ ἄδικος γένοιτο, where δυσε... is 'covenant-breaker'; and 424 D, ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους εξιμβολαία μείκων ἀκβαινει; and 554 C, ἂρ' οὖν οὐ τούτω δήλων ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοίς εξιμβολαίοις οὐ τοιούτος...κατέχει ἐπίθυμια; So in Xen. Mem. 2, 6, 3, δυσεξάμβολος ἑστι, καὶ λαμβάνων μὲν ἥδεται, ἀποδιδόναι δὲ οὐ βούλεται; et τηρ. 5, εὐθυκρός τε καὶ εὐθύμβολος ὃν τυχάνει.

τέτταν. 'Πεσοὶ sive pessoi non sunt tali, sed calculi; ἀστράγαλοι tali sunt; at pessoi ψήφοι

τινες, ut constat ex Polluce libr. ix. Ludi sunt valde inter se dissimiles. Male itaque Marsilius, "in diferendis talis"; tali non diferuntur sed jacintur. At pessoi disposition in lineis, deinde moventur.'—Muretus. The game is mentioned again in Book C, 487 B: ὠσπερ ὅτι τῶν πεπτευέν δεινῶν ο[user deleted] τελευταίας ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὁ τι φέρωσιν, οὐτό καὶ σφεῖς ἀποκλείονται ὅπο πεπτελέος αὐτα τινής τιῶν ἐτέρας οὐκ ἐν ψήφοις ἄλλοι ἐν λόγοις, i.e. the skilful dialectician 'checkmates' his opponent. The game is mentioned also in Euripides, Medea 68. Here again Polemarchus is taken through a number of special pursuits, each aiming at a direct result; and is naturally unable to discover any limited class of objects upon which justice exercises its functions. Generally speaking we might summarize the fallacy here by saying that justice regards the mode in which a thing is done, or, as above, the relation of those concerned in it, rather than the action itself and its results.
eis ἄργυριον. Polemarchus thus driven into a corner falls back upon that case, mentioned above (see note ad Cap. V. ἀποδιδόναι τι) where the services of another are required to guard a deposit, a case of very frequent occurrence, but entirely inadequate for purposes of definition. καὶ μὴν. v. s. note ad Cap. II. τί δεῖ...χρῆσθαι. This verb takes accusative of the purpose or object, and dative of the means employed. See Ar. Acharnians 935, τί χρῆσται ποτ' αὐτῷ; and Nubes 22, τί ἐχρῆσαιμν.; Equit. 1183, καὶ τί τούτοις χρῆσομαι τοῖς ἐντέροις; Plat. Euthyd. 287 C, οὐκ ἔχω ὁ τι χρῆσομαι τοῖς λόγοις; Xen. Anab. 7, 2, 31, ἦνοφοιν ἐπήρετο Σεῦθην ὧ τι δέοιτο χρῆσθαι τῇ ἁρταίᾳ. And so here ἤτοι, ὅταν μηδὲν δέχατος χρῆσθαι. ἀλλὰ κεῖσθαι. Notice the instantaneous change of ἄργυριον here from object to subject. See Homer, 11. 1, 218— ὃς κε θεοῖς ἐπιπεθήται, μέλα τ' ἐκλυνον αὐτοῦ.

Here the subject, ὃς, never reaches its verb, but is changed into an object, αὐτῷ, before its own construction is complete. Such abruptness is characteristic of the Greek language, and seldom finds a place in Latin; for where it does occur we shall probably be right in attributing it to the influence of Greek literature; e.g. Virg. Æn. 5, 773—

'Tres Eryci vitulos, et Tempestatibus agnam
Cædere deinde jubet, solvique ex ordine funem.'

Again ibid. iii. 60—

'Omnibus idem animus, scele-rata excedere terra,
Linquit pollutum hospitium, et dare classibus Austros.'

And vii. 468—

'Jubet arma parari
Tutari Italiam, detrudere fin-
ibus hostem.'

But in these passages the change of subject lessens the abruptness of the change of construction.
\(\Delta\) χρήσιμος ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἢ δικαιοσύνη; Κινδυνευεί. Καὶ ὅταν δὴ δρέπανον δέῃ φυλάττειν, ἢ δικαιοσύνη χρήσιμος καὶ κοινῆ καὶ ἰδιαὶ ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, ἢ ἀμπελουργική; Φαίνεται. Φήσεις δὲ καὶ ἀσπίδα καὶ λύραν ὅταν δὲ φυλάττειν καὶ μηδὲν χρῆσθαι, χρήσιμον εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, τὴν ὅπλιτικὴν καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν; Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ περὶ τάλλα δὴ πάντα ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐκάστον ἐν μὲν χρῆσει ἄχρηστος, ἐν δὲ ἄχρηστία χρήσιμος; Κινδυνεύει.

CAP. VIII.

Ε Οὐκ ἂν οὖν, ὁ φίλε, πανυ γε τι σπουδαῖον εἴη ἡ δικαιοσύνη, εἰ πρὸς τὰ ἄχρηστα χρήσιμον ὅτι τυγχάνει. τόδε δὲ σκέψωμεθα. ἄρ' οὖν ὁ πατάξαι δεινότατος ἐν μάχῃ εἴτε πυκτικῇ εἴτε τινὶ καὶ ἀλλῃ, οὕτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι; Πάνυ γε. ἂρ' οὖν καὶ νόσου

πεδί τάλλα δή πάντα. δή is here conclusive, as it is in combination with καὶ δὴ καὶ, see above Ch. II. init. but with καὶ alone, καὶ δὴ τεθνᾶσ, ‘Well then they are dead?’ i.e. suppose them dead, Eur. Med. 386, καὶ δὴ λέγω σοι, Soph. Ant. 245, δὴ assents. See 361 E, note.

Ch. VIII.—But we may make a mistake between friend and foe. Therefore justice would be better defined as benefiting our real friends and harming our real enemies.

ἀρ' οὖν καὶ νόσον, &c. The original reading here of most of the MSS. is φυλάξασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν, οὕτος δεινότατος καὶ ἐπιστήσα. Muretus was for removing καὶ λαθεῖν altogether, as ‘absurdum planeque obscurum, although the latter epithet hardly implies a reason for removing the words. Bekker, from a MS., substituted καὶ μὲν παθεῖν, in which he was followed by Stallbaum; a substitution which cuts the knot rather than unties it. Faesi’s defence of the common reading is accepted by Boeckh, Wiegand, and apparently at one time by C. F. Hermann, from whose recension the text is taken; it is as follows, ‘cavere sibi a morbo morbumque fallere (aut devitare, aut latere ne te capiat).’ Stallbaum, from whose note the above facts are taken, points out with justice that the notion of λαθεῖν, secrecy, is required in the latter part of the sentence, for we have below the good
custodian of the camp represented as δεινός κλέψαι, and again in the conclusion of the whole matter the just man, i.e. the good custodian, turns out to be a good thief. λαθείν then must be transferred to the latter part of the sentence. And the best codices remove καὶ altogether from between δεινότατος and ἐμποιήσας. Thus far for destructive criticism. But it is evident that the construction of the words καὶ λαθείν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιήσας conveys no meaning at all. And the fault in the sentence is also evident; viz. the want of a participle to combine with λαθείν. If we are right in our destruction of the common reading, there can be no doubt about the meaning which this latter clause should convey; viz. (‘The man who is clever at protecting himself from disease) is the very man who is cleverest at secretly inflicting it upon others.’ Stallbaum whilst acknowledging this requirement of the text, retains the reading which involves this want of construction; although he has satisfied himself, ‘sine ulla dubitatione,’ that we should write ἐμποιήσας for ἐμποιήσας. The conjecture is very happy, involves the smallest possible alteration of the text, and may very fitly stand until challenged by a better.

It is but fair to the poet to quote the lines which follow—

θεος δὲ οἱ αὐτὸς ἐδώκεν 'Ερμελας τῷ γὰρ κεχαρισμένα μὴρια καίειν 'Αρνών ἣδ' ἐρίφων.

In this conclusion of Socrates we have an expression of that hostility which Plato felt towards poets who represented the gods as immoral. We cannot palliate the fact that fraud and deception commanded admiration in the Homeric age, provided success followed their employment. But we must couple with this fact another, viz. that this deception was directed against foes, and that a semi-barbarous age compelled recourse
to many shameful acts, the prime object of which was self-preservation on the part of the perpetrator.

Où μὰ τὸν Δ’ ἐφη, &c. Socrates’ method, here exhibited at length, is described lower down by Thrasymachus thus: ‘He will take care not to answer himself, but make the other person answer, then seize his words, and so confute them.’ 337 E. This charge is true, for Socrates’ method as above described was eliminative, viz. to discover the true by getting rid of the false or the vague. In this part of the Dialogue he is destroying popular ideas of justice, which are vague and insufficient: hence he draws Polemarchus on to give his ideas full expression and convince him of their insufficiency. In 348 B Socrates gives a reason for his method. He says, ‘It is no use for us to make orations and each sum up the points in his favour, because, in such a case, we shall need a jury to decide; whereas if we pursue the system of question and answer, we shall be barristers and jurymen at one and the same time.’ In Book VI. Adeimantus, as it has been mentioned above, compares Socrates’ method to that of a good chess-player, whose opponent does not understand the gist of his moves, but suddenly finds himself, at the end of the game, in a predicament.
δοκεῖν αυτοῖς πολλοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς εἶναι μὴ ὄντας, πολλοὺς δὲ τούναντίον; Ἀμαρτάνουσιν. Τούτοις ἁρα οἱ μὲν ἀγαθοὶ ἔχθροι, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ φίλοι; Πάνω γε. Ἀλλ’ ὁμος δίκαιον τότε τούτοις, τοὺς μὲν πονηροὺς ὦφελείν, τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς βλάπτειν. Φαίνεται. Ὁ Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἱ γε ἀγαθοὶ δίκαιοι τε καὶ οἱοὶ μὴ ἀδικεῖν. Ἀληθὲ. Κατὰ δὴ τὸν σὸν λόγον τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦν
tας δίκαιον κακῶς ποιεῖν. Μηδαμώς, ἐφη, ὁ Σώ-
κρατεῖς. πονηρὸς γάρ έουκεν εἶναι ὁ λόγος. Τοὺς
ἀδίκους ἁρα, ἡν δ’ ἐγὼ, δίκαιον βλάπτειν, τοὺς δὲ
dικαίους ὦφελείν. Οὕτως ἐκεῖνον καλλίων φαίνεται.
Πολλοῖς ἁρα, ὁ Πολέμαρχε, ἔμμβησεται, ὡσοι δημαρ-
tήκασι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλον
βλάπτειν. πονηροὶ γάρ αὐτοῖς εἰσί’ τοὺς δ’ ἔχθρον ἔ
ὀφελείν ἀγαθοὶ γάρ· καὶ οὔτως ἐροῦμεν αὐτὸ τοῦ

XIII. Πότερον δὲ ἀμαρτητοὶ εἰσίν οἱ ἄρχοντες εἰν ταῖς πόλεισιν ἐκάστασιν ὧστι τι καὶ ἀμαρτείν;
tότε, ἓν τον, ὡστ’ αὐτὸ τοῦ τοῦναντίον ἡ τῶν Σιμωνίδην ἐφαμεν λέγειν. Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη, οὕτω ἐμπειρεῖν. ἅλλα μεταθώμεθα: κινδυνεύ-
ομεν γάρ οὐκ ὅρθως τὸν φίλον καὶ ἔχθρον θέσθαι. Πῶς θέμενοι, ὁ Πολέμαρχε; Τὸν δοκοῦντα χρηστον,
tοῦτον φίλον εἶναι. Νῦν δὲ πῶς, ἡν δ’ ἐγὼ, μεταθω-
μέθα; Τὸν δοκοῦντα τε, ἡ δ’ ὅσ, καὶ τὸν ὄντα χρηστον

ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἐγώον ὅπως σοι ἐποὶ δ νοῦ’ περιερχεται γάρ τοῦ ήμιν δελ ὁ ἀν προθώμεθα,
καὶ οὐκ ἑθέλει μενειν ὅπου ἐν ἰδρυσάμεθα αὐτό.
ὡσοι δημαρτήκασι τῶν ἀνθρώ-
pων. Stallb. compares Phaedr. 257 D, τὸν ἑταῖρον συχνὸν δια-
μαρτάνεις, which sets any doubt
about this passage at rest. Heindorf, on the Phædrus, had
already compared this passage
of the Republic.

τὸν δοκοῦντα τε, &c. ‘By
distinguishing the apparently
and the really good friend.’
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\[335 \text{φίλων τὸν δὲ δοκούντα μὲν, ὄντα δὲ μή, δοκεῖν ἀλλὰ μή εἰναι φίλων καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ θεσίς.}
\[\text{Φίλως μὲν δῆ, ὡς ἐοικε, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἕσται, ἐχθρὸς δὲ ὁ πονηρός. Ναὶ. Κελεύεις δὴ ἡμᾶς ἐπεξείπαι τῷ δικαίῳ ἡ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν, λέγουτες δίκαιον εἰναι τὸν μὲν φίλον εὐ ποιεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἐχθρὸν κακῶς. νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ ὧδε λέγειν, ὅτι ἐστὶ δίκαιον τὸν μὲν φίλον ἀγαθὸν ὄντα εὐ ποιεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἐχθρὸν κακὸν ὄντα βλάπτειν; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφι, Βούτως ἃν μοι δοκεῖ καλὸς λέγεσθαι.}

\[\text{CAP. IX.}
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Εστὶν ἀρα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, δικαίον ἀνδρὸς βλάπτειν καὶ ὄντινοιν ἀνθρώπων; Καὶ πᾶν γε, ἐφι, τοὺς γε πονηροὺς τε καὶ ἐχθροὺς δεὶ βλάπτειν. Βλαπτόμενοι δ' ἵπποι βελτίωσιν ἡ χείρους γνύονται; Χείρους. Ἀρα εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀρετὴν, ἡ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων; Εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων. Ἀρ' οὖν καὶ κύνες βλαπτόμενοι χείρους γνύονται εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς

Φίλως μὲν δὴ...κελεύεις δὴ... ‘You conclude then that the good man,’ &c., and ‘Finally you would have us add...’

προσθείναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἡ... A curious ellipse. We must supply πλέον, not ἀλλο, for at first the statement was unqualified. The notion of comparison, or greater extent, is implied in the preposition πρὸς. So μάλλον is omitted, II. I, 117—

βούλουμαι.

ἐγὼ λαῖν σὸν ἐμέμεναι, ἣ ἀπολέσθαι.

Lysias 171, 5, Ἑπτούσι κερδαίνειν ἡ ἡμᾶς πείθειν.

νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ ὧδε λέγειν... Xenophon, Mem. 2, 3, 14, so far depreciates the character of Socrates as to make him lay down this rule of retaliation himself. καὶ μὴν πλείστου γε δοκεῖ ἀνήρ ἐπαλνὸν ἄξιον εἰναι, δὴ ἂν φθάνῃ τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους κακῶς ποιῶν τοὺς δὲ φίλους εὐεργετῶν, showing thereby how far below Plato's was his knowledge of Socrates.

CH. IX.—But good men do no harm to any one.

ἀρα εἰς τὴν... This qualification restricts the injury to the proper nature of the sufferer; and shows that it is the most telling and deleterious possible.
In the time of the cruelties of the Thirty, Socrates spoke out against ill-treatment of our fellow man thus: 'Ετείς δὲ θαμαστάτερον (sc. than the herdsman ill-treating his flock with impunity) εἶ τις προσάττης γενόμενος πόλεως, καὶ ποιῶν τοὺς πολίτας ἐλάττους καὶ χείρους, μὴ αἰσχύνεται. Αλλ' ἡ δικαιοσύνη. It must be noticed above that the question is not 'Is it right that any one should harm another?' but 'Is it right that a just man should harm any one?' Then δικαιοσύνην is adroitly introduced as that human ἀρετή upon which any harm done will take effect; thus bringing about the telling conclusion that for a just man to harm another is an unnatural action, and, in fact, a moral impossibility. Looking back upon this piece of reasoning, it must be impugned, upon logical grounds, as again merely resting on analogy. But to consider the argument broadly: first let us grant that Socrates by βλάπτω means the physical equivalent of ἀδικώ. Then we must translate βλάπτω by 'hurt wantonly,' not merely 'hurt'; because if we strike a horse or a dog it may be for his good, and instead of depreciating his 'powers' (ἀρετή) improve them. Then, if by βλάπτω he means 'to treat wantonly,' we shall thoroughly agree with Socrates that all creatures treated thus have their powers diverted towards resentment and retaliation, instead of keeping them concentrated upon useful and healthy action. So we speak of 'vice' in horses (to carry out Socrates' illustration), which is often the result of wanton ill-treatment. And so in the moral sphere. If a person is wantonly injured (ἀδικεῖσθαι), the injury not only breeds in him a desire to be revenged upon the perpetrator, but lowers his general sense of justice, by making him think worse of his fellow-man.

ἀμοῦσος. This word means here 'unmusical' or 'uneducated,' devoid of μουσικῆ. In Book III. 411 D, the result of practising gymnastic to the exclusion of music is said to render a man μισόλογος καὶ ἀμοῦσος, i.e. 'opposed to intellectual exercise,' and ἀμοῦσος is 'un-intellectual.' A third sense arises from this meaning, the positive sense of 'vulgar,' or 'wanting taste,' which appears in the words ἀμοῦσια; v. ἱνθ. 403 C. Ψόγον ἀμοῦσιας καὶ ἀπειροκαλίας ὑφέξονται. So Ausonius ad Symmachum: 'Dein cogitans mecum non illud Catullianum, "Cui dono lepidum et novum libellum?"' sed ἀμοῦσότερον
et verius; "Cui dono illepidum, rudem libellum?"

ἐργον, 'function,' or, more objectively, 'use.' We have three divisions of things possessing ἑργα in the Republic.

i. Abstractions, as in the present passage. 'The function or property of heat.'

ii. The arts, v. infra. 346 D. καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι (τέχναι) οὕτω τὸ αὐτὸς ἐκάστη ἐργον ἐργάζεται καὶ ὑφελεὶ ἐκεῖνο ἐφ' δὲ τέταρτα...

iii. Individuals, infra. 352 E. καὶ μοι λέγει δοκεῖ τι σοι εἶναι ἵππυν ἐργον.

The definition of ἐργον is to be found in the context of the last passage quoted: Ἀρ' οὖν τοῦτο ἀν θέλη καὶ ἵππυν καὶ ἄλλου ὅποιον ἐργον, ὃ ἀν ἡ μοῦ ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖ τις ἢ ἁριστα; This principle forms the groundwork of the State which is to be created; thus Book V. 453 B. αὐτὸ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ τής κατοικίας ἢν φιλεῖτε πόλιν, ὁμολογεῖτε δεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστον ἕνα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πρᾶττειν. The expression κατὰ φύσιν must be noticed; it covers the case of individuals; because to do ungenial work, however well, is not strictly an ἐργον. Aristotle describes the ἐργον of man as that, in the exercise of which lies a man's well-being physical and moral: αὐλητῆ καὶ ἀγαλματοποι καὶ πάντες τεχνίτης, καὶ ὅλως ἀν ἐστιν ἐργον τὶ καὶ πράξει, ἐν τῷ ἐργῷ δοκεῖ τάγαθον εἶναι καὶ τῷ ἑ. He then defines it more distinctly as, ἢν πρακτικῆ τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἔχουσο, or finally, ψυχῆς ἐνεργεία κατὰ λόγον.—Nic. Eth. 1, 7, 10—14. Ἐργον in short is exercise of faculties.

ὁ δὲ γε δικαῖος ἀγαθός. 'And the just man I suppose comes under the head of "good."' νοεῖ, 'means,' 'signifies,' see Euthydemus, 287 D, where an eristic quibble is set up on the expression νοεῖ τὸ ῥήμα, 'the word means.'
πολιτείας α′. 139

δικαίου ἀνδρός, τοις δὲ φίλοις ὧφελείαν, οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών: οὐ γὰρ ἀληθὴ ἔλεγεν οὔδαμοι γὰρ δικαίου οὐδένα ἥμιν ἐφάνη ὅν βλάπτειν. Συγχωρῶ, ἢ δ’ ὃς. Μαχαομέθα ἄρα, ἢν δ’ ἔγω, κοινὴ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σύ, εάν τις αὐτὸ φῇ ἢ Συμωνίδην ἢ Βίαντα ἢ Πυττακῶν εἰρήκειν ἢ τιν’ ἄλλον τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν. Ὅγων’ οὖν, ἐφῆ, έτοιμὸς εἰμὶ κοινωνεῖν τῆς μάχης. Ἀλλ’ οἴσθα, ἢν δ’ ἔγω, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ῥήμα τὸ φάναι δικαίου εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους ὧφελείν, τοὺς δέ ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν; Τίνος; ἐφη. Οἶμαι αὐτὸ Περιάνδρου εἶναι ἢ Περδίκκου ἢ Ἐρέξου ἢ Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Ὀθηβαῖον ἢ τινὸς ἄλλου μέγα οἰμημένου δύνασθαι πλουσίον ἀνδρός. Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφη, λέγεις. Εἶπεν, ἢν δ’ ἔγων ἐπειδή δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐφάνη ἢ δικαιοσύνη ὅν οὐδὲ τὸ δικαίου, τί ἀν ἄλλο τις αὐτὸ φαίνε εἶναι;

οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ... δικαιο... ὑπ’ predicate; οὐδένα, object. οὐδαμοῦ, ‘in the case of no man.’

ἔγω τε καὶ σύ. Perhaps the best example of this identification of his companion with himself in the discovery of truth is found in Book IV. 432, where Socrates has started with the discovery of temperance, wisdom and courage, and proceeds to find justice by eliminating the other three. ‘Now, Glaucon, like hunters, we must surround the thicket, and beware lest the object of our search escape us. Be zealous then and look carefully, and tell me if you see it first,’ &c. For this expression of uncompromising hostility against false morals, see his opinion, not less uncompromising, on religious beliefs, Book II. 380 B. κακῶν δὲ αὐτῶν φάναι θεὸν τινὶ γῆνεσθαι ἄγαθὸν ήντα,

diaμαχετέν ταυτὶ τρόπῳ μῆτε τινὰ λέγειν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ αὐτοῖς πόλει, μῆτε τινὰ ἀκούειν.

οἶμαι αὐτὸ Περιάνδρου... Plato’s contempt for this maxim may be gauged by the fact that he attributes it to tyrants: for whom he had the liveliest de
testation. See Argument of the Dialogue, Books IX., X. For Periander, tyrant of Corinth, see Herod. 3, 48, seqq.; and 8, 137, seqq. for Perdiccas, tyrant of Macedonia. For Ismenius of Thebes, see Xen. Hell. 3, 5, 1. οὐδὲ... quam... δικαίοσύνη... οὐδὲ τὸ δικαῖον. Similarly Plato distin

guishes between ὁ τυραννός and τύραννος in Book IX. See Argument, and note, p. 90. δικαίοσύνη is the General or Ἰδέα, under which τὸ δικαῖον, i.e. individual cases of justice, are included.
Καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ διαλέγομενων ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ὁρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου, ἐπειτα ὑπὸ τῶν παρακαθημένων διεκδικεῖτο βουλομένων διακοῦσαι τῶν λόγων ὡς δὲ διεπαιπασάμεθα καὶ ἐγὼ ταῦτ' εἶπον, οὐκέτι ἦσυχιαν ἦγεν, ἀλλὰ συστρέφασα ἐαυτὸν ὀστερ θηρίων ἦκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὡς

CH. X.—Thrasymachus interposes violently; and asks why they do not discuss the question seriously.

καὶ διαλέγει. καὶ emphatic, 'even whilst we had been talking,' as in 582 B. μάλλον δὲ καὶ προθυμούμενον ὁ βδόν (γενέσθαι). 'On the contrary, it is a hard matter even for one who is zealous.' The particle is employed in a similar way above, Ch. III. 'καὶ ἄλλως καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς; but it is more emphatic here, the coordinate clause being introduced merely by δὲ (ὡς δὲ διεπαιπασάμεθα), much weaker than καὶ δὴ καὶ which introduces the second clause of the example above. See Ch. V. not. ad καὶ μέντοι.

ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. See not. c. i. ad μον...λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου. Ἀντὶ here, as in similar verbs, ἀντέχωμαι, e.g. implies that the object caught hold of is entirely distinct and separate from the person who catches hold of it: and communicates the idea of aggression in the present passage. See Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 618, Obs. 1, 3rd ed. 'As a general rule the compounds of ἀντὶ take a dative, as conveying a notion of hostility.'

ἐπειτα, the middle point of the sequence, introduced by μεῖ and concluding with δέ.

διακοῦσαι. Note force of διά, 'hear it out.'

θηρίον. We see here a reference to a hunt, from which Socrates draws many similes and metaphors; v. infra. Book IV. 432, quoted above: κυνηγήτας θάμων περιστασθαι. Euthyphro 13a, et passim. Socrates arrives at the conclusion how to combine courage and gentleness in the warriors of his city, by a reference to the fact that those traits coexist in hounds. Book II. 375 C. For συστρέφας we may compare the metaphor ἐχθρίων τὸν λέοντα, infra. Ch. XV., where Thrasymachus is the lion. Another word involving a metaphor from the sphere of hunting is ἄγριαλω, 'to behave like a wild beast.' See infra. ἐχαγριάλεσθαι; and Book VI. 501 E. ἔτι οὖν ἄγριαρυνοι λεγόντων ἡμῶν... From this metaphor another is drawn, viz. the process of 'taming' a person, as in Book II. Ch. II. init. Thrasymachus is said to have been 'tamed' by Socrates: this metaphor is of the most frequent occurrence, as will be noticed there.
diarropasomenos. kai eγώ τε καὶ ὁ Πολεμαρχος δει-
σαντες-διεπτόθημεν ὁ Ὁ εἰς τὸ μέσον φθεγξάμενος
Τίς, ἐφη, ἢμᾶς πάλαι φλαντίν χείο, ὁ Σώκρατες; ο
καὶ τί εὐθυβίσσεθε πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὕποκατακλύ-
μενοι ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς; ἀλλ' εἴπερ ὡς ἀληθῶς βούλει
εἶδέναι τὸ δίκαιον ὃ τι ἐστί, μὴ μονὸν ἑρῶτα μηδὲ
φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων, ἐπειδὰν τίς τι ἀποκρίνησιν
ἐγνώκως τούτο, ὅτι μᾶν ἑρωτᾶν ἢ ἀποκρίνεσθαι
ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπόκριναι καὶ εἶπε, τί φής εἶναι τὸ
eis μέσον φθεγξ. So Herod. 3, 62. προσγορόμεν στὰς ἐς μέσον
tὰ ἐντεταλμένα. And v. s. not. ad Cap. ii. ἐκαθεζόμεθα...παο'
ἀὐτῶν.

ὡν αὐτοῖς, reflexive for reciprocal ‘each other.’ For see
below ὕποκατακλύσσεται ἀλλή-
λοις. The word ὕποκατακλ, means ‘retiring in turn,’ and
expresses the motions of a pair of
dancers, to whom Thrasyma-
chus derisively likens Socrates
and Polemarchus. Such dancers
were ordinarily employed to
amuse guests at a banquet from
Homeric times. See Hom. ii.
18, 605; Od. 4, 15. In od.
8, 378, we have the equivalent
of ὕποκατακλ.—

ὡρχεῖσθαι δὴ ἐπείτα ποτὶ
χθονὶ πουλυβοτειρρ
ταρφὲ’ ἀμειβομένω
where ἀμειβομένῳ exactly ex-
presses the alternate advance
and retirement of the two per-
fomers. Although Thrasyma-
chus compares Socrates to a
public juggler, it will be seen
in the course of his conversation
that he is very anxious to ex-
hibit his own rhetorical powers.
Thus ἔνωρι. 338 A. ὁ Θρασ-
μαχος φανερὸς ἢν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰπεῖν,
ἠν εὐδοκιμησεῖν.

μηδὲ φιλο. ἐλεγχ. &c. 'And
do not be anxious to distinguish
yourself in disproving every-
thing that a person says,' ἐπειδὰν
&c. must be taken closely with
ἐλέγχων.

ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀποκρ. This
is exactly what Socrates could
not be brought to do; he dis-
claimed all knowledge, which
relieved him from the onus of
construction; and persisted in
showing the incorrectness of po-
pular beliefs, theories, language,
and morality. In many cases
we may believe that he had
actually no settled account to
give at once of the large ques-
tions which he used to discuss,
and that he really derived in-
struction and assistance from
demolishing the mistaken no-
tions of other people. It has
been pointed out in the Intro-
duction that, as this Dialogue
proceeds, Socrates is induced to
launch out into construction;
but it is at the urgent request
of Glaucon and Adeimantus,
who in Book ii. int. evince a
feeling of perplexity at the pro-
sperity of the wicked, and a sin-
cere desire to hear of a solution
to the troublesome paradox, that
the gods are good and the wicked
are prosperous. But Thrasyma-
chus asks, and asks in vain.
The sentence indicates Thrasy-machus' temperament, condemning as he does five possible definitions as υδαλοι τοιούτοι, nonsense of this sort.

ἐι μὴ πρότερος... See Virg. Ecl. 9, 53—

'Sed in Italia quoque creditus luporum visus esse noxius, vocemque homini, quem priores contemptur, adimere ad pre-sens.'

ὑποτρέμων. Socrates here almost descends into the bur-lesque; and prepares the effect which is afterwards produced by the discomfiture of the over-bearing Thrasymachus.

μὴ γὰρ δὴ ὅσον... 'For pray do not think that in a search for gold we should not have deferred to each other, but that in the search for justice we should do so.' This ἀ fortiori reasoning from the physical to the moral sphere is employed very frequently by the Xeno-phontic Socrates; see Memorabilia, Book 1, 2, 32. θαυμαστόν οἱ δοκεῖ ἦναι, εἰ τις γενόμενοι βοῶν ἄγελθα νομέως, καὶ τὰς βοῦς ἔλαττους τε καὶ χείρων πολῖν, μὴ ὁμολογηθεὶσα κακὸς βοῦκολος εἶναι ἐτί δὲ θαυμαστότερον, εἰ τις προσπάτης γενόμενοι πόλεως, καὶ

ὅπως μοι μὴ ἐρείσ, omission of ὥσα, or a similar word. See Eur. Cycl. 487—

ἀγε νυν. ὅπως ἅψεσθε τοῦ δαλοῦ χεροῦ.


ἀγε νυν, ὅπως, ὅταν τι προβά-λομαι σοφὸν περὶ τῶν μετέωρων εὐθέως ὑφαρπάσει.

ei ἵση. 882—

ὅπως δ' ἔκεινο τὸ λόγῳ μαθή- σεται.

This sentence indicates Thrasy-machus' temperament, condemning as he does five possible definitions as υδαλοι τοιουτοι, nonsense of this sort.

ἐι μη προτερος... See Virg. Ecl. 9, 53—

'Vox quoque Mœrim Jam fugit ipsa; lupi Mœrim videre priores.'

So Pliny, Hist. Nat. 8, 34.


εὐκόνιας εἶναι ὑποκατακλίνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ ξηθήσει καὶ διαφθείρειν τὴν εὐρεσιν αὐτοῦ, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ξητοῦντας, πράγμα πολλῶν χρυσῶν τιμώτερον, ἕπειθ' ὦτως ἀνοήτως ὑπείκειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὐ σπουδάζειν ὁ τι μάλιστα φανήναι αὐτὸ. οἴον γε σὺ, ὦ φίλε· ἄλλ', οἴμαι, οὐ δυνάμεθα· ἐλεεῖσθαι οὖν ἡμᾶς πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστι πον ὑπὸ ὑμῶν τῶν δεινῶν ἡ 337 χαλεπαίνεσθαι.

νοῦν τοῦ πολίτας ἐλάττους καὶ ἱερῶν, μὴ αἰσχύνεται, μηδ' ὄστεα κακὸς εἶναι προστάτης τῆς πόλεως. And ἢνθερ, Ch. VII. τότε ἄπαντεσαν δ' ἐκάλεσα οὐ μικρὸν μὲν, εἰ τὸν ἀρχιστὸν ἢ σκέφτως παρὰ τοῦ πειθοῦ λαβών ἀποστεροῦν, πολύ δὲ μεγίστον, ὡστε μηδενὸς άξιος ἄν εξηπατήκης, πείθων ὡς ἴκανος εἶν ἡ τῆς πόλεως ἤγεισθαι. And again, Book 2, 4, 2, καὶ γὰρ οἰκίας καὶ ἄγροις καὶ ἀνδράποδα καὶ βασικῆματα καὶ σκέφτως κτωμένους τε ἐπιμελῶς ὄραν ἔφη, καὶ τὰ ὑπατασίεως πειραμάτων· φιλον δὲ, ὃ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φανερον ὄραν ἔφη τοὺς πολλοὺς ὡς ὑπὸς ἐκτίςαται προστατόντας, ὡς ὑπὸς οἱ ὑπατασίες εὑροῖσθαι. ἕπειθ', 'in that case,' 'in such a case as that.' This particle generally emphasizes the connexion of one sentence with another in a sequence, see above this Ch. ἐπιτά. ἐπειτα ὑπὸ τῶν... But, as here, it sometimes stands more as a powerful demonstrative, although still retaining the sequential force in part. This sequential force is logical rather than temporal, as Conington points out when he compares the use of præterea with ἐπειτα. Virg. Æn. 1, 49—

'Et quisquam numen Junonis adorat
Præterea?'

And cf. Od. 2, 275—

'.εὶ δ' οὐ κελνου γ' ἐσσὶ νόνοι καὶ
Πηνελοπείνις,
οὐ σέγ' ἐπειτα ἐκάθα τελευ-
τήσει καὶ μενοίμ."

dεινῶν. δεινὸς by itself bears the secondary sense of 'clever,' which it gains through the notion that great cleverness strikes awe into those who witness it. Thus 'wonderfully clever' would more nearly express the exact meaning. In his description of a chariot race in the Electra, Sophocles, with the complacency of one who praises his audience, speaks thus:—

γνώσις δ' οὐ Αθηνῶν δεινὸς
Ἁμοστρόφος
ἐξω παροσπα κάνακωχεύει...
CAP. XI.

Καὶ ὃς ἀκουσάς ἀνεκάγχασέ τε μάλα σαρδάνιον καὶ εἶπεν Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, αὐτὴ Ἰεννὴ ἢ εἰωθοῦια εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, καὶ ταῦτ’ ἐγὼ ἵδη τε καὶ τούτοις προῦλεγον, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθελήσοις, εἰρωνεύσοι δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσοις ἢ ἀποκρινοῦ, εἰ τις τι σε ἐρωτᾶ. Σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἤν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὁ Θρασύμαχε εὐς οὖν ἴδησθα ὅτι, εἰ τινὰ ἔροιο ὀποσαβεστὶ τὰ δῶδεκα, καὶ ἐρόμενοι προεῖποι ἀυτῷ ὅπως μοι, ὃ ἀνθρωπε, μὴ ἔρεις, ὅτι ἐστὶ τὰ δῶδεκα δις ἢ ἔξ μηδέ ὅτι τρὶς τέτταρα μηδ’ ὅτι ἐξάκις δύο μηδ’ ὅτι τετράκις τρία· ὡς οὖν ἀποδέξομαι σοι, ἐὰν τοιαῦτα

Ch. XI.—Thrasymachus knows what justice is, but wishes to be paid before he will share his knowledge.

ἀνεκαγχ. σαρδάν. Cf. Virg. Eclogue 7, 41—

‘Immo ego Sardoniis videar tibi amarior herbis,’

and Horace, A. P. 375; from which passages it is evident that Sardinia produced certain acrid herbs; but the connexion of the ‘Sardonic smile’ with the grimace produced by eating these herbs seems not to be warranted. For the construction of this adverbial accusative, see Eur. Alc. 772—

τί σεμνὸν οὕτω καὶ περφοντικὸς βλέπεις;

And Aristoph. Vesp. 900—

ὡς δὲ καὶ κλέπτων βλέπεις, εἰρωνεία, ‘pretending to know less than one does,’ ‘self-depreciation.’ ὁ εἰρών in Aristotle is described as the converse of the braggart. Thus Nic. Eth. 4, 7, 2. δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ ἀλαζὸν προσποντικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἰναι καὶ μὴ υπάρχοντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, δ’ εἰρών ἀνάπαλιν ἄρνεσθαι τὰ υπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάστων ποιεῖν. And so in 2, 7, 12. ἢ δὲ προσπονησὶς ἢ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μείζων ἀλαζονεία καὶ δ’ ἐχὼν αὐτὴν ἀλαζῶν, ἢ δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐλάστων εἰρωνεία καὶ εἰρών,

σόφος γὰρ εἶ, ‘(of course you knew this) for you are adroit,’ &c. Socrates implies that Thrasymachus put his question in such a manner as to preclude an answer, so that he might charge Socrates with εἰρωνεία. For the expression ν. ἱνερ. ἤδες γὰρ εἶ, Ἡμιόφανῆς γὰρ εἶ.

ὅπως μοι, ν.ς. Thrasymachus’ own words, which are repeated exactly, to point the ludicrous comparison.

ὡς οὖν ἀποδ. ν.ς. Ch. IV. ἱνερ. Β. Κεφαλῆς, οἷμαι σοι τοὺς πολλοὺς οὖν ἀποδέχεσθαι’ εἰ ἱνερ. Ch. XIII. ἱν. οὕτως αὐτοῦ ἀποδεχόμεθα.
We should expect this, but Socrates perhaps wishes to put the case as if it had really passed through Thrasy machus' mind. We should expect this, but Socrates perhaps wishes to put the case as if it had really passed through Thrasy machus' mind.

Soph. Ant. 646. Also see Euthydemus 276 A.: ἀλλο τι οὖν οὔτω ἡπίστασθαι ταύτα. εἰτ ἐνφρ. here Ch. XV. 342 D. Thrasy machus is evidently dismayed at Socrates refusing to bind himself to the restrictions laid upon him. This kind of sophist required that the conversation should be conducted not merely on certain lines, but even in certain terms, if he were to prove his points. See Euthydemus, Ch. XVI., where a sophist, bearing a certain resemblance to Thrasy machus—although gifted with great powers of argument, ἐνφρ. τοῦ ἀπετέθηναι τοῦ φαινόμενον ἐστιν, εάν τε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν εάν τε μή; "Ἀλλο τι οὖν, ἥπια, καὶ σὺ οὖτω

If you really have inherited your father's spirit." See Book VIII. 544 C.: ἡ γενναλα δὴ τυμανν. ἀλλο τι οὖν καὶ σὺ οὔτω ποιήσεις; 'Are you positively going to do so?' A common colloquialism in which the particle ἐν is omitted. Constructed fully the phrase would stand ἀλλο τι ἐστιν ἡ οὔτω, ὡς...κ.τ.λ. We can see the first stage of the ellipse in such an expression as this:

τί τόνι οὖν εἴποις ἀλλο πλὴν αὐτῷ πᾶν οὖν φύσαι.
ποιήσεις; ὃν ἐγὼ ἀπείπον, τούτων τι ἀποκρίνεται; Ὁυκ ἄν ἰαθμάσαιμι, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, εἰ μοι σκεφταμένῳ οὕτω δόξειεν. Τί οὖν, ἐφη, ἄν ἐγὼ δεῖξω εἴτεραν αὐτόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταύτας περὶ δικαιοσύνης βελτίω τούτων; τί ἀξιώσαθα παθεῖν; Τί ἄλλο, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ἧ ὄπερ προσήκει πάσχειν τῷ μὴ εἰδότι; προσήκει δὲ που μαθεῖν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος· καὶ ἐγὼ οὖν τούτο ἀξίω παθεῖν. 'Ἡδος γὰρ εἰ, ἐφη, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ μαθεῖν καὶ ἀπότισον ἀργύριον. Ὁυκοίν ἐπειδὰν

ti ἀξιώσαθα παθεῖν, 'how ought you to be treated?' i.e. 'what ought you to have done to you?'

For this use of παθεῖν v.s. not. ad Cap. III. ἐπεσέβην.

ἡδος γὰρ εἰ, 'you are a cool fellow.' ἡδος in this relation means 'simple' or 'ingenuous,' and is thus euphemistic, and sarcastically used for its opposite e.g. δείνους or ὑβριστικός: i.e. 'it is a cool request to ask, without payment.' Somewhat similarly in Book VII. 527 D.

Ἡδος εἰ, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ὥστε έσικας δεδίσας τοὺς πολλοὺς, μη δοκῆις ἀρχηγα σαμάθημα προστάτειν. And so χαριεῖς Book IX. 602 B, χαριεῖς ἄν εῇ δ' ἐν τῇ ποίησει μιμητικῶς. Where the opposite notion is intended, v.s. Ch. V. not. ad τελευτήσεως.

ἀποτίσουν ἀργύριον. ταύτα τοιαύτα τιμήσιμον ἐπερεαίον τοῦτος προσβλάστην to λαμβάνειν οὐκ ἀναγκή διαλέγεσθαι δ' ἀν μὴ βούλωμαι. In the Apology Socrates mentions that his accusers could not bring the charge of money-making against him; 31 C. οὗτος οὖν τε ἀπανασχυννήσαι ὡς ἐγὼ ποτὲ τινα ἢ ἐπαραξάμεναι μισθῶν ἢ ἱττήσαι. And so 19 D. οὐκ ἐστιν...δ' ἐγὼ χρήσηται πράττομαι.

ἐπειδὰν μοι γένεται. In the Apology 23 B, Socrates explains his poverty thus: πενίους ζήτω may be gathered from Book VI. 493 A.: ἐκαστος τῶν μυθαραφοῦντων ιδιωτῶν, οὐς δ' οὐθεὶς σοφιστὰς καλοῦσιν...κ.τ.λ. where the word μυθαράφουντων bears a bad sense.

Other passages in the Memoria- bilia corroborating Socrates' refusal to take money for teaching are 1, 6, 11. οὐδένα γινοῦ τῆς συνονίας ἀργύριον πράττη. And supr. § 3. καὶ μὴν χρήσαται γε οὐ λαμβάνεις. Socrates speaks thus of those who took money for imparting knowledge: καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὀσακτύως τούς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βαουλεψάντων πολύντας σοφισ- τάς ἀστερ πόρους ἀποκαλοῦσι. And he speaks of the advantage which he enjoys from his practice of taking none, viz. that he can choose whom he will to instruct, and is not at the beck and call of every one; § 5. ἐμοὶ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντι οὐκ ἀναγκή διαλέ- γεσθαι δ' ἀν μὴ βούλωμαι. In the Apology Socrates mentions that his accusers could not bring the charge of money-making against him; 31 C. οὗτος οὖν τε ἀπανασχυννήσαι ὡς ἐγὼ ποτὲ τινα ἢ ἐπαραξάμεναι μισθῶν ἢ ἱττήσαι. And so 19 D. οὐκ ἐστιν...δ' ἐγὼ χρήσηται πράττομαι.

ἐπειδὰν μοι γένεται. In the Apology 23 B, Socrates explains his poverty thus: πενίους ζήτω
μοι γένηται, εἶτον. Ὁ Θρασύμαχος, γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σωκράτεις εἰσοίσομεν. Πάνω γε, οὖν, ἢ δ' ὡς, ἦν ἡμας τὸ εἰσόδος διαπράζοντα, αὐτὸς μὲν μὴ ἀποκρίνηται, ἄλλου δ' ἀποκρινόμενον λαμβάνη λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχῃ. Πώς γὰρ ἂν, ἐφην εὖ, ὃ βέλτιστε, τις ἀποκρίναυτε πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς μηδὲ φασκὼν εἰδέναι, ἐπειτα, εἰ τι καὶ οὗτοι περὶ τούτων, ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἰη, ὅπως μηδὲν ἔρει ὃν ἤγειται, ὅπρος οὖν φαῦλον; ἄλλα σὲ δὴ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς λέγειν.

καὶ ἔρευνῷ κατὰ τὸν θεὸν, καὶ τῶν ἄστων καὶ τῶν ξένων, ἣν τίνα ὁμιλοῦν, ἔρευνος, καὶ ὅτι ταύτης τῆς ἀρχολασ...ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν. v.s. also the mention of his charity in the passage from Xen. Mem. I, 2, 60: πάνω ἄφθονος ἐπήρχεθε; which would help to account for it.

'Ενεκα ἁργυρίου, 'as far as money is concerned.' Cf. Eu-thyphr. 11 D: ἐπεί ἔµοι γε ἐνεκα ἐμενὲν ἀν ταύτα ὦτως, i.e. 'for anything I did to the contrary.' And see Eur. Cycl. 512—κελευσμάτων δ' ἐκατι τυφέσθω Κύκλωφ.

Και ὁ παντες γὰρ Σωκράτει. Of this popularity which Socrates evidently enjoys, the Charmides supplies another instance; see ἐπί. καὶ μὲ ὠς εἰδον ἐστίνα ἐξ ἀποσδοκήτου, εὕθεν πόρρωθεν ἡσπάζοντο ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν. αὐτὸς μὲν, &c. A very fair description of Socrates' ordinary method. See Introd. p. 7.

ἀπειρημένον...εἰη. Stallbaum proposes to omit εἰη, which the run of the sentence recommends; for, as the text stands, εἰ must qualify both οὗτοι and εἰη, which it cannot do without awkwardness. Then εἰρημένον will be a case of the neuter absolute participle in the accusative case. Sometimes the partic. is omitted: Book V. 449 C: ὃς ἄρα περὶ γυναικῶν τε καὶ παιδῶν πάντι δῆλον. Protag. 323 B: ὃς ἄναγκαίον οὐδένα μετέχει αὐτῆς. Also Herod. 1, 129: εἰ, παρεῦν αὐτῷ βασίλεα γενέσθαι...ἀλλω περιεθηκε τὸ κράτος.

ὑπ' ἄνδρος οὖ φαῦλον. v.s. σφος γὰρ εἴ.

ἔµοι τε χάρ. So below, 351 C, where Thrasymachus repeats Socrates' words. Σοι γὰρ, ἐφη χάριτοι, οἴκτι αἰδ. τόδε μοι χάριται καὶ λέγε. And in...
Euthydemus 274 D. πάνω μὲν οὖν τούτοις χαρίσασθον καλ... ἐπιδείξατον.

Ch. XII.—Thrasymachus’ definition of Justice; the Interest of the Stronger.

These expressions prove Thrasymachus to have belonged rather to the rhetorical than the ethical division of sophists. See below, Ch. XVI., where Thrasymachus having stated his views at length wishes to make off without further argument. Protagoras of Abdera, the most famous of all the sophists, was not often in the habit of conversing; he, too, rather employed rhetoric than dialectic. See Prot. 335 Α. where he refuses to go upon the principle of short questions and answers, which Socrates avers to be the only kind of discussion he can follow. It is true that earlier in the dialogue Protagoras offers to discuss a question ἐπιπλέον λέγον, ἢ λόγῳ διεξελθών. But we can see from the later passage quoted that λόγῳ with Protagoras and Socrates meant different things. And Socrates believed in the case of Protagoras, as in that of Thrasymachus here, that he had a distinct desire to produce a rhetorical effect. id. 317 C. ὑπώπτευσα γὰρ βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τῷ τῇ Προδίκῃ καὶ τῷ Ἰππίᾳ ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι (as εὐδοκιμήσει, here).

ἡ Σωκράτους σοφία, v.s. above ἢ εἰσαθνία εἰρανεία Σωκράτους. The article indicates that Socrates had a public reputation for wisdom.

χρήματα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω, v.s. not. αδ. ἀποτίσον ἄγρυφων, Ch. XI. In Xen. Mem. I, 6, 2, Antiphon asks how it is that philosophy only brings poverty: ὅ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ μὲν δῆμην τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας
SoKT 6V XeyeiVj ev ε€€, Srj, iireiSav yap ev, "Afcove F C 09. yap iyo) eivai, 'Afcove F C 09. yap iyo) eivai, ye ye, €, €€(€ €€€» Aristotele in the Politics, i, 4, shows that the philosopher can be wealthy, if he chooses, by the story of Thales in Miletus, who discovered from astronomical researches that the olive-yield would be excessive in the ensuing year, and, by a small deposit of earnest-money, secured a large profit upon it at the harvest: ἐπείδη δ’ ὁ κοιρὸς ήκε πολλῶν ζητουμένων ἁμα, καὶ εξ- αλφῆς ἐκμισθοῦντα ὑπὸ τρόπων ἡβούλετο, πολλὰ χρήματα εὐλέξαι ἐπίδειξαι, ὅτι βαδίον ἐστὶ πλουτεῖν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ἂν βουλῶνται.

Ἀν αἱ προβάμοις τούτῳ δρῶ... This adroit piece of flattery is evidently swallowed by Thrasy- machus, for he proceeds without more ado to give his definition. Socrates’ words exhibit a phase of his εἰρωνεία, for he incites Thrasy machus to speak by an assumed admiration for the wis- dom of what he is going to say. We must suppose that Socrates veils the sarcasm of his words beneath an appearance of innocence: otherwise Thrasy machus would hardly fail to see their true drift.

τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον. We have now left behind popu-
lar, and have to treat with sophisticated definition; briefly the principle is, ‘Might is Right.’ Thrasy machus’ line of argument is as follows. The stronger make regulations for their own benefit, and these regulations are dignified by the term ‘laws,’ and justice is obedience to them. Now the description of that form of government called τυραννίς in Aristotle’s Politics, 3. 55. corresponds exactly to Thrasy machus’ account of a state of justice here: ἥ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστὶ μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ ξυμφέρον τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος. And Aristotle calls such a state a degenerated form or abnormal growth from a monarchy, which is described, in contrast to the τυραννίς, as having regard to the common interest, not to that of the ruler; καλεῖν δ’ εἰδὼμεν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβλέπουσαν ξυμφέρον βασιλεῖαν; where it should be noticed that ἀποβλέ- πουσαν means having regard only, or chiefly, to the public weal. Here Thrasy machus puts forward the κρείττον, ἢ. τ. e. the man who is superior in bodily strength or force of will, but disregards the claims of the commonwealth upon him, as the ruler of the state. Socrates, on the contrary, gradually un- folds the principle that all arts and sciences, and therefore all governments, ought to be
directed, if they are true arts and governments, towards the amelioration of some objects less strong and less capable than themselves. And therefore he will be found to claim the right to govern for that man who is himself governed by his best nature, arguing from the analogy of such a man's own psychical polity. For when the θείον, λογιστικόν, or rational part of man's nature is in the ascendant, and keeps under the spirited and sensual, then such a man's body and mind as a whole will be most healthy and most efficient.

See Book IX. 590 D. δοῦλον αὐτόν (sc. τὸν τυχόντα) φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι ἐκεῖνον τοῦ βελτίστου, ἐχόντος ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θείον ἄρχον, οὐκ επὶ βλαβῇ τῇ τοῦ δοῦλου οἴκειοι δεῖν ἄρχεσθαι αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ Θρασύμαχος ἄνετο τοὺς ἄρχομένους, ἀλλ' ἂς άμεινον ὅ τι πάντι ὑπὸ θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκείοιν ἐχόντος ἐν αὐτῷ, εἶ δὲ μὴ, ἐξωθέν ἐφεστῶτος. That Thrasymachus' position is not entirely out of date, the following passages from a modern writer will show. 'All fighting is the dusty conflict of Strengths, each thinking itself the strongest, or in other words the justest: of Mights which do in the long run and for ever will in this just universe in the long run mean Rights.'

Carlyle, Past and Present, Book III. Ch. X; and again in his Life of John Sterling, Pt. III. Ch. I. 'Might and Right, the identity of these two, if a man will understand this God's-universe, and that only he who conforms to the law of it can in the long run have any "Might."'

Despite the fact that he is a servant, he claims the right to govern for that man who is himself governed by his best nature, arguing from the analogy of such a man's own psychical polity. For when the θείον, λογιστικόν, or rational part of man's nature is in the ascendant, and keeps under the spirited and sensual, then such a man's body and mind as a whole will be most healthy and most efficient.

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Schol.

The answer to this must be observed, is a confession that the definition is assailable, i.e. is imperfect, ὑπὸ implies stealth on Socrates' part, in an underhand way, as we say; so ὑποκάθημα, to lie in ambush, ὑποστέλλωμαι, to prevaricate. But the word is also used merely 'to interrupt,' without any further notion; see below, Ch. XIII. ad med. ἐφη ο Κλειτοφόν ὑπολαβών. In the present passage we may translate ὑπ. ταυτ. 'twist into that sense,' with the additional notion of stealth. In Euthyd. 295 B, the word means simply 'to understand.'
Plato is fond of this triple division, which occurs again in his analysis of μέλος (λόγος, ἀριμνία, ρυθμός); of justice itself (σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σοφία); of the city (χρηματιστικόν, ἐπικουρικόν, φυλακικόν); of the soul (θυμοειδές, φιλομάθες, φιλοχρηστόν); and of the main difficulties to be encountered in founding the ideal State, Book V.; and of things desirable, Book II. init. But in Book VIII. (conf. Book IV. fin.) we have four varieties of the State, degenerations from the Ideal, viz. the Timocratic, Oligarchic, Democratic, and Despotie; the first of which Socrates limits to such constitutions as those of Crete and Sparta. In his accusation of Ctesiphon ἈσχινηΣ divides all states into three kinds. εὐ γὰρ ἔστε, ὥς Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι τρεῖς εἰσὶν πολιτεῖαι παρά πάσιν ἀνθρώποις τυράννεις καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι καὶ δημοκρατίαι. And he goes on to say that the former two are managed merely according to the fancies of the rulers, but the democracy by established law. διωκοῦνται δ' αἱ μὲν τυράννεις καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι τοῖς τρόποις τῶν ἐφεστηκότων, αἱ δὲ πόλεις αἱ δημοκρατοῦμεναι τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς κειμένοις. Ἀσχ. in Ctes. αἵ init.

Thrasymachus is correct in this statement as long as the selfish and unjust have the reins of government. But in Book IX. 590 D (v.s. not. ad τοῦ κρατήτους εὐμφέρον) Socrates shows that the best men, i.e. those in whose souls the λογιστικόν or rational element is master, ought to be masters of all the rest; because as the λογιστικόν, by restraining the lusts and passions produces the best possible condition, of the body, when it is master, so the good man will not indulge himself when he is master in the state, but will set himself to make the whole body politic as healthy and efficient as possible. Therefore it is that he says in Book V. 473 D, that, until kings are philosophers and philosophers kings, the best state cannot be; for by philosopher he means λογιστικός, i.e. one in whom the intellectual dominates the sensual, v. Introd. p. 19. In short, the good man or philosopher is unselshf, and has regard for the well-being of the whole state, rather than for his own. Such is Socrates' answer in effect to this position of Thrasymachus.
...to which end heathenness to the eye of the commonwealth, as propagated by certaine wars and battles, doth in a manner conduce.

So Sir Thomas More in his Utopia, Book II. of the religions in Utopia. 'Besides this the riche men not only by private fraud but also by commen lawes, do every day pluck and snatche awaye from the poore some parte of their daily living. So where as it semed before unjuste to recompense with unkindnesse their paynes that have been beneficall to the publique weale, now they have to this their wrong and unjuste dealinge given the name of justice; yea and that by force of a law.' See Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 41, where the question is asked, τί ἐστι νόμος; and the conclusion is: πάντα, διὰ τὸ κράτους τῆς πόλεως θουλευσάμενοι & χρὴ ποιεῖν γράψη, νόμος καλεῖται. And it is there shown that spoliation and oppression is often dignified by the term law. See also Arist. Pol. 3, 6. ἀλλ' ἄρα τῶς ἐλάττων δίκαιων ἄρχειν καὶ τῶν πλούσιων; ἄν ὁμ κάκεινοι ταύτα ποιῶσι, καὶ διαράξωσι καὶ τὰ κτῖματα ἀφαιρῶτα τοῦ πλῆθους, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ δίκαιον; πειράσομαι μαθεῖν. Socrates is really anxious to arrive at a refutation of Thrasymachus' account of justice; therefore he passes over, with a bare mention, the objection that Thrasymachus has employed a word in his definition which he had forbidden Socrates to use; v.s. 336, D. And he likewise passes over Thrasymachus' reply, that he added to this word the qualification τοῦ κρείττονος. His desire is expressed in 346 A in the words ὑπά τι καὶ περαινωμέν, 'let us get to some conclusion or other'; and so below here he uses the imperative verbal, οὕτω σκεπτέον, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, δίλον.

αὐτῶθι, 'in this (latter) place,' in your later definition.' συμκρά γε ἱσως, 'a slight qualification, I suppose.' ἱσως sarcastically.
προσθήκη. Οὕτω δήλων οὐδ' εἰ μεγάλη ἄλλ' ὑπὶ μὲν τούτῳ σκεπτέων εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, δήλων. ἐπειδή γὰρ ἐμφάνισεν γέ τι εἶναι καὶ ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐ δὲ προστίθης καὶ αὐτὸ φής εἶναι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ἐγώ δὲ ἀγνοῶ, σκεπτέων δὴ. Σκόπει, ἐφη.

**CAP. XIII.**

Ταύτ' ἐσταί, ᾧ δ' ἐγώ. καὶ μοι εἶπέ· οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἀρχονσι δίκαιον φῆς εἶναι; Ἕγωγε. Πότερον δὲ ἀναμαρτητοί εἰσίν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκάσταις ἢ οὐδ' τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν; Πάντως ποι, ἐφη, οὐδ' τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. Οὐκοιν ἐπιχειροῦντες νόμους τιθέναι τοὺς μὲν ὁρθῶς τιθέσαι, τοὺς δὲ τινάς οὐκ ὁρθῶς; Οἴμαι ἐγώγη. Τὸ δὲ

οὕτω δήλων... 'It may be an important one for all I know.' οὔδ', 'not even,' implying that it may very well be an important addition.

ἐμφάνισεν γέ τι...ὁμολογῶ. The first piece of positive statement which Socrates has admitted in this argument. He allows justice to be 'advantageous.' ἐμφάνισεν τι is not more than a quality of justice. It is no definition, but merely one of the aspects of justice.

σκεπτέων δὴ. We have had three statements to which this is the conclusion; δὴ being the particle which marks the final stage of an argument. v.s. not. ad. περὶ τάλανα, Ch. VII. and Ch. II. ini. καὶ δὴ καὶ.

Ch. XIII.—But often, Thrasymuchus, the Stronger make laws, in their ignorance, to their own disadvantage; and is that Justice?
It is noticeable how very careful Socrates is to define all his terms with strictness; the reason being that he has to deal with a sophist who would think nothing of obstructing the argument by a mere logomachy, whilst Socrates is anxious to get to a conclusion.

The subjunctive is used to express the indefinite nature of the lawmaking, which depends merely upon the will and present feeling of the legislators; as Eschines expresses it, ὅτι τρόποι τῶν ἐφεστηκότων. v.s. not. ad τῶν πολέων αἱ μὲν.

tί λέγεις σύ; Thrasymachus is taken by surprise; he does not see to the end of Socrates' argument at present. This argument has been employed before in Polemarchus' case. See supr. Ch. VIII. ad med., where Socrates points out that a person may injure a friend through believing him to be an enemy, just as here he is about to show that legislators may harm themselves through legislation intended for their own benefit.

τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι φής. If we punctuate as in the text it would seem better to read φής, and look upon this clause as not dependent upon ὅταν in the preceding one, but added as an after thought, repeating one of the premisses. Stallb. places only a comma at προσέταξαν, but the question ἄρα τάτε, &c., cannot follow in the same sentence as the imperative οὖν.
taβαν' ἁρα τότε, ὁ σοφώτατε Ὀρασύμαχε, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν αὐτὸ οὕτως δίκαιον εἶναι ποιεῖν, τούναντίον ἢ ὧ σὺ λέγεις; τὸ γὰρ τὸν κρείττονος ἀξύμφορον δῆτον προστάττεται τοῖς ὧττοις ποιεῖν. Ναὶ μὰ Δι', ἐφι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὁ Πολέμαρχος, σαφέστατα γε. 'Εαν σὺ γ', ἐφι, αὐτῷ μαρτυρήσῃς, ὁ Κλειτοφῶν ὑπολαβῶν. Καὶ τί, ἐφι, δεῖται μάρτυρος; αὐτὸς γὰρ Ὀρασύμαχος ὁμολογεῖ τοὺς μὲν ἄρχοντας ἐνίοτε ἑαυτοῖς κακὰ προστάττειν, τοῖς δὲ ἄρχομένους δίκαιον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν. Τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν, ὁ Πολέμαρχε, ὑπὸ τῶν ἄρχοντων δίκαιον εἶναι ἐθέτο Ὀρασύμαχος. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ὁ Κλειτοφῶν, ἐξυμφέρον δίκαιον εἶναι ἐθέτο. ταῦτα δὲ Β ἀμφότερα θέμενοι ὁμολογήσειν αὐ ἐνίοτε τοὺς κρεῖττους τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀξύμφορα κελεύοντο τοὺς ὧττους τε καὶ ἄρχομένους ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν ὁμολογῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἐξυμφέρον δίκαιον ἂν εἰῇ ἢ τὸ μὴ ἐξυμφέρον. 'Αλλ', ἐφι ὁ Κλειτοφῶν, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἐξυμφέρον ἐλεγεν ὃ ἡγούτο ὁ κρείττων αὐτῷ ἐξυμφέρειν τοῦτο ποιητέον εἶναι τῷ ὧττοι, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο ἐτίθετο. 'Αλλ' οὐχ οὕτως, ἢ δ' ὃς ὁ Πολέμαρχος,

ὑπολαβῶν. v.s. not. ad taβὴ ὑπολ. Cap. XII. med. This is a piece of raillery on Cleito-
phon's part; Polemarchus chim-
ing in as though there were an end of the discussion to which he himself has contributed nothing.

to toυ κρείττ. ἐλεγεν... ἐλεγεν here is 'meant,' not 'said'; for if it were the latter, the sense would require εἶναι before ἢ. And Polemarchus is quite right in the point of fact, viz. that Thrasydamus did not say so.

And, thirdly, λέγειν is used in the same sense, XIV. init.; and in Ch. XV. ποτέρως λέγεις τὸν ἄρχοντα τε, &c. For another sense of λέγω see Ch. IV. note, with which compare Cicero, Cato Major, vi. 16. 'Nihil igitur afferunt, qui in re gerenda versari senectutem negant,' i.e. 'they say nothing to the point.' τοῦτο ποιητέον, &c. 'This he meant was to be done by the inferior, and he meant to define (ἐτίθετο) justice thus.'
Ci elégeto. Oúdén, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Πολέμαρχε, διαφέρει, ἀλλ' εἰ νῦν οὕτω λέγει Ὁρασύμαχος, οὗτος αὐτοῦ ἀποδεχόμεθα.

CAP. XIV.

Καὶ μοι εἰπὲ, ὁ Ὁρασύμαχε τοῦτο ἢν ὦ ἐβούλου λέγειν τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἐξυμφέρον δοκοῦν εἶναι τῷ κρείττοι, εάν τε ἐξυμφέρη ἐάν τε μὴ; οὕτω σε φῶμεν λέγειν; 'Ἡκιστὰ γ', ἐφ' ἀλλὰ κρείττω με οἴει καλεῖν τον ἐξαμαρτάνοντα, ὅταν ἐξαμαρτάνην; Ἐγώγη, εἰπτον, φῶμην σε τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτε τοὺς ἀρ- χοντας ὡμολόγεις οὐκ ἀναμαρτήτους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ὅτι καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνειν. Συκοφάντης γὰρ εἰ, ἐφ', ὦ

ἀποδεχόμεθα αὐτοῦ, ν.σ. ν. ν. ad Cap. XI. ὡς οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι σοι. And see Parmenides, 128 E. ἀλλ' ἀποδέχομαι...καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν. We can render here 'Let us take him so,' i.e. 'So let us understand him.' During this discussion Thrasymachus has been at a loss for an answer, and is elaborating a reply, when Cleitophon, who seems to lean rather to Thrasymachus' side, saves him from immediate confusion by the different reading of his definition.

Ch. XIV.—Thrasymachus shows that one who legislates against his advantage cannot be termed the Stronger when he makes a mistake. This delicate distinction can be upheld in theory; but in practical legislation the result does not arise from the intention of the legislator, but from the actual legislation. It is to no purpose to uphold, as Thrasymachus does, that cases of bad legislation are to be left out of the question; because it is the sum total of all upon which the estimate of a man's powers is founded. It has been said, 'the best general is he who makes fewest mistakes'; as Thrasymachus would phrase it, 'who is oftenest a general'; but we can see in such a case that, regarding the total result, the office and the man are inseparable.

Συκοφάντης. Below, Ch. XV. ini. we have Socrates' reading of this expression. οἴει μὲ ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κακουρ-
γοντά σε ἐρέσθαι ὅς ἰρόμην; εἷς ἐπιθυμήσ is the point wherein lies the συκοφαντία: ‘making a false representation on purpose.’ So Demosthenes accuses Ἀσχινες of συκοφαντία, in that Ἀσχινες accused him of receiving commendation from Ctesiphon when in office and for the mere discharge of the duties of his office, whilst, Demosthenes implies, Ἀσχινες knew very well that the commendation was elicited by the gift of certain moneys, separate and distinct from the official accounts. See Dem. de Cor. 264, Keiske. ὦτος συκοφαντῶν, ὦτι ἐπὶ τῷ θεωρικῷ τότε ἄν ἐπέδωκα τὰ χρήματα, ἐπήμενεν αὐτῶν, φησιν, ὑπεδυόν ὁντα. Ὁδριοὶ τούτων γε ὀὐδενὸς, ἦν ὑπεύθυνος ἢν, ἄλλ’ ἐφ’ ὦτι ἐπέδωκα, ὄ συκοφάντα.

αὐτίκα. ‘Ne longe abeam ut statim exemplum afferam’; Stallb. ‘Do you call a physician, now,...’

ἀγομέν τῷ ἰρήματι. Cf. Euthydemus, 304 E. ὦτωσι γάρ πᾶς καὶ εἴπε τοῖς ὑδόμασι. λέγω here is ‘to say,’ not ‘to mean.’ ἰρήματι is added to make this clear; but should be omitted in translation, and λέγομεν emphasized. ‘We say the physician has made a mistake, whereas he cannot make a mistake as a physician,’ ἄλλα here may be translated as ‘yet’; and so below, ἄλλα πᾶς γ’ ἄν εἶποι, ‘yet it would be commonly said.’

Greek text:
Σώκρατεσ, ἐν τούς λόγοις ἔπει αὐτίκα ἰατρον καλεῖσ, σὺ τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας κατ’ αὐτὸ τούτῳ ὁ ἐξαμαρτάνει; ἡ λογιστικών, ὅς ἂν ἐν λογισμῷ ἀμαρτάνη, τότε ὅταν ἀμαρτάνη, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀμαρτίαν; ἀλλ’, οἴμαι, λέγομεν τῷ ἰρήματι οὔτως, ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐξήμαρτε καὶ ὁ λογιστής ἐξήμαρτε καὶ ὁ γραμματιστής τὸ δ’, οἴμαι, ἐκαστὸς τούτων, καθ’ ὅσον τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὁ προσαγορεύομεν ἑαυτὸν, οὐδέποτε ἀμαρτάνειν ὡστε κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ἀκριβολογεῖ, οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἀμαρτάνει. ἐπιλειτουργήσῃ γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἀμαρτάνων ἀμαρτάνει, ἐν ό οὐκ ἔστι δημιουργός; ὡστε δημιουργὸς ἢ σοφὸς ἢ ἄρχων οὐδεὶς ἀμαρτάνει τότε ὅταν ἄρχων ἦ, ἄλλα πᾶς γ’ ἄν εἰποί, ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἰμαρτε καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ἰμαρτε. τοιούτων οὐν δι’, σοι καὶ ἔμε ὑπόλαβε νῦν δὴ ἄποκρίνεσθαι τὸ δὲ ἀκουβέστατον ἐκείνῳ τυχάνει ὁν, τὸν ἄρχοντα, καθ’ ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστί, μὴ ἀμαρτάνειν, μὴ ἀμαρτάνοντα δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ βέλτιστον τίθεσθαι, τούτῳ δὲ
CAP. XV.

But, Thrasymachus, all the arts and sciences have regard to the interest of those to whom they minister, to the interest, that is, of the Weaker.

Socrates shifts his line of confutation here: he does not prove the fallacy of Thrasymachus' point, that the legislator, as a legislator, cannot err. And he refrains for this reason. He is about to employ Thrasymachus' own words on this point to confute him farther on. See Ch. XVII. 345 C, where Thrasymachus is shown to have first demanded that the shepherd, or ruler, be considered only and entirely as a shepherd, or ruler; and afterwards to have employed the term shepherd, or ruler, as one who keeps sheep, or rules a people, for his own profit.

See Euthydemus, 288 E: oüdein pléon, oüd' eî anevn praxmátaton kal toû drôsteiûn thn gênu toû pâv ëmín chrêsìn ëvénouto. And see below here, Ch. XXI.; also in Ch. XVI. we have the converse phrase: diakais anhp adikou panteqho ëlaston ëxei. oüte më labōn, &c. 'Nor, if you are detected [lit. fail to escape notice], will you be able to force me in the argument.' There is an alternative between the employment of fraud and force, as in Book II. 3. lêgeiun te ikanv õvnti prôs òd pêthn., kal biásthath ësa õv biais dêntai. õn. Keeping the same meaning of êleqes as above in lêgeis, õn must refer to tôn, not to lôgyf.
In this example τάδε has been explained as an accusativus pen- dens, in the others ταῦτα is rather an accusative of respect, or adverbial accusative.

At this point Socrates begins to introduce the consideration that a physician, as a physician, has no regard for money, i.e. for his own interests, and that, by analogy of the arts, a ruler must, as a ruler, have regard to the interests of the ruled. Hence the injunction, λέγε τὸν τῇ ὑπ' ἑτέρῳ ἱστρόν ὑπέρ. His next point is that the arts, in so far as they require anything, require it in order to render them more efficient, that they may be perfect in themselves (τέλειαν), and self-sufficient (αὐτάρκεις); whereas both that with which, and that upon which, they are exercised, require their assistance, and perhaps the assistance of much else besides. Governing, therefore, being an art, looks to the benefit of the governed, and in itself should be self-sufficient, and should not require recompense from the governed.
A short digression upon the meaning of κυβερνήτης. His duties as captain (καυτῶν ἄρχον) and as the person responsible for the safe conduct of the ship (κυβερνήτης) form his real business; his duties as a sailor, and the fact of his sailing in the vessel are incidental. 

Both of these questions must be connected in the argument: they form an antithesis; and whilst the answer to the first is 'yes,' the answer to the second, if Thrasymachus understood the question, would be 'no.' See below, οὕτως φαίνεται, and the question answered in those words. Every person who exercises an art (ἐκάστῳ τοῦτῳ) receives a reward or payment (ξυμφέρον) in return, in order that he may be supported and kept in a state of efficiency to discharge the duties of his art. But every art (ἐκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν) is sufficient in itself, requires no external aid, and only aims at being as perfect as possible by enlarging its sphere of action.

The question is worded in such a manner that it does not convey a definite meaning to Thrasymachus.

εἶ μὲ ἔρωτο... Socrates' fondness for the dialectical method causes him to cast even his illustration in the form of question and answer.

The corresponding adjective is αὐτάρκης, self-sufficient, that which has not to depend upon external resources and external aid. The origin of justice itself is said (Book II. 358 E) by Glaucon to lie in the fact that some men, being naturally unable to defend themselves, combine together to bring about an arrangement which shall insure their not being ill-
treated. In other words they are not αυτάρκειας, they require external assistance. Aristotle follows in Plato's steps thus:

...πολιτικόν δίκαιον. τούτο δέ εστὶν ἐπὶ κοινονάς βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν. Eth. Nic. 5, 6, 4. Again in Book II. the origin of the city itself is said to lie in men being not αὐτάρκειας, but requiring each other's assistance in daily life. Γίνεται τοὺσ πόλεις ἐπεὶ δι’ τυχῆς τυχαίαν ἤμων ἑκαστὸς οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεχόμενον. Aristotle places happiness in the same category that Plato places the arts here, because whilst all things else in human life have regard to happiness as their aim, happiness itself is αὐτάρκης, or self-sufficient. See Nic. Eth. 1, 7, 6: τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐτάρκεια εἶναι δοκεῖ. Similarly in the Republic, Book III. 387 D, the noble man (ἐπισκεφτής αὐτῆρ) who has no fear of death is αὐτάρκης: ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα αὐτὸς αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εἶναι, καὶ διαφέροντες τῶν ἄλλων ἥκιστα ἑτέρου προσδείται. But not entirely so; see Ch. IV. οὗτ' ἄν ὁ ἐπισκεφτὴς πάντα τῷ βασίλει γῆρας μετὰ πενίας ἐνέγκει. Similarly Aristotle in the passage quoted allows that even his perfect human character stands in need of a few relations and friends, and therefore in Books 10, 7, 4, he speaks of perfect αὐτάρκεια as having rather a mental than a social and physical import. Ἡ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἄν εἴη; τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ σύνοφος καὶ δίκαιον καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δεόνται.

ἡ ἄρθρος...εἰπεῖν οὕτω λέγων. v.s. Ch. VI. ἵππε. τι φησι τῶν Σιμωνίδην λέγοντα ἄρθρος λέγειν περὶ δικαιοσύνης;

αὐτὴ ἢ ἰατρικὴ... Here the original question is repeated, ἀρ' οὖν καὶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν τεχνῶν... Thrasymachus having been enlightened.

ἐσθ' ὃ τι προσδείται. See infr. 346 D: ἐσθ' ὃ τι ὡφελεῖται ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης; And Ch. XXIII. fin.: ἐσθ' ὃ ὡτι ἄν ἄλλῳ θείως ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς; Also the particle ὃτι combines very readily with such words as ἐστίν, οἶδα, δῆλον, to emphasize either a statement or a question. So ἐστίν ἴναι, ἐστιν οὐ, οὐκ ἐστιν ὅπως, οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως.

ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ‘over and above them.’ The force of ἔτι here must not be overlooked. The meaning is that on account of this dependence (διὰ ταύτα)
there is a further consideration, viz., the art which attends to the eye and ear. *autōi* then refers to the eye and ear; whilst *tēs to ξ* &c. below will mean 'an art which looks out and provides that which is to the advantage (of the eye and ear) for these purposes,' viz. sight and hearing (*eis tauta*).

καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἀπέραντον, 'and does this go on for ever? 'ad infinitum?

*ή αὐτή αὐτή...* The latter alternative, as usual in these longer dilemmas, is intended to be accepted. *v.s. Ch. XIXI. ἑπι.: πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητον εἰσιν οἱ ἀρχωτε μὲν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκάσταις ἢ οὗτοι τι καὶ ἀμαρτείν. And see Meno. 72 *B.* ἄρα τούτω ψῆς πολλάς καὶ παντοδαπὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, τῷ μελλέσας εἶναι; η τούτω μὲν οὖδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἀλλώ δὲ τῷ;

οὔτε αὕτης... 'Not only is the art independent of other arts, but it is also independent of assistance from itself.' This proposition is not true in its latter clause. An art, as practised upon its objects, does not gain assistance from other arts *directly*; although indirectly many arts contribute to the improvement of one, *e.g.* microscopy to surgery. See Sir John Lubbock's address to the British Association at York, 1881: 'One very marked feature in modern discovery was the manner in which distinct branches of science had thrown, and were throwing, light on one another.' But an art does gain assistance from itself, *i.e.* it improves by experience, the continual treatment of new cases suggests improvements,—vires acquirit eundo. And, to transfer this to Plato's instance, an old doctor is, broadly speaking, better than a young one. This loose point, although of no account here, will be found to create a difficulty later on, in Book III., where Socrates is speaking of the physicians in his State. In that passage (*409 fin.*), he slurs over the fact that experience of disease makes the best physician, with the barbarous conclusion that where a person is of a bad constitution, *ἀποθήσασεν ἐδοσώσιν.*

οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία... *i.e.* in the principles of science there is nothing of evil effect. They are immutable and beneficial; for by the knowledge of them we can work according, and not in opposition, to nature. But in the person who applies them, and in the recipient of their application, there is *poνηρία*, or fault. An art is the exercise of
human faculty according to system, and whilst exercised thus (ὄφθη οὖσα) an art is benefic- sial. In this passage it must be borne in mind that Socrates is speaking 'strictly,' i.e. when speaking of an art he speaks of those principles which in their nature are unerring; and does not regard the art in the slightest degree as remunerative to him who practises it.

οὕτως ἔφη, φαίνεται. Thrasy- machus is beginning to see the gist of Socrates' argument, and uses the qualitative word φα- νεται.

ἀρχοντι γε... 'are in command of, and are stronger than...' On this analogy, cleverly brought home to the ears of his audience by the use of ἀρχῶ and κρατεῖω, rests Socrates' conclusion, that justice is the interest of the weaker, and not of the stronger. The analogy may be borne out thus: the principles of medicine and the ruler of a State alike dictate to the people what they are to do and what they are not to do as subjects, respectively, of medicine and law. The principles of medicine and of law are alike intrusted to experts whose duty it is to legislate, for prevention and cure, against illness and crime. A citizen who is a good member of the common- wealth, and a person who has need of medicine, must, as a condition of benefit, accept the constitution and the principles of medicine. But it is easy to see that the analogy cannot be borne out entirely. If we put the case that a person disobeys his doctor, who is the worse? The patient. Whereas if a citizen be guilty of treason he may throw the State into confusion and ruin the ruler. The particle μὴν is used to introduce a fresh link in the chain of argument, and also indicates the point at which this argument begins to show in marked opposition to Thrasy machus' words, that rulers rule for their own benefit; just as in XXI. ἄρ', in a similar stage of an argument we have ἀλλα μὴν ὠμολογούμεν, &c. For Socrates here brings the arts under the category of rulers. 'And yet, Thrasy machus [i.e. for all that you said before], the arts are rulers.' Γε is to save.
the directness of this attack
upon Thrasymachus’ position;
it is apologetic.

ἄλλο τι οὖν, v.s. Ch. XI. C.

ἀλλὰ, 'in whose interest,' 'for
whose benefit.'

CH. XVI.—That is all nonsense,
replied Thrasymachus; any one
can tell you that an unjust man
turns government to his own
benefit, and a just man finds it
his ruin.

ἐνταῦθα τοῦ λόγου, v.s. Ch.

II. ἕν. ἐνταῦθα εἴ τῆς ἡλικίας.

ὁ τοῦ δικ. λόγος, ‘the account’
or ‘the definition’ of that which
is just.
perieisthke, ó Ὀρασύμαχος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, Εἰπὲ μοι, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, τίθη σοι ἔστιν; Τί δὲ; ἰὴν δ' ἐγώ. οὐκ ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρήν μᾶλλον ἡ τοιαύτα ἑρωτῶν; Ὅτι τοι σε, ἐφη, κορυφάντα περιορίσκω καὶ οὐκ ἀπομύττει δεόμενον, δὲ γε αὐτῇ οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γινώσκεις. Ὅτι δὴ τί μάλλοτα; ἰὴν δ' ἐγώ. Ὅτι οἷεὶ τοὺς ποιμένας ἢ τοὺς βουκόλους

κελεύσασι δὲ νυσὶ καθελομεν ἵστια πάντα.

Hom. Od. 9, 149.

'Multis ille bonis flebilis occidit.'

Hor. Od. I. 24, 9.

The above datives fall in grammars under different heads; but they all agree in this fundamental character, that they express some person or thing more or less directly connected with the main action. In these examples the connection is close: often we can render by 'of,' as though the case were a genitive. Subjoined are some examples of the Ethnic Dative, where it will be noticed that the connection between the person or thing in the dative, and the subject, is more remote, is rather mental than physical, as in the above examples:—

'Non Beroe vobis! non haec Rheteia, matres, Est Dorycli conjux.'

Virg. Æn. 5, 646.

ὦκ ἄρρεν' ὦμιν ἔστιν;


κλῆθη νῦν μοι, πλεύρα θεὸς ἐπὶ χονός.


ἰδεῖν ἄλλα τε ἐκ μυθολογοῦσι θαυμαστὰ καὶ ἵστον.—Rep. Book II. 359 D.

μάλιστα, 'particularly,' 'in what special point?'
always in view when taking all care of those committed to him. 

οὐτώ πόρρω εἰ, 'so far a-field,' 

' so far off.' We find the expression used, to convey an exactly opposite sense when the simple genitive is employed. 

οὐτώ πόρρω σοφίας ἦκε, 'you are so far advanced upon the road of wisdom.' —Euthyd. 294 E.


The phrase means, 'the benefit of some one else.' Thrasymachus here must be taken as meaning by δικαιοσύνην, 'justice as popularly understood'; otherwise ἀλλότριον has no meaning. But he is passing on now to consider the condition of the subjects, those who experience justice, i.e. the 'rule of the Stronger'; whilst, from the view of the rulers, justice is the 'advantage of the Stronger.' 'By justice,
he would say, ‘in the mouths of the people, we must understand the profit of the rulers and the injury of the ruled.’

οικεία βλάβη. v.s. the passage quoted from Sir Thomas More's Utopia in Ch. XII. 338 E. The passage proceeds thus:—

Therefore when I consider and way in my mind all these common welthes, which now a dayes any where do florish, so God helpe me, I can perceave nothing but a certein conspiracy of riche men procuring their owne commodities under the name of the common wealth.'

η δὲ ἀδικία τούναντιον, καὶ ἄρχει... Thrasymachus does not tell us who are the perpetrators of injustice; but, as injustice is stated to be the exercise of rule over the just (ἄρχει τῶν δικαίων), we are obliged to conclude that it is the rulers who are the ἀδικοὶ and exercise this ἀδικία. We are confirmed in this conclusion by a reference to Book III. 409, loc. supr. cit., where the just man, it is allowed, is often the victim of the unjust; just as in the Gospel it is said that the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light. διδ δὴ καὶ εὑρίσκειν (as εὐθυκῶν here) νέοι ὑπὲρ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς φαι- νονται καὶ εὐθυκατηγοῦνι τῶν ἀδικῶν. Therefore Thrasymachus' position comes to this: Rulers manage the people for their own profit: the law-abiding people consider obedience to the rulers to be justice. Still it remains that the rule of the Rulers is, in all cases, an unjust one. It is evident from this that Thrasymachus allows in the background the existence of a very different justice from the justice of his definition; otherwise, why does he acknowledge that the Rulers rule unjustly? We shall see what use Socrates makes of this inconsistency in the sequel. Aristotle treats of a similar case in Eth. Nic. 5, 6, where, describing πολιτικὸν δί- καιον, he also defines injustice: τοῦτο δ' εστὶ τὸ πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἄπλως ἀγαθῶν, ἐλαττῶν δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν. Αἰτὶ οὖν ἐκεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἄρχειν ἀλλα-γῶν λόγον. δίκαιος ἀνὴρ δίκαιον πανταχοῦ ἐλαττῶν ἔχει, v.s. not. at οὐδὲν γέ σου πλέον ἔσται, Ch. XV. init. In Arist. Eth. Nic. 5, 9, 9, the just man is described as denying himself, as permitting or conniving at the advantage of others, ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴς ἐλαττωτικὸς ἔστιν. And above,
ευμβολαιοις, ὅπου ἃν ὁ τοιούτος τῷ τοιούτῳ κοινωνίᾳ, οὖναμοῦ ἃν εὐροίς ἐν τῇ διαλύσει τῆς κοινωνίας πλέον ἔχοντα τὸν δίκαιον τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀλλ' ἐλαττον ἐπειτα ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὅταν τε τίνες εἴσφοραί ὁσίων, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν ἱσων πλέον εἰσφέρει, ὁ δὲ ἐλαττον, ὅταν τε λήψεις, ὁ μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ πολλὰ κερδαίνει. καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἀρχὴν τινα ἄρχῃ ἐκάτερος,

πλέον ἐτέρῳ ἢ αὐτῷ νέμει. For this position see Book II. Chaps. I.—IX., where it is drawn out at much greater length, and illustrated with much greater force by Glaucon and Adeimantus. See also Aristophanes, Clouds, where the Δίκαιος Δόγος and the Ἀδίκος Δόγος measure swords, ll. 889—1104. And with regard to the special question, ἐπειτα ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, of the just man and the unjust in office, see Socrates’ conversation with Aristippus in Mem. Xenophon, Book II. Ch. I. And also Antiphon’s opinion of Socrates’ refusal to take money for teaching; ibid. Book I. 6, 12. Δίκαιος μὲν ὅν ἄν εἴη, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξαπατᾶς ἐπὶ πλευνεῖα, σόφος δὲ οὐκ ἄν, μηδενός γε ἄει ἐπισταλεινος. Here σόφος οὐκ... is the equivalent of εὐθυτίκων and εὐθθεις in the passages of the Republic. And see also the passage from Arist. Ethics quoted above, πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν.

εὐμβολαιοις. v.s. not. ad Cap. VII.

eἰσφορά, an extraordinary tax, raised upon property, to meet urgent occasions. Thus when Mytilene was besieged, b.c. 428, by Paches, an εἰσφορά was imposed. προσδέομενοι δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι χρημάτων ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑσενέγκοντες τὸ τρίτον εἰσφοράν διακόσια, ἐξέπεμψαν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς εὐμμάχοις, &c. The term for the imperial requisition was φόρος, and afterwards σύνταξις, see Dem. de Cor. 305, Reiske.

ἀπὸ τῶν ἱσων, ‘upon an equal assessment or amount of property,’ ἀπὸ implies ‘calculating from.’

λήψεις. An illustration of this practice, i.e. of gratis distribution to the citizens when any extraordinary revenue accrued, is found in Herod. VII. 144, where it is proposed that the produce of the Laurian silver should be applied thus: ἐμελλόν λάξεσθαι ὅρχηδον ἐκαστος δέκα δραχμάς. Themistocles however diverted the money to the building of a fleet. Similarly in Roman history, when Attalus Philometor, king of Pergamus, bequeathed his property to Rome, Tiberius Gracchus proposed to apply it to the stocking of those farms which poor farmers had obtained through his agrarian laws, instead of merely distributing it to all the citizens.

ὅταν ἀρχῇ τινα... For this third point compare Xen. Mem. II. 1, 8. καὶ γὰρ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ἄφινονος ἀνθρώπων εἶναι τὸ, μεγάλου ὅντος τοῦ ἑαυτῷ τὰ δέοντα παρασκευάζειν, μὴ ἀρκεῖν τούτο, ἀλλὰ προσαναθέσθαι τὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ἄν δέονται
τῶν μὲν δικαιῶν ὑπάρχει, καὶ εἰ μηδεμία ἄλλη ἡμια, τά γε οἰκεία δι’ ἄμελειαν μοχθηροτέρως ἔχειν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δημοσίου μηδὲν ἀφελείσθαι διὰ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀπέχθεσθαι τοῖς τε οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς γνωρίμοις, ὅταν μηδὲν ἐθέλῃ αὐτοῖς ὑπηρετεῖν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ πάντα τούτων τὰναντία ὑπάρχει. λέγω γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἔλεγον, τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν. τοῦτον οὖν σκόπει, εἴπερ Βουλεῖς κρίνειν, ὅσο μᾶλλον ἔμφερει ἵδια αὐτῷ ἀδίκον εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον. πάντων δὲ ὅστα μαθη-

porίζειν, καὶ ἐαυτῷ μὲν πολλὰ ἃν βούλεται ἐκλείπει τῆς δὲ πόλεως προσέτατα, εἰς μὴ πάντα, ὡσά νῦν βούλεται καταπράττη, τούτοις δικήν ὑπέχειν, τοῦτο πῶς ὧν πολλῇ ἄφροτην ἑστὶν; So in Herod. I, 97, the just man Deioces, who is always appointed arbiter of disputes, finds that his own affairs go to ruin whilst he is rectifying others'. οὗ γὰρ οἱ λοιπονεῖσιν, τῶν ἐαυτοῦ ἐξημεληκότα, τοῖσι πέλας δι’ ἡμέρας δικαίζειν. Aristotle (Eth. 5, 66) gives the reason for the just man's poverty in office, by stating the principle on which he acts: οὗ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἀπλώς ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτῶν ἀνάλογον ἑστίν. And he agrees with Plato in his opinion of their different behaviour in office when he says, ἀρχῇ ἄνδρα δεῖξε; 5, I, 16. Thrasymachus adds that it is the fault of the judge's ἐνύθεσια if he cannot make his livelihood and something to spare out of his dispensation of justice.

μοχθηροτέρως ἔχειν. We should be inclined at first sight to make τὰ οἰκεία the subject of μοχθ. ἔχειν, but when we come to the balancing clauses, ἐκ δὲ... ἀφελείσθαι, and πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀπέχθεσθαι, we see that the sentence will be more perfect if 'the just man' be made the subject of μοχθ. ἔχειν as well as of ἀφελείσθαι. The use of μοχθηρός δικαίος in Gorgias, 504 E, may be noticed in support of this construction; and τἀ γε οἰκεία will then be accusativus respectūs pendens. For the termination of μοχθ. Stallb. addsuces a number of similar words, ἐνδεικτέρως, ἀγριοτέρως, μαθακοτέρως, &c. And for this use of the absolute comparative, see Euthyphro init., τὶ νεώτερον; Herod. VI. 46, τείχος ἰσχυρότερον περιβαλλόμενον.

ἀπέχθεσθαι. Transl. 'to be an object of hatred to,' thus bringing out the force of the dative, the case of the person indirectly concerned; v.s. not. ad autē, and see infr. Ch. XXIII. ἱνα μὴ τοίοῦ ἀπέχθωμαι. To render, 'by his relations and acquaintances,' is not accurate, although unavoidable in such a phrase as, ἐμοὶ πέπρακται τοῦρον.

ἡ τὸ δίκαιον, sc. εἶναι ἔμφερει τῷ δικαίῳ, Stallb. The expression is awkward and more abrupt.
than we should expect to find. Bremius conjectured τό before ἄδικον, which would improve the reading; but some of the MSS. omit τό altogether.

τὴν τελεωτ. ἄδικαιν. v. i. 348 D: οἱ γε τελέω σοί τέ τά ἄδικεν. And ἢνθ. in this Ch. τὴν ὁλην ἄδικαιν ἡδικηκότα. 351 B: τελεωτάτα οὖσα ἄδικος. 352 C: κομιδὴ ὑπνεῖ ἄδικοι. 360 E: τελέουν ἐκάτερον εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα τιθῶμεν. El ἢνθ. ἢνθ. ἐσχάτη ἄδικα, τῷ τελεώ ἄδικῳ. And so ὡμολογήσαντες, 352 C, and οἱ κατὰ μὲρη ἄδικωντες, ἢνθ. here.

ἐστι δὲ τούτῳ τυραννίσ. See Arist. Eth. 5, 6, 5. Αἰών οὐκ ἔωμεν ἄρχειν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ λόγον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τούτῳ ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος. Loc. supr. cit.; et ἢνθ. § 7. Μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέοις...ὅτω δὲ μὴ ἰκανὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὕτω γίνονται τύραννοι. For the genesis of the τύραννος, see Book VIII. fin. IX. ἢνθ. Thrasymachus’ account of the despot here agrees substantially with that of Socrates in Book VIII.

ἱερὰ καὶ ὃσιον ἠπά; Latīn sacer; ὃσιον = fas. See Liddell and Scott ad ὅσιος, 2. For ἄδικων v.s. Ch. IX.: ἢ καὶ ἄδικων ὀρεθῇ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακοὶ; (sc. ποιοῦσι).

καὶ γὰρ ἰερόσυλοι, &c. Cf. the tale of Alexander and the robber, which has been related thus. ‘A certain pirate who made great havoc among the shipping of the Mediterranean Sea was taken prisoner by the Macedonian soldiers and brought before Alexander, who asked by what right he committed his robberies. “I am a robber by the same right that you are a conqueror,” was the reply; “the only difference between us is, that I have but a few men, and can do but little mischief, while you have a large army and can do a great deal.”

τῶν τοιοῦτων κακ. Causal genitive: it is used very frequently in Greek, and appears in many forms. E.g. with adjective alone, ὁ δυστάλανα τῶν ἐμῶν παθημάτων. Or with verbs of wondering, see ἢνθ. 426 D. τούς...προβουλεύεσθαι οὐκ ἀγαπᾶσθαι τῆς ἀνδρέας. Also with such verbs as εὐδαιμονίζω, μακαρίζω, ὀλβίζω.
δὰν δὲ τις πρὸς τοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήματι καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδίσαμενος δουλώσῃται, ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν ἀισχρῶν ὅνομάτων εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι κέκληνται, οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἄλλα καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσπερ ἂν πῦθωνται αὐτοῦ τὴν ὀλην ἀδικίαν ἡ ἡδικηκότα: οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἁδικα ἄλλα τὸ πᾶσχεν φοβοῦμενοι ὁνειδίζουσιν οἱ ὁνειδίζοντες τὴν ἁδικίαν. οὕτως, ὑ διόκρατες, καὶ ἵσχυρότερον καὶ ἑλευθερώτερον καὶ δεσποτικότερον ἁδικία δικαιοσύνης ἐστίν ἵκανος γυγνομένη, καὶ ὅπερ εἴ άρχης ἐλεγον, τὸ μὲν τοῦ κρείττονος ἐμφέρον τὸ δίκαιον τυγχάνει οὖν, τὸ δ' ἁδικον ἑαυτῷ λυστελοῦν τε καὶ ἐμφέρον.

CAP. XVII.

Ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὁ Θρασύμαχος ἐν νῷ εἶχεν ἀπιέναι, ὅσπερ βαλανεὺς ἢμῶν καταπτιλῆσας κατὰ τῶν ὀντῶν ἀνδραποδίζομαι is the more odious word of the two, and expresses the act of depriving a man of his liberty; hence it means sometimes to kidnap; δουλω, to hold in subjection. So in Book V. 469 B, we find the former used when the question is discussed—Shall Greeks enslave Greeks in war? Πρῶτον μὲν ἀνδραποδισοῦν πέρι, δοκεὶ δικαίων Ἑλλήνας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι. Whilst farther on we find δοῦλος and δουλεία used to describe the state of slavery.

οὗ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἁδικα ἄλλα τὸ πᾶσχειν. In his elaboration of Thrasymachus' case in Book II., Glaucón shows that what is called justice arises from this fact, that men give up wrong dealing, not from principle, but because they prefer to free themselves from the danger of being ill-treated by others. ὡς' ἐπειδὴν ἄλλην ἁδικῶσι τε καὶ ἁδικῶνται καὶ ἀμφιτορὼν γεώνται, τοῖς μη δυναμένοι τῳ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἱρεῖν δοκεὶ λυσιτελεῖν ἐμφθεῖσθαι ἄλληλοις μητ' ἁδικεῖσθαι. φοβοῦμενοι, 'because they are afraid of.' ἵσχυρότερον... ἁδικία. Thrasymachus here no longer conceals his true position, but clearly states that what is justice to the ruled is injustice in the hands of the ruler; an inconsistency which cannot be supported by the terms of any definition.

CH. XVII.—Socrates entreats Thrasymachus to abide by his words.

ἕσπερ βαλανεύς... Socrates, as it has been mentioned above, had the greatest objection to
long speeches, and always stipulated for the method of question and answer in discussion. See Protag. 334 D. He justified this claim on the ground that he had a bad memory (a phase of the ἐλπιδαί, thus: loc. cit. ἕγω τυχάνω ἐπιλήσιμον τις ἄνθρωπος. In Ch. XXII. init. Thrasymachus, when defeated in argument, refuses to be convinced, and expresses his intention either of giving his opinion in a speech, or of saying ‘yes’ and ‘no,’ just as Socrates desires—in other words, of not attempting to argue the question. He there states that he knows Socrates will accuse him of making an harangue (θημιγο-ρείν) if he deliver himself as he desires, and yet declines to argue point by point. For καταντλέω, see 536 B, φιλοσοφίας ἐτί πλείω γέλωτα καταντλήσομεν; where also the object is in the genitive.

πολύν τὸν λόγον. Cf. Dem. de Cor. 272, 20, πολλῷ βέοντι, of an orator; and Hor. Sat. i. 7, 28—

'Salso multoque fluenti.'

The word θρασυνομένω preceding πολλῷ βέοντι in the passage quoted from Demosthenes, encourages us to believe that the name Thrasymachus was appropriated by Plato to intimate the character of this sophist.

οὐ μὴν εἶασάν γε, 'but the rest by no means permitted him to escape.' γε implies the complete refusal of the others to let Thrasymachus off, being attached to εἶασαν, in order to negative the bare idea of their doing so.

οἶον ἐμβαλὼν...ἐχείς. Here, as noticed above, page 128, the principal verb is cast into the participle, for purposes of grammatical construction; as we had above, οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα...ποθοῦμεν οἰνειδίζομεν. 'They are not afraid of doing but of suffering harm, that they reproach,' &c. We may recall Virgil, Ἀν. i, 141—

'Claua ventorum carcerem regnet.'

i.e. 'Let him shut up his prison before he play the king.' For ἐμβαλὼν v. infr. ἥ εἰς τὴν πυχὴν φέρων ἐνθῶ τοῦ λόγου;

ἡ σμικρὸν οἷεὶ...ἀλλ’ οὐ... For the sentiment, v.s. not. ad εἰ μὲν χρυσὸν ἔχετομεν, Ch. X. And infr. 352 C, οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος δ λόγος ἄλλα περὶ τοῦ ὄντων τρόπον χρὴ ζην. Similarly 358 E, περὶ γὰρ τίνος ἄν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἔχων χαίροι λέγων καὶ ἀκόουν; (sc. δικαιοσύνης). Again 367 D, σοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἂν (sc. bear to hear the ordinary talk about justice) εἰ ἦν οὐ κελεύεις, διότι πάντα τὸ
In the same strain he insists in Book V. 452 C, seqq. on the folly of those who only make a joke out of well-intentioned legislation, adding the telling remark, μάταιος δ' γελαίων ἄλλο τι ήγείται ἢ τὸ κακὸν. Again in Book VI. 497 E he makes the just man disregard all else but living his life purely and uprightly; ἄγαπα, εἴ τι αὐτὸς καθαρὸς ἀδικίας τε καὶ ἀνοσίαν ἠργᾶν τοῦ τε ἐνθάδε βιώσαται καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτοῦ μετὰ καλῆς ἐπιτίθεος ἵππως τε καὶ εὐμενὶς ἀπαλλάσσεται. These passages are very valuable, because they preserve the leading point of Socrates’ moral system—‘Put everything after living your life uprightly,’—just as in Book X. ἰδι. he puts truth before persons, ἀλλ’ οὐ γὰρ πρὸ γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέως ἄνηρ, and they prove to us what we are liable to forget sometimes amid the railery of the dialogue, that Socrates was always in earnest. See Introd. § 7. Aristotle speaks similarly in Eth. Nic. 2, 21: Ἕπειρ οὖν ἡ παρόσσου πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκα ἔστων οὐ γὰρ ἦν εἰδαμέν τι ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ’ ἦν ἄγαθον γενόμεθα, &c. The expression ἄλλ’ οὐ is to be noticed, where in English we should say ‘and not.’ See Book II. 379 D: τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλ’ ἄτα δεί ζητεῖν τὰ αἰτία, ἄλλ’ οὐ τὸν θεόν. So in Book VI. 500 A: ἐν διάλογοις τισιν ἠγούμει, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν τῷ πληθεί, χαλεπήν οὕτω φύσιν γλυ νεσθαί. Also ibid. 492 A: ἢ καὶ οὐ διαφθειρομένους τίνας εἶναι ὁπδο σοφιστῶν νέους...ἄλλ’ οὐκ αἰσχύνοι τοὺς ταῦτα λέγουσας μεγάλους μὲν εἶναι σοφιστάς. And also Book VII. 532 C, and ἰδι. here, ὥσπερ χρηματιστήν ἀλλ’ οὐ ποιέμεν, and Ch. XVIII. ἀφελειαν ἴδιαν παρέχεται, ἀλλ’ οὐ κοινῆν.

εἴτε χείρον εἴτε βέλτιον βιωσ. v. Euthyphro βιλ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὃτι ἀμειονον βιωσούμην. προθυμώμω. A favourite term with Plato in a similar context. So Euthyphro II B, αὐτὸς σοι ξυμπροθυμήσομαι δείξαι, where ἐξ ὑπὲρ implies that the learner will assist the teacher by readiness to receive information; as in Xen. Anab. 7, 2, 24: δεδεμένου μου ξυμπροθυμηθήναι διαβήναι τὸ στράτευμα. See also Laches 186 A: προθυμόμενοι αὐτῶν ὃ τι ἀργύτες γενέσται τὰς ψυχὰς. And for the spirit in which the remark is proffered see Meno. 71 D: εἶπον καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς, τί φης ἀρετὴν εἶναι; κελεσται. Something similar is Virgil’s—

‘Haud illistabantur Æneia parvo Hospitia.’ (Æn. io, 494); the difference being that stare is used of the expense, κείμαι of the gain.
For this sense of κείμαι, to be stored up, see Ch. VII. ad fin. μηδέν αὐτῷ (sc. ἄργυρῳ) χρήσται ἀλλὰ κείσθαι.

τὸ γ’ ἐμὸν, v.s. τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους, Ch. III. ἢ τὸ λανθάνειν ἢ τὸ διαμ. v. οἰνοπ. Book II. Ch. IV.: λέγειν τε ἵκανός ὄντι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν, εἰν τι μηνύται τῶν ἄδικημάτων, καὶ βιάζασθαι ὡς ἄν ἔλαβε ἄνεσι. The unjust man is described as fully provided against all emergencies, by fraud or force, as in this passage.

πέπονθην, ‘has occurred to some one else,’ v.s. not. αὐτῷ ad page 114, ἐπεπόνθην.

ὅτι τίν ὡς ἄληθῶς ποιμένα, &c. See the beginning of Ch. XVI. where Thrasyumachus, in transferring his metaphor from a physician to a shepherd, forgot or repudiated his former distinction between the physician speaking roughly, and the physician purely as a physician; and proceeded to assert that the shepherd has his own ultimate profit always in view rather than the good of the sheep. Socrates points out that if the shepherd is to be understood rigorously as a shepherd (ἀγριβῶς), he has regard only to the well-being of the sheep, and not of himself. See Sir Thomas More's Utopia, p. 61, ed. Arber, in imitation of this passage: ‘Therefore the kynge ought to take more care for the wealthe of his people, then for his owne wealth, even as the office and dewtie of a shepehearde is, in that he is a shepherde, to feede his shepe rather then himselfe.’
We find this verb used personally in Hom. Od. 9, 20—

εἰμ' Ὅδυσείς Δασεριάδης ὅσ πᾶσι δόλοισιν

νθρώποις μέλων.

So δοκέω is found, and ἔοικα personally, as well as δοκεῖ and ἔοικεν. See Book II. 368 B: δοκέω γάρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἷναι. And Meno. 72 A: πολλῇ γέ τινι εὐνυχίᾳ ἔοικα κεχρήσθαι. ἔως γ' ἄν μηδὲν... See above, Ch. XV., the question at which Thrasy machus stumbled: ἄρ' ὅπειρον καὶ ἐκάσθι τῶν τεχνῶν ἔστι τι εὐμάθευτον ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι μάλιστα τελέσαι εἴναι;

οὕτω δὲ ὑμὶν... νῦν δὴ, 'just now.' Socrates calls Thrasy machus' attention to the inconsistency of making the ruler, as a ruler, have regard to his own interest. He then puts a question involving the word ἄρχειν, which he and Thrasy machus understand in different ways, thus; Thrasy machus' idea of ἄρχη is the discharge of certain duties as a necessary condition of obtaining money, power, and opportunity to further one's influence by judicious distribution of places; whilst Socrates looks upon it as an arduous and responsible labour, in which self must be ignored, and all the powers of the mind strained to their utmost, in providing for the welfare of the public. On these different acceptations of the term ἄρχη turns the next part of the discussion.
Ch. XVIII.—To every art, if it be exercised not merely as an art, but as a means of livelihood, the art, so to speak, of making money is subsidiary.

To understand Socrates' hint better if we refer back to Thrasymachus' question, Ch. XVI., 346 τι θη σοι ἐστιν; and below, Ch. XX. ad med., where Socrates says, 'I think you are now really speaking your mind, Thrasymachus, and not jesting.' έμοι γάρ δοκείσ σοι, ὃ Θρασύμαχε, ἀτεχνῶς νῦν οὖστε καί, ὥ μπαρά δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαιώμεν. Ἀλλὰ τούτῳ, ἐφή, ἐτέρα. Οὔκοιν καὶ ὄφελειαν ἐκάστη ἰδίαιν τινὰ ἡμῖν παρέχεται, ἀλλ' οὔ κοινήν, οἶον ἰατρική μὲν ὑγίειαν, κυβερ-
νητικῇ δὲ σωτηρίαν ἐν τῷ πλεῖν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτως; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ μισθωτικὴ μισθῶν; αὕτη γὰρ αὐτῆς ἦ δύναμις. ἦ τὴν ἱατρικὴν σὺ καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν τὴν αὐτὴν καλεῖς; ἦ εἶναις βούλη ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν, ὡσπερ ὑπέθου, οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον, εάν τις κυβερνῶν ὑγίης γίγνεται διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρειν αὐτῷ πλεῖν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, ἑνεκα τούτου καλεῖς μᾶλλον αὐτὴν ἱατρικὴν; Οὐ δῆτα, ἐφη. Οὐδὲ γ’, οἷμαι, τὴν μισθωτικὴν, εάν υγιαῖν τις μισθαρνῶν. Οὐ δῆτα. Τί δέ; τὴν ἱατρικὴν μισθαρνητικὴν, εάν ἰῶμενός τις μισθαρνῇ; Οὐκ, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν τὴν γε σφέλειαν ἐκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἱδίαν ὀμολογήσαμεν εἶναι; Ἡντίνα ἁρα σφέλειαν κοινῇ σφελοῦνται πάντες οἱ δημιουργοί, δῆλον ὃτι κοινῇ ἡ εἶναις βούλη ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν. The latter alternative gives the proposition to be accepted, v.s. Ch. XV. note. The art of navigation exists for and is directed solely towards, the safe conduct of people and goods over the sea. A physician may say to a man ‘take a sea voyage to recruit yourself’; but if a sailor is the better for his seafaring life, it is an accident in his art, not a constituent element, for he may be required to voyage in unhealthy as well as healthy climates.

οὐ δῆτα, ‘of course not.’ Prof. Paley terms δῆτα an adverbial expansion of δή. Δῆ, as has been noticed above, is culminating or final, and often emphatic; and often thus combined with οὐ. So infir. Ch. XXIII. init. δοκεῖς...πράξαι ἐν τὶ δύνασθαι, εἰ αἰδικοίειν; Οὐ δῆτα. See also Sophocles, Ὑ. Τύγ. 754, 5—

IO. ἦ καὶ δόμοιοι τυχανεὶ
tauv παρὼν;

IO. Οὐ δῆτα.
We have here a crude version of the fact that all human labour can be productive. The only way of justifying the use of the word τέχνη is to say that there is an art in knowing what article is demanded, in order that the labour may meet a want and be profitable to the labourer. But Socrates does not mean this, he is only arguing upon analogy; and he chooses to term the practice of getting paid for duties, professional or mechanical, an art, because it suits his disproof of Thrasymachus' statements.

έαν δὲ μὴ μισθὸς... We must not overlook the importance of this clause, although stated conditionally. 'But what if a man gets no pay for his labour —what then? Does he get any benefit from the art itself?' 'No,' Socrates would go on, 'it is to the person for whom he works that all benefit accrues from the art itself and not to the labourer; for he may spend his labour on that which is not wanted at once, and then he gets no return.' In contrast to this Socrates then puts the converse, 'Does he do no good, then, if he work without pay?' And Socrates' answer is that he must benefit some one by productive labour; although he may not be necessarily remunerated for it. In brief, it is impossible to work without doing good, but it is possible to work without gaining money.
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... to be unwilling to take office, but who, nevertheless do take it; where it may be construed 'those who must take office.'

And in this Book, Ch. XXI.; πώς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει... έοικέναι: 'How can he fail to be like... ?

And here ἵντρ.: τοῖς μέλλουσιν έθελήσειν άρχειν, 'Those who are to be induced to take office.'

And in Book II. Ch. I.: τῷ μέλλοντι μακάρῳ ἔσεσθαι. Also id. Ch. IV.: λανθανέτω, εἰ μέλλει σφόδρα δύικος εἶναι. This meaning is in curious contrast to another use 'to be going to do a thing (and never do it)'; 'to linger,' 'hesitate.' See Soph. O. C. 1627, 8—

οὐτός οὐτός, ὦ ὅδε, τι μέλλομεν χωρεῖν; πάλαι δὴ τ' ἀπὸ σοῦ βραδύνεται.

From which latter sense we have μελλητῆς (cunctator) in Ar. Eth. Nic. 4, 3, 27.

ζημίαν. See Ar. Eth. 5, 6, 6, loc. sup. cit.
Men who love money and fame are ready to take office; the best men only do so when pressed. But next I do not agree with Thrasymachus, that the just life is less profitable than the unjust.

Glauccon does not contemplate a repugnance to taking office; Socrates himself confesses that the reverse is the case, ὅσπερ νυν τὸ ἄρχειν (περιμένουν). Aristotle in Eth. Nic. draws out this character of a just man who is actuated by no self-interest, because he is in lack of nothing (οὐδὲν ἐχει), he is βασιλεὺς, the true monarch, and stands in contrast to τύραννος.

Thus threefold division of the self-sufficient, the praise-loving, and the money-loving characters, compare Book IX. 531 A. Ἀρ' οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς· καλούντες φιλοχρήστον καὶ φιλοκερδῆς ὁρῶς ἢ καλοίμενοι... Τί δὲ; τὸ θυμοειδὲς· εἰ φιλόνεικον αὐτὸ καὶ φιλότιμον προσαγο-ρεύομεν, ἢ ἐμμελῶς ἢ χοί; Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐν γε μανθάνομεν... φιλομαθὲς δὴ καὶ φιλόσοφον καλοῦντες αὐτὸ κατὰ τρόπον ἢν καλοίμεν; We have therefore before us here already an intimation of that threefold division into which the human mind is to be parted in Plato's ethical system; upon which he founds his political system as well. This statement, τὸ φιλότιμον τε καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι ὄνειδος λέγεται τε καὶ ἕστιν, may have been true in so far as the latter (φιλάργυρον) was concerned, but not as regards τὸ φιλότιμον, in Athenian politics. Demosthenes acknowledges in a magnificent passage that Athens had spent more money and more lives úπερ φιλοτιμίας than the rest of Hellas had spent upon themselves; and the statement would apply with equal truth to those epochs of Athenian history which witnessed the decorations of the Acropolis and the Sicilian expedition.
At the completion of his system of education for the philosopher-kings (Book VII. 520), Plato shows how unwillingly they will take office, preferring much the life of calm speculation to that of political business. ός ἐπ’ ἀναγκαῖον, &c. 

In the passage quoted, 520 D Book VII., Plato adds that that city is the best where men are least anxious to govern. ἐν τῶς ἦτο πρὸς ἀρξεῖν οἱ μέλλοντες ἁρξεῖν, ταύτην ἀριστα καὶ ἀστασιασότατα ἀνάγκη οἰκείσθαι.

And infr. here, Ch. XXIII; πάντα παντείζες, ἀπερ ἄφενεν ἐργάζεσθαι.

ἡ ἀλλὸν ὀφελῶν πράγματα ἐχεῖν. The fondness for a continuous participial construction is allowed here to interfere with the exactness of the antithesis, which would have required ὀφελεῖν.
Thrasymachus is here reduced to silence, but not convinced.

Although Glaucon is ready to state his conviction to this effect, we find in Book II. that he is sorely troubled by the misfortunes of the just and the prosperity of the wicked. See Ch. V. 361 E: ὁ δίκαιος μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, &c. (τὸν δὲ ἀδίκον) πρῶτον μὲν ἥρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐπείτα γαμεῖν ὅποθεν ἠν Βούληται, &c.

ἀληθεστέρως, v.s. μοχθοροτέρως, Ch. XVI. and infr. Book II. Ch. V. ἄγνοικοτέρως.

AdapterManager. In Book II. init. Glaucon confesses that he has doubts about the question, for the superiority of injustice has been so dinned into his ears by Thrasymachus and others, ἀπὸρῶ μὲντοι διαστηρυκομένοι τὰ ὑπάρχον Ἰασμαχόν καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων.

πείθειν, 'convince.' So Book II. init.: πότερον ἡμᾶς Βούλετε δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς πεῖται;

ἀν μὲν τοῖνυν... v.s. not. ad Cap. XII. init. This arrangement is proposed by Socrates in the interest of his method. We know that he disliked long speeches, from the way in which he speaks of Thrasymachus' oration, sup. Ch. XVII., and from Protagoras 335; and, if he can induce Thrasymachus to argue the question, he is sure of the victory. For the word ἀντικατατάσσειν. Stallb. comp. Phædr. 257 C: ἐὰν ὥρα καὶ ἔθελην πρὸς αὐτὸν ἄλλον (λόγον) ἀντιπαρατίθειναι.

ἀυτῷ, Ἰασμαχῷ.

ἄδ. This particle always has reference to a fresh case whether of like nature, or not, with that which precedes; v. infr. Ch. XXIV. ad med.: τι δ᾿ ἄδ ὧν 

The statement then, of the advantages of justice is looked upon as a rejoinder to
Thrasymachus' statement already made, that injustice is the better.

έκατέρψ, sc. λόγον.

ἀνομολογούμενοι, 'allowing,' or 'making concessions.'

Ch. XX.—Justice then with you, Thrasymachus, is wretched and evil, whilst injustice is noble and good. But your just man only tries to get the better of the unjust, whilst your unjust man tries to get the better of both unjust and just.

τὴν τελέαν ἀδικίαν... v.s. 344 A: ἐπὶ τὴν τελεστήν ἀδικίαν ἔλθῃ. 'The ideal of injustice,' in contrast to mere acts of felony, τοὺς τὰ βαλλυτία ἀποτέμνοτις, infr. Hence the definite article is used.

φέρε δὴ τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτῶν πῶς λέγεις; 'Come then, what would you say to such a question as this about them?' The drift of this part of the argument is clear, if we look to the middle of the chapter, where Socrates says that he believes Thrasymachus to be in earnest. He is merely taking Thrasymachus categorically over the ground of his assertion—on which it rests; he wishes to have Thrasymachus' position well defined before he proceeds to attack it. It is with this intent that he couches his questions in such a form as to draw from Thrasymachus downright and emphatic answers. Thus he says, when he has elicited the statement that one is ἀρετή and the other κακία, 'I suppose justice is ἀρετή and injustice κακία;' on purpose to draw from Thrasymachus an indignant disclaimer.
kaleis, to de kakia; Pws gar ou; Oukouv thn mev
dikaiosunyn arretyn, thn de adikiaian kakiai; Eikos ge'
efhi, ou hdioste, eteuidh kai legew adikiaian mev
lusiite-
leiv, dikaiosunyn d' ou. Alla ti mhn; Touvanov, 
hi de ou. "H thn dikaiosunyn kakiai; Ouk, alla
pwn ennainai euihtheian. Thn adikiaian ara kaka-
thetian kaleis; Ouk, alla euvoulian, efhi. "H kai
fronimoi sou, ou Oraosumache, dokousin einaa kai
agathoi ou adikoi; Ou ge telewos, efhi, ouoi te adikein,
poleis te kai eihnu dunameon anbropwv ufi eautois
poieithain, ou de oui me iswv tous ta balahtia
apoteimontas legein. Lusiitelei men ou, hi de ou,
ka kai ta toiauta, eauter lanhayh esti de ouk a'ixa
Elygon, alla a'vou di' elegon. Touto metnoi, efh,
ouk aghnodo ou ti voulei legein' alla ta tote eithmasta,
ei en arretis kai sofiai tithis merei thn adikian, thn
de dikaiosunyn en tois enantios. Alla pwn ou'tou
tithymi. Touto, then de' egow, h'hi stereosperon, ou etaire,

hdioste. Not merely collo-
quial, as Horace's 'quid agis,
dulcissumereurum,' but with
the sarcastic vein noticed on h'dis
gar ei, Ch. XI. The words
virtue and vice for arreti and
cakia are altogether inadequate;
there is a further notion in
arreti of health and vigour.

touvanov...ouk, alla... It
is evident that Thrasymachus
is now talking very much at
random; he states that his view
is the converse (touvanov) of
Socrates'; but has to qualify
this statement considerably.

pwn genw. eu'bheian, 'an ad-
mirable simplicity,' or 'most
ingenious folly.' So below,
'asteios is coupled with eu'hysis.

kakophtheian. A passing pun
of Socrates'; eu'bheia, goodness
or mildness of disposition,
comes afterwards to mean fool-
ishness euphemistically; see p.
120, note. Socrates pretends
to conclude that, adikia being
the contrary of dikaiosunyn, the
former is kakophtheia. But euihthea
in its ordinary, that is, its
derived sense of folly, is not
the contrary or correlative of
kakophtheia, which means vici-
ness. Hence Socrates is merely
jesting for the moment.

en arretis ... merei, v.s. Ch.
XIX.: en msotho merei eu'rhkhas.
alla pwn... v.s. Ch. I.: alla
perimenoimen.

tou'to stereosperon. This is
said to beguile Thrasymachus.
Socrates has no difficulty in
refuting such a suicidal position
as that taken up here. It is
a much more difficult task, and
one which he has to meet in
Book II., to prove that "honesty is the best policy," against the facts marshalled by Glaucon and Adeimantus. It will be seen that Socrates does not attempt the solution of that difficulty there; he begins to form his state, and only in Book IX., does he come back to settle finally the thorny question, of which the present position of Thrasy-machus is but a shadow or a caricature, see Book IX. 588: Εἴειν δὴ, εἴπον ἐπείδη ἐνταῦθα λόγον γεγονόμενα, ἀναλάβωμεν τὰ πρῶτα λεχέντα, δι’ ἄφεν δέφιμομεν. ἢν δὲ ποι λεγόμενον λυστελεῖν ἄδικε ἔρροι ἀπειρούμενα, ἡμεῖς τῷ δικαίῳ προστίθεμεν, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ ἐν ἀρέτῃ αὐτῷ καὶ σοφίᾳ ἐτόλμησας θείαι. 'Αληθέστατα, ἐφη, μαντεύει. 'Αλλ’ οὐ μέντοι, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ἀποκυντεῖον γε τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν σκοπούμενον, ἔως ἃν σε ὑπολαμβάνω λέγειν ἀπερ διανοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖσαν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἀπεκδικήσας τῆς ἀληθείας λέγειν. Γί δέ σοι, ἐφη, τούτῳ διαφέρει, εἴτε μοι δοκεῖ εἴτε μὴ, ἀλλ’ οὖ τὸν λόγον ἐλέγχειν; Οὐδέν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ Β τόθεν μοι πειρώ ἐτί πρὸς τούτου ἀποκρίνεσθαι τῷ δίκαιου δοκεῖ τί σοι ἄν ἐθέλειν πλέον.
a consistent meaning in all the different cases where it is applied. We can understand the unjust man 'taking advantage' (compare οὖδεν γέ σοι πλέον ἐσται, Ch. XV.) or 'getting the better of,' his own kind and the just also. But we do not understand Socrates' statement that the just man would try to take advantage of the unjust; unless we admit that, for the sake of the present argument, Socrates sinks his own opinion about 'doing good to friends and harm to foes,' as Xenophon represents him in Mem. 2, 3, 14: καὶ μὴν πλείστου γε δοκεῖ ὁνὴ ἑπαίνου ἄξιος εἶναι, δὲ ἐν φθάνῃ τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους κακῶς ποιῶν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους εὐφρενῶς. Again, accepting this explanation, we come to a further difficulty; viz. how to understand the phrase, when, in Ch. XXI., it is applied to the arts of music, doctoring, &c. It seems probable, as Messrs. Davies and Vaughan in their translation of the Republic suppose, that there is here a play upon words. πλέον ἔχειν means (as noticed above) 'to get or take advantage of'; but, in its application to the arts, this sense of the phrase must be passed over for another—such as 'to know more about,' 'to be more at home with.' Now this sense also implies that the man who 'knows more about' music or physic 'has the advantage over' one who knows less; and it is in this sense that we must understand Socrates, if we are to follow him in his disproof. The analogy of the arts cannot conduct us here to a conclusion in ethics any more than in Ch. XV., where see note on ἄρχουσί γε. The whole train of argument is forced, and the disproof must be held to depend entirely upon this equivoque inherent in the expression πλέον ἔχειν. The translators above mentioned have been happy in their mode of conveying the sense of the Greek to English readers. Thus they render πλέον ἔχειν, 'to go beyond,' in most places where it occurs; but reserve to themselves the privilege of substituting 'have the advantage of,' 'do or say more,' (πλείω αἴρεῖται ... ἡ πράττειν ἡ λέγειν) in other places which seem to gain in clearness as they lose in consistency of translation.

ἄστείος ... καὶ εὐθῆς. Hendiadys, conveying the same meaning as γενναὶα εὐθῆς. ἄστείος is used like ἕδεσ, χαρίεις, γενναῖος, χρηστός, sarcastically here. Its first meaning is 'fine,' comptus, or laetus; it is found in Πράξ. τῶν Ἀποστ. Μωσῆς ἢν ἄστειον τῷ Θεῷ. E. V. 'exceeding fair.' See also Arist. Nub. where the explanation is being given that geometry measures out the whole earth, and Strepstades, understanding it to mean allotments, replies—

ἄστειον λέγεις.

Τὸ γὰρ σοφίσμα δημοσίων καὶ χρήσιμων.

We find it used again in this sarcastic sense in Book V. 452 C: ἔξην τοῖς τῶτε ἄστείοις πάντα ταῦτα κωμῳδεῖν. 'The wits of the day had the opportunity
and pleonasticiin kai ἑγοῦτο δικαιον εἶναι, ἦ οὖκ ἄν ἑγοῦτο δικαιον; 'Ἡγοήτ' ἄν', ἦ δ' ὲς, καὶ ἄξιοι, ἄλλ' οὖκ ἄν δύνατο. Ἀλλ' οὔ τούτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐρωτῶ ἄλλ' εἴ τοῦ μὲν δικαιον μὴ ἄξιοι πλέον ἐχειν μηδὲ βούλεται ὁ δικαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἄδικον; Ἀλλ' οὕτως, ἐφη, ἐχει. Τι δὲ δὴ ὁ ἄδικος; ἄρα ἄξιοι τοῦ δικαιον πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ τῆς δικαιας πράξεως; Πῶς γὰρ οὖκ; ἐφη, ὡς γα πάντων πλέον ἐχειν ἄξιοι. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄδικον ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ πράξεως ὁ ἄδικος πλεονεκτήσει καὶ ἀμιλλήσεται ὡς ἀπάντων πλείστον αὐτὸς λάβῃ; ἦς ταύτα.

CAP. XXI.

"Ωδε δὴ λέγωμεν, ἐφην' ὁ δικαιος τοῦ μὲν ὄμοιον οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίον, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τοῦ τε ὄμοιον καὶ τοῦ ἀνομοίον. "Ἀριστα, ἐφη, εἰρήκας. ἦς ταύτα τε γε, ἐφην, φρονίμος τε καὶ ἄγαθος ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δικαιος οὐδέτερα. Καὶ τούτ," ἐφη, εὖ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ έοικε τὰ φρονίμῳ καὶ τὰ ἄγαθῷ ὁ

of turning this into burlesque.'

And sarcastically again Arist.

Νυμ. 1064—

Μάχαραν ἁστείδων γε κέρδος ἐλαβεν ὁ κακοδαίμων.

ἀμιλλήσεται. Σο διαμιλλάν ἰν

516 E: τὰς δὲ δὴ σκιας ἐκείνας πάλιν εἴ δὲοι αὐτῶν γνωριεύοντα διαμιλλᾶσθαι τοῖς δὲ δεσμωταις εκεῖνοις, δὲ. And again ἐνα-

μιλλοῦν 433 D: Ἐναμιλλοῦν ἄρα, ὡς έοικε, πρὸς ἄρετην πόλεως τῇ τε σοφίᾳ αὐτῆς καὶ τῇ σωφρότητῃ καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ τοῦ ἐκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ αὐτῶν πράσσειν δύναμις.

Ch. XXI.—But no man who exercises an art well, tries to have the advantage of his fellow-

workman, but only of the un-

practised. And such an artificer

is good and wise; therefore an

unjust man is wicked and

foolish.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐοικε. This chain

in the argument is inserted with a
definite object. It has been

mentioned above that the ar-

gument is one of analogy; and the

first conclusion comes out there-

fore in the establishment of a

resemblance,—a resemblance

between the just man and him

who is wise and good; see infra

350 B. Socrates, foreseeing the

nature of his conclusion, pro-

vides against its indefinite
character by gaining Thrasymachus' agreement to the proposition: 'A man is of the same kind as those whom he resembles'; a position in itself neither correct nor definite, but necessary for confounding Thrasymachus.

πῶς γὰρ ὦν μέλλει... ἐοικέναι, 'how can he help being like?' v.s. not. αἰδὸ μέλλων, Ch. XVIII. μέλλω has here the sense of 'sure to be,' whilst in Thrasymachus' next remark we have an entirely different meaning, partaking of that sense of delay or hesitation which, it has been noticed, μέλλω also possesses. τί μέλλει, then, is like τί μὴν; 'what further stay is there,' or, colloquially, 'Well, what then?'

πότερον φρόνιμον... Here there is a double deception. First the fallacy of two questions; for, be it observed, Socrates asks which is wise and which foolish, before he has asked if they are respectively wise and foolish. And secondly the word φρόνιμος is used in its broad sense, although there is no certainty that a man who is μονικός is also φρόνιμος. This latter fallacy appears later on more than once, see 350 B: ὃ δ' ἐπιστήμων σοφὸς; ὃ δὲ σοφὸς ἄγαθός. But Thrasymachus, as it has been stated, is more of a declaimer than a dialectician, and has not the ability to find these flaws in Socrates' argument. In fact we can quite imagine that Socrates is caricaturing argument in the present passage. In his next suggestion Socrates seems to feel the necessity for qualifying these conclusions, and adds to the statement that 'the wise man is a good man' the limitation, 'in so far as he is wise'; but it is a solitary piece of accuracy in an otherwise loose argument.
πλεῖον αἵρεσθαι... ἢ πράττειν ἢ λέγειν, ν.α. νολ. αἱ πλέον ἔχειν. These infinitives are apposition, not epehexetical.

τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἐαυτῷ, τῷ ὁμ. depends upon ταῦτα, and ἐαυτῷ upon ὁμοίῳ; 'the same things with the man who is like him.'

Άλλα ἵσως... τοῦτο γε. Signs of hesitation begin to appear in Thrasymachus. Thus we find the word ἵσως in his reply to the next question, when, to a similar question with the mere substitution of δίκαιος and ἀδίκιος for ἐπιστήμων and ἄνεπιστήμων, he had readily assented. Ch. XX. Ἰφιν.

δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφός; δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός. These generalizations are not accurate, as it has been remarked; they require the qualification ἀπερ ἐπιστήμων and ἀπερ σοφός. In Euthydemus a sophist tries this dialectical trick upon Socrates himself, but Socrates exposes the fallacy, and then gratifies the sophist by appearing to be defeated in the argument. Ψελ. 293 C: Ὄψον ὦ τι μὴ ἐπιστάσασι, ὦκ ἐπιστήμων εἰ. Ἐκείνων γε, ἵ. τ. 'In respect of that I am not wise.'

Αλλὰ μὴν. For the same particles in a similar context, see Ch. XV. and note on ἄνοιξος γε.
O de Ḟoraσύμαχος ὠμολόγησε μεν πάντα ταῦτα, διὸν ώς ἐγὼ νῦν ῥάδιως λέγω, ἀλλ’ ἐλκόμενος καὶ μόνιμος, μετὰ ίδρῦτος θαυμαστοῦ ὅσου, ἀτε καὶ θέρους ὄντος· τότε καὶ εἶδον ἐγώ, προτερον δὲ οὖπῳ, Ὑρα-
σύμαχον ἐρυθρίωνα. ἔπειδὴ δὲ οὖν διωμολογησά-
μεθα τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀρέτην εἶναι καὶ σοφίαν, τὴν
dὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν τε καὶ ἀμαθίαν, Εἰεν; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ,
tούτο μὲν ἦμιν οὔτω κείσθω, ἐφαμεν δὲ δὴ καὶ
ἰσχυρῶν εἶναι τὴν ἀδικίαν ἦ οὐ μέμησαι, δ’ Ὑρα-
sύμαχε; Μέμησαι, ἐφ’ ἀλλ’ ἐμοιγε οὐδὲ ἄ νῦν
λέγεις ἀρέσκειν, καὶ ἑχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν. ἐι οὖν
Ἑλέγοιμι, εὐ οἶδ’ ὅτι δημηγορεῖν ἄν με φαίης ἢ οὖν

ἀρα ἀναπέφανται. Ergo evasit. See Book V. 464 B: τοῦ μεγί-
στον ἀρά ἄγαθον τῇ πόλει αἰτία ἦμιν πέφανται ἦ κοινωνία τοῖς
ἐπικοῦροις τῶν τε παιδῶν καὶ τῶν νυμαίων.

Ch. XXII.—There is yet another point, Thrasymachus; you
said that the unjust was more efficient than the just. Shall we
settle it? Just as you please, he said.

θαυμαστοῦ ὅσου, v.s. Ch. V.:
eὐ οὖν λέγει θαυμαστῶς ἄσ
σφάδρα.

ἀτε καὶ θέρους. ἀτε it has
been seen, Ch. I., introduces
an accompanying fact; ἄτε νῦν

πρώτον ἄγοντες, and ὡς in some
cases, also ibid.: ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς
πομπῆς. So oía te, Od. 3, 73; oía
tε ληιστῆρες.

Θρασύμαχον ἐρυθρίωτα. See
Euthydemus 297 B, where
Dionysodorus, the less adroit
of the two word-fencers, is over-
come in an argument and
blushes. Καὶ δ’ Ἰωνοῦσδορός
ἡπρίασεν.

ἐφαμεν δὲ δὴ. See 348 Ἐ:
νῦν δὲ δήλος εἰ ὅτι φήσεις αὐτὸ
cαὶ καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρῶν εἶναι.

ἐχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν, v.s.
347 D: οὖκ ἐχοντες εάντων
βελτίωσιν ἐπιτρέψαι.

δημηγορεῖν, 'harangue,' v.s.
not. αἰ ὁσπεο βαλανεύς, Ch.
ΧVII.
έα με εἰπεῖν ὧσα βούλομαι, ᾦ, εἰ βούλει εἰρωτᾶν, ἐρώτα: ἐγὼ δὲ σοι, ὅσπερ ταῖς γρανοὶ ταῖς τοὺς μύθους λεγούσας, εἰεν ἐρῶ καὶ κατανεύσομαι καὶ ἀνανεύσομαι. Μηδαμώς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρά γε τὴν σαντοῦ δόξαν. "Ὅστε σοι, ἐφη, ἀρέσκειν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐκ ἐὰς λέγειν. καὶ τοι τί ἄλλο βούλει; Όυδὲν μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τοῦτο ποιήσεις, πολεῖ ἐγὼ δὲ ἐρωτήσω. 'Ερώτα δὴ. Τούτῳ τοῖνυν ἐρωτῶ, ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἵνα καὶ ἐξῆς διασκεψόμεθα τὸν λόγον, 351 ὀποῖὸν τι τυγχάνει ὃν δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἄδικια. ἐλέξθη γὰρ πον, ὅτι καὶ δυνατότερον καὶ ἵσχυρότερον εἰ ἄδικια δικαιοσύνης: νῦν δὲ γ', ἐφη, εἴπερ σοφία τε καὶ ἁρετή ἐστι δικαιοσύνη, ἐραδίως, οἷμαι, φανήσεται καὶ ἵσχυρότερον ἄδικιας, ἐπειδήπερ ἐστὶν ἀμαθία ἢ ἄδικια. οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐν τούτῳ ἁγνοήσειν. ἀλλ' οὕτωσι ἀπλῶς, ὁ Ὡρασύμαχος, ἠγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἔστι τὴν σκέψασθαι: πόλιν φαῖν ἂν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι Β ἄδικως καὶ καταδουλώσθαι, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ύψιν ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν δουλωσμένην; Πῶς γὰρ οὗτ; ἐφη καὶ τούτῳ γε ἡ ἁριστὴ μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελεωτάτα ὀυσα ἄδικος. Μανθάνω, ἐφη, ὅτι σός οὕτως ἂν ὁ λόγος: ἀλλὰ τὸ δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοπὸν πότερον ἢ ἐρώτα δὴ, ἂν δὲν, ζ. ι. Book II. 361 Ε: καὶ δὴ κἂν, and note.

σοφία τε καὶ ἁρετή, predicate. ἐτι, sc. after the proof that justice is wise and good, and injustice foolish and bad.

οὕτωσι ἀπλῶς, 'by no means in this sweeping manner.' ἀπλῶς means 'generally' or 'broadly.' τὸ ἀπλὸς καλον, Arist. Eth. 5, 9, 9, is 'the absolute good.' So above here in Ch. VI. πότερα τὴν ἁλῆθειαν δικαιοσύνην φήσομεν εἶναι ἀπλῶς; i.e. 'without qualification.' Socrates does not wish here to employ the general conclusion that justice is good and wise and injustice wicked and foolish, in order to prove the strength of the former and the weakness of the latter; he is going back to prior considerations, expressed in the proverb, 'Union is Strength,' which he proceeds to develop.

τελεωτάτα ὀυσα ἄδικος, v.s. Ch. XVI. τὴν τελεωτάτην ἄδικιαν, and note.
In every relation of life injustice, by breeding hatred and discord, brings weakness; but justice, concord and strength. Again, the just man will be happier than the unjust.

In this chapter Thrasymachus does not attempt to argue, but carries out his stated intention, κατανεύσομαι καὶ ἀνανεύσομαι. This use is not uncommon. We find also a construction intermediate between this and the ordinary impersonal sense. See Book II. 368 B, δοκὸ γάρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι.

οὐ δῆτα, v. infr. E: έσθ’ στις ἂν ἀλλω ίδοις ή ὀφθαλμοῖς; Οὐ δῆτα. And supr. Ch. XVIII: στάσεις. Stasis was the bête noire of Greek politicians; for the constitution was not often in such stable equilibrium that it could defy the attacks of a single determined and pertinacious citizen. The Republic, being a political dialogue (as well as an ethical), abounds in references to Stasis. Thus when describing the contest between the sensual and rational elements of the soul, we have the simile of a stasis: ὥσπερ δοὺς στασιαζόντων ἐξιμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τῶν θυμῶν, Book IV. 440 B; ετ’ infr. 442 B, of the sensual nature again, ἄρχειν ἐπιχειρήσῃ ὃν οὐ προσήκον. Again 459 E, ἡ ἀγέλη τῶν φυλάκων ὃτι μάλιστα άστασιάσ- τος ἕστα. It is especially con-
demned in Book V. 462 B: 'Εχομεν ουν τι μειων κακον πόλει ή ἐκείνο ή συν αυτὴν (πόλιν) διαστά και ποιη πολλάς ἀντι μιάς; The community of wives and children, and property, will remove all occasions of στάσις from the guardians of the Ideal State, 464 B: ὅσα γε διὰ χρημάτων ἢ παιδῶν ἢ ξυγγενῶν κτήσιν ἄνθρωποι στασιάζονται. And if the guardians of the State are not subject to στάσις, the rest of the State will fall into στάσις neither with the guardians nor amongst themselves. τούτων μὴ ἐν ἐαυτοῖς μὴ στασιάζοντος οὐδὲν δεινὼν μὴ ποτὲ ἡ ἀλλή πόλις πρὸς τούτους ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διεχοσστήσῃ. In 470 B, we have στάσεις defined and distinguished from war. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῇ τοῦ οἰκεῖου ἐξήρα στάσεις κέκληται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου πόλεμοι. Change in a State arises from στάσεις in the governing body, Book VIII. 545 D: πᾶσα πολιτεία μεταβάλλει εἰς αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔξοχον τὰς ἀρχὰς, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ στάσεις ἐγγέννηται. A city composed of very rich and very poor men is two cities, and must come to nought. Τὸ μὴ ἦναν ἀλλὰ δύο ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν τὴν μὲν πενήτων, τὴν δὲ πλουσίων, ὁικούντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ ἐπιβουλεύονται ἀλλήλοις, 551 D. There is no στάσις in the philosopher's soul. Τῷ φιλοσοφῷ ἢρα ἐπομένης ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ στασιάζουσας; 556 E. This point has been illustrated at length, not only because the passages quoted will be found to bear upon the present chapter, but because in this principle, that concord is inherent in justice and discord in injustice, we have the keynote of the whole Dialogue of the Republic. In agreement with this fact we find the definition of justice, as finally discovered in Book IV. 433 A: ἕνα ἐκαστὸν ἐν δεόν ἐπιτηδεύειν τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν εἰς ὑ αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις ἐπιτηδευτάτη περιφυκύα εἶν. 'Each unit of the State should concentrate himself upon that for which nature has best fitted him.' Or, in a briefer definition, ἰβιδημ., τὰ αὐτόν πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονέων δικαιούντας ἐστὶ, 'Justice is doing your own business and not meddling.' Therefore in the present passage, although Socrates does not pretend to arrive at definition (see the last words of this book, ὡς τε μοι νῦν γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν εἰσῆκεν), he is still preparing his own and his audience's thoughts for the line he afterwards takes; viz. that justice must be found in the due discharge of one's proper duties. We have noticed above a similar presage of a theory to come, in the case of the three-fold division of rulers into those who love money, praise, and duty; Ch. XIX. init. And we shall perhaps view in their true light these correspondences between the earlier and later books of the Republic, if we consider that Plato in the composition of his work first approached those questions only tentatively and incompletely which he afterwards bent his full powers to solve.
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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

η δ' ὦς, ἵνα σοι μὴ διαφέρωμαι. Ἄλλ᾽ εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ ἄριστε. τὸδε δὲ μοι λέγει ἄρα εἰ τοῦτο ἔργον ἁδικίας, μῖσος ἐμποιεῖν ὅποιον ἄν ἐνη, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δούλοις ἐνγυμνομένη μισεῖν ποιήσει Ἐάλλήλους καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ ἄδυνατοις εἰναι κοινῷ ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων πράττειν; Πάνυ γε. Τὴ δὲ; ἂν ἐν δυὸν ἐγγένηται, οὐ διοίσονται καὶ μισήσονται καὶ ἐκθροὶ ἐςονται ἄλληλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις; "Εσονται, ἐφη. 'Εὰν δὲ δὴ, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐν ἐν ἐγγένηται ἁδικία, μῶν μὴ ἀπολεῖ τὴν αὐτῆς δύναμιν, η̣ οὐδὲν ήττον ἐξει; Μηδὲν ήττον ἐχέτω, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν τοιᾶν τε νὰ παίνεται ἔχουσα τὴν δύναμιν, οἶαν, ὃ ἂν ἐγγένηται, εἴτε πόλει τοιὶ ἐφνεὶ εἴτε στρατο-πέδῳ εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὄρφοιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἄδυνατον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν πράττειν μεθ᾽ αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν καὶ διαφέρεσθαι, ἔτι δ᾽ ἐκθρον ἐιναι ἐαυτῷ τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ; οὐχ οὗτως; Πάνυ γε. Καὶ ἂν ἐν ἐνὶ δή, οἴμαι, ἐνοῦσα ταῦτα πάντα ποιήσει, ἀπερ πέφυκεν ἐργάζεσθαι πρῶτον μὲν ἄδυνατον αὐτῶν πράττειν ποιήσει στασιάζοντα καὶ νῦχ ὁμονοοῦντα αὐτῶν ἐαυτῷ, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἐκθρὸν καὶ ἔργον ἁδικίας, v.s. Ch. IX. θερμότητος ἔργον, ct ἐντ. Ch. XXIV. ἀφθαλμω σέργων.

καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις. This is added with a distinct purpose; see below 352 Α, Δίκαιοι δὲ καὶ οἱ θεοὶ;

ἐν ἐνὶ, v.s. passage quoted from 586 E; note on στάσεις.

μῶν μὴ...ἐξει. The nom. to ἄπολει is ἁδικία, and also to ἐξει. οὐδὲν ἦττον is adverbial.

οἶαν, ὃ ἂν ἐγγένηται...ποιεῖν. οἶαν is attracted to the case of δύναμιν; we should expect ὧν ἄν ποιοί. Jelf, Gr. Gr. 823, Obs. 2, οἶας is for οἶας τε or ὡστε. So ἐντ. 415 E: τοιαῦτα (ἐνὰς) οἶας χειμῶνος τε στέγειν καὶ θέους ικανάς εἰναι.

μεθ᾽ αὐτοῦ, 'with itself,' i.e. 'with harmony among its individuals'; for notice that the several examples are all collective—city, camp, nation; whilst in the next question we come to the individual, who is none the less susceptible of στάσεις. καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ is again added with the intention of proving the schismatic to be θεοὶ ἐκθρός; see below.

ἐν ἐνὶ δή, δή final; the case of the individual being the important one, to which the other cases are introductory.
ēantō kai tois dikaios. ἡ γάρ; Ναὶ. Δίκαιοι δὲ γ' εἰσίν, ὧν φίλε, καὶ οἱ θεοὶ; "Ἐστωσαν, ἐφη. Καὶ θεοὶς ἄρα ἐξθρός ἔσται ὁ ἄδικος, ὧν Ἰρασύμαχε, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος φίλως. Εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου, ἐφη, θαρρῶν· οὐ γάρ ἐγωγέ σοι ἐναντιώσωμαι, ἵνα μὴ τοίςδε ἀπέχ-θωμαι. Ἡθι δὴ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μοι τῆς ἐστιάσεως ἀποπληρωσον ἀποκρινόμενος ὠσπερ καὶ νῦν. ὅτι μὲν γάρ καὶ σοφότεροι καὶ ἀμείνους καὶ δυνατώτεροι πράττειν οἱ δίκαιοι φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι οὐδὲν πράττειν μετ' ἀλλήλων οἶοι τε, ἀλλὰ ὅτι καὶ οὐς φαμεν ἐρρομένους πῶποτέ τι μετ' ἀλλήλων κοινὴν πρᾶξαι ἄδικος ὄντας, τούτο οὐ παντά· ζωσιν ἀληθείς λέγομεν οὐ γάρ ἄν ἀπείχοντο ἀλλήλων — κομιδὴ ὄντες ἄδικοι, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἐνήν τις αὐτοῖς ἐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου. For this word v.s. Ch. III. init., peri te ταφροδίσια καὶ peri πότοι καὶ εὐωχίας. And Ch. XVII. C: ὅπερ δαυτιμόνα τινα καὶ μέλ· λοντα ἐστιάσεθαι πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν. And see a similar expression of Thrasymachus' below Ch. XXIV.: Ἀναὶ δὴ σοι, ἐφη, δ' Σάκρατε, εἰσίταισθω ἐν τοῖς Βερδιδελοίς, 'Let this be your banquet.' So we may translate here 'Feast yourself upon the argument.' And finally we have immediately below, τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς εἰστιάσεως. ὅτι μὲν γάρ, &c. This introduction of the sentence is taken up again after a long parenthesis (ἀλλὰ δὴ ... ἀδύνατοι), in the words: ταύτα μὲν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει. οὗς φαμεν, &c. The construction here is entirely changed. We should expect at least οὕτως οὕτως ἐχοὺσιν οἱ περὶ τοῦτων οὐκ ἀληθεύσουμεν; but the personal pronoun is neglected altogether, and the whole clause dismissed by a demonstrative, τότε. Somewhat similar is Electra Sophoclis, 1364— τοὺς γάρ ἐν μέσφι λόγους πολλαὶ κυκλούνται νύκτες ἡ· μέραι τ' ἤσαι αἴ ταύτᾳ σοι δεξιούσιν, Ἡλέκ· τρα, σαφῆ. Where the substitution of a neuter pronoun, to express the substance of that which has preceded, occurs; but the construction approaches nearer than the present to a regular one. κομιδὴ ὄντες ἄδικοι, opposed to ἠμμοῦχθηροι ὄντες. For this expression and τελεως ἄδικοι, v.s. nol. ad τὴν τελεωτὴν ἄδικιαν, Ch. XVI. δῆλον ὅτι ἐνήν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη. See Xen. Mem. 3, 9, 5: τὰ τέ γάρ δίκαια καὶ πάντα δόσα ἄρετη πράττεται, καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐλναι· καὶ οὕτ' ἂν τοὺς ταύτα εἰδότας ἀλλό ἄντι τοῦτων οὐδὲν προελεύθαι, οὕτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταύμενος δύνασθαι πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ, ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἀμαρ· τάνειν.
Portrayed events, indeed, may be equivocally treated as if they might happen, as if they might happen, or as if they might happen. And yet if the story be not treated thus, in Book II., Socrates will not consent that the children in his State be permitted to hear any kind of fiction from any kind of person. "And if you do not, would you then call the function of a horse, or of anything else, that which we do only with horses or best with horses?" In Book III. 406 E, it is implied that without the  ἐργον  it is no use for a man to live: ἂν τι αὐτῷ ἐργον, διὸ euπράττω, οὐκ ἔλευστελλεν ξην. And in Book V. 453 B, when the question has been asked, are not women different from men? and answered in the affirmative, the inference is that they should have a different  ἐργον, οὐδέν άλλο καὶ ἐργον ἐκατέρα προσήκει προστάτευς τον κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν. ἐργον then, as meant by Plato, is action of some kind, the agent or instrument being that which is naturally fitted to perform it; v.s. Ch. IX.: θερμότητος ἐργον, and note. And for the rest of the doctrine of τὸ ἐργον see Ch. XXIV., and note.
Finally, everything has a function which it is enabled to discharge by means of its own proper virtue. The virtue of the soul is justice; hence a just man lives the best, the most useful, and the happiest life.

νῦν δὴ, 'by this time,' sc. 'after this explanation'; v. instr. ἐξε δὴ, ὅτι δὴ.

ο ἂν ἢ μόνον τι. τι, subject; ὃ, object; μόνον and κάλλιστα qualify ἀπεργυ.

ἀρετή. The word here has the widest signification of which it is capable; and, as noted above, is not adequately translated by 'virtue'; 'excellence' expresses this general sense better. With Plato the physical aspect of ἀρετή is more pronounced; it expresses first an efficiency of bodily organs which is rather congenital than acquired; and, afterwards, moral excellence, which also Plato thought was inherent in man. It is true that according to the dialogue of the Meno, Plato thought that moral ἀρετή was a science (ἐπιστήμη), and admitted of being taught (διδασκή); but he also believed that the rudiments of it and the aptitude for it existed already in man. Similarly Socrates in Mem. Xen. 2, 6, 39, speaks of the
moral excellences, not being formed, but increased by study and practice; διὰ δὲ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἁρεταὶ λέγονται, σκοπούμενοι εὐφράτεις πάσας μαθήσει τε καὶ μελέτη αὐξανομένας. And for Plato’s belief in the existence of ἁρετῆ in man, see Rep. Book IV. 444 E: ἁρετῆ μὲν ἀρα, ὡς ἔσωκε, ὑγιειά τε τις τινες εἰς καὶ κάλλους καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς, (i.e. its normal and natural state) κακία δὲ νόσους τε καὶ αἰσχοὺς καὶ ἀσθένεια. Aristotle (Eth. 2, 6, 2) follows partly in Plato’s footsteps: πᾶσα ἁρετῆ, οὐ ἂν ἂν ἁρετῇ, αὐτὸ τε καὶ ἠχον ἀποτελεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εἰς ἀποδίδοντι, οἶν η τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἁρετῆ τόν τοῦ ὀφθαλμῶν σπουδαίον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἁρετῇ εὐ ὀρώμεν. Ὁμοίως ἂν τὸ ὁποῖον ἁρετῇ ὁποῖον τε σπουδαίον ποιεῖ καὶ ἄγαθον... καὶ ἂν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἁρετῇ εἰς ἂν εἰς ἄρ’ ἂς ἄγαθος ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἄρ’ ἂς εἰ τὸ ἐπιτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. The first part of this passage is taken directly from Plato; the latter part is Aristotle’s own. For he looks upon ἁρετῆ of man as something acquired by habit (ἐξίς); see Ἀει. Ch. I. 2: ἦν δὲ ἤρετοι ὁ πρὸν ἡμῖν ὁ ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται, ‘No ethical excellence is congenital’; the contrary of Plato’s belief quoted above from Rep. Book IV.

ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ, ‘the same illustration.’

εἰς δὲ, ‘now mark,’ δὲ emphatic; intimating an important step, and a new point of departure in the argument. So, ὅθι δὲ, μετὰ ταύτα τὸ ἀργόν.

τυφλότητα γὰρ, &c. Thrasymachus is too assentient here: in his willingness to agree to all that Socrates says, he says too much. Socrates is not concerned with the actual excellence or vice of this or that subject of illustration; he does not wish to stop over that, hence he disregards the suggestion and dismisses it with a mere acknowledgment.
Politeia, Book 1, Section 199

The text discusses the philosophical ideas of Aristotle, particularly his concept of virtue and how it differs from excellence. It highlights the importance of clarity in definitions and the role of reason in ethical decision-making. The text also touches on the idea that the pursuit of virtue is the best life, contrasting it with other pursuits.

In summary, the dialogue between Socrates and his interlocutors explores the nature of the virtuous life and the role of excellence in defining human virtue. Aristotle’s demand for a fuller definition of virtue and the introduction of the concept of human virtue are central to the discussion. The text concludes that the virtuous life is the best.
The former also is said to soothe the third element of the soul, τὸ ἐμφανές πραξάντως. In Book II. Ch. II., the simile is further elaborated, τόδε ἐμφανές... 'through my own fault, not through yours'; ἢ τὸν σου γε ἐσῳρ. Socrates hints that he has thoroughly enjoyed that part of the entertainment which Thrasymachus has supplied; that he has enjoyed a light meal and a quaint, not a hearty one.

τοῦ αἰεὶ παραφερομένου. Β.Ι. Book II. Ch. III.: αὐτῷ αἰεὶ οὕτω ξυμβαίνειν, 'from time to time.'

ἀρπάζοντες. See Arist. Nub. where Socrates tells the neophyte to 'catch up' any scrap of wisdom he may throw him. Αἰγὴ νῦν, ὠτὼς, ὅταν τι προβάλλωμαι σοφόν περὶ τῶν μετεώρων, εὐθῶς ὑφαρπέσῃ. Πρὶν τὸν προτ. μετρ. ἀπολαῦσαι, 'Before they have had a fair taste of the first.' For μετρίως v.s. p. 116.
τον ἐσκοποῦμεν εὑρεῖν, τὸ δίκαιον ὡ τί ποτ’ ἔστιν, ἀφέμενος ἐκείνου ὁρμῆσαι ἔπει τὸ σκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἶτε κακία ἔστι καὶ ἀμαθία εἶτε σοφία καὶ ἀρετή, καὶ ἐμπεσόντος αὐ ὕστερον λόγου, ὡτὶ λυσιτελέστερον ἡ ἄδικία τῆς δικαιοσύνης, οὐκ ἀπεσχόμην τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἔπει τούτῳ ἐλθεῖν ἀπ’ ἐκείνου, ὡστε μοι νυνὶ γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν εἰδέναι· ὥποτε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὁ ἔστι, σχολὴ εἰσομαι εἶτε ἀρετὴ τις οὕσα τυγχάνει εἶτε καὶ οὐ, καὶ πότερον ὁ ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐκ εὐδαίμων ἐστίν ἡ εὐδαίμων.

τὸ δίκαιον ὡ τί ποτ’ ἔστιν, cf. Ἀesch. Ag. 162: Ζεὺς ὅστις ποτ’ ἔστιν, implying ignorance of the real nature of Zeus, as here of justice.

σχολὴ εἰσομαι, ‘it will be long before I know,’ ‘I shall take a long time to find out’;

v.i. Book III. 394 E: Σχολὴ ἄρα ἐπιτηδεύσει γέ τι ἄμα τῶν ἀξίων λόγου ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ πολλὰ μιμήσεται, ‘He will be very far from,’ &c.
BOOK II.

CAP. I.

357 Ἑγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἴπὼν ὄμην λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι τὸ δ' ἢν ἄρα, ὡς ἐοικε, προοίμιον. ὁ γὰρ

Ch. I.—I thought we had here come to a conclusion, but it was only the prologue after all. For Glaucon would have me attempt an account of justice.

The first book, as Socrates says here, is a preface or prologue; it intimates, as we have noticed in one or two passages, what is to be the matter of the whole dialogue; it shows how far astray even those men who profess to have a coherent system of ethics, wander from the real facts. It smooths the way for a fresh and a more satisfactory system in two ways, viz. by removing error, and by suggesting possible solutions to different ethical difficulties; and this last confession of Socrates that he knows nothing about justice, separates the inquiry from all prejudice. And, finally, Socrates is thus placed in the position of director of the discussion, as the man who can remove fallacy and point the way, if he decline to lead it, towards truth and justice. The first five chapters are devoted to Glaucon's statement of the case for injustice and the unjust life; the next four to a like statement, or an elaboration of the same, by Adeimantus. Then at last Socrates takes up his parable and speaks his mind. He proceeds to the construction of a State, in which, so he expects, the counterpart of justice in man may be found. For the State is made 'not of stone or wood, but of men, of living flesh and blood.' And the construction of the State, and the education required in it, occupy the rest of this second book.

λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι, v.s. note page 115.
ἄρα, note p. 108.
προοίμιον. Cf. πάντα ταῦτα προοίμια ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου δὲν δεῖ μαθεῖν. See 531 D.
Γλαύκων ἀεὶ τε ἀνδρείότατος ὁν τυγχάνει πρὸς ἀπαντα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε τοῦ Ὄρασιμάχου τὴν ἀπόρρησιν οὐκ ἀπεδέξατο, ἀλλ' ἐφη Ὡ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἥμας βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς πεῖσαι, Β ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀμεινόν ἐστὶ δίκαιον εἶναι ἢ ἄδικον; Ἡς ἀληθῶς, εἴπον, ἐγών' ἂν ἐλοίμην, εἰ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ εἶη. Οὐ τοῖνυν, ἐφη, ποιεῖς ὅ βούλει. λέγε γάρ μοι ἀρά σοι δοκεῖ τοιόντε τι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν, ὁ δεξαίμεθ ἄν ἐχεῖν οὗ τῶν ἀποβαίνοντων ἐφιέμενοι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἐνεκα ἀσπαζόμενοι; οἶον τὸ χαίρειν καὶ αἱ

Γλαύκων. For other traits in this character see Book I. Ch. XI. where he generously offers on behalf of all to contribute for Socrates: ἀλλ' ἐνεκα ἄργυρου, ὃ Ὅρασίμαχε, λέγε πάντες γάρ ἥμαι Σωκράτει εἰσόλοσεμ. He is outspoken and confesses his ignorance with a laugh in Book III. 398 C: καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων ἐπιγελάσας Ἐγώ τοῖνυν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, κινδυνεύον ἐκτὸς τῶν πάντων εἶναι. In the same Book 402 E, we are almost surprised to find him advancing the enlightened suggestion, that bodily defects do not obscure the loveliness of a fair mind: εἰ μέντοι τι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ὑπομελεῖν ἄν ὄστ' θέλειν ἀσπαζέσαται. In Book VIII. 348 E his brother Adeimantus calls him combative: οἶμαι μὲν, ἐφη ὃ Ἀδείμαντος, ἐγὼς τι αὐτὸν Γλαυκόνως τουτοῦ τείνειν ἐνεκά γε φιλονεικίας. He is ἐρωτικός, 474 D: ἄλλω, εἰπόν, ἐπρεπεν, ὁ Γλαύκων, λέγειν ἦ λέγεις· ἀνδρὶ δ' ἐρωτικῷ, &c. He is very earnest over the dialogue. Book V. 450 C: μέτρον δὲ γ', ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, τοιούτων λόγον ἀκούειν ἄλος ὁ βίος νοῦν ἔχουσιν. Yet we are disappointed in Book VI. 508 B, to find that he supposes ἴδονὴ to be the source of knowledge and truth: οὐ γάρ δῆτον σὺ γε ἴδονὴν αὐτὸ λέγεις.

ἀεὶ τε...καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε, v.s. Book I.: ἡδὴ ἐνετυχηκα καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ δὴ καὶ Σωφοκλὲς, &c.; pp. 109 and 112.

ἀπεδέξατο. See Book I. Ch. IV. ἀπι. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις· οὗ γὰρ ἀποδέχονται. And here ἰν. 568 B: ὁ πρὸς Θρασύμαχον λέγων ὧμην ἀποθανεῖν, οὐκ ἀπεδέσατο μοι.

ὃς ἀληθῶς ἐγών' ἂν ἐλοίμην. This declaration follows with consistency upon his opinion, delivered in Book I. Ch. XXIII., about the importance of the question before them: οὐ γάρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐντύμου τρόπον χρὴ ἐγὼ. εἰ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ εἶη is spoken in Socrates' usual tone of self-depreciation, just as ἰν. Ch. X. he says of himself, ἰμεὶς οὗ δεινοὶ. See Book I. Ch. XI. ἰν. ἀνὴ ἐκείνη ἡ εἰσωθεῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους. So below here he says, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τις, ὃς ἔνοικε, δυσμαθῆς. And in Meno 71 C: οὗ τῶν εἰμι μνήμων, ὁ Μένων. Here also in 368 B: δοκῶ γὰρ μοι ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

καὶ αἰ ἱδοναῖ, &c. The con-
struc tion in the middle of this sentence passes easily from a relative to a demonstrative: instead of διὰ ταύτας where it stands, the continuation of the regular construction would require διὰ as after καί; see p. 195.

χαίρειν ἔχοντα. Here the personal accusative is thrown in, as frequently; see below, καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἵστεσθαι. And Book I. Ch. V.: μηδ' αὖ ὀφειλοῦντα ἢ θεῖ' δυνάσ τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρωπὸς χρήματα ἔπειτα ἐκεῖσε ἀπιέναι δεδίωτα.

τρίτων δὲ. For this continually recurring division into three heads, v.s. Book I. Ch. XII., note τῶν πολέων αἱ μὲν. And below here Ch. II. ad init.

ἐν δ', 'under which fall'; as in Book I. Ch. XX.: ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ ἐν ἄρετῃ αὐτὸ καὶ σοφὶ ἐτόλμησας θείναι. The same meaning is expressed in Ch. XIX. id. by the phrase ἐν μέρει: ἐν μισθοῦ μέρει.

τί δῆ, 'what is your conclusion?' v. infr. Book I. Ch. XXIV. Νῦν δῆ, ἔχε δῆ, ἵστη δῆ, which mark off the salient points, or points of conclusion; and not. pp. 109, 114.

τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσεσθαι, v.s. not. ad ὁ μέλλων, Book I. Ch. XVIII.; and the examples of this expression there mentioned.

τοῦ ἐπιτόπου εἰδών. This may be regarded either as a purely partitive genitive, or the speaker may have in his mind the expression ἐν μέρει, q.v. supr.

τοῖς πολλοῖς. Adeimantus further elaborates this statement of Glaucos's in Ch. IX. infr.,
Oďa, ἤν ὅ ἐγώ, ὅτι δοκεῖ οὕτω, καὶ πάλαι ὑπὸ Θρασύμαχου ὃς τοιοῦτον ὑπὲργεται ἂλλ' ἐγώ τις, ὡς έοικε, δυσμαθὴς. Πλατ. δῆ, ἔφη, ἀκούσον καὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐὰν σοι ταύτα δοκῇ. Θρασύμαχος γὰρ μοι φαίνεται πρωιαῖτερον τοῦ δέοντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ὁσπερ ὁφίς κηληθήναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὕτω κατὰ νοῦν ἢ ἀπόδειξις γέγονε περὶ ἐκάτερον ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ ἀκούσαι, τί τ' ἐστιν ἐκάτερον καὶ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐνοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τους δὲ μισθοὺς καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἑάσαι χαῖρειν. οὕτωσι οὖν τοιῆσο, ἐὰν καὶ σοὶ δοκῇ ἐπανανεώσομαι τὸν Θρασύμαχον λόγον,

where he says that no one has ever praised justice or blamed injustice for themselves, but only for the rewards and reputation that each brings. ὁσπερ ὁφίς κηληθῆναι, v.s. not. αὐτῷ ἐγένει καὶ χαλεπάνων ἐπαίνω, Book I. Ch. XXIV.

The word expresses the effect of the Seirens' song in Xen. Mem. 2, 6, 31: ἂλλα πάσιν ἐπὶθ' ὅπῃ, πάντας φᾶσιν ὑπομένει, καὶ ἀκούσοντας αὐτῶν κηλεύθαι. In Phaedrus 267 C, Thrasymachus is represented as doing that which he here suffers himself: ὃργίσας τ' αὐτῷ πολλοὺς ἔμα δείκνυσιν ἁμήρ γέγονε, καὶ πάλιν ὧργισμένοις ἐπάθων κηλεύει ὡς ἔφη. In Rep. X, 601 the word is used of the charm of poetry, which makes the poet seem to understand all the subjects on which he touches: οὕτω φῶςε αὐτὰ ταῦτα μεγάλην τινα ἐκάτερον. Ἐπαναλείψας τὸν ἰδίῳ ἀρχ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐστίν ἐκάτερον. Τι πρὸς κηλήσῃ. Compare the expression ἵμερον Λόγος, Book VIII. 554 D. τ' ἐστιν ἐκάτερον. Above, Book I. fin., Socrates has confessed ὃποτε γὰρ τὸ δικαίων μὴ οὔδα ὅτι... ἐπανανεώσομαι... Λόγον. Σο φηκμαξαξόμενον, ūfr.; expressions used as if the Λόγος were an actually existent being;
C καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐρώ δικαιοσύνην οἶνον εἰναὶ φασὶ καὶ ὁθὲν γεγονέναι· δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι πάντες αὐτὸ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀκούτες ἐπιτηδεύονσιν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλὰ οὕκ ὡσ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον δὲ ὅτι εἰκότως αὐτὸ δρῶσιν πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείων ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδικοῦ ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν. ἐπεὶ ἐμοιγε, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὗτι δοκεῖ οὐτος· ἀπορῶ μὲντοι διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ότα, ἀκοῦν Θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, τὸν δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγον, ὡσ ἀμείων ἀδικίας, οὐδενὸς πτω ἀκήκοα ὡς Βοῦλομαι. Βοῦλομαι δὲ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἀκούσαί. μάλιστα δ' οἴμαι ἃν σοῦ πυθέσθαι διὸ κατατέλειας ἐρώ τὸν ἀδικον βίου ἐπαινῶν, εἴπὼν δὲ ἐνδείξομαι σοι, ὅν τρόπον αὐτοίς Βοῦλομαι καὶ σοῦ ἀκούειν ἀδικίαν μὲν ψέγοντος, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπαινοῦντος. ἀλλ' ὃρα, εἴ σοι Βου- λομένῳ δ' λέγω. Πάντων μάλιστα, ὃν δ' ἐγώ' περὶ εἴγαρ τίνος ἀν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τίς νοῦν ἐχον χαροὶ λέγων καὶ ἀκούον; Κάλλιστα, ἐφι, λέγεις· καὶ ὁ πρῶτον ἐφην ἐρεῖν, περὶ τούτοι ἄκουε, τί οἶνον τε καὶ ὁθὲν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη. πεφυκέναι γὰρ δὴ φασὶ τὸ

hence the expressions, ἔχει τοῦ λόγου, τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴχνος, Book V. 462 A. See also not. pp. 108, 132, 135.

ἐρώ δικ. οἶνον εἰναὶ φασιν, v.s. not. p. 106.

πρῶτον...δεύτερον...τρίτον, v.s. Ch. I. not. ad τρίτον.


ἀκούον Θρασυμάχου...καὶ λόγον...οὐδενὸς ἀκήκοα. Notice the accusative of the thing and genitive of the persons.

κατατέλειας, v.s. not. p. 115. αὖ, 'in return.'


pery γὰρ τίνος, &c., v.s. not. ad ὅ γαρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, Book I. Ch. XXIII.

tί οἶνον τε καὶ ὁθὲν, 'what justice is, both in its nature and its source.'

πεφυκέναι γὰρ δὴ φασὶ, &c. 'They say that doing harm is naturally a good thing.'
μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἁγαθὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακόν, πλέον
dὲ κακὸν ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἁγαθὸν τὸ
ἀδικεῖν, ὡς τ' ἐπειδὰν ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσι τε καὶ
ἀδικώνται καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γεύονται, τοὺς μὴ δυναμέ-
νοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἱρεῖν δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν
359 ξυνθέσθαι ἀλλήλους μὴτ' ἀδικεῖν μὴτ' ἀδικεῖσθαι.

πλέον δὲ κακῷ, 'but that
suffering harm is more of an
evil than the doing it is a good.'
The construction here is com-
 pound. By the omission of
πλέον...ἡ we should have the
simple sense, 'but that suffer-
ring harm exceeds, as an evil,
doing harm as a good.' Thus
πλέον is inserted pleonastically;
and if it were to be kept, the
comparative word ὑπερβάλ-
λειν would have to be removed
in favour of some neutral ex-
pression such as εἶναι :—πλέον
dὲ κακὸν εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ
ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

ξυνθέσθαι ἀλλήλους, i.e. the
origin of justice lies in a social
contract. To this view, which
Glaucou propounds, the view
taken of justice by Hobbes,
the English philosopher (1588-
1679), has a certain resemblance.
He considered that, naturally
all men are equal, and all have
an equal right to everything;
but that, in virtue of their
possessing reason, they recog-
nise 'Laws of Nature' as he
terms them. The first or
fundamental Law of Nature
according to Hobbes is this :
'That every man ought to
endeavour Peace, as farre as
he has hope of obtaining it;
and when he cannot obtain it,
that he may seek and use, all
helps and advantages of Warre.'
The second 'Law of Nature'
grows out of this one: 'That
a man be willing, when others
are so too, as farre forth as
for Peace, and defence of him-
self he shall think it necessary,
to lay down this right to all
things; and be contented with
so much liberty against other
men, as he would allow other
men against himself.' 'Quod
tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne
feceris.' This surrendering of
right corresponds to the sur-
rendering of the power of doing
harm, which Glaucou speaks of
here, and the object is the same,
self-preservation and self-protec-
tion. Glaucou's justice is nothing
more than this compromise; but
Hobbes' justice is something
more. This second Law of
Nature makes it possible for the
Contract to come into existence.
'Right is laid aside either by
renouncing or transferring.'
'The mutuall transferring of
Right, is that which men call
Contract.' And a contract ex-
tending over a period of time
Hobbes calls a Covenant.
'Before the names of Just and
Unjust can have place, there
must be some coercive Power
to compell men equally to the
performance of their Covenants,
by the terrou of some Punish-
ment, greater than the benefit
they expect by the breach of
their Covenant.' It will be seen
that, in this description of the
germs of justice, Hobbes' account
agrees partly with Glaucou's.
He agrees with him that men will violate their covenants if they can do so without suffering. But he does not agree with him precisely as to the restraining power. Plato makes Glaucon here affirm that it is the fear of being treated themselves unjustly at another time, which restrains men from acting unjustly, and thereby gives rise to Justice; which, in effect, is the belief of Hobbes also; but Hobbes continues thus to explain what he means by that ‘terour of Punishment.’ ‘Such power there is none before the erection of a Commonwealth... And therefore where there is no Own, that is, no Propriety, there is no Injustice; and where there is no coercive power erected, that is where there is no Commonwealth, there is no Propriety; all men having Right to all things. Therefore, where there is no Commonwealth, there is nothing Unjust. So that the nature of Justice consisteth in keeping of valid Covenants; but the validity of Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient to compell men to keep them.’ Hobbes therefore thought with Socrates (Ch. X.) that Justice must be sought for in the State. It is not, as Glaucon here is urging, a crude bargain between men in a savage state; but it is the result of an attempt to gain security, which can only exist in a civil polity. And thus Hobbes enunciates a Third Law of Nature: ‘That men performe their Covenants made.’ ‘And in this Law of Nature consisteth the Fountain and Original of Justice.’ ‘And the definition of Injustice is no other than the not Performance of Covenant.’ Therefore, taking a general view of Hobbes’ scheme of justice, we see that it is arrived at by three steps, these three Laws of Nature:—

i. Man as a reasonable being makes peace his object.

ii. To ensure peace he surrenders certain of his natural rights.

iii. He must abide consistently by this surrender, i.e. by his Covenants.

Finally, to this description of the evolution of law from a state of barbarism may be added a similar account of the origin of chivalry; which is thus summarized: ‘The exaltation of woman, and the extravagant homage paid to her sex, by the masters of the gay saber, were among the instinctive efforts of a semi-barbarous society to protect itself from its own ferocity.’ See the Nineteenth Century, November 1881: A New Love Poet; by Lord Lytton.

ἄριστου ὄντος ἕλε ἄδικῶν... In Book III. 405 C Socrates holds up such a person as the worst type of man possible in a state. Ἡ δοκεῖ σοι, ἤν δὲ ἐγὼ,
τού δὲ κακίστου, ἐὰν ἀδικοῦμενος τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατος ἢ, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαπᾶσθαι οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθὸν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀρρωστία τοῦ Β ἀδικεῖν τιμώμενον ἐπεὶ τῶν δυνάμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ ποτὲ ἔρνθέσθαι τὸ μήτε ἀδικεῖν μῆτε ἀδικεῖσθαι: μαίνεσθαι γάρ ἂν.

τούτου άσχιον εἶναι τούτο ὅταν τις...ἡ αὐτῷ ἢ τούτῳ πεισθῇ καλλωπίζεσθαι, ὡς δεινὸς ὑπὲρ τὸ αδικεῖν καὶ ἐκατὸν πάσας μὲν στροφὰς στρέφεσθαι, πάσας δὲ διεξόδους διεξελθόν ἀποστραφῆαι λυνυζόμενοι ὅστε μὴ παρασχεῖν δίκην. Also in Crito (49), injustice is harmful to the doer. To γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικούντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀσχίρον τυγχάνει δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ. So Gorg. 508: καὶ χυλλήθηκαν ὅτι οὖν ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἀσχίρον καὶ κάκιον εἶναι ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀδικούμενῳ. In Aristophanes' Clouds the ἀδικοὺς λόγος sums up the advantages of Injustice, ll. 1071 seqq.; and, as in the case of the character referred to in Rep. Book III., it is said that to practise injustice with impunity requires a ready tongue. See Arist. Nub. 1073: ἀπόλλωνος τὰς ἀνυπατοσ τὸ γὰρ εἶ λέγειν. The use made of rhetorical education to elude the law, brought a bad name upon those who learnt and those who taught. The sophists, we know, lay under a social stigma, for evidence of which see Protagoras, 311 C–E (καὶ ὡς ἐπεν ἐρυθρίασας). And the teachers of rhetoric were included under the σοφισταλ. See note on πειθοῦς διδασκαλοῦ, Ch. VIII.

to δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ. For this favourite image of a virtue or anything desirable lying as a mean between two points, see note p. 116. Aristotle has followed it out completely in his account of the different virtues. Thus courage is the meanbetween rashness and cowardice, liberality between extravagance and parsimony; see Ethics 2, 7. And of justice itself, Book V. 5, 17: δὴν οὖν ἣ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ αδικεῖν καὶ αδικεῖσθαι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεον ἔχειν τὸ δὲ ἔλαιτον ἐστίν. But not in the same way as the others; for injustice is at once excess and defect, justice being the mean.

ἀγαπᾶσθαι, see p. 118, note; 'to put up with,' or 'accept.' That which is put up with is often introduced by the conditional εἴ. Thus Demosthenes de Cor. 301 (Reiske): ἀλλ' ἀγαπητὸν εἶναι, εἰ μηδὲν παραλεῖπον τίς δὲ πράξειν. And so here Book VI. 496 E. ἀγαπᾷ εἰ τῇ αὐτὸς καθάρος ἀδικίας τε καὶ ἀνασκόν ἐργών τοῖς τέ ἐνθάδε βίον βιώσει, κ.τ.λ. Book V. 471 Β : ἣ ἀγαπητοὶ, εἶδαν ὅτι ἐγχύντατα αὐτῆς ἢ ; Book IV. 435 C: οὐκοῦν ἀγαπητοῖς; ἐπῃ. Similarly στέρων in Dem. de Cor. 249: εἰ δὲ φησίν οὖτος, δειξάω, κἂν στέρω καὶ σιωπήσωμαι. Æschines cont. Ctes. 20 (ed. Simcox): ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀγαπῶνιν, εἶν τις παρ' αὐτοῖς μη ἀδικῇ.
Cap. III.

"Ως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀδυναμία τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἀκοντεῖ αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύοντο, μάλιστ' ἂν αἰσθοίμεθα, 

Ceί τοιόντες ποιήσαμεν τῇ διανολῇ δόντες ἐξουσίαν ἐκατέρφω ποιεῖν ὁ τι ἂν βούληται, τῷ τε δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ, εἶτ' ἐπακολουθήσαμεν θέωμεν, τοι ἐπιθυμία ἐκάτερον ἄξει. ἐπ' αὐτοφῶρῳ ὤν λάβομεν ἂν τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς ταύτον ἄλον διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ὁ πάσα φύσις διόκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν, νόμῳ δὲ βία παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄσου τιμήν. εἰδ' ἂν ἡ ἐξουσία ἦν λέγω τοιάδε μάλιστα, εἰ αὐτοὺς γένοιτο οἶνα ποτε φασι δύνομαι τῷ [Γύγη] τοῦ Λυδοῦ.

Ch. III.—If the just man had the power of doing evil without being detected, he would be as bad as the unjust, as in the tale of Gyges.

autó, sc. δικαιοσύνην.

εἰ τοιοῦτε ποιήσαμεν διανόλῃ. Similarly εἰ γιγαντεὶν πόλιν θεασάμενα λόγῳ, ἐντη Ch. X. And τῇ λόγῳ εἶχε ἀρχής ποιώμεν πόλιν, Ch. XI. εἰσθ. 

ἐπακολούθησαμεν ... βούληται ... ἄξει, v.s. not. p. 106.

νόμῳ δὲ βία παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄσου τιμήν. See Aristotle Eth. 10, 9, 9: ἐπὶ ταῦτα δεν-μεθ' ἂν νόμων καὶ ἄλος δὴ περὶ πάντα τοῦ βίου. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρ-χοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ. Εἶ ἐντη 12: ὅ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν. And the majority of mankind, so Aristotle thinks, do not pursue what is good unless they are compelled; see supra. § 4: οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοὶ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσαί τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας τάς πάντες γὰρ ζῶντες τὸς οἰκελας ἡδονάς διάκοσιν καὶ δὲ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἐσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λυτᾶς, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὃς ἀληθῶς ἤθες οὖν ἐννοοῦ ἐχούσιν ἢσιοῦσιν ἰσοτοῖ δόντες.

Γύγη. An older and a different version of the story is related in Herod. I. 8–15; whilst in Cicero de Off. we have a short summary of Plato's account, see 3, 9, 38: Hinc ille Gyges inducitur a Platone, &c. The account here is thrown into the infinitive narration, as in the story of Er in Book X. p. 614, seqq.
accounts for this present tense, by supposing that the word refers to the passing of accounts at the meeting.

tυχειν τὴν σφενδόνην. Cicero 
loc. cit.: Quem ut detractis, ipse induit: tum in pastorum se concilium receptit: ibi quum palam ejus annuli ad palmam converterat, a nullo videbatur, ipse autem omnia videbat; idem rursus videbatur quum in locum annulum inverterat.

καὶ διαλέγεσθαι, ‘and they began to converse about him as though he had gone away.’ For the sudden change of subject see p. 131 note; and add to the examples quoted Virg. Äen. X.:—

liceat dimittere ab armis Incolumem Ascanium, liceat superesse nepotem.


diapráxašthai, 'to manage.'

In Book IV. 440 C. the word means 'to carry out to the end.' οὐ λήγει τῶν γενεάων, πρὶν ἃν ἡ διαπράζῃται ἡ τελευτήσῃ. In Xenophon Anab. 7, 3, 16, 'to effect': Παρανοῦσ τινας, οἱ παρῆσαν φιλιὰν διαπραξόμενοι πρὸς Μήδοκον. In Od. ii. 213, 'to accomplish'—

οἷς κὲ μοι ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα διαπρήσασι τέλειον.

And so in Herod. iii. 61, 4: ὡς οἱ αὐτῶς πάντα διαπρήσει.

ὡς δοξεῖν. Ast inserted ἄν, but against MS. authority. Matthiae held that the preceding ἄν qualifies this clause. For ἀδαμάντινος Stallb. compares Book X. 619 A: ἀδαμαντίνως δὲ δει ταύτην τὴν δόξαν ἔχοντα
eis "Aiodon iénai.

τολμήσειν, 'bring himself to abstain.' τολμᾶω, like ἀλῶ, is 'to have the heart to...'

See Medea Euripid. 1325—

ἥτις τέκνοις σοῦσιν ἐμβαλεῖν ἔφος

ἐτλής τεκοῦσα.

And so ὑντὶν ἱδι. 1339—

οὐκ ἐστὶν ἥτις τοῦτον ἃν 'Ελληνις γυνὴ

ἐτλήττατεν.

For τολμᾶω see Book IX. 576 A: πάντα σχῆματα τολμῶντε τοιεῖν ὡς οἰκεῖαν.

ἐξὸν αὐτῷ. For this absolute accusative v.s. note page 147; also Ἀσκίνης cont. Ctes. 10, (ed. Simcox): εἰ φανῆσεται ὁ αὐτός ἁνήρ, ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ τούλῃ, τυχὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐνίαντι.
Τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτὴν τοῦ βίου περὶ δὲν λέγομεν, ἡνὶ διαστησώμεθα τὸν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἁδικώτατον.

ὁ δὲ γὰρ ἁγαθὸν ἴδια ὄντος. It is not clear if ἴδια is to be taken as equivalent to καθ’ ἑαυτὴν; ‘Justice is not a good in itself,’ or ‘with regard to the individual.’ The latter seems preferable, if we take into account ἴδια in the following sentence.

ἡ ὁμήρον. This is spoken merely in the character of advocate for injustice which Glaucon has assumed. The question is this, ‘Is injustice more profitable (λυσιτελεῖν)?’ But Glaucon does not even believe that it is; v.s. Ch. II: τολυ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἡ ἡ τοῦ ἁδικοῦ ἢ τοῦ δικαλον βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν ἐπεὶ ἐμωγε, ἄ Σώκρατες, οὕτι δοκεὶ ὄντως.

ἐπισταβόμενος. For verbs of this kind v.s. note p. 107.

ἀνοητότατος, v.s. Book I. ἀστείος καὶ εὐθῆς, Ch. XX. and note.

διὰ τὸν τοῦ ἅ. φῶςον. So Horace Sat. I, 3, 111—Jura inventa metu injusti fateare necesse est, Tempora si fastosque velis evolvere mundi.

Ch. IV.—Let us now place before us the unjust man, fully equipped with injustice, even appearing by his cleverness, to be just; and on the other side the just man who, on his part, fails to seem just.

ἐὰν διαστ. τὸν τε δικ. καὶ τὸν ἅ. See Arist. Nub. 889-1104. διαστ. means to discriminate, to set before oneself separately;
this is necessary, because, as
Glaunon shows below, the just
is often mistaken for the unjust,
and vice versa.

μηδὲν ἀφαίρομεν μήτε τοῦ ἄδικου. As a rule this verb takes an
accusative of the thing, and
dative of the person, or a double
accusative; but the present con-
struction is found again in Xen.
Hell. iii. 1, 7: φρεστὰν τεμο-
μένοις ὑπόνομον ἀρτύτεν, ὡς
ἀφαιρησόμενος τὸ ὕδωρ αὐτῶν.
tέλευον, v.i. τῷ τελέω τάδικον,
and supr. τὴν τελεωτάτην ἄδικαὶ,
Ch. XVI. and note.

δεινὸν δὴμ., ‘adepts in their
craft;’ v.i. ἥμεις οὗ δεινὸν,
Ch. X.

ei οὖν ἔλλει, v.s. Book I. Ch.
XVIII.: ό μέλλων, and note.

tὸν ἀληθικόμενον. With this
expression, and ἐὰν ἄρα τῇ σφαλῇ,
compare Ar. Nub. loc. cit. 1079—

μοιχὸς γὰρ ἢν τόχης ἄλοις,
tάδ’ ἀντερεῖσ πρὸς αὐτόν,
ὡς οὐδὲν ἡδίκηκας.

λέγει τε ἴκανόν ὄντι Πρὸς τὸ πείθειν, ἐὰν τι μηνύηται
tῶν ἄδικημάτων, καὶ βιάσασθαι ὅσα ἄν βίας δέηται,

B δέξαμεν αὐτῷ παρεσκευακέναι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, καὶ
ἐὰν ἄρα σφάλληται τι, ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δυνατὸ εἶναι,
λέγειν τε ἴκανόν ὄντι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν, ἐὰν τι μηνύηται
tῶν ἄδικημάτων, καὶ βιάσασθαι ὅσα ἄν βίας Δέηται,
Ede quid illum
Esse putes? quem vis hominem
secum attulit ad nos:
Grammaticus, rhetor, geome-
tres, pictor, aliptes,
Augur, schænobates, medicus,
magus: omnia novit.

...Natio comœda est. Rides:
majore cachinno
Concutitur; fet, si lacrimas
conspexit amici.
...Non sumus ergo pares:
melior, qui semper et omni
Nocte dieque potest alienum
sumere vultum.

kat’ Aισχυλον. See Sept. c.
Theb. 592—
où γάρ δόκειν ἀριστος, ἀλλ’
einai thele,
βαβεῖαν ἀλοικα διὰ φρενὸς καρποῦμενος,
ἀφ’ ἢς τὰ κενα βλαστάνει
βουλεύματα.
And v. infra. Ch. V. ad med.
where the lines are quoted.

άδηλον οὖν, sc. ἂν εἰτη.
A favourite simile with Athenian writers; who had the works of Myron, Polycleitus, Phidias, and many others before their eyes. See Book IV. 420 C: τών μὲν οὖν, ὃς οἶδιμεθα, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν (πόλιν) πλάττομεν ὅπειρα ἀπολαβόντες, ὁλίγους ἐν αὐτῇ τοιούτω τινὰς τιθέντες, ἀλλ' ὅλην αὐτίκα δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν σκέψομεθα. ὅσπερ οὖν ἂν εἰ ἡμᾶς ἀνδριάντας γράφοντας προσελθών τίς ἐμφατα τὸν ἐπεγείρα, κ.τ.λ. See also Book VI. 500 D: *Αν οὖν τίς, ἐποίην, αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη γένηται καὶ ἐκεί ὅρα μελετήσει εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἐθνή καὶ ἀδιανον, καὶ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, κ.τ.λ., where the metaphor of the painter accompanies it. Again, Book VII. 540 C: Παγκάλους, ἔφη, τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὈΣώκρατες, ὅσπερ ἀνδριάντοποιος, ἀπέιραγμα. We find a reference again to the art in Xen. Mem 2, 5, 6: τοὺς μὲν ἀνδριάντοποιος, ἔφη, δοκιμάζομεν, ὅτι τοὺς αὐτῶν τεκμαίρομεν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἂν ὁ ὁρώμεν τοὺς πρόσθεν ἀνδριάντας καλῶς εἰργασμένον τούτῳ πιστεύομεν καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς οὖσι ποιήσειν. Again, Demosthenes accuses Ἐσχίνης of demanding
an arbitrary definition of δημοτικός: ὁσπερ ἀνδράντα ἐκδεδωκός κατὰ ξυγγραφήν, εἰτ' οὐκ ἔχοντα καὶ προσκενέ ἐκ τῆς ξυγγραφῆς κομιζόμενος. — 268 Reiske. Again, in Ion. 533 A, Plato draws an instance from the art: Τί δέ; ἐν ἀνδραντοποίᾳ, ἣν δὴ τίν' εἶδε, δοσίς... ἀνδραντοποιὸν πέρι ἐνώ δεινός έστιν ἐξηγεύσαται καὶ εὐ πεποίηκεν; ἐπεξερευνήσατε, 'to go through next.' εἴδε here has the force of διὰ in διερεύνειν, 'to go through,' or 'describe fully.' See Meno. 71 E: εἰ δὲ βουλεῖ γνωσικὸς ἀφτήν, οὔ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν. 'Επί with the same force occurs again in ἐπανελθεῖν, ἐπανεῖναι; see Dem. de Cor. 260: βοῦλομα τοῖνυν ἐπανελθεῖν ἐφ' ἀ τούτων ἐξῆς ἐπολειτοῦμην, 'I wish next to refer back to...' And so 246: ἀλλ' ἐκεῖσ' ἐπανέρχομαι, 'But I am coming back to that point next.' See also Arist. Nub. 1058— ἀνείμθ' δὴν εντεῦθεν εἰς τὴν γλώσσαν,'From this point I pass back to the question of talking.' And ἰνν. 1408— ἐκεῖσ' δ' ὅθεν ἀπέσχισας με τοῦ λόγου μέτειμα.

καὶ δὴ καν. καὶ δὴ καὶ here is not culminating as noticed pp. 109, 112. We have rather to emphasise καὶ δὴ: 'Well then, granted that it be spoken.' Καὶ δὴ is expressive of assent, either to a thought— καὶ δὴ τεθυμασί τίς με δεξεται πόλεις.—Eur. Med. or to a command— ΚΡ. οὐκοῦν ἐρείς τοτ', εἰτ' ἀπαλλιθεῖς ἀπει; ΦΥ. καὶ δὴ λέγω σοι.—Soph. Ant. 244.

So here καὶ δὴ is assentient to the thought which Glaucon takes for granted will be in Socrates' mind: 'And if you say that my words are rather unpolished,' &c. The assentient force of δὴ is very noticeable in δήτα; see Book I. Ch. IX.: ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις τὰ κοινωνήματα, ἢ τί ἄλλο; κοινωνήματα δήτα, ἢ ὅτι. Certainly covenants.' ἐκκαυθήσεται τῷ φθαλμῷ. See Dem. de Cor. 246: τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκκεκομμένον, τὴν κλεῖν κατεγότα, τὴν χεῖρα, τὸ σκέλος πεπτομένον.

πολ' ἄν ἄρα, for ἄρα in this sense v.s. 346 C, and note on ἄφελειαν: also Book I. 335 E, where it has been found
πολύ ἂν ἄρα ὀρθότερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ ἁδίκου. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ φήσουσι τὸν ἁδίκου, ἀτε ἐπιτηδεύοντα πράγμα ἀληθείας ἐχώμενοι καὶ οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ζωντα, οὐ δοκεῖν ἁδίκον ἀλλ' εἶναι ἔθελεν,

βαθείαν ἀλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπουόμενον, εὖ ἦς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα,

πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει δοκοῦντε ὑκαίῳ εἶναι, ἐπειτὰ γαμεῖν ὅποθεν ἄν βουλησθαι, ἐκδίδοναι εἰς οὐς ἄν βουλησθαι, ἐξμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν οἷς ἄν ἐθέλη, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ὀφελείσθαι κερδαίνοντα τῷ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν τὸ ἁδικεῖν· εἰς ἀγώνας τοίνυν ἴόντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ περιγύνεσθαι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, πλεονεκτοῦντα δὲ πλούτειν καὶ τοὺς τε φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν, καὶ

that a definition cannot be rightly ascribed to Simonides: μαχούμεθα ἁρα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ...εὰν τις φη, κ.τ.λ. For τὸ τοῦ Ἀιλέχ. see τὸ τοῦ Ἐορκέλους γίγνεται, Book I. 329 C; and τὸ τῶν παιζόντων, Book IV. 422 E. For the imperfect indicative we may recall Horace's—

'Ornare pulvinar deorum
Tempus erat dapibus sodales.'
Od. 1, 37, 2.
And Virg. Ecl. 1, 80—
'Hic tamen hanc mecum poteras requiescere nocem,' where see Conington.

τῷ ὄντι γὰρ, ὅσ. the unjust man's conduct is consistently unjust, and, inasmuch as he realises good things from it, there is an element of consistency or reality in it.

ἐχώμενον, lit. 'attaching itself to'; v.s. note p. 107, and ἐνερ. here πολλὰ ἄγαθα τούτων ἐχώμενα, Ch. VI. ad med.

ἐξμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν, v.s. Book I. 333 A: ἐξμβολαία δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα; And ἐνερ. Ch. XI. where money is described as νόμισμα ἐξμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἑνεκα.

τοὺς τε φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθρ. βλάπτειν, see Memo. 71 E, where the ἀρετῆ of a man includes this practice, when he is in office: πρῶτον μὲν εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετῆν, βάδιων, ὅτι αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετῆ, ικανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς.

ἀνάθημα. Any dedicated offering: see Herod. 5, 60, this inscription on a tripod, Σκαῖος πυγμαχέων μὲ ἐκηβόλῳ Ἀπόλ- λωνι νικησας ἀνέθηκε τεῖν περι- καλλίς ἄγαλμα—in the temple of Ismenian Apollo at Thebes. Again, upon a chariot and four horses of bronze, on the left hand
πῶς θύειν τε καὶ ἀνατιθέναι, καὶ θεραπεύειν τοῦ δικαίου πολὺ ἀμεινον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐς ἄν βουληταί, ὡστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἢ τῶν δικαίων. οὖτω φασίν, ὃ Σώκρατες, παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ᾽ ἀνθρώ-πων τῷ ἀδίκῳ παρεσκευάσθαι τὸν βίον ἀμεινον ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ.

CAP. VI.

Ταῦτ᾽ εἰπόντος τοῦ Γλαύκωνος, ἐγὼ μὲν ἐν νῷ ἐλέχον τι λέγειν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὃ δὲ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἀδείμαντος, Οὐ τί ποιοῦ ἐξεῖ, ἔφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἰκανὸς

as one entered by the propylaea into the Acropolis at Athens:

*’Εθνα Βωιαγών καὶ Χαλκιδέων
damásantes
Παῖδες Ἀθηναίων ἐργασάν ἐν
pόλεμοι,
Δεσμῷ ἐν ἀχλυοντὶ σιδηρέω
ἐσβεσάν ὕβριν,
Τῶν ὑπὸν δεκάνην Παλάδι
τάσθ᾽ ἐθεραν...

See also the epigraph of Pausanias upon the tripod dedicated by the Greeks at Delphi, after the Persian war—

*Ελλήνων ἀρχηγῶν ἐπει στρατῶν
ἀλεσε Μῆδων
Παυσανίας Φοίβῳ μνήμ᾽ ἀνέ-
θηκε τόδε.

θεραπεύειν τοῦ δικαίου πολὺ ἀμεινον τοὺς θεοὺς. Socrates at the end of the dialogue comes back to this question, and slights, in direct reference to this passage (ἄρ᾽ οἵν ἀποδώσετε
καὶ ἐδανείσασθε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ,
Book X. 612 C), that God knows
well the character of each, ibid.
Ε. οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ἀπο-
dώσετε, ὅτι θεοὺς γε οὐ λανθάνει
ἐκάτεροι αὐτῶν οἶδ᾽ ἐστίν. It is
worth noticing that Hesiod,
whose morality Adeimantus dis-
parages, Ch. VI. infr. bears wit-
ness also to the omniscience of
Heaven. See Op. et Dies. 247 :

ἐγγὺς γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἐὼνε
ἀθάνατοι φράζονται ὅσοι σκο-
lίσις δίκην
ἀλλήλους τρίβουσιν θεῶν ὅπως
οὐκ ἀλέγοντες.

τρὶς γὰρ μύριοι εἰσὶν ἐπὶ χθονὶ
πουλυβότερη
ἀθάνατοι Σαρνὸς φύλακες θνητῶν
ἀνθρώπων.

θεοφιλέστερον, in opposition
to Socrates' position that the
unjust is θεοῖς ἐχθρός. Book I
Ch. XXIII. 352 B.

Ch. VI.—Herewith Adeimantus
struck in: ‘Neither should we
leave out the case for justice:
fathers commend justice to their
children, not for its own sake,
but for its rewards; and poets
likewise.’

ταῦτ᾽ εἰπ. With these open-
ing words compare Book I. Ch.
XVII. inil. ταῦτ᾽ εἰπόν ὃ
Θρασύμαχος ἐν νῷ ἐλέχει ἀπίεναι.
εἰρήσθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου; Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; εἴπον. Αὐτό, ἢ δ' ὦς, οὐκ εἰρήται ὁ μάλιστα ἐδει ρηθήναι. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη; ὡστε καὶ σὺ, εἰ τι ὦδε ἐλλεῖπει, ἔπαμι. Καίτοι ἐμὲ γε ἵκανα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτου ρηθέντα κατα- παλαίσαι καὶ ἀδύνατον ποιήσαι βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνη.

Ε καὶ ὦς, Οὔδεν, ἐφῆ, λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἐτι καὶ τάδε ἄκουε· δεὶ γὰρ διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἑναντίους λόγους ὃν ὦδε ἐἰπεν, οὐ δικαιοσύνην μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἀδικίαν δὲ ψέγουσιν, ἵν' ἢ σαφέστερον ὃ μοι δοκεῖ βούλεσθαι Γλαύκον, λέγουσι δὲ ποι καὶ παρακελεύονται πατέ- ρες τε νιέσι καὶ πάντες οἱ τινῶν κηδόμενοι, ὡς χρὴ δικαίον εἶναι, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες,

τὸ λεγόμενον, 'as the proverb goes.' The phrase occurs again in Book VI. 492 C, ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τῶν νέων, τὸ λεγόμενον, τίνα ὦτε καρδιὰν ἵσχευν. Σοὶ τῶν παῖζοντων, 'as they say in the game.' ἐκάστη γὰρ αὐτῶν πόλεις εἰσὶ παμπολλαί, ἀλλ' οὐ πολίσ, τὸ τῶν παῖζοντων. Book IV. 422 E. Also Euthydemus ἕν. Θαρρῶν διώκει καὶ ἄσκει, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὰ παιδία, ἰδ. Ch. XIX. ἕν. ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγόμενον ὁ Δίδος Κόρινθος γίγνεται; also Chaps. XX., XXIV. The expression stands in apposition to the proverb it recalls, and some verb such as γίγνεται is understood, as we had above, τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται, Book I. Ch. III. οὐκοῦν, ἢ. 'is it not as we should expect?' 'Naturally,' as in Book I. Ch. V. ἐν. where there is also a reference to relationship, οὐκοῦν, ἐφην ἐγώ, ὁ Πολέμαρχος τῶν τε σῶν κλη- ρόνων, 'Should we not expect it, Polemarchus being your heir?'

ἐμὲ γε, εἰρωνίκως, 'poor me.' καταπαλαίσα, a favourite metaphor; more generally, in Book IX. 553 B, δὶς νευκηκὼς ὁ δίκαιος τῶν ἄδικων, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὀλυμπικῶς τῷ σωτηρί τε καὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ Δί, κ.τ.λ. And below, ἰδ., with this metaphor, καὶ τοῦτ' ἂν εἶ τι μέγιστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν πτώματων. Similarly in the contest between the Λόγοι in Aristophanes' Clouds, the Αδικος says:— ἐπισχεῖς. ἐδῶς γὰρ σε μέσον ἔχω λαβὼν ἀφικτόν, 1. 1045. οὔδεν λέγεις, Adeimantus means that he takes Socrates' denial as merely εἰρωνεία. For he proceeds to make the task of explanation harder than ever. οἷ τοι τίς οἱ. βούλεσθαι, 'to mean.' Lat. velle dicere. πάντες οἱ τινῶν κηδ. 'all kinds of guardians.' οὐκ αὐτὸ δικ. ἐπ., 'not praising the thing itself, justice.' Adei- mantus is here taking up Glaucon's original point; viz. that some things are desirable
in themselves, others for their effects, and others for both. Supr. Ch. I. ἀρά σοι δοκεῖ τοῖνοσ τί εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ὁ δὲ δεξαίμηθ᾽ ἂν ἔχειν ὡς τῶν ἀποβαθανῶν ἐφεύμενοι, ἀλλ′ αὐτῷ αὐτὸν ἐπεκεῖ ἁσ-παζόμενοι; cf. Juv. Sat. X. 141.

Quis enim virtutem amplitudineram sam
Prennia si tollas.

γίγνηται... ἀρχάιτε, &c. The schema Pindaricum; where the plural substantive is masculine or feminine; but the word θαπαρερ here helps out the irregularity. See Æsch. Sept. c. Theb. 49, ἢμεταί δ᾽ ἐρωτο Τμώλου πελάται
Ζύγων ἀμφιβαλεῖν δουλίον Ἐλάλιδι.
And see Book V. infr. 462 E extr. ἦστι μὲν ποι καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλαίσ πόλεσιν ἄρχοντες τε καὶ δήμοι. Jelf, Gr. Gr., 386, notices that this schema amongst Attic writers is chiefly limited to the verb ἦστι, ἄν, at the beginning of a sentence.

ἐνὶ πλεον δὲ... 'And these people carry out this principle, the advantage of a good reputation, still further.' τά τῶν δοξῶν is something like τά τῶν παῖδών quoted above. The expression is indefinite in both cases, because it is as short and elliptical as possible. And it is shortened thus because there can be no doubt in the mind of the hearer as to the reference in both cases. τὸ τῶν παιδῶν means 'the (saying) of people who play a game.' τὰ τῶν δοξῶν means 'the (advantage) of (gaining) reputation.' τὸ τοῦ Σωφοκλέους, 'the (case, or circumstances, of) Sophocles.' Sup. Ch. III. The article, in short, is used thus indefinitely with the purpose of suggesting to the hearer some known fact about the substantive which depends on it as genitive. See Ch. II. Book I., ἰδίν. note τούτο..., τοῦ βίου.

ὁ γενεάως 'Ησ. Spoken sarcastically: in the same spirit that Thrasymachus uses the expression γενεάω εἴπθεια, Ch. XX. Book I. 'Ingenuous' is the sense meant to be conveyed. Translate, 'as our good Hesiod and Homer say.' For Hesiod's theology, v. Introd. p. 25, 26; and Ch. V. here, note on θερα-πεένοι τοῦ δικαίου. And, for another charge against Homer's morality, p. 133.

He is said to have foretold the particulars of the battle of Salamis; id. 8, 96. ὡστε ἀποπλῆσαι τῶν χρησμῶν, τῶν τέρατων τῶν παραπλησίων. Plato in the Ion 536, speaks of him as possessing with Homer and Orpheus poetic inspiration and occult influence upon other poets and rhapsodes. οἱ μὲν εὗρον κατέχονταί τέρατα, ὡστε ἀποπλῆσαι τῶν παραπλησίων. Plato in the Ion 536, speaks of him as possessing with Homer and Orpheus poetic inspiration and occult influence upon other poets and rhapsodes. οἱ μὲν εὗρον κατέχονταί τέρατα, ὡστε ἀποπλῆσαι τῶν παραπλησίων.
Ch. X. *init.* He is included by Protagoras among the first *sofists* or ‘Wise men’, who veiled their true profession under that of poetry, or sooth-saying, or gymnastic, or music; Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, having the reputation of poets, Musaeus and Orpheus of sooth-sayers. Prot. 316 D. *φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθὲς αὐτὴς (sc. τὸ σοφιστάς καλείται) πρόσχημα ποιεῖται καὶ προκαλύπτεται τόσο μὲν ποίησιν, οἷον ὧν Ἰμηρὸν τε καὶ Ἑσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην, τούς τε αὐτοὺς τελεταί τε καὶ χρησιμοδίαις, τοὺς ἀμφὶ τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαίον. His son Eumolpus, migrating from Thrace to Attica, founded the Eleusinian mysteries: hence the sacred family of Eumolpidae. *V. infr.* Ch. VII. *init. βίβλων δὲ ὄμοιον παρέχονται Μουσαίοι καὶ Ὀρφεῖοι.

νεανικότερα, *v. infr.* Book IV. 425 C, καὶ τελευτῶν δὴ, οἷμαι, φαίμεν ἄν εἰς ἔν τι τέλεον καὶ νεανικὸν ἀποβαίνειν αὐτὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ καὶ τοῦν αὐτόν, Æschylus (Ag. 75) speaks of the *νεαρὸς μυελὸς στέρων ἔντος ἀνάσας.*

τῷ λόγῳ, *v. infr.* Ch. X. *ad fin.* εἰ γιγνομένην τόλμων θεσαλομέθα λόγῳ.

κατακλίναντες ὧν ... ἐστεφανομένοι, *v.s.* Book I, Ch. II. καθήστο δ’ ἐστεφανομένοι, and note.

μεθήν αἰώνιον. This view of the after life is evidently a survival from barbaric times. *Μεθὴ* is emphatically proscribed in the account of the *régime* under which the *φύλακες* are to live; see Book III. 403 E. A connection between old Greek and Scandinavian mythology is apparent here; for in Valhalla the Valkyries or attendant nymphs are said to serve warriors after their death with cups of mead and ale; and thus the promise used to be made to a warrior: ‘You shall quaff beer out of the skulls of your enemies.’

μακροτέρους ἀποτ. A common phrase to express a lengthy speech. Eurip. Med. 1351—

‘μακρὰν ἃν ἐξέτεινα τοῖσ’ ἐναντία λόγους.

Æsch. Ag. 916: μακρὰν γὰρ ἐξέτεινας.

dε ἄνοσίους αὖ ᾧ ... To answer this travesty of the rewards of virtue and vice, Socrates at the end of the whole Dialogue tells a tale in which fearful punishments and great enjoyment are meted out to the bad and good respectively. This
tovou in "Aidou kai kocikn vo Udor anagkazoousi
Efevein, eti te zvntas eis kakas doxas agontes, apter
Palmknov peri tvn dikalov doxaemevon de adikon
diile the tiparhmeta, tauta peri twn adikon legoun-
sin, alba de oiv exeusin. o men ouv epainos kai o
psongos ovtos ekateron.

CAP. VII.

Prose de toutous skesfai, o Sowkretes, allo av

eidos logon peri dikaiosunhs te kai adikias idia te

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legomenu kai upo poitwv. pantes gar eis evos
stomatos umnoyn, wos kalon men h sofrosynh te
tale of Er the Pamphylian (see Argument Book X.) did not
represent Socrates' belief regarding a future existence; and is
merely popular. His general
audience, for whose sake the
tale is told, could hardly un-
derstand, much less appreciate his
ideal of existence, viz.: anakli-
vantas thn ths psyhhs aughin eis
auta apobllwv to pasi fws
perexon, sc. idean tou angado:
'To lift the eye of the soul up
to the contemplation of the Real
Good.' Book VII. 540 A.

agontes, 'representing them
as coming to an evil reputation.'
Like katonhtousin above, 'sub-
merge them' i.e. 'represent
them as submerged.' It is a
brachylogy of expression, where
the first and prominent subject
of the sentence is constituted
subject also to an action which
does not really belong to it.
In Soph. Ed. Tyr. 742, we
have the expression used of an
old man—

xovaaou aorti lenkandhes kara,
an action where the person is
not properly an agent. And id.

480—
ta metomphala yhs apovosphywv
maneia.
i.e. 'going away from,' but
literally, 'separating.' In
the same way Virgil. En. 7, 173—
'Hie primos attollere fasces
Regibus omen erat.'
Where the kings are said 'to
raise,' when properly they
should be said 'to have raised
for them.' Other examples in
Virgil are, 'dare classibus
Austros,' 'seram dedit per
membra quietem'; and see
below here Ch. XVI. paiwvanov

touis anbras.
alba de oiv exeusin, i.e. 'they
have none better to speak of.'

Ch. VII.—The poets too one and
all describe virtue as toilsome,
and vice as pleasant, whilst
soothsayers offer to purge men
from crime with a few prayers.

umnoyn, 'harp on this';
see Book VIII. 549 E: alla di
dsa kal oia filouwv ai gynaike
καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπῶν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον· ἀκολούθια δὲ καὶ ἁδικία ἦδυ μὲν καὶ εὐπτές κτήσασθαι, δόξη δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἰσχρόν. Λυσιτελέστερα δὲ τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἄδικα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλήθος λέγουσι, καὶ πονηρῶς πλουσίους καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας εὐδαιμονίζειν καὶ τιμᾶν εὐχερῶς ἐθέλουσι δημοσία τε καὶ ἱδία, τοὺς δὲ ἀτιμάζειν καὶ ὑπερορᾶν, οἳ ἀν τῇ ἀσθενείᾳ τε καὶ πένητες ὤσιν, ὡμολογοῦντες αὐτοὺς ἀμείνως ἐίναι τῶν ἔτερων. τούτων δὲ πάντων οἱ περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἁρετὴς θαυμασιώτατοι λέγονται, ὡς ἰρα καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ μὲν ἁγαθοὶς δυστυχίας τε καὶ βίον κακῶν ἐνειμαν, τοῖς δὲ ἐναντίοις ἐξαντίαν μοίραν. ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ μάντεις ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἵναι πείθουσιν ὡς ἔστι παρὰ

Debuerant olim tenues micrassae Quirites.

And for the admiration and influence which wealth brings with it, Sat. VII. 124, seqq. ὁμολογ. ἀλλοῦ, they allow the just to be better.

πολλοὶ μὲν ἁγαθοὶς δυστυχίας.

At the end of this Book it is argued that God cannot be the author of evil to any one; 379 Ο: οὐκ ἦρα πάντων γε ἁίτιον τὸ ἁγαθὸν, ἅλλα τῶν μὲν εὖ ἔχοντων ἁίτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἁνατίον... τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἅλλ' ἅττα δεί ἕχειν τὰ ἁίτια ἅλλ' ὁ τῶν θεῶν ἠρα, introducing the words or thoughts of others, stigmatizes them as incorrect or absurd; see below: πείθουσι...ὁ δὲ ἀρά λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀνθρώπων διὰ θυσίαν καὶ παντοὶς ἢδονῶν εἰσι. See also Ἑσχήνος contr. Ctes. 13 (ed. Simcox): Δέξουσι δὲ...ἀν ἀρὰ, διὰ τὸ ἀρέστο ἐν πράττει κατὰ ψυφίσμα, οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ἄρχει. Where the orator is anticipating the case for the defence.
These were also used to keep off disease; Eurip. Hippol. 478—
eisyn δ' ἑπφαδαὶ καὶ λόγοι θελκτήριοι
φανήσεται δ' τῆς δ' φάρμακον
νόσου.
μολος δίκαιον ἄδικα, v.s. Book I. Ch. XXI. τῷ ἀργοῦ ἀνταφ.
ἐπαγωγαί τισὶ καὶ κατάδ. In Aristoph. Nub. 749 we have
a caricature of this witchcraft—
γυναικα φάρμακα εἰ πριάμενος
Θετταλῆς,
καθέλουσι νοκτωρ τὴν σελήνην...
As in Horace Epod. 17, 5—
Refixa cælo devocare sidera.
And again, Epod. 5, 45—
Quae sidera excantata voca
Lunamque cælo deripit.
Virg. Ecl. 8, 69—
Carmina vel cælo possunt
deducere Lunam.
And Plato in the Gorgias 513:
τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαρούσας,
tās Θητταλίδας.
ὡς τὴν μὲν, &c. Hesiod.
Mem. 2, 1, 22 in the choice of Hercules: ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ὡς
χαλεπὴν καὶ μακρὰν δῶν ἐπὶ τὰς
eφροσύνας ἡ γυνὴ σπούδα
διηγεῖται. Et suppr. for ιδρώτα
here: ei δ' καὶ τῷ σώματι βουλεῖν
dυνατὸς εἶναι, τῇ γυνῶν ὑπηρε-
tείν ἐνυποτέλεν τὸ σῶμα καὶ γυμνασ-
tεῖν σφών πόνοις καὶ ιδρώται.
λιστοί, &c. Hom. II. ix.
497.
Τάντα πάντα, ἢθη, ὥς φίλη Σώκρατες, τοιαύτα καὶ τοσαύτα λεγόμενα ἀρετῆς πέρι καὶ κακίας, ὡς ἀνθρωποί καὶ θεοὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ἔχουσι τιμῆς, τί οἷόμεθα ἀκούοντας νέων ψυχῶν ποιεῖν, ὅσοι εὐφρείοι καὶ
tῶν ἤκεῖ κακῶν. See p. 120 supra., and Ch. V. B, ἤκείσε ἀπέναι, τὴν ἤκεῖ μοίραν.

Ch. VIII.—What wonder if young men, then, make this perfect injustice their object? It is no easy task, but all things perfect are difficult to realize; and if we prosper in wickedness we can appease the gods with sacrifice.

περὶ ταύτα ἔχουσι τιμῆς, see Jelf Gr. Gr. 528. Thuc. 1. 22, ὡς ἐκατέρων ἐνυώδας...ἡ μνήμης ἔχου. Ἐχείν in this sense usually refers to the condition not the action of the subject, e.g. Ἐχείν τρόπου, εὐθαμονίας, γνώμης, ἐμπειρίας, but here τιμῆς stands for τοῦ τιμῶν.
In the Republic we find a partial explanation of this interest. Apart from other reasons, Socrates was interested in the young, because they were most susceptible to his teaching, and he hoped to imbue them rather than the older men with his beliefs; see Book III. 415 D: οὐδαμῶς, ἐφη, ὅπως γ' ἀν αὐτὰ οὕτως ὅπως μὲν ἄν οἱ πολλοὶ νῦν ἐνείσαι καὶ οἱ ἑπείτα οἱ τ' ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι οἱ ὑστεροὶ. ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ λέγ. ὥσπερ ἐπιπτόμενοι, 'flitting as it were over the whole field of words.' Although the metaphor is different, the sense of the present passage reminds us of that in Book I, Ch. XXIV.: τὸν ἀεὶ παραφρομένον ἀπογευόμεναι ἄρπάξοντες, and see below Ch. XII. ἕν.: ἐπιπτώμενες.

τὸν βιον ὃς ἀριστα διέλθη, ν.ς. Book I. 352 Ε: οὔ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιπτώμενος ὅ λόγος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντινα τρόπον χρῆς ἢ, and Note.

τὰν ἀλάθειαν β. Plato is
"...the peculiarity of dialect.

Simonides: hence the peculiarity of dialect.

And in Book X. 602 D, σκιαγραφία is described as deceptive: ὃ δὴ ἴμων τῷ παθήματι τῆς φύσεως ἡ σκιαγραφία ἐπιθεμένη γοητειάς οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει; and in Book IX. 583 B, the pleasure of the φρόνιμος is said to be the only true pleasure, that of others being shadowy: οὐδὲ παναληθῆς ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἴμων πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρόνιμου οὐδὲ καθαρά, ἄλλ' ἐσκιαγραφήμενή τις. σχῆμα means the figure or general outlines of an object; thus it denotes the movement of troops.

Book VII. 326 D: δὴ δὴ ἄλλα σχηματίζουσι τά στρατόπεδα ἐν αὐτάις τε μάχαις καὶ πορείαις; and in Book VIII. 548 D, we find the word itself explained: ἀνθή μὲν ἡ πολιτεία ὦντις γεγονὼν καὶ τοιαῦτα ἐν τις εἰ, ὅσ λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράφαται μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθα, 'in outline, not in detail.'

τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφ. Fr. 89, τῇ ἀρ' ἀλώπηξ κερδαλέα συνήντητο. "Αλώπηξ dicitur pro pelle vulpina, ut λέων pro pelle leonina, et ejusdem generis alia; de quibus Horatius de Arte Poetica, 437:—

"Nunquam te fallent animi sub vulpe latentes."—Ruhnken.

οὐδὲν εὔπτετε τῶν μεγάλων. Socrates expresses this sentiment in Book VI. 497 E in the words, χαλέπα τῷ ὤντί τά καλά. εἰ μέλλομεν εὐδαιμονίσειν, see note, Book I. Ch. XVIII.

ταύτῃ ἱτέον, ὥς τὰ ἱχνη, see notes, pp. 128, 132, 135, and infra. Book III. 401 C: τοὺς εὐφιών δυναμένους ἱχνεύειν τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν, and Book VIII. init.: ἀναμνησθοῦμε, πόθεν δεύο ἐξε- τραπόμεθα, ἵνα πάλιν τὴν αὐτήν ταμεν; and Book V.: ἄρα δὲ νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν εἰς μὲν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἱχνος ἴμων ἀρμότει. And the final discovery of justice Plato compares to threading the way through a dark and tangled thicket, in pursuit of game. Book IV. 432 C: καὶ μὴν, εἶπον ἐγώ, δυσβατός γέ τις ὁ τότος φανεται καὶ ἐπισκιώς ἐστὶ γούν σκοτεινος καὶ δυσδιερευνητος, ἄλλα γὰρ ὤμος ἱτέον.
πειθοὺς διδάσκαλοι, ἢς. σοφισταῖ, see Ch. II. note ἄριστου ὄντος; and Protagoras 312 C: τί ἦγεῖ εἶναι σοφιστὴν; Ἑγὼ μὲν, ἦδ' ὡς, ὃσπερ τούνομα λέγει, τούτων εἶναι τῶν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμων... Ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τι σοφῶν ἐστι...ποιας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; Τί ἂν εἴπομεν αὐτῶν εἶναι, ὦ Σῶκρατε, ἢ ἐπιστάτην του ποίησαι δεινον λέγειν. Gorgias was a sophist of this sort, see Philebus 58 Α: Ἦκουν μὲν ἐγώγε, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ἐκάστοτε Γοργίου πολλάκις, ὃς ἦ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέροι παισὼν τεχνῶν. And for σοφιὰν δημογορικὴν see Sympos. 198 C, where Socrates bears witness to his powers of rhetoric: ἐφοβοῦμην μὴ μοι τελευτῆν ὃ Ἀγάθων Γοργίου κεφάλην δεινοῦ λέγειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὸν ἔμοι λόγον πέμψας, &c. Also Aristophanes makes the ἄδικος λόγος the principal accomplishment of the Socratic School; Clouds 114 seqq.—

τούτων τὸν ἑτερὸν τῶν λόγων, τὸν Ἴησον

μικᾶς λέγοματα φασι τάδικώτερα.

And one of the first questions Socrates asks the Neophyte in the same play is—

εὔστῃ δὴ τά σοι λέγειν ἐν τῇ φύσει;

τὰ μὲν πείσομεν τὸ δὲ βιασ,. v.s. Ch. IV. βιάσομαι ὅσα ἄν ἔπαι δηται.

θεοὺς ὀὔτε λανθάνειν. See 612 E, Book X.: θεοὺς γε οὐ λανθανέι εκάτεροι αὐτῶν οἷός ἐστιν. And here above Ch. V. ἤπειρ.: θεοφλέστεροι αὐτῶν εἶναι; sc. τῶν ἄωκον. ἀλλὰ δὴ ἑιτεῦρει στροφοὺν αὐτῶν εἶναι. And here above Ch. V. ἤπειρ.: θεοφλέστεροι αὐτῶν εἶναι; sc. τῶν ἄωκον. ἀλλὰ δὴ ἑιτεῦρει στροφοὺν αὐτῶν εἶναι. And here above Ch. V. ἤπειρ.: θεοφλέστεροι αὐτῶν εἶναι; sc. τῶν ἄωκον. ἀλλὰ δὴ ἑιτεῦρει στροφοὺν αὐτῶν εἶναι. And here above Ch. V. ἤπειρ.: θεοφλέστεροι αὐτῶν εἶναι; sc. τῶν ἄωκον. ἀλλὰ δὴ ἑιτεῦρει στροφοὺν αὐτῶν εἶναι. And here above Ch. V. ἤπειρ.: θεοφλέστεροι αὐτῶν εἶναι; sc. τῶν ἄωκον. ἀλλὰ δὴ ἑιτεῦρει στροφοὺν αὐτῶν εἶναι.
Such, priestcraft as this was not uncommon in Greece, and was practised by the ministers of Cybele, called μητραγύρται. In the time of the Roman Empire the priests of Isis, besides those of Cybele, flocked to Italy to practise similar knaveries, and even Jews traded upon their religion. See Juvenal VI. 543.

Arcanam Judaea tremens mendicat in aurem

Interpres legum Solymarum, We find mention of these priests of Cybele in Juv. II. 111; VI. 512; and we gain some idea of their quack religions from Demosthenes’ reflections upon Æschines, when he is accusing him of having assisted his mother in inaugural rites or mysteries of initiation. De Cor. 312 (Reiske), ἀνὴρ δὲ γενόμενος τῇ μητρὶ τελούσῃ τὰς βίβλους ἀνεγερνάσκει καὶ τάλαν συνεσκευῶσιν, τὴν μὲν νόκτα νεβρίζων καὶ κρατηρίζων καὶ καθαίρων τοὺς τελομένους καὶ ἀπομάττων τῷ πηλῷ καὶ τοὺς πτυριοὺς καὶ ἀνιστάσι αὐτῷ τοῦ καθαροῦ κελέων λέγειν ἑφυγων κακῶν, εἴρην ἀμείνων; &c. Arnold ad loc. states that Lobeck has proved these mysteries to have been of an Orphico-Bacchic character, to which the word νεβρίζων, amongst others, points.

Θυτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἄδικ. Jelf, Gr. Gr. 620, calls this a temporal genitive, ‘where a point of time is marked by an action,’ and compares Herod. VI. 129, γενέσικαὶ ἀπὸ δείπνου. It is a condensed expression, the notion of ἀπαλλάσσειν (ὁ ἰθη. ἄξημι ἀπαλλάξαμεν) being probably present to the writer’s mind; thus, fully expressed, θυτεον ὡστε ἀπαλλάσσειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄδικομάτων.

κερδανοῦμεν τε καὶ... ἀπαλλάξαμεν, ‘But if we do wrong we shall not only gain by it, but get off scot free, by making prayers when we transgress and using persuasion when we commit crimes.’ For the various senses of ἀπαλλάσσω and its compounds v.s. note p. 115.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ..., reply of the objector: which is answered by a sentence introduced by ἀλλὰ repeated, as above, Book I. init. ἀλλὰ περιμένετε, ἀλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν, and p. 109. note. Also Ch. IX. Book I., Ἀλλὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δὴ οἱ δίκαιοι ἄδικοι; καὶ ξυλῇβδῆν ἀρετῇ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακοὶ; Ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον.
CARY. IX.

Katà tîn òyn èti ëvpòv ðikaiosûnîy àn prò megyístîs àdikías aîroîmeméth' àn; òn èán met' evûxhî-

moosûny kîbîdîlîou kîthiômêthá, kai parà ðeîos kai

par' ânthrôpouîs pràxîmêv káta noûv ðwntèss te kai
teleutîsantîs, òs ò tòn polllîn te kai ákron

leugômenos lógon. ëk òd ðè pánmtov tòn eîrhmènon tîs

mìhaxhî, òî Swôkrates, dikaiosûnîn tîmâv ëbèlênî, òî

tîs ðûnâmaîs ûpárxhei ðûnchîs òî xhêmâton òî sômatoîs

òî gênovus, álâlì ù îgêlân épàpnomênîs àkouûnta;
casm discernible here in Adei-
mantus' words. This expression
is a Hendiadys:—'many of the
most competent.'

dûnâmaîs, so below, àðbhvaton
aívto ðrâv. This is in agree-
ment with Glaucon's original ac-
count of the nature of justice,
v.s. Ch. II. tôis ùî dûnâmênoi tò mèn
èkfeûgein tò ðè aîreîv, òc.,
'Those who have no power';
whilst those who have power, be
it bodily or mental, direct or
indirect, find injustice to be to
their advantage rather than
justice. Hence we are at present
only listening to Thrasymachus' 
case elaborated,—that Justice is
the Interest of the stronger; for
Thrasymachus made it clear that
the interest of the stronger was
injustice towards the weaker.
Ch. XVI. Book I.

δûlâtâ ùî. ùî is used, the case
being hypothetical. For ἀλλὰ with the negative, v. infr. 379 D., ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ τὸν θεόν.

'Εχει... ἀποφήμαι v.s. pp. 181 and 190; εἰ infr. Ch. XI. ἦν οἱ οἰκοδόμοι (ἐχοιείς) χρῆσθαι ὑπογυνοῖς.

ἀριστον δικ., ν. infr. Ch. IX. ἢ μὲν κακῶν, ἢδὲ ἀγαθῶν ἐστί, 'One is an evil, the other a good,' ἀριστον, 'the Best.'

ικανός ἔγνωκεν... πολλὴν συγγνώμην. Tout comprendre c'est tout pardoner. The particles ὡς δὴ τοι, introduce a statement explaining or corroborating that preceding, 'At any rate the fact is...' ὡς here is like ἐπεὶ in Euthyphr. 9 B. Μανθάνω ὅτι σοὶ δοκῶ τῶν δικαστῶν δυσμαθέστερον εἶναι, ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνος ἔτι ἐνεδείκη, κ.τ.λ. And Arist. Nub. 785.

'Αλλὰ εὖθυς ἐπιλήθει σοῦ γ' ἄπτ' ἄν καὶ μάθης.'

ἐπεῖ τι νυν πρῶτον ἐδιδάχθης; λέγε.

Both particles bring in a further consideration not to be lost sight of.

πλὴν ἐι τις θέλα φύσ., v.s. not. ad σοφός καὶ θείος, p. 126. εἰ γὰρ χρῆ εἰδέναι ὅτι περ ἂν σωθῇ τε καὶ γένεται οἶον δεὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει πολιτείας, θεοῦ μοιραν αὐτὸ σῶσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἑρείς. Book VI. 492 E. These words are part of the description mentioned above in Ch. VIII. (on the words τι οἰδέμεθα ἀκούσας); where it is shown that a young man who is exposed to the ordinary influences of life cannot fail to be depreciated by the noise and struggle. Aedimantus here, and Socrates in the passage quoted, are speaking the same words: it is the same expression of Plato's belief that God works by means of and in man: see Ion 534, where it is shown that the best poetry is the direct inspiration of God.

ἀλλὰ ἐγένετο τὸ ἀδ., ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ ὁμιλων, Ch. III. ἀνήκουσα τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἄκουστες αὐτὸ (δικαιοσύνην) ἐπιτηδεύσουσι.

πρῶτος ἀδίκει, v.s. Ch. III. ἐπ' αὐτοφόροι ὅδ' ἀδικοῦμεν ἄν τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς ταύτῳ ἃντα διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν.

τόδε, Glauccon, who insisted upon this point, Ch. II. ad med.
The choice of Heracles, notably the choice of
Heracles in之举ction, given at length in
Xen. Mem. II. 1, 21, seqq. e.g. 28. εἶτε τοὺς θεοῦς ἴλεος εἶναι οὖσα βουλεῖ, θεραπευτέον τοὺς θεοὺς, εἴτε ὑπὸ φιλών ἠθέλεις ἀγαπᾶθαι, τοὺς φίλους ἐνεργητέον, εἴτε ὑπὸ τοὺς πόλεως ἐπιθυμεῖς τιμᾶσθαι, τὴν πόλιν ὥφελητέον, εἴτε ὑπὸ τῆς Ἐλλάδος πάσης ἁξίους ἐπ' ἄρετὴ δυναμεσθαι, τὴν Ἐλλάδα πειρατέον εὖ ποιεῖν.

οὐδὲς πῶστ' ἐν ποίησει. Θεογνίς, for instance, as it has been noticed in the Introduction, describes justice as καλλίστον, the Fairest, i.e. he commends it rather for its external than its intrinsic value. This sentiment, the devotion to τὸ καλόν, is characteristic of the Greeks who were an emulous people, and to some extent of the Romans also. The Greeks possessed to an extent the ordinary degree the sense of τὸ όνομα beautiful, and they lived very much in public: hence they were prone rather to judge of actions by their effects than by the motives which prompted them. τιμᾶι, δωρεάι, στέφανοι, the rewards of probity and great deeds, are set forth and insisted upon instead of probity itself. Thus Aristotle, in describing the

good man’s patience under adversity, speaks of τὸ καλόν, the beauty of the endurance and the decency (εὐσχημόνως) of his conduct, ἐν τούτοις διαλαμπεῖ τὸ καλὸν, ἐπειδὴν φέρῃ τὰς εὐκάλυπτος πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἄτυχιας. Eth. Nic. I. 10, 12, et ἐπὶ τ. 13. τὸν γὰρ ὃς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔφησαν πᾶσα ὡσίμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν. Similarly in 8, XIII. 8, καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν. It is the same feeling which prompts the use of the word 'laud' in Virgil’s poem for ‘noble deeds.’ See Εν. VIII. 257—

Tantarum in munere laudum
Virgile Brunde comas.

and Ι. 432—

Quae nobis, que digna, viri,
proaudibis istis
Praemia posse rear solvi?

Also I. 461—

Sunt hic etiam sua præmia laudi.

Adeimantus’s complaint is that the good deed and its intrinsic value is lost sight of in the honour and glory of the reward. ιδιοὶ λόγοι, i.e. pedestri sermone. Stallb. See Ch. VII. ad init. ιδια τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν.

μέγιστον κακῶν ὦ ἑσχει ψυχή
αυτῇ, δικαιοσύνη δὲ μέγιστον ἀγαθῶν. εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἑλεγετο εξ ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ πάντων ὑμῶν καὶ ἐκ νέων ἡμᾶς ἐπείθετε, οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἢν ἐκαστὸς φύλαξ, δεδίως μὴ ἀδικών τῷ μεγίστῳ κακῷ ξύνοικος ἦ. ταῦτα, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ὦσος δὲ καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλείω Ὀρασύμαχος τε καὶ ἄλλος ποὺ τις ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας λέγοιεν ἃν μεταστρέφοντες αὐτοῦν τὴν δύναμιν, φορτικῶς, ὡς γε μοι δοκεῖ: ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν σὲ δέομαι ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, σοῦ ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκοῦσαι τάναντία, ὡς δὴ μαι μάλιστα κατατείνας λέγω. μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν μόνον ἐπειδή ὅταν λόγῳ, ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας κρείττον, ἀλλὰ τὶ ποιοῦσα ἐκατέρα τὸν ἤχουτα αὐτή δὲ αὐτὴν ἢ μὲν κακῶν, ἢ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ τὰς δὲ δόξας ἀφαίρει, ὅσπερ Γλαύκων διεκε- λεύσατο. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀφαιρήσεις ἐκατέρωθεν τὰς ἀληθείς, τὰς δὲ φευγεῖς προσθήσεις, οὗ τὸ δίκαιον φήσομεν ἐπαινεῖν σε, ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀδικον εἶναι φέγγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, καὶ παρακελεύσεσθαι C ἀδικον ὄντα λανθάνειν, καὶ ὀμολογεῖν Ὀρασύμαχος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν, ἔμμμερον τοῦ κρείττονος, τὸ δὲ ἀδικον μὲν ἐν αὐτῇ. So in Book III. 491 C. Ἀχιλλεὺς... ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ νοσήματε δύο ἐναντίων ἀλλήλων, whilst in Book IV. 444 E. as already noticed, virtue is described in the same metaphor as ὑγίεια τις.

"FORTIFIED, 'in a vulgar or un-appreciative way.' See VII. 528 E. ἐπέπλησας (μοι) περὶ ἀστρονομίας ἃς φορτικῶς ἐπαινοῦστε, and IX. 581 D. οὐ τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν χρυσάτων ἡδονῆς φορτικῆς τινα ἴσχεται; καταστείνας, v.s. p. 115, note. τὶ ποιοῦσα τὸν ἤχουτα, after the analogy of ἐδ, κακῶς, ποιεῖν with accusative.

"Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀφεῖ, &c. 'If you do not remove their real characters and give them the credit of false ones,' &c. See above Ch. IV. Π. μοῦ ὄντα ἀφαιρέτων (ἀδικῶν) ἐστεῖν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα; μεγίστην δὲν ἀὐτῷ παρεσ- τέφειν εἰς δικαιοσύνην... ἀφαιρέτων δὲ τὸ δοκεῖν (δικαίως). Εἰ γὰρ δοξαί δίκαιος εἶναι, ἐσοφαι ἀδυνατί τιμαί, &c. The unjust man is to have the credit of justice, whilst from the just man is to be taken away even the reputation of the justice which he practises."
It is pleasant to notice here the optimistic tone of Adeimantus' words—the sense of healthy enjoyment in mere existence. There is no question, 'Is life worth living?' Existence itself is a pleasure, as long as health is with us.

Τυγαίνειν concludes the list of blessings, and emphasized as it is by δή, is marked out as the greatest blessing of all. In Book IX. 583 D, we have an analysis of such pleasurable states. ἂρ οὐν μημομενεὶς, ζήν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς τῶν κομμονῶν λόγους, οὓς λέγουσιν ὅταν καμνοσίν; Ποιοῦσ; ὅσ οὖθεν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἥδιον τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἄλλα σφᾶς ἐλελήθει, πρὸν κάμνειν, ἥδιστον ὑπ. See also Argument, p. 91.

The optimistic tone of Adeimantus' words is strikingly exemplified. Adeimantus is convinced that to commend justice for its reward...
is a mistake, but if Socrates choose to do so, he is ready to hear him, as believing that he would have something valuable to say.

πάντα τὸν βιον, τ.υ. Ch. ΠΙ., περί γάρ τίνος ἂν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἔχων χαροί λέγων καὶ ἀκούων. And in Book V. 450 Ὁ. μέτρον δὲ γ᾽ ἔφη, ὥς ἀκριβεῖς, ὡς Γλαύκων, τοιούτων λόγων ἀκούεις δος δὲ βίος νοῦν ἔχουσιν. Such are Socrates’ own expressions, which bear witness to the truth of Glaucon’s words here. With this chapter the case for injustice comes to an end, and with it the first part of the Republic. It has been an elaborate criticism of popular beliefs and definitions. We have seen Cephalus decline to enter upon the question, ‘What is justice?’ We have had definition after definition of justice tried, and found wanting, and lastly, we have seen the spectacle of two earnest minds, fully convinced that integrity is the best, but harassed and wearied with the commendations of wickedness, demanding of their friend and teacher a solution of the paradox which distresses them. Besides this, the matter of the dialogue, there has also been no small preparation for a lengthy controversy. Side subjects, bearing on the main question, have been suggested for future settlement; methods of argument have been tested, and approved, or found wanting; accuracy in description and definition has been demanded, and all is ready for Socrates’ task, the justification of justice. 

Ch. Χ.—I said that their able words had filled me with admiration; I was however unequal to the task. Then they besought me again to try. So I said: Let us take a larger organism than man, the State, and try first if we can find justice there.


ελεγείων ἐποιησεν ὁ Γλαύκων ἐρᾷιστής, εὐδοκιμη-σαντας περὶ τὴν Μεγαροῦ μάχην, εἰπών.

πάϊδες Ἀρίστωνος, κλεινοῦ θείου γένους ἄνδρός.

tοῦτό μοι, ὦ φίλοι, εἰ δοκεῖ ἐξειν. πάνυ γὰρ θείου πεπόνθατε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἄδικιαν ἀδικαίοσύνης ἀμε-νον εἰναι, οὔτω δυνάμενοι ἐπειν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ. δοκεῖτε

Βδῆ μοι ὃς ἄληθῶς οὐ πεπείσθαί.

ἐκ τοῦ ἀλλοῦ τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου, ἐπεὶ κατὰ γε αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους ἥπιστον ἀν ὑμῖν ὁ σοὶ δὲ μᾶλλον πιστεύω, τοσοῦτο μᾶλλον ἀπορῶ ἀν στράτευοι ἐπὶ τοῖς χρήσωμαι. οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως Βοήθω ἔχω. δοκῶ γάρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἰναι σημεῖον δὲ μοι, ὅτι ὁ πρὸς Ῥασάμαχον λέγων ὁμὴν ἀποφαίνειν, ὅς ἀμενον ἀδικαίοσύνη ἄδικιας, οὐκ ἀπεδέξασθε μοι οὔτ' αἳ ὅπως μὴ Βοήθησον ἔχω· δέδοικα γὰρ, μὴ οὖδ' ὁσιον ἐπαραγονόμενον δικαι-

Cοςύνη κατηγορομένη ἐπαγορεύειν καὶ μὴ Βοηθεϊν

θείου, ὁσ. not. ad Μουσαίοις Ch. VI. ad med., and not. pp. 126, 150. ‘You have received a divine afflatus.’ This remark of Socrates must not be taken too seriously; there is a spice of raillery intended, but he goes on to pay them a compliment, which, coming from him, is of the greatest value, for their able statement of the case for injustice. ἐπείθατε see note p. 114.

ἀπορῶ δέ τι χρήσωμαι. Elliptical. ‘I don’t know what to do (with the situation).’ For this sense v.s p. 131, note. Here the usual dative is omitted, the object of χρήσωμαι being τοῦτος, or ταύτη τῇ πίστει, to be supplied from πιστεύω. This omission occurs in Arist. Nub. 439—Νῦν οὖν χρῆσωμω τι τῷ βοῦ-

λονται. Sc. ἐμοὶ.

ὅπως Βοήθω ἔχω. We have seen ἔχω used above in this sense but with an infinitive; see Ch. IX. ἔχει...ἀποφήναι. 

dοκῶ ἀδύνατος, v.s. δῆλος εἰ ὁτι φήσεις, Book I. Ch. XX. ad med.; and ἐμοὶ γε δοκῶ Book I. 339 D. So on p. 175 it has been noticed above that μέλω and ἔσκα are used.

ἀπεδέξασθε. See note p. 122. ὦτ’ ἀδ... Socrates’ devotion to the defence of truth against falsehood is here expressed with words of grand simplicity. Similarly Aristotle, when investigating the nature of moral action, and finding a difficulty in providing for particular acts: ἀλλὰ καλίτερ ὤντος τοιοῦτον τοῦ πάροντος λόγου πειρατέον βοηθεῖν. —Eth. Nic. 2, 2, 5.

ἀπαγορεῦειν, ‘to refuse’; hence ‘to give up,’ or ‘fail’;
In the discovery of justice the spot where it lies hid is called ὑσσανόσ; Book IV. 432 C. For the eagerness of all those present to hear Socrates and to follow the discussion, see Book I. Ch. XI.: πάντες γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σωκратεὶ ταῦτα εἰσολοῦμεν. Ibid. XII. init.: οἱ τε Πλάοκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ μὴ ἄλλοις ποιεῖν. Ch. XVII.: οὐ μὴν εἰσάγῃ γε αὐτοῦ οἱ παρόντες, ἀλλ’ ἱμαχασάν υπομείνα τε καὶ παρασχεῖν τῶν εἰρημένων λόγον.

οὐ φαίλον, v.s. Book I. Ch. XXIII.: οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος οἱ λόγοι ἄλλα περὶ τοῦ ἄντων τρόπον χρῆν. Εἰ \textit{i} i\textit{nfr.} here Ch. XV. \textit{in} i\textit{t}: οὐκ ἄρα φαίλον πράγμα ἱμαχαβα.

δὲ βλέπωντος. So in the account of the cave, Book VII. 516 D: γέρα τὸ δέδετα καθορᾶντε τα παρόντα.

ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοὶ. Not necessarily \textit{eirōnē}a; but with Socrates customary self-deprecation. When this self-deprecation is excessive, and has the direct intention of deceiving an opponent, it becomes \textit{eirōnē}a; \textit{v.s.} οἱ \textit{ἐν} ἐμοὶ ένήθ, Ch. I. \textit{i}in\textit{t}.

οἶνος τὸν εἰ... For this position of ἂν, repeated below (されました ἢν ἐφάνη), see p. 128 note. The construction is broken off at οἶνος τὸν and a fresh sentence begun.

ἐν μείζον, sc. χρήματι, or τόπο, 'in a larger place,' or 'on a larger object.'

Ἑρμεια, 'a piece of good luck.' Hermes was the divinity from whom good fortune came; see II. 14, 491—

τὸν ρα μάλιστα

Ἑρμειας Τρόων \textit{εφίλει καὶ κτῆσιν ὤπασε.}

For the word \textit{Ἑρμαιον} see Euthydemus 273 E: πόθεν τούτο τὸ \textit{Ἑρμαιον} εὐφέτην; \textit{et id.} \textit{i}n\textit{fr.}: τὸ μείζον \textit{Ἑρμαιον} αὐτοῦ ἢν εὐρομι ἢν πάντι τὸ βίω;
The common possession of certain qualities, habits, and morals is attributed to men and states in Book VIII. 544 E: οὐδὲν ὢν, ἦν ὦ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ὅπερ καὶ πολιτείαν; ή οὐεί εἰς δρῶν ποθὲν ἢ ἔκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι; καὶ οὐχὶ εἰ τῶν ἡθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν. Also Book VIII. passim, and Book IX.

With this system Aristotle agrees, Pol. i. 1, when he says, after describing the origin of the πόλις from the οἰκία and καμη, that the πόλις is in its nature prior to the οἰκία, and καμη as the whole is prior to its parts: καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἐκαστὸς ἦμῶν ἐστιν τὸ γὰρ δὲν πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους. In Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 17 the charge is brought against Socrates: χρῆν τὸν Ἑωκράτην μὴ πρότερον τὰ πολιτικὰ διδάσκειν τοὺς συνήθεις ἢ σωφρονεῖς, a charge pointed by the fact that Critias and Alcibiades were his pupils. But it is there urged that these two men came to Socrates merely with the object of learning politics; and we know from the rest of Plato's dialogues that ethical rather than political enquiries commanded Socrates' attention when dealing with the young. Aristotle again puts political science above ethic in Nic. Eth. 1, 2, 8: εἰ γὰρ καὶ παντὸν ἐστὶν (sc. τὰνθρώπων ἀγαθῶν) ἐν καὶ πόλει, μεῖζων γε καὶ τελεστέρον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαοῖς καὶ σώφειν. ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐν μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θεωτέρον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τίς ὁδὸς. In short, Ethic is a kind of Politic.
If we were to see in our argument how a city comes into being, i.e. 'picture to ourselves.' See infr. Book V. 458 A: ὅσπερ οἱ ἄρχοι τὴν διανολὴν εἰσώθησιν ἐστιάσων ὑφ᾽ ἐκατόν, ὅ. ἐκατόν, i.e. 'feed their imagination.' And above here, Ch. III. init.: εἰ τὸνδε ποιήσαμεν τῇ διανολῇ, 'if we were to put this case before our minds.' Plato describes the city as a sketch, when accomplished; Book VIII. 548 D: ὥς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράφαντα. 

Describes a city as a community, or clubbing together, directed towards some good: πάσαν πόλιν ὄραμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὔτον... πάσαν μὲν ἄγαθον τινὸς στοχαζόντα. It is also that κοινωνία which includes and joins together all other κοινωνία: ἡ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας. He then proceeds to analyse this κοινωνία by going back, as Plato does here, to the origin of the state: ἐν δὴ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φυσικαὶ βλέπειν, ὅσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστον ἀν οὕτω θεωρήσειν. Those who cannot exist without each other's help naturally come together: ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδεῖσθαι τοὺς ἄνευ ἄλληλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι. But Aristotle goes farther back than Plato; he finds the first κοινωνία in family relations, man and wife, and man and slave; not between man and man, as Plato does here; and this is the first germ of the state, viz. oikia. Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τοῦτον τῶν δύο κοινωνίων οἰκία

**CAP. XI.**

Γίγνεται τοίνυν, ήν δ᾿ ἐγώ, πόλις, ὃς ἐγείμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἢμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδείης: ἡ τίν' οἷς ἀρχὴν ἄλλην πόλιν

ei γιγνομένη πόλ. θε. λόγ., 'If we were to see in our argument how a city comes into being,' i.e. 'picture to ourselves.' See infr. Book V. 458 A: ὅσπερ οἱ ἄρχοι τὴν διανολὴν εἰσώθησιν ἐστιάσων ὑφ᾽ ἐκατόν, ὅ. ἐκατόν, i.e. 'feed their imagination.' And above here, Ch. III. init.: εἰ τὸνδε ποιήσαμεν τῇ διανολῇ, 'if we were to put this case before our minds.' Plato describes the city as a sketch, when accomplished; Book VIII. 548 D: ὥς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράφαντα. 

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**CH. XI.—A city arises from man’s necessities, which cause him to join with his fellow-man for mutual benefit.** And one man must devote himself to one kind of production, not to many.

Γίγνεται τοίνυν, et seqq. With this account it will be well to compare Aristotle's history of the origin of a community. He
Homer's expression—

"πρότη. For this he compares

He then proceeds from the family to the κοινωνία πλείονον οίκιων, or κώμη; thence from the κώμη to the κοινωνία πλείονον κωμών, or πόλις. Still Aristotle agrees on the whole with Plato in his account of the origin of a state, viz. that it lies in man's need (χρεία) of his fellow-man. For instance when speaking of the πόλις he says: γιγνομένη οὖν τοῦ ἃν ἔνεκεν, ὁδα δὲ τοῦ εὗ ἢν, 'In its origin existence is the object, in its complete state, orderly existence.' And in speaking of the former of these two original relations, viz. that between master and servant, he says: πρῶτον δὲ περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου εἴπωμεν, ἵνα τά τε πρὸς ἀναγκαίαν χρείαν ἱδομέν, &c. ἀναγκαία χρεία, 'necessities that must be satisfied.' And in agreement with this principle, a family is said to be more αὐτάρκης than an individual, and a city than a family; see Pol. 2, 1: οἰκία μὲν γὰρ αὐταρκέστερον ἔνδει, πόλις δὲ οἰκίας.

And, again, a man who wants nothing and shares nothing, but is self-sufficient, cannot, Aristotle says, be part of a city at all: ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν, ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δὲ αὐτάρκειαν, οὐδὲν μέρος πόλεως. For which see also Herodotus I, 32, 14: ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου σώμα ἐν οὐδὲν αὐτάρκεις ἐστὶν, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει, ἄλλου δὲ ἕνθες ἐστὶ. Whilst upon this subject of the origin and growth of the state, it may be as well to give Aristotle's definition of justice, which he draws from his description of the state, viz. 'Justice is the adjustment (τάξις) of common relations in the πόλις.' ἢ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν. For this, in effect, is Plato's view of justice also; see Rep. IV: τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράτ-τεν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν; 433 Α. 'To do one's own business and not meddle with other people's,' i.e. 'To act in those relations where you are called to act, and not in those where you are not.' Hobbes, also, points out, as Plato does here, that physical necessity is the cause of a commonwealth coming into being. 'The finale Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love liberty and Dominion over others), in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which we see them live in Common-wealths), is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturall passions of men.' He then shows that covenants (see note on ξυνήθεσιν ἄλληλοις, Ch. II.), the outcome of the first and second Laws of Nature, are by themselves so liable to be broken, that a further step in the same direction is taken by a multitude of people, not by a few. This step is to centre the rights which they have renounced (see above not. cit.), in the hands of an individual or a representative body of
persons, who will enforce their adjustment (τάξις, in Aristotle’s words) by the strength of the whole people. ‘The only way to erect such a Common Power as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another ...is to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of Men, that they may reduce all their Wills by plurality of voices, unto one Will.’ Hence the following definition of a Commonwealth. ‘A Commonwealth is One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude by Mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the Strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common Defence.’ ‘This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence.’

For αὐταρκῆς v.s. note, p. 118.
way?' i.e. 'what must be its elements, or constituent parts, if such a result is to be obtained?'

'All three, see v.s. p. 145.

'He defines the city's limits for Aristotle's purposes. For Aristotle's limits of the city, see Introd. p. 21. His words are thus γάρ έκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, κύριον' εκ δέκα μυρίαν ἔτι πόλις έστιν. 'Anag. The least possible.' So when the Athenians were working at their wall (Thuc. I. 90), they raised it to the 'least height necessary' for defence before they informed the Lacedemonians. ήστε ἀπομάχεσθαι εκ τοῦ ἄναγκαιοτάτου ύψους. Similarly, of words, to say the fewest necessary. Demoth. de Cor. 269, αὕτα τόναγκαιοτάτα' εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ. And here ἤφη. Book VI. 486 E, μὴ τη δοκούμεν σοι οὐκ ἄναγκαια ἔκαστα διεκληρωθέναι ...'Anag.καιοτάτα μὲν οὐν, ἔφη. ένα ἐκαστον τούτων. The principle of specialization, i.e. that each man should have but one employment and confine himself to it, runs through the whole of this Dialogue, and is employed to such an extent by Plato, that Aristotle complains of it as excessive. Thus in reviewing the Republic, he says, ἐρίστου δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὅ φησι τῇ πόλει δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ὅσι μὲν ἔρηται νῦν, ἀδύνατον' λέγω δὲ τό μίαν εἶναι τήν πόλιν πάσαν ὡς ἀριστον ὅτι μάλιστα. λαυβάνει γάρ ταῦτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ Σωκράτης. Καίτοι φανερὸν ἐστιν, ὃ προϊόντος καὶ γινομένη μία μᾶλλον οὐδὲ πόλις ἔσται. πλήθος γὰρ τῇ τῆς φύσεως ἔστιν ἡ πόλις ... Οὔ μόνον δὲ ἐκ πλείονον ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἐναλλαθειμονίας, ὅ γάρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοιώμ. And so below, τῷ λιαν εἴουν ζητεῖν τὴν πόλιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμεινον. And again φανερόν, ὃς οὐτε πέφυκε μίαν οὔτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν, ὅς λέγωσι, Pol. 2, i. This criticism of Aristotle's arises in a discussion of the merits of Plato's suggestion that wives and children should be in common to the citizens of the state (see Book V.); the extreme point to which Plato's communistic tendencies lead him in the Republic; and if taken as a criticism of that point, we must accept it as just. But, if we see how Plato in certain other places works out the principle of specialization, and employs it in his discovery of justice, we shall be unable to agree with Aristotle's complaint. Thus in Republic IV. 423 B, we read οὐκοίν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὔτος δὲν εἶναι καὶ κάλλιστος ὃρος τοῖς ἡμετέροις ὄρθωσιν, οὔτε δὲ τῷ μέγεθος τῇ πόλιν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ ἡλικίᾳ οὐσία ὣσιν χάρων ἀφηρισμένους, τὸν ἀλλήν χαῖρειν ἑαυτῷ τίς, ἔφη, ὥστε; οἷς μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τόδε μέχρι οὐ ἂν ἐθέλῃ αὐξανομένῃ εἶναι μία, μέχρι τοῦτον αὔξειν, πένα δὲ μή. And
and Primary Forms, which are transcendent, and furnish life and reality to the objects of the world of sense.) Further, in 476 A, Plato strongly insists upon the unity that pervades Nature, the model of the unity which he would introduce into his state: καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἁδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν ἔνδον περὶ τὸ άιτός λόγος, άιτό μὲν ἐν ἡ ἀκατὸν εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πραξέων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ αλλήλων κοινωνία πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλά φανεράς ἀκατότων. Lastly he passes on from this unity of the world of sense (apparently diverse) to the 'Real Good,' or the 'Form of Good,' which supplies their truth to all things that are known, and the capacity of knowing them to the knower; and is, in a word, the Single Source of all that is Real and Good: see Book VI. 508 E. Τούτο τοίνυν τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας παρέχων τοῖς γιγνωσκόμενοι καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκομεί τῆν δύναμιν ἀποδιδόν τὴν τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φαθί εἶναι, αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης χώραν καὶ ἀληθείας. Such in brief is the Platonic unity, which is carried on from the physical to the transcendent world. The remarks quoted from Book IV. respecting the unity of the city itself must commend themselves to our acceptance, whatever we may think of the system of ἰδέα.
370 тетάρτῳ μέρει τοῦ χρόνου, τὰ δὲ τρία, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ
tῆς οἰκίας παρασκευῆς διατριβεῖν, τὸ δὲ ἴματον, τὸ
δὲ ὑποδημάτων, καὶ μὴ ἄλλοις κοινωνοῦντα πράγ-
ματα ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἀυτῶν δι' ἀυτῶν τὰ ἀυτοῦ πράττειν;
καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος ἔφη Ἀλλ' ἰσως, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὗτω
ῥῶν ἢ' κείνως. Οὐδέν, ἤν δ' ἐγώ, μὰ Δι' ἀτοποῦ.
ἐννοοῦ γάρ καὶ αὐτῶς εἰπόντος σοῦ, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν
Β φύεται ἐκαστος οὐ πάνυ ὁμοίους ἐκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ δια-
φέρων τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλου ἔργου πρᾶξιν. ἥ
οὐ δοκεί σοι; Ἐμοιγε. Τί δὲ; πότερον κάλλιον
πράττοι ἂν τις εἰς ὄν πολλὰς τέχνας ἐργαζόμενος,
ἡ ὥταν μίαν εἰς; ἢ'Ὀταν, ἢ δ' ὅς, εἰς μίαν. Ἀλλὰ
μὴν, οἴμαι, καὶ τόδε δῆλον, ὡς, εάν τίς τινος παρῇ
ἔργου καριόν, διόλλυται. Δῆλον γάρ. Οὐ γάρ,
οἴμαι, ἐθέλει το πραττόμενον τὴν τοῦ πράττοντος
σχολὴν περιμένειν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τοῦ πράττοντα τῷ
πραττομένῳ ἐπακολουθεῖν μὴ ἐν παρέργῳ μέρει.
C' Ἀνάγκη. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἐκαστα γίγνεται
καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ράον, ὅταν εἰς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν
καιρῷ, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἁγών, πρᾶττῃ. Παντά-

ἀλλ. καὶ
πράγματα ἔχειν.
See Xen. Mem. 2, 1, 9: ἐγὼ
οὖν τοὺς μὲν βουλομένους πολλὰ
πράγματα ἔχειν αὐτοῖς τε καὶ
ἀλλοις παρέχειν, &c.; where the
sense is slightly different, 'to
be busy'; here it is 'to give
one's self trouble.'

φύεται ἐκαστος οὐ πάνυ ὁμοίους.
So Aristotle, loc. supr. cii.: οὐ
γάρ γίγνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων.
v.s. not. αδ μεταδίδωσι δῆ, and
the passage where Aristotle says
that men must be different if
they are to form a mutually
beneficial community.

ἐν παρέργῳ μέρει. See Book
I. not. p. 184. For παρέργον v.
Book VII. 527 C: καὶ γάρ τὰ
παρέργα αὐτοῦ (sc. γεωμετρίας)
οὐ σμικρά, i.e. the secondary
uses of geometry, besides its
value as leading to the acqui-
sition of pure knowledge. And
Book VI. 498 A: μεγαλὰ ἡγού-
ται, παρεργον οἷμενοι αὐτὸ δεῖν
πράττειν, where the study of
philosophy is said to be taken
up off hand, as a leisure emplo-
ment, by most men, if they
take it up at all. See also
Euthydemus 273 D: παρέργοις
αὐτοῖς χρῶμεθα.

κατὰ φύσιν. See what has
been said in Book I, of the
ἔργον of man, p. 138; and the
recurrence of this expression in
the passage there quoted from
Book V.: δεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκασ-
tον ἑνα ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ πράττειν.
ei μέλλει καλὸν εἶναι, 'if it is to be a good one.' See not. Ch. XVIII.

ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρονν ἔχοιεν βοῦς. Hesiod makes the ox an indispensable part of the most primitive household—

οὐκὸν μὲν πρότιστα, γυναῖκα τε, βοῦν τ' ἄροτὶρα. οἱ τε οἰκοδόμοι. Supply ἔχοιεν before χρήσθαι.

μετὰ τῶν γεωργῶν. To be joined closely with πρὸς τὰς ἀγωγάς. 'For their carrying-traffic with the farmers.'

ἀλλὰ μὴν, 'but again.' ἢ ἀλλὰ opposes, and μὴν shows that a fresh instance is to be ad-
duced.

Προσδείησε ἁρὰ ἔτι καὶ ἀλλῶν. So Aristotle in Pol. 1, 3, shows that some nations support them-
selves from a single pursuit, e.g. νομαδικόλ, ἀλιευτικόλ, θηρευτικοὶ. But those, he adds, who com-
bine them live pleasurably, filling up the life that lacks much; to which conclusion Plato is gradually coming here. οἱ δὲ καὶ μικρὸντες ἐκ τοῦτον, ἢδέως ἑως, προσαναληφθοῦντες τὸν ἐνδεέστατον βίον, ἢ γυγχά νεὶ ἐλλείπον πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκη εἶναι,
And if the carrier go empty, taking nothing with him of those things which the people want, from whomsoever they are importing their own requirements, he will have to go away empty. έκείνοι is the people to whom the trader comes; whilst the subject of κομίζονται and αὐτοῖς, refer to the people who sends the trader. The principle is that the trader must come with some import to exchange for a nation's exports; and therefore production must not be limited by the bare requirements of the country itself, but there must be a surplus, with which to purchase the exports of other nations. See the passage in Arist. Pol. 1, 3, quoted above, regarding this surplus: ἐστί γὰρ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ πάντων, ὄρθιο ἡ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείον, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττων ἰκανῶν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. It will be noticed that Aristotle makes this surplus a natural result, in which he practically agrees with Plato. Ἐις ἐν πάνεται, regarding the πλήρωσις or ‘filling up,’ in which all exchange consists: εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν γὰρ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας ἤν. eἰσαξόντον καὶ ἐξαξόντων. Arist. loc. cit.: τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι, καὶ ἐκπέμπειν ἐν ἐπλεόναζον. Exportation results from over production.
CAP. XII.

This barter must be made more convenient through a medium of exchange, money, and through middlemen, i.e. retail traders. How then will our citizens live?

Δν, partitive genitive, from the sense of ‘sharing’ in metadósoin. The second Δν refers also to the results of labour, the several productions, which were to be mutually exchanged and shared.

νόμισμα έψιμβολον τής ἄλλ. νόμισμα means that which is recognised, anything instituted.

See Soph. Antig. 295—οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώποισιν οἶον ἄργυρος κακόν νόμισμα ἐβλαστε. And έψιμβολον has reference to interchange with agreement; see note p. 130. νόμ. έψιμβ. then means, ‘a recognised medium,’ or ‘a common token.’

In Aristotle’s Ethics 5, 5, 11, the reason for using money is thus given: δὲι ἅρα ἐνὶ τινι πάντα μετρεῖσθαι...οἶον δ’ ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ ξυνηθήκην. Where κατὰ ζ. represents έψιμβολον in Plato’s definition. And again in Pol. 1, 3, 16, the origin of the use of money is explained in accordance with the principle of the origin of society: Πορισθέντος οὖν ἡδὲ νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς, κ.τ.λ. Eτ surre.: εἰς ἀνάγκης ἢ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρῆσις...οὗ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον ἐκατόν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀναγκαίων. Διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς τοιοῦτον τις συνέθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ὃ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ δὲν, εἰς τὴν χρέαιν εὐμεταχείριστον πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, οἶον σίδηρος καὶ ἄργυρος, κ.τ.λ. et infra. 18: τὸ γὰρ νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἄλλαγῆς ἐστίν.

εἰςιν οὐ τούτο ὀρώντες. With reference to the necessity and growth of middlemen or tradesmen, Aristotle (loc. cit.) shows that they are not found in the
primitive community where all exchange is barter, and that ἡ κατηλική is παρὰ φύσιν. Εν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ (τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶν οἰκία) φανερὸν ὅτι οὐθέν ἐστὶν ἔργον αὐτῆς (σχ. κατηλίκης) ἀλλὰ ἥδη πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας ὀσὺς.

ἀλλάξασθαι...διαλλάττειν, 'to take...and give in exchange.' The difference of voice is noticeable.

οἱ ἐν τὰ μὲν τῆς διαν. Aristotle also draws this distinction in Pol. i. 1. And the extreme case of those whom Plato is describing in the text is the δοῦλος, whom Aristotle in a like spirit calls ἐμφυσώκειν ὑγιαν, 'a live machine'; Eth. Nic. 8, ii, 6. It is characteristic of Plato's broader views, as compared with those of his age, that he makes no mention here of the δοῦλος, in other words he does not consider a slave necessary to a community. Aristotle, on the other hand, considers that superiority of intellect constitutes the relation of slavery at once: 'Ἀρχὸν δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τῆς σωτηρίας τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προσφέραν, ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπόζον φύσει' τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον τὸ σώματι ταύτα ποιεῖν, ἄρχομενον καὶ φύσει δουλον. Here it will be noticed that he grounds his principle upon the same distinction as Plato, viz. that between mental and bodily efficiency; but where Plato concludes that some men must be μισθωτοὶ, Aristotle condemns them to slavery. He commends slavery again in 1, ii. thus: τὸ γὰρ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι, οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐμφαράντων ἔστιν καὶ εὔθεια ἐκ γενετῆς ἐξια διεστηκε, τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχεσθαι, τὰ δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχεῖν.
μισθωτοί· ἡ γὰρ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Πλήρωμα δὴ πόλεως εἰσὶν, ὡς ἔσοικε, καὶ μισθωτοί. Δοκεῖ μοι. 'Αρ' οὖν, ὦ 'Αδείμαντε, ἡδη ἤμων ὑδύκηται ἡ πόλις, ὡστ' εἶναι τελέα; "Ισως. Ποῦ οὖν ἂν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῇ εἴη ἢ τε δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδίκια; καὶ τινὶ ἀμα ἐγγε- νομένη ὡς ἐσκέμμεθα; 'Ἐγὼ μεν, ἐφη, οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ 372 Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ποὺ ἐν αὐτῶν τούτων χρεία τινὶ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλους. 'Αλλ' ἵσως, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, καλῶς λέγεις; καὶ σκέπτεσθο γε καὶ οὐκ ἀποκνητέον. πρῶτον οὖν σκεφώμεθα, τίνα τρόπον διαιτήσονται οἱ οὐτω παρεσκευασμένοι. ἀλλο τι ἣ σιτῶν τε ποιοῦντες καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἰμάτια καὶ ὑποδήματα, καὶ οἰκοδομη- σάμενοι οἰκίας, θέρους μὲν τὰ πολλὰ γυμνοὶ τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητοι ἐργάσονται, τού δὲ χειρῶν ἡμιφεσ- μένοι τε καὶ ὑποδεδεμένοι ἱκανῶς; θρέψονται δὲ ἐκ μὲν τῶν κριθῶν ἀλφίτα σκευαζόμενοι, ἐκ δὲ τῶν πυρῶν ἀλευρα, τὰ μὲν πέψαντες, τὰ δὲ μάξαντες, μάζας γενναίας καὶ ἄρτους ἐπὶ κάλαμον τίνα παρα- βαλλόμενοι ἡ φύλλα καθαρά, κατακλώνετε ἐπὶ στιβάδων ἐστρωμένων μίλακι τε καὶ μυρρίναις,

χρεία τινὶ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλους. Aristotle says in Pol. 1, 2: ὥς βίος πράξεις, οὐ πολλοίς ἔστιν, 'Life is action, not creation,' i.e. 'Our life lies more in our relations with others than in our own several acts themselves.' Adeimantus' suggestion here is prompted by a similar thought. Justice as noticed above (p. 129, note) has to do not so much with persons and things, but with the relations between persons and things, inasmuch as it has to do with the whole of life. And so Aristotle gives the following definition of justice as popularly accepted: ὁ ὀρῶμεν δὴ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἐξίν βου- λομένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην, ὥς πρακτικὸν των δικαλῶν εἰσὶ. οὐκ ἀποκνητέον. See below 380 C: διαμαχετέον πάντι τρόπῳ: and above Ch. X.: δεδοικα γάρ μὴ οὖδ' ὅσιον ἥ παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνη κατηγορομένη ἀπαγο- ρεύειν. So in Ch. XV. ἵνα: ὡμως δὲ οὖκ ἀποδειλιατέον, ὅσιον γ' ἄν δύναμις παρελκη. γυμνοι, 'without the upper garment.' See Hesiod Opp. et Di. 389—

γυμνὸν σπείρειν, γυμνὸν τε βοστεῖν, Γυμνὸν δ' ἄμάειν. Which Virgil imitates Geor. i. 299—

Nudus ara, sere nudus.
The same sense is more definitely given below in the words μετρίως υποπίνοντες, Ch. XIII.

χ. XIII.—Glaucon, interrupting, said that I ought to give them some slight amenities of life. Ah! said I, you mean that, instead of a simple, happy community, I am to form a luxurious and fevered city, full of doctors, cooks, dancing girls, and the rest.

υπολαβών, v.s. note p. 150. σποδιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ πῦρ, ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰς σποδοῦν ἤγεν εἰς ἀνδρακίαν ἐσβεσμένην ἐψήσουσιν. Schol. υποπίνοντες. Other words in which ὑπό has this force are υποάμουσος; see Book VIII., 548 E, ‘rather less intellectual;’ υπογράφειν, ‘to sketch slightly,’ ibid. D, i.e. give in outline, v.s. note on σκιαγρ. ἀνετῆς, Ch. VIII.
The exact meaning of the word may be gathered from an expression in the context of the last passage quoted:—μαλακοὺς καρτερεῖν πρός ἡδονᾶς καὶ λυπᾶς καὶ ἀργούς. See Eschines contr. Ctes. 20 (Ed. Simcox), οὐκ ἄρα στεφανωθῆσαι ἤ βουλή ἢ ἔχ Ἀρείου πάγου; οὖδὲ γὰρ πάτριου αὐτοῖς ἐστίν. οὐκ ἄρα φιλοτιμοῦνται; Πάνω γε, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄγαπώσιν, εάν τις παρ’ αὐτῶς μὴ ἀδική, ἀλλ’ εάν τις ἐξαμαρταντὶ κολαζοῦσιν’ οἱ δὲ ψυχορτίοι ἄρετοι τρυφώσι. 'Are not Areopagites then able to receive crowns? No, it is not the custom. Have they then no ambition? Certainly, but it is to punish vigorously any crimes that come under their jurisdiction. But the orators who come before you have no principle,’ i.e. they are weak and liable to urge considerations of indulgence and pity; in Plato’s words, μὴ καρτερεῖν. For which sense compare Euthyphro, 111 E, μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφῶ, used of one who is not energetic.
ήσως οὖν οὐδὲ κακῶς ἔχειν σκοποῦντες γὰρ καὶ
tοιαύτην τάχ' ἄν κατίδοιμεν τὴν τε δικαιοσύνην καὶ
ἀδικιαν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐμφύονται. ή
μὲν οὖν ἀληθινὴ πόλις δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἣν διεληλυ-
θαμεν, ὡσπερ ὑγίς τις· εἰ δ' αὖ θοῦλεσθε καὶ
φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἀποκολύει
tάυτα γὰρ δὴ τισιν, ὡς δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἔξαρκέσει, οὐδ'
373 αὕτη ἡ δίαιτα, ἀλλὰ κλῖναὶ τε προσέονται καὶ
τράπεζαι καὶ τᾶλλα σκεῦη, καὶ ὄψα δὴ καὶ μύρα
cαι θυμιάματα καὶ ἑταῖραι καὶ πέμματα, ἐκαστα
tοῦτων παντοδαπᾶ· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἄ τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέ-
γομεν οὐκέτι τὰ ἀναγκαῖα θετέον, οἰκίας τε καὶ
ἰμάτια καὶ υποδήματα, ἀλλὰ τὴν τε ζωγραφίαν
κινητέον καὶ χρυσόν καὶ ἑλέφαντα καὶ πάντα τὰ
Β τοιαύτα κτητέον. ἡ γὰρ; Ναὶ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν μει-
ξοῦν τέ αὐ τὴν πόλιν δεῖ ποιεῖν; ἐκείνη γὰρ ἡ ὑγιεινῆ

η μὲν οὖν ἀληθ. Stallb. makes ὡσπερ ὑγίς τις the predicate of εἶναι: but it is open to us to take ἀληθινὴ; thus 'the city which we have described seems to be the true one, being as it were healthy.' 'Healthy,' or 'sound,' is a favourite metaphorical expression with Plato. It occurs again in conjunction with ἀληθης in Book X. 603 B, where Plato is speaking of the painter's art, of which he says, προσομιλεῖ τε καὶ ἑταῖρα καὶ φίλη ἐστὶν ἐπ' οὐδεν ὑγεῖ οὐδ' ἀλη-
θεῖ. And in speaking of the middle state, which, compared with pain and pleasure respectively, seems to be pleasure or pain, he says, οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄρα τοῦτο ἀλλὰ φαίνεται παρὰ τὸ ἀλγεινὸν ἡδῶ καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἡδὸν ἀλγεινὸν τότε ἡ ἀσυχία, καὶ
οὐδὲν υγίες τοῦτων τῶν φαντασ-
μάτων πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ
γνησία τις.

οὐκέτι τὰ ἀναγκ. θετ. 'And we
must no longer lay down as the
only requirements those that we
mentioned at first.' For ἀναγκαῖα, 'the least
necessary,' v.s. Ch. XI. ἀναγκαστάτη
πόλις.

ζωγραφ. κιν., 'we shall have
to start painting.' κινεῖως is 'to
set in motion.' See Book I.
Ch. IV. ἴππι. βουλήμενος ἐτὶ
λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκίνησιν. It is used
of a top in Book IV. 436 D,
which is stationary (ἔστηκε) and
in motion (κινεῖται), simul-
taneously, viz. in respect of axis
and circumference. 'Begin,'
here would not convey the
whole meaning; the art of
painting is to be 'set going.'

χρυσόν, κ.τ.λ. governed by
κτητέον.

ἀὖ v.s. note p. 124; and above
in this chapter, εἰ δ' αὖ θοῦ-
λεσθε.
We should not be surprised, if we were not aware of Plato’s hostility to poets, to find them thus unceremoniously thrust in among the rabble of the Larger City, as if they were no more than Horace’s Ambubaiarum collegia, pharmacopoleæ.

Mendice, mimæ, balatrones, hoc genus omne.

See pp. 121, 133, notes. We shall find below (Ch. XVII.) what is the moving cause of this hostility to poets in Plato’s mind. For σχήματα, ‘drawing,’ v.s. note on σκιαγρ. ἀρετῆς. Ch. VIII. In Book X. 601 A, it is explained that poets are nothing but ‘word-painters,’ and that as painters are nothing but copyists, poets are the same, and have no claim to originality or truth. Thus we can understand why Plato includes them here among the vulgar herd. In the passage referred to we find these same words coupled together. Οὐτώ δὴ, οἶμαι, καὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν φήσομεν χρώματ' ἀπ' ἐκάστων τῶν τεχνῶν τοῖς ἀνόμοις καὶ βῆμαις ἐπιχρωματίζειν. And for Plato’s opinion of painting see 603 A, ἡ γραφική καὶ ὕλος ἡ μυθικὴ πόρρῳ μὲν τῆς ἀληθείας ἰν τὸ αὐτής ἔργον ἀπεργαζέσται.

κοσμόν, the general word for a lady’s toilette, mundus muliebris, including many different articles. One of these we know to have been rouge, which Professor Newton tells us has been found in a grave at Athens; it being usual to bury with the dead articles of all kinds which they had used in their lifetime.

ιατρῶν. Plato’s hatred of doctoring is so strong that, as has been noticed in the Argu-
ment, p. 55, note, he allows it to blind his logic, in replying to Glaucous's suggestion that the best doctor is he who has had the largest and most varied experience of disease. His suggestion in another place (Book III. 410 A) that, where a man is of a weakly constitution, he had better take his leave of life as soon as possible, has been already noticed. For his general treatment of the question in brief see Argument, p. 54; and Book IV. fin., where he draws an elaborate comparison between illness and wickedness; illness, as he describes it, being another (ita) in the body. "Esti de to mev yúgeian politeía tā ēn tō σώματι katα φύσιν καθιστάναι κρατεῖν te kai κρατεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, te de νόσον παρά φύσιν ἁρχεῖν te kai ἁρχεῖσθαι ἀλλο ὑπ' ἀλλου. And again Book VIII. 556 E. σώμα νοσώ- δες μικράς ὑπῆς ἐξωθεν δεῖται προσλαβέσθαι πρὸς τὸ κάμνειν, ἐντὸς de kai ἀνευ τῶν ἐξω στα- σιάζει αὐτῷ αὐτῷ... Generally, Plato thought illness almost culpable, because he considered that most diseases arose from indulgence: in which opinion he was not far wrong. Hence his expression above here, φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις; and in Book VIII. loc. cit. he shows what an advantage the poor, sun-burnt, yet wiry (ἰσχυὸς) citizen, possesses in any contest over one who is rich but incapable, through having too much flesh and too little wind.

Ch. XIV.—We shall then want to take our neighbour's land, i.e. we shall go to war; and the warriors must be carefully trained from their youth up.

Aristotle agrees with Plato that war is, in its nature, a form of acquisition, drawing this fact from man's universal pursuit of wild, and acquisition of tame animals. See Pol. 1.

3. διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσις κτη- τικὴ πως ἐσται, et præced. But he considers that the immediate cause of war is the refusal of men who are φύσει δούλοι, to submit. ἥ γὰρ νη- ρωτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς, ἥ δεi χρήσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἔθια καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώ- πων ὅσιο πεφυκότες ἁρχεῖσθαι μὴ θέλοντι, ὃς φύσει δίκαιον τοῦτο οὐντα τὸν πόλεμον. Sir Thomas More does not follow Plato upon this point, but assigns as the chief cause of war the wantonness and pugnacity of princes. Thus, 'The most part of all princes have more delyte in warlike matters and feats of chivalrie than in the good feates of peace, and employe muche more study, how by right or by wrong to enlarge their dominions, than howe wel and peace-
able to rule and governer that they have alreidie.

this, with this genitive compare etipivos tov ouin, Ch. XII. fiv.
ei melelomeiv ik. eixeiv, 'if we are to have enough'; see Book I. Ch. XVIII. note.
edi xerimatov ktt. apieiron.
Aristotle shows in Pol. I, 3, that there are two kinds of wealth, δ πλουτος δ κατα φύσιν, which is not the possession of so much money, but abundance of those things necessary to a comfortable life: this he brings under the province of oikonomikai; the other is η xerimatistikai with which is closely allied kathlakai, money-making by trade. He then goes on to show that in oikonomikai there is a peiras teles, or 'limitation of wealth, in its object'; whilst in xerimatistikai there is no peias, the object of money-making being to go on continually amassing more. Oute kai tainis tis xerimatistikai ouik esti tov teles περας teles de, ο τωνυτος πλουτος και χρηματων κτησις. Της δ οικονομικης, ου χρηματιστικης, este περας. And therefore, he adds, those fall into error who think that amassing money is the part of oikonomikai, -aixeiin tin tov nomismatos oustov eis apieiron, agreeing with Plato in this, viz. that where there is unlimited covetousness (eis apieiron tis epithumias ousths, as here edi xerimatov kttov apieiron) it is the result of an abnormal state of a community, not of πλουτος κατα φύσιν.

autoi oux ikanoi; The necessity for a standing army is here shown, on the continually recurring principle of specialization. 'What we do, we must
do well. We cannot do our business well, unless we attend to it and to it alone: therefore each man must choose one profession and no more.' V.s. Ch. XI.

tεχνική, 'an art in itself,' 'a special art;' for which word see Ar. Pol. I. i. τόλιν άδύναμον καὶ περὶ τούτων (sc. ἐὰν ἵππηκεῖται) μᾶλλον, τὶ τε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἶ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδεχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἑκάστον τῶν ἡμείων. ἦν. 'any characteristic,' or 'special distinction.' V. infr. Ch. XV. init. where the defence of the city, in regard of its great importance, is said to require the greatest elaboration and study (τέχνης καὶ επιμελείας μεγάλης δεόμεν.)

tού μὲν σκυτ. διεκ. μὴτε γεωργ. ἐπίχ. εἶναι. Upon this principle Socrates refuses in Ch. XVIII. to prescribe what the poetry of the State is to be, for he says, we are not poets but founders of a city: καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἐσμὲν ποιηταὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ οὐ εὖ τῇ παρόντι, ἄλλα οἰκισταὶ πόλεως. On the same principle actors in tragedy do not succeed in comedy; see Book III. 395 B: ἀλλὰ οὔδε τοι ὑποκριτα κωμῳδοῖς τε καὶ πραγῳδοῖς οἱ αὐτοῖ. Where Socrates adds that man's nature is so atomic, that it is impossible for him not only to do many things, but even to imitate many things, with success: καὶ ἦτι γε τούτων, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, φαίνεται μοι εἰς σμίκρουτα κατακερματίζεται ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις, ὡς τε ἄδυνατος εἶναι πολλὰ καλῶς μιμεῖσθαι ἢ αὐτὰ ἑκεῖνα πράττειν ὅν δὴ καὶ τὰ μιμήματα ἐστὶν ἀφομοιόμενα. Cf. the Latin proverb, 'Ne sutor ultra crepidam.'

καὶ τῶν ἄλλ. ἐν ἔκ. See Ch. XI.: Ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλεῖον τε ἑκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ δόξον, ὅταν εἰς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ σχολή τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττῃ.

αὐτὸ. This demonstrative thrown in to help a long relavitval construction, has al-
kairoûs kai logos ápergázeotai: tâ dê dê perî tôn pôlemon pôteron ou perî pleistou estin eis áper-
gyasthenta; ñ oútò râdion, ñste kal ñeorgroûn tis ánna polémikos ëstai kal skuotomwn kal álhn
tékhyn ëntinouý érgagómevov, pepteutikos dê ñ kubëutikos íkanoûs ouû an eis géuoto mi autò toûto
ek pайдos épitithévov, állass parêrywv chrómenvov; kal àstôda mev la.âwôn ñ ti állo tôn pôlemon ð
ôplon te kal ñrégânon auðhmerðon ðplutikís ñ tînos álhnûs máçhês tôn kata pôlemon íkanoû ëstai àgno-
visthí, tân dê álłlon ñrégânon ouûèné ouûêna ðнmís-
ußynou ouûè áthlëthn ñphðn poyjse, ouû ëstai
chrísímou tò miîte tìn épistîmyn èkástou labónti
miîte tìn meléthyn íkâny parassômenv; Polllô
yâp ãn, ëdî õs, tâ ñrégâna ñn åxía.

ready been noticed in Ch. I.: 
òion tò xài réwv kal ài ñádvai 
bassei áblæbeis ñàv ìnden eis tòv
ëpeita chròv v dià tóutòs gérethai
állo ñ xài réwv ëçovtai.
ëmelè kal. ñp. For this
sense, expressing an indispens-
able condition, see above note
Ch. XVIII. ‘Which he can-
not bring to perfection unless
he concentrate himself there-
upon,’ or ‘Which he will bring
to perfection only if he give all
his attention thereto.’

tà dê dê. dê recalls the
hearer to the point on which
this recapitulation bears; ‘To
come to the point, then, &c.’
ëståi...ûn géuoto. The for-
ger case, that a mechanic could
at once become a soldier, is
cast into the mood of facts, so
that it may stand, in all its
glaring absurdity, contrasted
with the potentially stated

yet truer assertion, that for
a man to become even a good
chess-player the study of years
is requisite. For pepteutikos,
v.s. p. 130 note.

parérwv chróm., sc. tóutô;
pag. being predicate. So para-
dêigmati chrômevov èkeíno;
Book VII. 540 A. Philosophy,
Socrates shows, is treated as a
párengvón by most men;
Book VI. 498 A: párengvón ouímevov:
aútò ðeîn práttew. In Book
VII. the word bears a slightly
different sense, ‘the details, or
minor aspects, of a study’; 527
C: kal yâp tà párengva autòv
(geosaméntas) ou símía. For
the predicative sense see also
Xen. Mem. i. 2, 56: èphè dê
autòv ñ kathýgoros kal tàvòn ëndödo-
tátovn poìstovn èkleigómevov tà
povnedtata, kal tóutòs márti-
grlois chrómenvov, k.t.l.
CAP. XV.

Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσῳ μεγιστον τὸ τῶν φυλάκων Ἐέργων, τουσίτω χολῆς τε τῶν ἅλλων πλείστης ἃν εἰ ἐκαὶ αὐ τῆχνης τε καὶ ἐπιμελείας μεγίστης δεόμενον. Οἶμαι ἐγώνε, ἢ δ' ὅς. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ φύσεως ἑπιτηδείας εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ἑπιτηδεῦμα; Πῶς δ' οὖ; 'Ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργων ἀν εἰ, ὡς έοικεν, εὖπερ οἴοι τ' ἐσμέν, ἐκλέξασθαι, τίνες τε καὶ ποίαι φύσεις ἑπιτηδείας εἰς πόλεως φυλακήν. 'Ἡμέτερον μέντω. Μά Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἄρα φαύλου πράγμα ἡράμεθα; ὁμοί δὲ οὐκ ἀποδειλιάτεον, ὅσον γ' ἂν δύναμις 375 παρείκη. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἐφη. Οἴει οὖν τι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίον σκύλακος εἰς φυλακήν νεανίσκον εὐγενοῦς; Τὸ ποίον λέγεις; Οἶον οὖν τε που δεί αὐτοίν ἑκάτερον εἴναι πρὸς αὐθίσθησιν καὶ ἑλαφρὸν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθανόμενον διοκάθειν, καὶ ἱσχυρὸν αὑ, ἐὰν δέῃ ἐλόντα διαμάχεσθαι. Δεὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἐφη, πάντων τοιῶν. Καὶ μὴν ἀνδρείον γε, εἶπερ

Ch. XV.—The defenders of our state must unite in themselves the two traits of courage and gentleness, lest they turn and ill-treat those whom they defend.

τέχνης, 'special work,' v.s. Ch. XIV. note on τεχνή.

ἡμέτερον δή ἔργων...ἐκλέξασθαι. Arist. Nub. 1594—

οὖν ἔργων, διδασκομένους, ὁμοί, ἔννοι πολλῆν


φαύλου, v.s. Ch. X.: τὸ ζήτημα

ἀποδειλ., v.s. Ch. XII.: οὐκ ἀποκυκτητέον.

παρέικη, 'allow'; not 'fail' or 'submit,' as εἰκω uncom-pounded.


νεαν. εὐγ., ἤ. τῆς φύσεως νεαν. εὐγ.

τὸ ποίον λέγεις; as in Thrasy-machus' reply, Book I, Ch. XV.: πῶς τοῦτο ἔρωτας; the sense is, 'in what respect do you mean?' 'what is the bearing of your question?' And again, πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, Ch. XIX. Book I. init.

καὶ μὴν, v.s. p. 112, note.
év μαχεῖται. Πῶς δέ οὖ; 'Ανδρείος δὲ εἶναι ἀρα ἐθελήσει ὁ μὴ θυμοειδὴς εἰτε ὕππος εἰτε κύων ἢ ἄλλο ὁποιον ἥπων; ἢ οὐκ ἐννενόηκας, ὡς ἁμαχὸν τε καὶ ἁνίκητον θυμός, οὐ παρῶντος ψυχὴ πᾶσα πρὸς πάντα ἄφοβος τέ ἔστι καὶ ἀγηττητος; Ἐννενόηκα. Γὰ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ σώματος οἶνον δεῖ τὸν φύλακα εἶναι, δῆλα. Ναὶ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅτι γε θυμοειδῆ. Καὶ τοῦτο. Πῶς οὖν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, Ὁ Γλαύκων, οὐκ ἄγριοι ἀλλήλοις ἔσονται καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ὄντες τοιοῦτοι τὰς φύσεις; Μὰ Δία, ἢ δ’ ὃς, οὐ βαδίως. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ γε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς οἰκείους πράσεις αὐτοὺς εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους χαλεποὺς: εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐ περιμενοῦσιν ἄλλους σφᾶς διολέσαι, ἄλλ’ αὐτὸι φθίσονται αὐτὸ

ἐθελήσει, v. ἰνθρ. Book IV. 440 C; also in a psychological discussion: οὐκ ἐθέλει πρὸς τούτον αὐτοῦ ἐγείρεσθαι ὁ θυμός; and Book VI. 504 B: Εὑμαθεῖς ...οἶνος ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἀμα φύσει καὶ νεανίκοι. The certainty of a physical effect following upon its cause is emphasized by the use of the word, which properly belongs only to the mental sphere.

ἡ οὖν, nonne. For the nature of θύμος v. Book IV. loc. cit. In the triple division there made of the human mind into λογοτυκίν, ὑμοειδές, and ἐπιθυμητικόν, the second kind is said to range itself most frequently upon the side of the first, and to unite with it, in case of a στάσεις, or disagreement between reason and desire; and, again, it refuses to be aroused, in cases where it would be unworthy and unreasonable. τίθεσθαι τὰ ὀπλα πρὸς τοῦ λογοτυκίου.

τὰ μὲν, κ.λ. v. τοιοῦτοι τὰς φύσεις.

πῶς οὖν ἄγριοι, v. i. Book III: 410 E, where a just admixture of music and gymnastic in education is said to produce this harmony of courage and gentleness; the defenders being neither allowed to sink into effeminacy (μαλακία) by a preponderance of intellectual study, nor into roughness and crudity by applying themselves wholly to gymnastic. Δεῖν δὲ γὲ φαιμὲν τοὺς φύλακας ἀμφοτέρα ἔχειν τοῦτω τῷ φύσε; οὖκοιν ἥρμοσθαι δὲ αὐτὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλας... καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἥρμοσμένου σάφρων τι καὶ ἀνθρώπη ἡ ψυχή...τοῦ δὲ ἀναρμόστου δεὶλη καὶ ἄγροικος; and see Argument p. 55. In the reply it is to be noticed that οὐ βαδίως refers to the efforts of the οἰκιστῆς, not to the φύλακες.

σφᾶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς. Jelf notices the use, Gr. Gr. 654 i. b. Thuc. I, 126: ἐγκλήματα ποιούμενοι οὕτως σφίσθη μεγίστη πρόφασις εἵν. The prevailing sense of the plural is reflexive and
in the present passage we may consider that the defenders are, as it were, identified with those whom by their conduct they might ruin, p. 261.

έναντια γάρ ποὺ νθυμοειδῆς. See what is said of Socrates’ opinions regarding the θύμος in Book III. note ἡ οὕκ, p. 261.

δικαίως γε, δὲ φίλε, ἀπ. See Book IV. 432 C, where the search for justice is brought to a crisis, as here the search for the good defender: ᾿Η μὴ, ἡν δ’ ἐγώ, βλακκιόν γε ἡμῶν τὸ πάθος.

εἰκόνος ἀπελ., ‘we have stopped short in the illustration we employed,’ ‘we have not fully carried out our illustration.’ Privative genitive.

ἀρα, ‘as it seems,’ ‘as it turns out’; see note p. 108, and above here, Ch. V.

ἐν δ’, ἐν τούτῳ δ’.
'Αρ' οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐτί τοῦτε προσδεισθαι ὁ φυλακικὸς ἑσόμενος, πρὸς τῷ θυμοειδεῖ ἐτί προσγενέσθαι φιλόσοφος τῇ φύσιν; Πῶς δὴ; ἔφη οὖ γὰρ ἐννοοῦ. 376 Καὶ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς κυσί κατοίκει, δ' καὶ ἄξιον βαυμάται τοῦ θηρίου. Τὸ ποίον; 'Ον μὲν ἄν ἰδὴ ἀγνώτα, χαλεπαίνει, οὔδὲν δὲ κακὸν προσπονθῶς. ὃν δ' ἂν γνώριμον, ἀστάζεται, καὶ μηδὲν πῶς τὸ ὕπτε ἀυτοῦ ἀγαθὸν πεπόνθη. ἢ οὐπω τοῦτο ἑθαύμασας; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, μέχρι τοῦτο προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν ὅτι δὲ ποὺ δρᾶ ταῦτα, δῆλον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν κομψὸν γε φαίνεται τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ τῆς φύσεως καὶ

CH. XVI.—This discrimination is philosophic: so that in addition to being spirited, swift, and courageous, our ideal defender must be also of a philosophic nature.

ὁ φυλακ. ἑσόμενος. ἐσ. here is equal to ὁ μέλλων ἔσεθαι.
δ...τοῦ θηρίου. v.s. note p. 113 and suppr., here Ch. IX. komψόν, like ἄστειος, 'fine' or 'splendid,' and very often, like ἄστειος, used sarcastically, or in a passage through which runs a vein of humour, as in the present case. For the first use see Book VI. 505 B. τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἦδονη δοκεῖ ἐκεῖν ποτὸ ἀγαθὸν, τοῖς δὲ κομψότεροις φόρνησι, ἢ. 'finer natures.' And in Book VII. the study of number as directed to the acquisition of pure knowledge is contrasted with its use in trade (κατηλευέως) as komψόν, 525 D. καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νῦν καὶ ἐννοῶ ῥηθέντος τοῦ περὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς μαθήματος, ὃς κομψὸν ἐστι καὶ πολλαχῇ χρήσιμον ἤμιν πρὸς ὁ Bouλήμεθα, ἢν τοῦ γυναῖκειν ἐνεκά τις αὐτῷ ἐπιτηθεὶς ἄλλα μὴ τοῦ κατηλεύειν. Whilst in the humorous description of the democracy (Book VIII. 558 A), in which even the draught animals are so replete with freedom that they push people out of their way in the streets (563), and condemned criminals are suffered to walk about in public unmolested, the demeanour of the latter is termed κομψή. Τί δὲ, ἢ πράξεις ἔνων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή, 'exquisite' (D. and V.), 'charming' (J.). The word means 'lautus,' or 'comptus,' 'neat,' 'smart,' and suggests the further notion 'with an eye to effect.' From this further notion it results that the word specially suits a sarcastic context; because to challenge admiration is also to challenge criticism. Compare note on πώ το γε' ἐν ποιήσει; and for ἄστειος; Book I. Ch. XX. Here the word gives a humorous, not a sarcastic tone to the passage.
For the first two requisites of the philosophic nature are said, in Book VI, to be memory (μνήμης) and aptitude for gaining knowledge (ἐμνασία). It is thus termed because there is discrimination (διακρίνει) and limitation (ὀριζόμενον), which are characteristic of a mind that gains knowledge, and partakes in an elementary degree of the nature of the philosopher, oί τοῦ αἱ κατὰ ταύτα φωνής ἔχοντος δυναμενον ἐφάπτεσθαι. Book VI. int. For another definition of the philosophic mind see Book V. 475 C. Οὐκοίν καὶ τοῦ φιλόσοφου σφαίρας φίλοσομεν ἐπιθυμητήν εἶναι, οὐ τῆς μὲν, τῆς δ' οὖ, ἀλλὰ πάσης; εἰ ἤπνη. φιλομαθή καὶ φιλόσοφον, as synonymous.

Φιλόσοφος δῆ. It should be noticed that this conclusion has been reached on analogical grounds, as usual: by an appeal to experience of common objects and common events Socrates encourages the listener to agree to his larger propositions. See the remarks upon his method, Introd. p. 30. In Book VI where the philosophic nature is defined, as quoted above, it is also analysed, and like the φιλάς here, the φιλόσοφος is characterised by several different traits; εἰ μή φύσει εἶν μνήμων, ἐμνασία, μεγαλοπρεπής εὑχαρία, φιλός τε καὶ ξυγγενὴς ἀληθείας, δικαιούμενος, ἀνδρέας, σωφροσύνης; 487 A. The difficulty of combining all kinds of bodily and mental excellences is again insisted upon in the same Book: εὐαθέσι καὶ μνήμων καὶ ἄγχυνι καὶ δέξιος καὶ ὅσα ἀλλὰ τούτων ἐπίσταται οὐθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἀμα φύσεις καὶ νεανίκοι τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοῦς οἰον κοσμῶς μετὰ ἤπνοιας καὶ βεβαιοτότος ἐθέλειν ζην, ἀλλ' οἴ τούτοι ἐπὶ δέξιοντας κεραυνοῖς τῇ τόχῳ καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἀπαν αὐτῶν ἐξήκεται. That is, the element of steadiness, which alone can ensure valuable results, is especially hard to find in brilliant natures. Hence the need of education: the mind must be as thoroughly disciplined as the body; οὐκ ἤπτου μανθανοῦντι πονητῶν ἡ γνωμαζομένῳ. And again (Book VII. 536 B) Διομύνθησαι δεί αὐτοις ποὺς τὰ μαθήματα ὑπάρκειν.
καὶ ταχὺς καὶ ἵσχυρός ἦμιν τὴν φύσιν ἐσταῖ ὁ μέλλων καλὸς κἀγαθὸς ἐσεσθαί φύλαξ πόλεως; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Οὕτως μὲν δὴ ἄν οὕτως ὑπάρχουσιν θρέψονται δὲ δὴ ἦμιν οὕτω καὶ παιδευθήσονται τίνα τρόπον; καὶ ἄρα τι προὐργοὺ ἦμιν ἐστὶν αὐτὸ σκοποῦσι πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν, οὔπερ ἕνεκα πάντα σκοποῦμεν, δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ ἀδίκλαν τίνα τρόπον ἐν πόλει γίγνεται; ἵνα μὴ ἐὰν ἴκανὸν λόγον ἢ συχνὸν διεξίωμεν. καὶ ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἠδελφὸς Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ἔγωγε προσδοκῶ προὐργοὺ εἰσὶν εἰς τοῦτο ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν. Μά Δία, ἤν δὲ ἐγὼ, ὃ πρὸς Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἄρα ἀφετέον, οὔδε ἐι μακροτέρα τυγχάνει οὖσα. Οὔ γὰρ οὖν, ἵθι οὖν, ὡσπερ ἐν μῦθῳ μυθολογούντες τε καὶ σχολήν ἄγοντες λόγῳ παιδεύωμεν τοὺς ἄνδρας. 'Αλλὰ χρῆ.

ημίν, Ethic dative, v.s. note p. 165. οὐκ ἄρα ἀφ. οὖδ’ εἰ μακρ. For the sentiment v.s. οὐκ ἄποκνυτέον, Ch. XII. and the passages compared. μακροτέρα, 'rather long.' For this absolute comparative, very frequent both in Greek and Latin, see Euthyphr. init. τὶ νεότερον; Hom. Od. 3, 49—

αλλὰ νεότερὸς ἐστιν, διμηλικὴ δ’ ἐμοὶ αὐτῷ.

Ei infr. 302—

Οἶος γὰρ μετὰ τοῖσι γεραίτερος εὐχόμαι εἶναι.

Cic. Lelius 16, 59. Sæpe enim in quibusdam aut animus abjectior est, aut spes amplificandae fortunæ fractior. Ei infr. 60. Quis etiam si minus felices in deligendo fuissemus, ferendum id potius. Id. Cato Major, init. Et tamen te suspicor iisdem rebus, quibus meipsum, interdum gravius commoveri. See also Virg. Æn. i. 228—

Tristior et lacrimis oculos suffusa nitentes

Allaquitur Venus.

παιδεύωμεν τοὺς ἄνδρας, i.q. 'let us represent them as receiving their education.' For this mode of expression, where a narrator is referred as subject to an action not properly his own, but which he is describing, see above Ch. VI. p. 224, note on ἄγοντες, and κατορύττοσιν ἐν"Αἰδου, p. 223.

αλλὰ χρῆ. For αλλὰ in as sentient replies v.s. p. 107. αλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν.
Education is divided into music and gymnastic; and narration is a part of music, and in narration we must begin with fiction, avoiding however those legends that attribute immorality to the gods.

We here enter upon the first system of education, viz. that destined to train up a class of efficient soldiers whose military ardour is tempered with patriotic tenderness. The education comprises two branches, music, i.e. intellectual labour, and gymnastic, exercise of the body. In another place Socrates explains that it is necessary to employ these two exercises, because if a man give all his time to his body, he becomes vulgar, or incapable of appreciating things intellectual, whilst if he confine himself to mental work he becomes softer than is fit and unnerved in the presence of danger. The account of this first education continues from the present chapter to the end of Book III., after which the question is discussed, how the guardians will manage the city, and justice is discovered. But then the átopola arises, Until kings are philosophers and philosophers kings, the city will never be governed aright; and this results in the question, What is a philosopher? To answer this question a second, esoteric, system of education is required, much more elaborate, and much more searching than that before us, treating of all the sciences as they bear upon each other and upon their source, Real Knowledge, which is to human knowledge as the sun's light to the human eye.

Aristotle recognises the necessity for education, in order to curb individual peculiarities, and to make the welfare of the state an object of serious interest; and thus he agrees with Plato in the principle that the general object of education is to steady the mind. V.s. note on filósofōs δή, p. 264, and the words quoted μετὰ ἠσυχίας καὶ βεβαιότητος ἑθελειν ζῆν. Aristotle's words are, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παιδεύειν καὶ τοὺς παιδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκες, εἰπερ τι διαφέρει, πρὸς τὸ τὴν πόλιν ἐναι σπουδαίαν, καὶ τοὺς παιδάς ἐναι σπουδαίους καὶ τὰς γυναίκας σπουδαίους. Again in the Ethics 10, 9, Aristotle speaks of the necessity, not merely of education in letters for children when growing up, but also of a training in morals as soon as they are capable of understanding, a training which corresponds to the inculcation of principle through μίθοι which Plato here advocates for the very young. Δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἃδος προὐπάρχειν πως οἶκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, οὐτεργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραίνον τὸ ἀλάσχρον. ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετῆν χαλεπῶν μη ὑπὸ τοιοῦτοις.
μὲν ἔπει σώμασι γυμναστική, ἢ δ’ ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική.
'Εστὶ γὰρ. Ἄρον οὖν ὦ μουσικὴ πρότερον ἀρξόμεθα παιδεύοντες ἡ γυμναστική; Πῶς δ’ οὖ; Μουσικῆς δ’ εἰπών τίθης λόγους, ἢ οὖ; 'Εγώγε. Ὁγων δὲ διπτὸν εἴδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς, ψεῦδος δ’ ἔτερον; Ναλ. 377
Παιδευτέον δ’ ἐν ἀμφότεροι, πρότερον δ’ ἐν τοῖς ψευδέσι; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἐφη, πῶς λέγεις. Οὐ μανθάνεις, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν; τούτο δὲ ποι ὡς τὸ ὄλον εἰσείν ψεῦδος, ἐνι δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ. πρότερον δὲ μύθους πρὸς τὰ παιδία ἡ γυμνασίως χρώμεθα. 'Εστι τάυτα. Τούτῳ δὴ ἐλεγον, ὅτι μουσικῆς πρότερον ἀπτέον ἡ γυμναστικῆς.
'Ορθῶς, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν οἰσθ’ ὅτι ἄρχῃ παντός ἐργον Β μέγιστον, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ νέω καὶ ἀπαλῶ οὔφοιν; μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος, ὅν ἄν τις Βούληται ἐνσημήνασθαι ἐκάστῳ. Κομιδὴ

τραφέντα νόμοις...Διὸ νόμοις δεὶ τεταχθαί τὴν τροφὴν (i.e. their nurture) καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα’ οὐκ ἐσταὶ γὰρ λυπηρά συνήθη γενόμενα. Οὐκ ἰκανὸν δ’ ἵσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ὅρθῆς ἀλλ’ ἐπείγει καὶ ἀναδρέωντας δεῖ ἐπιπτωθείναι αὐτὸ καὶ θῆκεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταύτα δοῖμεθα ἄν νόμον, καὶ ἠλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον. And again, a direct reference to this passage, ἦν δεὶ ἰχθῶς πως εὑρίσκει ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὅ Πλάτων φησίν, ὡστε χαριέν καὶ λυπεϊσθαι οἷς δεῖ γὰρ ὧδε ὀφθη παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. Eth. 2, 3, 2.

Μουσικῆς δ’ εἰσιν... ‘and when you speak (of music) you include narration under music?’ Stallb, reads εἰσον from Ast’s emendation.

ὡς τὸ ὄλον εἰσείν, ν. ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. ὡς ἐπὶ πᾶν εἰσείν. Enthydemus 279 E.

οὐκοῦν οἰσθ’ ὅτι ἄρχῃ. See Aristotle Eth. i. vii. 23, where the necessity for strict definition follows upon this principle: σπουδαστέων ὅπως ὧρισθοσιν καλως μεγαλήν γὰρ ἔχουσι βοτὴν πρὸς τὰ ἐπάθημα. Δοκεὶ γὰρ πλείον ἢ ἠμῖν πάντος εἶναι ἢ ἄρχῃ. Cf. Hesiod’s proverb, Opp. et Di. 40, νήπιοι, οὕτω ὑπαστο ὅσοι πλέον ἠμῖν πάντος.

ἐνσημήνασθαι, to stamp, to impress; cf. the words παρά-
σημος, ἐπίσημος. For the met-
phor, cf. Theat. 191 C, Θές δὴ μοι λόγον ἔνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἠμῖν ἑνὸν κηρίων ἐκμαγείον. Cf. also the word πλάττεω below here. And Aristotle speaks again of the importance of train-
ing from the earliest age in Eth. 2, 1, 8, οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ ὄντως ἢ ὄντως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθῆθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολο, μάλλον δὲ τὸ τὰν, see preceding

note.
μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν ῥαδίως οὕτω παρήσησεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων μύθους πλασθέντας ἀκούειν τοὺς παίδας καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐναντίας δόξας ἐκεῖνας, ἃς, ἐπειδὰν τελεωθῶσιν, ἔχειν οἰησόμεθα δεῖν αὐτοὺς; Οὔδ' ὁπωστιοῦν παρήσησεν. Πρῶτον δὴ ἡμῖν, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἐπιστατητέου τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς, καὶ ὃν μὲν ἄν καλὸν ποιῆσωσιν, ἐγκριτέον, ὃν δ' ἂν μὴ, ἀποκριτέον τοὺς δ' ἐγκριθέντας πείσομεν τὰς τροφοὺς τε καὶ μητέρας λέγειν τοῖς παισί καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἦ τὰ σῶματα ταῖς χερσίν, ὅπερ δὲ νῦν λέγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκβλητέον. Ποίους δὴ; ἔφη. Ἐν τοῖς μεῖζοις, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, μύθοις ὁψόμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἑλάττουσ. δεῖ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ αὐτῶν τύπου εἶναι καὶ ταύτων δύνασθαι τοὺς τε μείζους καὶ τοὺς ἑλάττουσ. ἡ οὖν οἶει; Ἐγώγ', ἔφη' ἀλλ' οὖκ ἑννῷ οὐδὲ τοὺς μείζους τίνας λέγεις. Οὐδ' Ἡσίοδός τε, εἶπον, καὶ ὁ Ομηρός ἡμῖν ἐλεγέτην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι

ὡν μὲν ἂν, sc. μύθον.
ἐν τοῖς μεῖζοις, i.e. 'if we settle the claims of the larger tales and compositions we shall thereby settle also the less.'

ταύτων δύνασθαι, 'have the same import.' See Euthydemus, 286 C, τοῦτο γὰρ δύναται ὁ λόγος. Also see Dem. de Cor. το (ed. Arnold), τι δὲ τούτη ἡδύνατο, ὃ ἄδερες 'Αθηναῖοι; ἐγώ δὲδάξω. And in Aristoph. Clouds 674, the Socrate of the play explaining that κάρδοσ is, by virtue of its termination, as much masculine as Κλεανμοσ, uses the same expression: ταύτων δύναται οἱ κάρδοσ Κλεανμοσ.

Ἡσίοδὸς τε καὶ ὁ Ομηρός, v.s. pp. 133, 121, see also Book X. ivit. 607; where the case for and against Homer is thus summed up: Ἀνέγκερεν ὁ Ομηρὸς ποιητικότατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν πραγματικῶν, εἰδέναι δὲ τί ἂν χωρίς μὴν ζῆνον θεῖος καὶ ἐγκεκαίμα τοῖς ἄγαθοις ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν, and compare Xenophanes' words ap. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. i. 289, ix. 193—

Πάντα θεῖος ἀνέθηκαν ὁ Ομηρὸς θ' Ἡσίοδὸς τε ἔσσα παρ' ἀνθρωποσιν οὐείδεο καὶ φῶς ἔστιν.

* * *
ποιηταί. οὕτωι γάρ ποιος καὶ άνθρώπως
ψευδεῖς συντιθέντες ἔλεγον τε καὶ λέγουσιν. Ποίον
δή, δὲ δ' ὦς, καὶ τί αὐτῶν μεμφόμενον λέγεις; "Οπερ,
ην δ' ἐγώ, χρῆ καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα μέμφεσθαι,
ἀλλος τε καὶ εάν τις μη καλῶς ψεύδηται. Τί τοῦτο; Ε
"Οταν εἰκάζῃ τις κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ
ήρωων οἷοι εἴσιν, ὁσπερ γραφεῖς μηδὲν ἐοίκότα
grάφων οἷς ἄν ὀμοῖα βουλήθη γράψαι. Καὶ γάρ,

ὡς πλείστ' ἐφθέγξαντο θεῶν
ἀθειοστὰ ἔργα,
κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ
ἀλλήλους ἀπατεῖειν.

For the connection between the Eleatic Xenophanes and Plato's
philosophy, see infr. Ch. XX. Xenophanes acutely presents
the necessity, and, at the same
time, the absurdity of anthro-

morphism in religion thus—

'Αλλ' εἶτον χεῖρας γ' εἶχον
βοές ἄν λεόντες

η γράφαι χειρέσσι καὶ ἔργα
tελείν ἄπερ ἄνδρες
καὶ κε θεῶν ιδέας ἔγραφον καὶ
σώματ' ἐποίουν
τοιαύτ' οἶον περ κατοι δέμας εἶχον ὀμοῖον,
 ἵπποι μὲν θ' ἱπποίσι, βοές δὲ τε
βουσίν ὀμοῖα
τί αὐτῶν μεμφόμενον λέγεις.

The objection to Homer and to
poets in general, as it has been
noticed above, is that they are
imitators thrice removed from
realities, that, instead of study-
ing arts, they write about arts
of which they practically know
nothing, and that therefore
what they have to say upon
them is worth nothing. See
Book X. 598 E, extr. δει δη
ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερον μιμητάς
τούτοις οὕτωι ἔνυπνοτες ἐξαι-
τήνται καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὅραντες
οὐκ αἰσθάνονται τριττα ἀπέχοντα
tοῦ ὄργου καὶ ἰδία ποιεῖν μὴ
eιδοτι τιν ἄλῃθειαν. φαντάσματα
γάρ ἄλλ' οὐκ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν.

μὴ καλῶς ψεύδηται, 'If any
one of them write debased
fiction.' Ψεῦδος, fiction, is of
the highest value as a moral
instrument. Aristotle considers
poetry to be more philosophic
than history, because it deals in
fiction (οἷα ἂν γένετο) in con-
trast to fact (οἷα ἐγένετο). See
Poet. IX. 1451b, quoted on p. 10.

This καλὸν ψεῦδος is opposed to
the ὡς ἄληθῶς ψεῦδος (infr.
382, A) or 'lie with intent to
deceive,' or 'lie in the soul;'
the object of the καλὸν ψεῦδος
being not to deceive but to
instruct. Hence it is described
also as the 'lie in words' (τὸ γε
ἐν τοῖς λάγοις μήμα), and con-
trasted with the 'lie in the
soul' (τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτήν τὸ ὅμησιν
ψεῦδεσθαι), 382 B. Compare
also the Laws 663 E, where the
legislator, it is suggested, may
invent fictions, to point the
moral for the young. Νομοθε-
τής δὲ οὕτω τι καὶ σιμικρόν ὄφελος,
eἰ καὶ μὴ τούτο ἄν οὕτως ἔχουν,
eἰπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο ἐτόλμησεν ἄν
ἐν' ἀγάθοις ψεῦδεσθαι πρὸς τούς
νέους, ἔστιν ὃ τι τούτων ψεῦδος
λυσιτελέστερον ἄν ἐφεσσατυ ποτε;
ὡσπερ γραφεῖς μηδὲν, κ.τ.λ.
This simile, introduced here
merely as an illustration, is
worked out at length in Book X.
εφη, ορθῶς ἔχει τὰ γε τοιαῦτα μέμφεσθαι. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγομεν καὶ ποῖα; Πρῶτον μὲν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγάλων ψεύδος ὁ εἰπών, οὐ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο, ὡς Οὔρανὸς τε εἰργάσατο ἃ φησὶ δράσαι αὐτὸν 'Ησίόδος, ὃ τε αὖ Κρόνος ὡς
τὸν αὐτὸν πατέρα ἐκτεμεύειν δι᾽ ἑτερα τοιαῦτα, and similarly in Ἀρ. Νυμ. 904—
pons δὴ τὰ δικὰς οὕσης δ ᾽Ζεύς
οὐκ ἀπόλαλεν τὸν πατέρα
αὐτοῦ
dίσας;
For the question of mythology see Introd. p. 24.
ἀφρόνας καὶ νέους, as in the
passage quoted from Book X.
pαίδας τε καὶ ἀφρόνας ἀνθρώπους ἐξαπατῶ ἃν.

μάλιστα μὲν σιγάσθαι, εἰ δὲ...
'to keep silence if possible, and
failing that, &c.' For this expression see Book V. 461 C,
μάλιστα μὲν μηδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέ-
ρειν κύρια, μηδ' γ' ἐν, ἐὰν γένη-
ται, ἐὰν δὲ τι βιάσηται, οὕων
τυθέναι. 473 Β, μάλιστα μὲν
ἐνοί, εἰ δὲ μῆ, δυοῖν. Also Book
VIII. 564 C, μάλιστα μὲν ὡς
μὴ ἐγεννήθησθον, ἀν δὲ ἐγεννήθησθον,
κ.τ.λ. Demosthenes de Cor.
317, μάλιστα μὲν μὴ ἔχειν ταῦτα'
ἐν τῇ φύσει, εἰ δ' ἢ ἄρα ἄναγκη,
κ.τ.λ. Also in poetry, Soph.
Antigone, 327—
'Ἀλλ' εὑρέθηκε μὲν μάλιστ' ὡς
δὲ τοι
ληφθῇ τε καὶ μῆ, κ.τ.λ.
δ' ἀπορρήτων, cf. 460 C, ἐν
ἀπορρήτω τε καὶ ἄδηλος κατα-
κρύψον. 

598 C, sogg. in order to prove the
poet an imitator of an imitator.
The painter, it is there main-
tained, is a deceiver because he
represents not the nature, but
the appearance of objects, οὖν
ὁ ζωγράφος, φαμέν, ζωγραφίςει
ἤμιν σκυτότομοι, τέκτονα, τῶν
ἄλλων δημουργός, περὶ οὐδένς
tούτων ἐπαινῶ τῶν τε νόσων. ἀλλ' ὅμως παίδας τε καὶ ἀφρόνας ἀν-
θρώπους ἐξαπατῶ ἃν. In that
passage it is not false repre-
sentation, as here, that is com-
plained of; but representation,
however accurate, of appear-
ances, is disparaged: in the
present passage, the painter is
considered as drawing upon his
imagination, not even upon
appearances.

ὡς Οὔρανὸς τε εἰργ. Θεογόν. 154 and 179.

...τῶν μὲν (sc. παιδῶν)
ὅτως τις πρῶτα γένοιτο,
πάντας ἀποκρύπτεσθε, καὶ ἐς
φάσις οὐκ ἀνίεσθε
Γαϊῆς ἐν κενθυμάνι, κακῷ δ' ἑτέρπητον ἐργῷ
Οὔρανός.

τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἑργ. καὶ
παθ. See Euthyphr. 5 E, τούτων
(sc. Δία) ὁμολογοῦσι τῶν αὐτοῦ
πάτερα δῆσαι, ὃτι τοὺς ὑφὲς κατε-
πιέων οὐκ ἐν δίκη κακείνων γε ἃβ
The comedy of the Clouds was first acted B.C. 423, and for the second time B.C. 421; hence it is probable, as stated in the Introd. p. 13, that this, among other passages in Plato's works, has direct reference to that comedy which traduces Socrates so cruelly.

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θεόν τε καὶ ήρώων πρὸς συγγενείς τε καὶ οἰκείους αὐτῶν· ἀλλ' εἰ πως μέλλομεν πείσειν, ὡς οὐδεὶς πόστοτε πολιτῆς ἄτερος ἀτέρῳ ἀπῆχθετο ὑπὸ ἔστιν τοῦτο ὁσιον, τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ παιδία εὐθὺς καὶ γέρουσι καὶ γρανίς καὶ πρεσβυτεροὶ γνωμομένοι, καὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς ἐγγὺς τούτων ἀναγκαστέοι λογο-ποιεῖν. Ἡρας δὲ δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ νίεός καὶ Ἡφαίστου πρίσεις ὑπὸ πατρός, ἐκλυόντως τῇ μητρὶ τυπτομένη

ὡς οὐδεὶς πόστοτε πολιτῆς ἄτερος ἔστ. It is with the intention of arriving at this result that Plato proposes and works out his theory in Book V. that, in the model state, the wives and children should be in common to all the citizens. For, according to his scheme, all the younger people will look upon each other as brothers and sisters, and upon all the elders as fathers and mothers, that thus there will be ever present the sense of relationship, to prevent quarrels and injuries, and that the whole state, like one body, will respond either in pain or in pleasure to everything that affects a single individual in it. See 462 D: Καὶ ἢται δὴ ἐγγύσια ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἐχει, οἷον ὅταν ποῦ ἡμῶν δάκτυλος τοῦ πληγῆ, πάσα ἡ κοινωνία ἡ κατὰ τὸ σώμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταιμένη εἰς μιᾶν ξύνταξιν τῆς τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἐν αὐτῇ ἔστενε τε καὶ πάσα ἀμα ἐννηλήγησε μέρους πονησαντος ὅλη, καὶ οὕτω δὴ λέγομεν ὃτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν δάκτυλον ἀλγεί. And for the statement that this result will be arrived at by a community of wives and children, see 464 B: Τοῦ μεγίστον ἀρα ἄγαθον τῇ πόλει αὐτίκα ἡμῖν πέφανται ἡ κείσαντα τοῖς ἐπικούροις τῶν τε παιδῶν καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν.

γέρουσι, sc. μυθολογητέον, to be supplied from the preceding sentence. For the whole of this passage see Euthyphro 6 B: Καὶ πόλεμον ἄρα ἤγει σὺ εἶναι τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς θεῖοι πρὸς ἀλή-
lou, καὶ ἐχθράς γε δεινὰ καὶ μάχας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαύτα πολλὰ οία λέγεται τε ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν γραφόων τά τε ἄλλα ἱερὰ ἡμῖν καταπετοίκι-
tai.

"Ἡρας δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ νίεός, κ.τ.λ. In II. i. 588, Hephaestus recalls to his mother how he was thrown out of heaven by Zeus, when striving to help her, ἀλεξήμεναι μεμαώτα. And for the actual binding of Hera by Zeus, see II. xv. 18—

"Ἡ οὐ μέμην; ὑπὸ τ' ἐκρέμω ὑφθεν, ἐκ δὲ ποδοῖν "Ἀκμοναι ἥσαν δύο, περὶ χρει τ' δὲ δεσμον ἤθηλα Ἱδοςον, ἅρρηκτον. Ast ingeniously clears up the expression here, δεσμ. ὑπὸ νίεός by pointing out that Hephaestus made the chains to confine Hera at Zeus' bidding, although willing himself to connive at her escape.

"Ἡφαίστου πρίσεις. II. i. 590—

"Ἡδη γὰρ με καὶ ἀλλοτ' ἀλεξήμεναι μεμαώτα δίπε, ποδὸς ἑπαγγέλλω, ἀπὸ ψηλοῦ θεσπεσίου. Compare Euthyphro 6 B.
In Book IV. 429 D this metaphor, as we have seen in other cases, is expanded and detailed. The legislator, it is there said, must imbue the defenders of the state with courage, as with a dye that cannot be washed out. Oūkοιν οἶσθα, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὅτι οἱ βαφεῖς, ἐπειδὰν βουληθῶσι βάψαι ἔρια ὅσ’ εἶναι ἄλουγρα, πρῶτον μὲν...Λευκων, ἐπείτη προσ-παρασκενάζουσι οὐκ ὅληγη παρα-σκευή θεραπεύσατε, ὅπως δέεσται ὅτι μᾶλιστα τὸ ἄθος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ βάπτουσι. Καὶ δ’ μὲν ἄν τὸῦτο τῷ τρόπῳ βαφῆ, δευσοποιῶν γίγνεται τὸ βαφὲν, καὶ ἡ πλύσις οὕτ’ ἂνεν ρυμμάτων ὑστε μετὰ ρυμμάτων δύναται αὐτῶν τὸ ἄθος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι· δ’ ἢν μὴ, οἶσθα οἷα δὴ γίγνεται, ἕαν τέ τις ἄλλα χρώματα βάπτῃ ἐὰν τε καὶ ταῦτα μὴ προθεραπεύσας. Οἶδα, ἐφη, ὅτι ἐκπλυντα καὶ γελοία. Τοι-οῦτον τοῖνυν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὑπάλαβε κατὰ δύναμιν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ἡμᾶς, ὅτε ἐξελεγόμεθα τοὺς στρατιῶτας καὶ ἐπαιδεύομεν μοναχικὴ καὶ γυμ-ναστικὴ. Μηδὲν οἶνον ἄλλο μηχανάζει γ ας ἢ ὧς ἡμῖν ὅτι κάλλιστα τοὺς νόμους πειθέντες δέξιωτο ἢσπέρ βαφήν, ἤνα δευσο-ποίος αὐτῶν ἢ δόξα γάλακτο, κ.τ.λ.
CAP. XVIII.

'Εχει γάρ, ἐφη, λόγου. ἀλλ' εἰ τις αὐτά καὶ ταῦτα ἐρωτώθη ἡμᾶς, ταῦτα ἀττα ἐστι καὶ τίνος οἱ μύθοι, τίνας ἂν φαίμεν; καὶ ἐγώ εἰπον 'Ο 'Αδείμαντε, οὐκ 379 ἐσμὲν ποιηταί ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ' οἰκισταί πόλεως. οἰκισταῖς δὲ τοὺς μὲν τύπους προσήκει εἰδέναι, ἐν οἷς δεῖ μυθολογεῖν τοὺς ποιητὰς, παρ' οὗς ἐὰν ποιῶσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρέπτεον, οὐ μὴν αὐτοῖς γε ποιητέον μύθους. Ὀρθῶς, ἐφη· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δὴ τούτο, οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας τίνες ἂν εἴεν; Τοιοίδε ποὺ τίνες, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ· οἴδας τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὅν, ἀεὶ δήπον ἀποδοτέον, εάν τε τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἐπεσι ποιῆ ἐάν τε ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ. Δεὶ γάρ. Οὔκοιν ἀγαθὸς ὃ γε Βθεὸς τῷ ὄντι τε καὶ λεκτεον οὔτως; Τῇ μὴν· Ἀλλὰ

Ch. XVIII.—We are not poets ourselves, but legislators; we proceed therefore only to lay down the lines upon which the poets must compose.

Plato's attitude towards poets in this Book is merely critical; he gives his opinion as to what they should say and what they should not say; and he disparages their general tone. But he reserves for Book X. his complete and most exhaustive indictment against them. He treats them here only as they stand in relation to theology, and as regards the effect of their writings upon the children in the State; v.s. note p. 121.

τύπους, cf. Book III. 403 D: καλὰ ἡ τρισὶν ἔνωντα καὶ ἐν τῷ εἰδει ὁμολογουντα ἐκεῖνοι, τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοντα τύτου. And again in Book VI. 491 D it is used as equivalent to τὸ καθ' ἑλον, the general, as opposed to individual instances: ἐς εἰς γάρ τὸν τύπον ἄν λέγω...Δαβεὶς τοῖνυν ὅλου αὐτοῦ δρᾶς, κ.τ.λ. And similarly to this present use in Book III. 414 Α: ὃς ἐν τῷ ὁμοί δὴ αἱ ἀκριβεσίας.

οἱ τύπ. περὶ θεολογίας. For this question see Introd. pp. 13–15, 24–29. It has been already shown in Book I. Ch. IX. that good men do no harm (θλάπτεων) to any person, (see note p. 137, ἀλλ' ἡ δικαιοσύνη): Οὐκ ἀρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἐργον οὔτε φίλον οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα. And hence it would follow α ἀρτιορ that God does not harm anyone. But Socrates reviews rapidly the steps of the argument which proved in Book I. that it was unnatural for anything good to do anything bad.
μῆν οὖδεν γε τῶν ἀγαθῶν βλαβερον. ἦ γάρ; Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. Ἄρ’ οὖν’ ὁ μὴ βλαβερόν, βλάπτει; Οὔ-δαμῶς. Ὅ δὲ μὴ βλάπτει, κακὸν τι ποιεῖ; Οὔδε τούτο. Ὅ δὲ γε μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ, οὐδ’ ἄν τινος εἰη κακοῦ αἰτίων; Πῶς γάρ; Τί δὲ; ἀφέλμον τὸ ἀγαθὸν; Ναί. Αἰτίων ἁρα εὐπραγίας; Ναί. Οὐκ ἁρα πάντων γε αἰτίων τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἄλλα τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἰτίων, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναιτίων. Παντελῶς γ’, ἐφη. Οὐδ’ ἁρα, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, ο πάντων ἄν εἰη αἰτίων, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἄλλ’ ὄλγον μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰτίων, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναιτίως: πολὺ γάρ ἐλάττω τάγαθα τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἄλλον αἰτιατέου, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλ’ ἀττα δεὶ χειτείν τὰ αἰτία, ἄλλ’ οὐ τὸν θεόν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφη, δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν. Οὐκ

Αἰτίων ἁρα εὐπραγίας. See Hom. Od. xv. 532—
Οὐ τοίς ἄνευ θεοῦ ἐπτατο δέξιος ὄρνις.

τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχ. Xenophon, in the Memorabilia i, 3, 2, bears witness to this belief of Socrates: Καὶ εὐχετο δε πρὸς τούς θεοὺς ἀπλῶς τάγαθα διδόναι, ὡς τοὺς θεοὺς καλλίστ’ εἰδέναι ὅποια ἀγαθά ἐστί. For his belief in God’s direct care of man, see Mem I, 4, 10, seqq.

πολὺ γάρ ἐλάττω τάγαθα. Perhaps the most pessimistic statement that can be found in the Republic. We find a trace of the same feeling in Book IV. 442 A, where the lowest part of man’s nature is said to be the most extensive and exacting: τῶν ἐπισωμητικὸν, ὁ δὴ πλείον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἐστὶ καὶ χρημάτων φίλοι ἀπλησ- τότατον. And see Book VI. 491 A and 495 B, where he complains of the scarcity of natures susceptible of higher training. But these are isolated passages; through the whole of the Republic there breathes a hopeful spirit, if not of consummation, at any rate of amelioration; see Introd. p. 18 seqq., on the question whether Plato thought such a state could be realized, and his favourable opinion of the common mass of mankind, in Book VI. 499 E: Ἄ μακαρίε, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, μὴ πάνε νότω τῶν πολλῶν κατηγόρει, ἄλλοιαν τοι δοξαν ἔχουσιν, κ.τ.λ. See also Ch. IX. note on ὅρνις ἄκοινεοι.

τῶν δὲ κακῶν...οὐ τῶν θεῶν, Hesiod gives utterance to the opposite opinion in Εργ. 47—

Ἅλλα Ζεὺς ἐκρυφε, χολωσ-μενος φρεσὶν ἰδὸν,

ὅτι μὴν ἐξαπάτησε Προμηθεύος ἄγκυλομήτης.

τούνεκ’ ἄρ’ ἀνθρώποισιν ἐμῆ- σατο κήδεα λυγρά.

For Ἅλλ’ οὖ, v.s. p. 173.
In Book X. (see Argument) a choice is allowed to the souls who are going to enter into life, and their career does not depend upon the will of Fate. But, as remarked above, the story of Er is only popular. The gods do not change. Neither does God change. The story of Zeus and his children is popular, and Zevs - Pars ilia Iliados vocatur a veteribus. Pro Græcis.
όπι κακώσαι δώμα παμπήδημ θέλη.

άλλ' ἐάν τις ποιη, ἐν οἷς ταύτα τά ίαμβεία ἐνεστί, τὰ τῆς Νιόβης πάθη ἢ τὰ Πελοπιδών ἢ τὰ Τρωϊκά ἢ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ οὔ θεού ἔργα ἐατέον αὕτα λέγειν, ἢ εἰ θεοῦ, ἐξευρετέον αὕτοις σχεδὸν ὅν νῦν ἡμεῖς λόγον ξητούμεν, καὶ λεκτέον, ὡς ὁ μὲν θεὸς 

pugnant Juno, Minerva, Nepturnus, Vulcanus, Mercurius: 
pro Trojans Venus, Apollo, Diana, Latona, Mars, Scamander. 
Muretus. 
ὡς Αἰσχύλος λέγ. Cf. Ἀσεχ. 
Ag. 1468—
δαϊμον, ὃς ἐμπίτεινις δόμασι καὶ διψύχοις τάνταλδαις.
Et infr. 1481.
ἡ μέγαν οἶκοι τοίς δαϊμονα καὶ βαρυμήνιν ἀινεῖς.
and again, 1532, πίτουντος οἶκου.
And in the Choephore the chorus pray that the house be not entirely ruined, 1. 805.

γέρων φόνος μῆκτ' ἐν δόμῳ τέκου,
τόδε καλῶς κτάμενον, ὃς μέγαν ναῦων στόμιον, εὗ
δόσ ανιδεῖν δόμων ἀνδρός.

λόγον, 'some account,' 'explanation'; v. s. Ch. XVI. ἒπι. ὁ τοῖ δικαίου λόγος, the 'account of justice.'

ὁ δὲ ὄνιναύτο κολ. v. infr.

Book X. 613 Δ, τά δε θεοφιλεῖ τοὺς ὑμολογήσουμεν, ὃς γε ἀπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, πάντα γίγνεσθαι ὃς οἴκον τῇ ἀριστῃ, εἰ μὴ τι ἀναγκαίον αὐτῷ κακὸν ἕκ προτέρας ἀμαρτίας ὑπήρχε; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Oυτως ἄρα ὑποληπτέον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρόν, ἕαν τ' ἐν πενίᾳ γένεται, ἕαν τ' ἐν νόσοις, ὅ τιν ἄλλω τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν, ὃς τοῦτο ταύτα εἰς ἄγαθον τι τελευτήσῃ ἐξοντι καὶ ἀποθανόντι. The Socrates of the Clouds is made to rest his disproval of the existence of Zeus upon the consideration that the thunderbolt often falls not upon the guilty but upon inanimate objects. 11. 398, segg. καὶ τῶς, ὁ ἀνέμος σὺ καὶ κρονίων ὡς καὶ βεκκεσέληνε, ἐπερ βάλλει τοὺς ἐπώρκους, δήτ' οὐχὶ Σίμων ἐνεπηρησεν; Οὔδε Κλαύνυμιν οὐδὲ Θέσον; καὶ τοῖς σφόδρα γ' εἰς ἐπιρροκι. Ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ γε νεὼν βάλλει καὶ Σοῦνιον ἄκρων Ἀθη-νεών Καὶ τὰς δρύς τὰς μεγάλας.
The inconsistency of the belief in the immortality of the soul is shown in the Inconsistency, as the gods can disapprove or be in any divided. In this Book, Thrasymachus is obliged to submit to Socrates' proof, but struggles against agreeing to the several steps of the Argument. In Parmenides I. 335 E, aléxrov, see also Book I. 335 E. Also in Parmenides 127 E. For réf. éxov, see also Book I. Ch. 9, where the ruler is proved to have regard only to the interest of the ruled. In Book III. 413 A, men are said to lose their opinions not intentionally, but by force of enchantment. Opinions not intentionally, but by force or ménicrion, are τοπικά αργοστά τῶν συμβάλλων ψυχών. See Book I. Ch. XIV, where Thrasymachus is proved to have regard only to the interest of the ruled. In Book III. 413 A, men are said to lose their opinions not intentionally, but by force of enchantment. Opinions not intentionally, but by force or ménicrion, are τοπικά αργοστά τῶν συμβάλλων ψυχών. See Book I. Ch. XIV, where Thrasymachus is proved to have regard only to the interest of the ruled. In Book III. 413 A, men are said to lose their opinions not intentionally, but by force of enchantment. Opinions not intentionally, but by force or ménicrion, are τοπικά αργοστά τῶν συμβάλλων ψυχών. See Book I. Ch. XIV, where Thrasymachus is proved to have regard only to the interest of the ruled.
In this assertion of the Unity and simplicity of God, we trace the effect of Eleatic philosophy as interpreted by Xenophanes (c. 650). This philosopher attacked Homer and Hesiod in much the same way as Plato does here. See Diog. Laert. ix. 18, Γέγραψε δὲ καὶ ἐπεσει καὶ ἐλεγείας καὶ ἱάμβους κατ᾽ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Ὀμήρου, ἐπικόπτων αὐτῶν τὰ περὶ θεῶν εἰρήμενα, for which see also Ch. XVII. note on Ἡσίοδος τε καὶ Ὀμ. His words regarding the Unity and nature of God are as follows,

Εἰς θεὸν ἐν τε θεοίσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,
οὐ τι δέμας θυντοίων ὀμοίως οὐδὲ νόμιμα.

This passage supplies us with further evidence of the connection between Xenophanes and Plato mentioned on p. 3. Compare also Ar. Eth. 7, 14. 8, who is speaking of human fondness for change: he there explains it by the fact that human nature is not ἀπλή: but, he adds, God inasmuch as He is perfect is unchangeable, οὐκ ἄει δ' οὐθεν ἥδον το αὐτο δια το μη ἄπλην ἡμῶν εἰναι την φύσιν...Διω δ' Θεός ἄει μιαν κα κατλην χαρις ἡδονην. This Unity of the divine nature is again touched upon in Book X. 397 C, where Socrates is explaining his theory of Ideas or Original Essences (see Argument, p 95). He there supposes that all things upon the earth of the same kind have a single original or prototype in heaven, made or emanating from God, and he implies that it is in accordance with God's single nature that the prototype should be single, ο μὲν δηθεός, εἰτε οὐκ ἐβουλεύομαι, εἰτε τις ἀνάγκη ἐπὶ μή πλέον ἢ μιαν ἐν τη φύσει ἀπεργάσασθαι αὐτὸν κλίνην, οὕτως ἐπαύγηση μιᾶν μόνον αὐτὴν ἐκείνην ὁ ἐστι κλίνη. And ἰνθ. ταῦτα δή εἰδος ὁ θεός (sc. that there must always be one simple original of any number of individual objects), Βουλόμενος εἰναι οὐντος κλίνης ποιητῆς ὁντως ὡσης, ἀλλὰ μή κλίνης τινος μηδὲ κλωπολος τις, μιᾶν φύσει αὐτὴν ἐφοτεν.

οὐκ ἔχω, ἐφη. This challenge on behalf of monotheism comes upon Adeimantus with a startling effect. To a Greek, who saw a divinity in every stream and grove, and even in every tree, the monotheistic conception of God would be at once repugnant and hardly intelligible. Socrates' belief, as far as we can formulate it, beside the limitations in the present book, included the doctrine of το θεόν, or the communication of God's spirit to mankind. See notes, pp. 126, 150. Hence, although no polytheist, he believed in the present and pervading character of the Divine Nature throughout the universe. In advocating monotheism Plato follows strictly upon Xenophanes' belief concerning God, εἰ δ' ἐστιν ὁ θεός ἀπαίτων κράτιστον, ἐνα φύσιν αὐτὸν προσήκειν εἶναι εἰ γὰρ δύο ἢ πλεῖοι εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν ἐτι κράτιστον καὶ βέλτιστον αὐτὸν
νῦν γε οὕτως εἰπεῖν. Τι δὲ τὸδε; οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἰπερ τι ἐξίστατο τῆς αὐτοῦ ἱδέας, ἡ αὐτὸ ὅφ' ἔαυτοῦ Ἐμεθίστασθαί ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου; 'Ανάγκη. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ μὲν ἄλλου τὰ ἄριστα ἔχουτα ἥκιστα ἄλλοιοῦταί τε καὶ κινεῖται; οἶον σῶμα ὑπὸ σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ πῶνων, καὶ πᾶν φυτὸν ὑπὸ εἰλήσεων τε καὶ ἀνε-381 μων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, οὗ τὸ ὑγιέστατον καὶ ἵσχυρότατον ἥκιστα ἄλλοιοῦταί; Πῶς δὲ οὗ; Ψυχήν δὲ οὗ τὴν ἀνδρειοτάτην καὶ φρονιμωτάτην ἥκιστ' ἀν τι ἐξωθεν πάθος ταράξειε τε καὶ ἄλλοιο-σειεν; Ναι. Καὶ μὴν ποὺ καὶ τὰ γε ἔξυθεν πάντα σκεύη τε καὶ οἰκοδομήματα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τὰ εὖ εἰργασμένα καὶ εὖ ἔχουτα ὑπὸ χρόνου τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων ἥκιστα ἄλλοιοῦται. "Ἐστι δὴ 

Βταῦτα. Πάν δὴ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον ἢ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἐλαχίστην μεταβολὴν ὑπ' ἄλλου ἐν-δέχεται. "Εοικεν. 'Αλλὰ μὴν ὁ θεὸς γε καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντη ἄριστα ἔχει. Πῶς δὲ οὗ; Ταῦτῃ μὲν δὴ ἥκιστα ἃν πολλὰς μορφὰς ὅσχοι ὦ θεὸς. "Ἡκίστα δῆτα.

CAP. XX.

'Αλλ' ἄρα αὐτὸς αὐτῶν μεταβάλλοι ἃν καὶ ἄλλοιοῖ; Δῆλου, ἐφ' ὀτι, εἰπερ ἄλλοιοῦταί. Πότερον οὖν ἐπὶ 
pαθημάτων...πάθος, the objective use of these words is curious. As a rule the word πάσχω and its derivatives apply only to the subject, but here we have it, by the use of ὑπὸ, constituted an agent. 
ἐνδέχεται, 'admits of.' This word in Attic writers is generally neuter, and equivalent to 'it is possible.' See 501 C, Book VI. ἀνθρωπεία ἥθη, eis ὅσον εὐδεχέται, theophilia ὑποθείαν, but its use with accusative is not uncommon. 
"Ἡκίστα δῆτα, u.s. not. p. 177. 

Ch. XX.—He cannot change for the better: he would not change for the worse.

ἀλλ' ἄρα, 'but some one will say that' &c. For ἄρα and ἄρα
the superlative is used: Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 46. Εἰ δὲ σοι, ὡς Περίκλεις, τότε συνεγενόμην, ὡς δεινόστατον σαυτῷ ταῦτα ἥσα. χείρω ποιείν. This is in accordance with Xenophanes' teaching of the nature of the gods. See Arist. Rhet. ii. 23: Εἴνοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὅμως ἅσβεβοῦσιν οἱ γενεσίας φάσκοντες τοὺς θεούς τοῖς ἀποδανεῖν λέγουσιν ἅμφοτέρως γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι τοὺς θεούς πατέ. And he also gives the reason for this belief among men—

introducing another's words or opinions see above p. 225, and below here, ὡς ἄρα θεοὶ τινες περιέρχονται. χείρον εἰστ. a mode of expression not at all unusual, see below Book VII. 526. θεοί εἰς γε τὸ δέσπερον αὐτὸ ἁπτών γίγνεσθαι πάντες ἐπιδιδόσαιν. So the superlative is used: Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 46. Εἰ δὲ σοι, ὡς Περίκλεις, τότε συνεγενόμην, ὡς δεινόστατον σαυτῷ ταῦτα ἥσα. χείρω ποιείν. This is in accordance with Xenophanes' teaching of the nature of the gods. See Arist. Rhet. ii. 23: Εἴνοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὅμως ἅσβεβοῦσιν οἱ γενεσίας φάσκοντες τοὺς θεούς τοῖς ἀποδανεῖν λέγουσιν ἅμφοτέρως γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι τοὺς θεούς πατέ. And he also gives the reason for this belief among men—

Το θεοῦ ἄλλα βροτολ δοκεούσι θεοῦς γεγενήθησαι τὴν σφετέρην τα ἀσθηθίαν εἶχεν φανήν τε δέμας τε. And the principle of the immutability of the divine nature is thus expressed by him: Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἐν ἐν, ἐν τοῖς ἀθένις εἶναι. λέγει, οὕτω κινείσθαι οὕτω κινήτων εἶναι. ...οὕτω γὰρ ἐν ἐν τοί ἐπερον οὕτε ἐκείνο εἰς ἀλλο ἐλθεῖν. — Arist. de Xenoph., &c. 3.

And the principle of the immutability of the divine nature is thus expressed by him: Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἐν ἐν, ἐν τοῖς θεοῦς εἶναι. λέγει, οὕτω κινείσθαι οὕτω κινήτων εἶναι. ...οὕτω γὰρ ἐν ἐν τοί ἐπερον οὕτε ἐκείνο εἰς ἀλλο ἐλθεῖν. And the principle of the immutability of the divine nature is thus expressed by him: Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἐν ἐν, ἐν τοῖς θεοῦς εἶναι. λέγει, οὕτω κινείσθαι οὕτω κινήτων εἶναι. ...οὕτω γὰρ ἐν ἐν τοί ἐπερον οὕτε ἐκείνο εἰς ἀλλο ἐλθεῖν. — Arist. de Xenoph., &c. 3.


Πρώτευς, see Euthyphro 15 D: οὐκ ἀφέτεσθαι, εἰ, ὥσπερ ὁ Πρώτευς, πρὶν ἐν Εὐθύ. Euthydemus 288 B: τὸν Πρώτεα
εισαγετω Ηραν ἡλλοιωμένην ὡς ιερειαν ἀγελη-ρουσαν

Ινάχου Ἱργείου πτωματο παισιν βιοδώρῳς.

Ε και ἄλλα τοιαύτα πολλά μη ἦμιν ψευδέσθωσαν
μηδ’ αὖ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναπειθόμεναι αἱ μητέρες τὰ
παιδία ἐκδειματούντων, λέγουσαι τοὺς μύθους κακῶς,
ὡς ἄρα θεοὶ τινες περιέρχονται νύκτωρ πολλοῖς ξένοις
καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἰνδιάλλομενοι, ἵνα μὴ ἄμα μὲν εἰς
θεοὺς βλασφημῶσιν, ἀμα δὲ τοὺς παίδας ἀπεργά-
ζονται δειλοτέρους. Μὴ γὰρ, ἔφη. 'Αλλ’ ἄρα, ἦν δ’
ἔγω, αυτοὶ μὲν οἱ θεοὶ εἰσιν οἰοὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν,
ἡμῖν δὲ ποιοῦσι δοκεῖν σφᾶς παντοδαποὺς φαύνεσθαι,

382 ἑξαπατῶντες καὶ γοητεύοντες; 'Ἰσως, ἔφη. Τί δὲ;
ἡν δ’ ἔγω. ψευδέσθαι θεοὶ ἑθελοὶ ἄν ἢ λόγῳ ἢ ἔργῳ
φάντασμα προτείνων; Οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δ’ ὅσ. Οὐκ οἶσθα,
ἡν δ’ ἔγω, ὅτι τὸ γε ὡς ἄληθώς ψεῦδος, εἰ οἶον τὲ
τοῦτο εἰσεῖν, πάντες θεοὶ τε καὶ ἀνθρωποὶ μισοῦσιν;
Πῶς, ἔφη, λεγεῖς; 'Ὀὕτως, ἦν δ’ ἔγα, ὅτι τῷ κυριο-
τάτῳ ποῦ ἑαυτὸν ψεῦδεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα

ἀνείπεθον τοιν Αἰγύπτιον σοφιστήν
γοητεύοντε ἡμᾶς.

ὡς λεπ. ἁγειρ. Ruhnken points out
that ἁγείρω here is 'mendic-
ando colligere’; he supposes
the poet to be Sophocles, and
the verse to be taken from the
Inachus, a satyric play. Stallb.
thinks with Valcknaar that it
more likely belongs to Euripides
or Αἰσχύλους.

δειλοτέρους. sc. τοῦ δεόντος.
For an absolute comparative τοῦ
μακροτέρα, Ch. XVI. and note.

'Ἰσως. This reply is not to
be wondered at, if we recollect
the character attributed to
Hermes; see the description
of Autolycus in Book I. Ch.
VIII. and note.

τὸ γε ὡς ἄληθῶς ψεῦδος, con-
trasted with the ψεῦδος τὸ ἐν
λόγοις; v.s. μὴ καλὸς ψευδήται,
Ch. XVII. and note. Aristotle
implies the existence of the
'good lie' in Eth. 4, 7, 6: Καθ’
αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος
φαίλον καὶ ψεκτόν, i.e. there
are cases in which it may be
justifiable. And see also Book
V. of the Republic 459 D: πρὸς
tὸ δὲ, ἦν δ’ ἔγω, συχνῷ τῷ
ψεῦδει καὶ ἀπατῇ κυνιδεύειν ἡμῖν
dείξσει χρησάθαι τοὺς ἀρχοντας
ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀρχιμενίων.

τῷ κυριωτάτῳ. See Ar. Eth.
9, 8, 6: χαρίζεται ἑαυτῷ τῷ
κυριωτάτῳ. And in Book x. 7,
8, he speaks of νοῦς as τὸ θεῖον
and κύριον in man: Εἰ δὲ θεῖον
CAP. XXI.

Τὸ μὲν δὴ τῷ ὄντι ψεῦδος οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων μισεῖται. Δοκεῖ μοι. Τί δὲ δῆ;  

ἔπει τὸ γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, sc. ψεῦδος.

ὢστερον γεγονός εἰσιδωλον, an expression which points to the system of Ἰδει or first essences, found in Book VI., see Argument p. 69; all things of the same kind derive what being they have from a common source. And if there be anything derived from them or representing them, it is one step farther removed from the Really Existent. Thus τὸ ἐν λόγοις is merely the shadow of the principle, τὸ ἐν ψυχῇ, and not the substance.

CH. XXI.—God then neither changes nor deceives man: this also must be laid down as a precept for the use of the poets.
πότε καὶ τῷ, see Argument p. 56. And compare Book III. 369 B where, in recapitulation of these remarks, it is stated that falsehood must, like strong medicine, be used sparingly, and only by experts; and that the truth must be jealously guarded: 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀληθείαν γε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιησόντων· εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἑλέγομεν ἄρτι, καί τῷ ὑπὶ θεοῦσαν μὲν ἄχριστον ψευδός, ἀνθρώποις δὲ χρήσιμον ὡς ἐν φαρμάκων εἰδεῖ, δῆλον, ὥστε τὸ τοιοῦτον ἱστρὸς δοτέον, ἰδιώται δὲ οὐχ ἀπτεόν. Therefore the rulers may speak falsely in behalf of the city, but for a citizen to speak falsely to the rulers, is a worse fault than if a patient lied concerning his bodily condition to a doctor, or a sailor about the steering to his captain.

tῶν καὶ. φίλων, sc. πρὸς τούτος τῶν καὶ. φιλ.; or the genitive may be merely described as partitive.

cal ἐν αἷς, κ.τ.λ. 'And in the case of those tales of mythology, which we were speaking of just now, because we cannot be sure of the exact truth in antiquity, we shall try to make fiction profitable by assimilating it as far as possible to truth,' i.e. 'In telling tales about gods and heroes (ψευδός) we shall not lose sight of the principles of rectitude (ἀλήθεια). So in Book III. loc. cit. where Socrates is trying to find a means of preserving the right adjustment of classes in the state, he says: τίς ἂν οὖν ἡμῖν μηχανὴ γένοιτο τῶν ψευδῶν τῶν ἐν δεόντι γιγνομένων;

Γελοίον μὲν ἄν. See Book III. 404 E: γελοίον γὰρ, ἦ δ’ ὅσι, τὸν γε φύλακα φύλακος δείσθαι.

ποιητῆς μὲν ἄρα ψ. The speaker for the moment is regarding the divine nature as comprehending all others, the poet, philosopher, &c.
όνοιαν ἂ μανίαν; Ἄλλον ὀúdeς, ἐφθ, τῶν ἀνοῆτων καὶ μανιομένων θεοφιλῆς. Οὐκ ἁρά ἔστιν οὗ ἕνεκα ἂν θεὸς ψεῦδοιτο. Οὐκ ἔστιν. Πάντη ἁρά ἄψευδεσ τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ θεῖον. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Κομιδὴ ἁρὰ ὁ θεὸς ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἐν τε ἔργῳ, καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθύσταται οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατά, οὔτε κατὰ λόγους οὔτε κατὰ σημεῖων πομπάς, οὐθ' ὑπάρ ὑπερ οὖνᾳ. Οὔτω, ἐφη, ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται σοῦ λέγοντος. Συγχροεῖς ἁρὰ, ἐφη, τούτων δεύτερον τύπου εἶναι, ἐν ὧ δεῖ περὶ θεῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ὁς μήτε αὐτοὺς γνήταις ὄντας τῷ μεταβάλλειν ἐστοιούς μήτε ἥμας ψεῦδος παράγειν ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ἔργῳ; Συγχρωρ. Πολλὰ ἁρὰ Ὁμήρου ἐπαυνοῦντες ἄλλα τούτο ὀὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα, τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπνοῦν πομπὴν ἂλλ' ὀúdeς, κ.τ.λ. Cf. the proverb, 'Quem Deus vult perdere prius dementat.'

Κομιδὴ ἀπλ., ν.ς. Book I. Ch. XXIII., κομιδὴ ὑντες ἄδι-κοι.

'Οθ' ὑπάρ οὖτ' ὑπαρ', 'a sign either when we are awake or when we are asleep.' In the later Books of the Dialogue these two words are again employed together in contrast, but ὑπαρ there means 'a reality'; see Book IX. 576 B: ἔοστι δὲ τού (ὁ κάκιστος) οὖν ὑπαρ δηλ-θομεν, οὐ ἐν ὑπαρ τοιοῦτος ἢ. And in Book V. 476 ζ the two are defined: τὸ ὄνειρωττεν (sc. τὸ ὅνα) ἁρὰ οὐ τὸδε ἐστίν, εάν τε ἐν ὑπνῳ τις ἐάν τ' ἐγγυγηροὶ τὸ ἤμοιον τῷ μὴ ἤμοιον ἂλλ' αὐτὸ ἠγήται εἶναι ὁ ἔωκεν; Τί δὲ τὸ τάναντα τούτων ἡγούμενο τῷ τι αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ δυνάμενος καθοράν καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖνα μετέχουτα ἡγούμενος, ὑπαρ ὣ ὑπαρ αὐτοὶ καὶ σοι ζήν; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφθ, ὑπαρ.

Πολλὰ Ὁμ. ἐπαυν. See Book X. 607 Α, where Socrates allows that Homer is the first among tragic poets, before finally excluding him from his state: Οὐκοῦν, εἰπὼν, ὧ Γλαύκων, ὅταν Ὁμήρου ἐπαινεῖται ἐντύχης, λέ-γουσιν, ὡς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπα-δεικνύον οὕτω ὁ ποιητὴς...φιλεῖν μὲν χρή καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι... καὶ συγχροεῖς "Ομηρον ποιητικῶτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδο-ποιῶν. Whilst in 612 Α, the conclusion is reached by proof that Homer and Hesiod are wrong upon the whole in their views of justice: οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τὰ τὲ ἄλλα ἀπελυνάμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ οὗ τοὺς μισθοὺς οὗδε τὰς δόξας δικαιοσύνης ἐπι-νέγκαμεν, ὥστε Ἡσιοδὸν τοι καὶ Ομηρὸν ὑμεῖς ἔοστε, ἄλλα αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην αὐτῇ ψυχῇ ἄριστον εὐρομέν, καὶ ποιητῶν εἶναι αὐτῇ τὰ δίκαια, εάν τ' ἔχῃ τὸν Γόγγον δικτύλιον, εάν τε μή. τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπν. πομ. For this dream was a deception; see ΙΙ.
B υπὸ Διὸς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι, οὐδὲ Αἰσχύλου, ὡταν φὴ ἡ Θείας τῶν 'Απόλλω ἐν τοῖς αὐτῆς γάμοις ἄδοντα ἐνδατείσθαι τὰς ἔας εὐπαιδίας, νοσουν τ' ἀπείρους καὶ μακραίνως βίους. ἐξυπαντᾶ τ' εἰπὼν θεοφίλεις ἐμᾶς τύχας παϊῶν ἐπευφήμησεν, εὐθύμων ἐμέ. κἀγὼ τὸ Φοῖβον θείου ἄψευδες στόμα ἥλπιξον εἶναι, μαντικὴ βρύου τέχνη. ὁ δ', αὐτὸς ἔμμον, αὐτὸς ἐν θοινη παρών, αὐτὸς τάδ' εἰπὼν, αὐτὸς ἐστίν ὁ κτανῶν τὸν παίδα τὸν ἐμόν.

C ὅταν τις τοιαῦτα λέγῃ περὶ θεῶν, χαλεπανοῦμέν τε καὶ χρόνον ὦ δῶσομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς διδασκάλους ἐάσομεν ἐπὶ παιδεία χρήσθαι τῶν νέων, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἦμιν οἱ φύλακες θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ θείοι γίγνεσθαι, καθ' ὀσον ἀνθρώπω ἐπὶ πλείστον οἴον τε. Παντάπασιν ἐφη, ἐγὼγε τοὺς τύπους τούτους συγχωρῶ καὶ ὡς νόμοις ἀν χρῆμην.

ii. 8: Βάσκ', ιθ', οὐλε ὅνειρε. 
El infra. 35—
ὡς ἡμὰς φωνήσας ἀπεβήσετο, τὸν δ' ἔλειπ' αὐτοῦ τὰ φρονέων ὁμοῦσον ἃ ρ' οὗ τελεέσθαι ἔμελλον, ἕν' γὰρ ὅ γ' αἴρησεν Πρώμου πόλιν ἤματε κείνῳ, νῆπιος, οὐδὲ τὰ ἰδ' ἢ ρα Ζεῦς μὴ δετο ἐργα. ἐνδατείσθαι. Fr. 266. εὐνατ. quod prope significat dividere, nunc per partes celebrare, quo sensu item positum videtur apud Sophoclem, O. T. 205—
Βέλεα θέλομ' ἂν αἰώματ ἐνδατείσθαι.—Stallb.
ἔας ... ἔμᾶς. The passage passes from an indirect to a direct quotation. We should have expected αὐτῆς instead of ἔας, but ἔας is probably metri gratia to preserve the run of the line.

χρόνον ὦ δῶσομεν. A poet who desired to exhibit a play, applied to the ἄρχων βασιλεὺς if the play were to be represented at the Lenea in the month Gamelion, or to the Ἄρχων, if at the Διονυσία ἐν ἀστεί in Elaphbolion. If the play were approved, a chorus and actors were assigned to the poet; whom he trained and supervised for the performance. ei μέλλουσιν ἦμιν, 'if we intend that our protectors,' &c.
## INDEX TO THE NOTES.

### A.—ENGLISH.

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